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This rhetorical analysis of scientific media hoaxes written by prominent 
American literary figures from 1835 to 1880 treats hoaxes as rhetorical 
interventions in the process of scientific truth becoming public truth.  Edgar Allan 
Poe, Richard Adams Locke, Mark Twain, and Dan De Quille all used hoaxes to 
shock their readers into an awareness of the subtle shifting of the basis for 
determining truth in America away from humanistic epistemologies and toward 
scientific ones.  Using contemporary discussions of each hoax preserved in 
archival sources, I reconstruct a set of common expectations that nineteenth 
century readers had about scientific culture and science news.  The interaction and 
competition of these expectations in producing either belief or doubt in the hoaxes 
is modeled using a methodology derived from Optimality Theory.  Redefining 
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hoaxes in this way—as exchanges with readers over scientific issues via news 
media, rather than strictly as texts—enables me to revise traditional assumptions 
about Poe’s and Twain’s use of science and technology in their writings.  The 
concluding chapter explores the functional similarities between hoaxes and 
machines and suggests applications of the methodology developed in this project 
to problems in genre studies, reader-oriented studies of historical American 
literature, and the rhetoric of science.  In an epilogue I analyze the recent Sokal 
hoax as an intervention by a scientist in a perceived movement by cultural studies 
scholars to recapture the right to determine truth for the American public. 
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Chapter One:  Looking for Hoaxes Outside the Physical Text 
In October of 1862, the Territorial Enterprise of Virginia City, Nevada, 
reported the startling discovery of a fully intact fossilized man.  The author and 
city editor of the paper, Mark Twain, carefully reported all the scientific 
particulars of the petrifaction to a readership eager for more of the recent 
revelations of geologic wonders such as ice ages and fossilized mammoths.  
Twain’s story was immediately picked up by Eastern and Western newspapers 
and was perhaps wired as far as London—all in spite of the fact that a careful 
reading of the narrative betrays that the man was fossilized sitting up and 
thumbing his nose at the reader (Clemens “Memoranda” 859). 
Twain was not the only writer to toy with antebellum America’s 
fascination with science.  From the mid-1830s to the 1860s, at least a dozen 
similar hoaxes appeared in penny dailies or literary monthlies.  Edgar Allan Poe 
has at least four media hoaxes on scientific or technological topics to his credit.  
Other contributors include Richard Adams Locke, lateral descendant of John 
Locke and perpetrator of the famous “Moon Hoax” of 1835 that sold a record 
number of copies of the New York Sun; and, Dan De Quille, a coeditor of 
Twain’s on the Enterprise, who authored numerous scientific hoaxes including the 
“Solar Armor” hoax in which an inventor turns up a frozen corpse in the middle 
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of Death Valley because the wet-sponge suit he designed to cool him down 
worked a little too efficiently (Fedler 40). 
This roughly thirty-year heyday of scientific media hoaxing remains an 
unexamined and unexplained phenomenon in the history of American literature 
and popular science.  In this project I will develop a rhetorical theory of these 
hoaxes.  I consider them interactive events, reactions to and perpetuation of a 
particular kairos—an opportunity to speak up—prompted by increasing tensions 
between scientific and artistic cultures in antebellum America.  This new 
rhetorical definition of hoaxing accounts for its rich textuality, as the hoax itself 
lives outside the physical text as a tense relationship between reader reactions, 
media reputation, and authorial intentions.   
Redefining hoaxes rhetorically helps solve two major problems that 
plague traditional generic definitions of them:  overgeneration and 
underspecification.  Those problems will be examined in the first section of this 
chapter.  Next, a brief history of hoaxing in the Anglo-American tradition will 
uncover folk definitions of hoaxes that can serve as a useful foundation for 
redefining them as a rhetorical genre while simultaneously helping to distinguish 
them from the genres they are often confused with—parody, burlesque, and satire, 
mainly.  In the third section of this chapter, I summarize certain cultural dynamics 
in early nineteenth-century America that fostered hoaxing.   
After laying that groundwork, I will detail the contributions that a 
rhetorical analysis of nineteenth-century scientific media hoaxes can make to 
current problems in three fields of textual criticism.  Rhetoricians of scientific 
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genres will find that the hoax’s mimicry of nineteenth-century scientific news 
article yields a much-needed profile of that emergent genre.  For scholars of the 
popularization of science, or ethnoscience (cultural attitudes toward science), the 
hoaxes provide an opportunity to examine a rhetorical strategy of intervention by 
literary intellectuals in the process of scientific truth becoming public truth in 
America; this type of strategy is still effective today as a mode of criticizing the 
gaps in power and values between literary and scientific communities, as was 
made manifestly apparent by the recent Sokal Hoax.  For scholars interested in the 
history of reading scientific literature in America, these hoaxes offer themselves 
for study as a fascinating experiment by literary authors in guessing and re-
presenting readers’ expectations about science and science news.   
Finally and most importantly, this project is a reawakening and reworking 
of a historical tradition—instigated by Mikhail Bakhtin in his criticisms of the 
Russian Formalists and later developed by J.L. Austin and John Searle—that 
combines rhetorical and pragmatic-linguistic methods to examine literature in 
social context.  Hoaxing is a social project that expands beyond the physical text 
to enlist an author’s intentions and readers’ knowledge about genres and scientific 
culture.  Studying it requires a new methodology that can take as its basic unit of 
study a whole cycle of rhetorical interaction among an author, texts, a medium, 
and a reading community, an expansion of focus that David Kaufer and Kathleen 
Carley argue is crucial to understanding how media affects culture over time 
(Kaufer and Carley 2).  This new methodology uses reader-oriented and New 
Historical heuristics along with Optimality Theory—a constraint-satisfaction 
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framework borrowed from linguistics—and will be detailed in the final section of 
this chapter. 
Physical hoaxes—faked fossils and artifacts—proliferated in the period 
under examination here, and along with the media hoaxes, they constitute a text of 
both cooperation with and resistance to the project of “real” science in antebellum 
America.  Hoaxing is unquestionably a major factor in the development of 
American science, along with the gradual expulsion of the “pseudosciences” like 
mesmerism, alchemy, and phrenology from the ranks of the professional sciences.  
This social history of hoaxing is intriguing but is beyond the scope of the present 
study.  Alexander Boese’s book, The Museum of Hoaxes, along with his 
dissertation on antebellum hoaxing (in progress at UCSD), addresses the 
interaction of hoaxing with the scientific community.  James Cook’s new book 
The Arts of Deception connects hoaxing with antebellum fascination with 
authenticity and fraud. These social connections, especially the status of 
antebellum science and pressures of industrialization and immigration on the 
American reading public, enter into this project because they are crucial to 
reconstructing the rhetorical opening that writers like Poe and Twain entered with 
their hoaxes.  However, in order to hold in view and treat with rigor the complex 
of relationships hoaxes construct between authors, media, and readers, I have 
restricted my inquiry to scientific media hoaxes—journalistic accounts of 
scientific discoveries or technologies that seemed factual to many readers but that 
were later revealed to be authorial inventions. 
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1.  PREVIOUS HOAX SCHOLARSHIP 
 The scientific media hoaxes considered in this project have until 
this point remained almost entirely unstudied.  Scholarly work on the genre has 
overall been hampered by a New-Critical fixation with the physical text that is ill-
equipped to cope with the tendency of hoaxes’ generic status to shift and even 
dissolve over time.  These methods produce a theory of hoaxes that ignores their 
reception and thus can neither distinguish hoaxes from related genres nor describe 
the unique relationship a hoax constructs between author, audience, and medium. 
Most treatments of hoaxes in books, articles, or on the internet are 
essentially anecdotal.  One of the most thorough of these is Fred Fedler’s 
historical survey, Media Hoaxes.  In it Fedler provides all the publication facts of 
many of the hoaxes considered in this project along with plot summaries and 
stories of their effects on readers.  However, Fedler offers no analysis of why the 
hoaxes worked or did not, and he chalks up the phenomenon to a lack of objective 
standards on the part of newspaper editors during the mid-nineteenth century. 
Americanists working on Poe and Twain, especially, have had to confront 
these authors’ hoaxing practices at some point, and this literature will be reviewed 
more completely in the chapters on the individual authors.  However, some 
representative examples will serve to indicate that this work has been largely 
author-biographical and New-Critical.  Joan Ross, in her dissertation about 
Twain’s hoaxes, scientific and otherwise, lumps together as “hoaxial” stories as 
different as Twain’s media hoax “The Petrified Man” and his novel A 
Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court.  She assumes rather than defines 
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what she means by “hoaxial,” and her basic claim that Twain used hoaxes to teach 
his readers, and to remind himself, that every social institution was essentially an 
illusion conflicts with her psychological typography of hoaxes according to the 
comforts—authority, security, money—they offer the hoaxer.  A hoax cannot 
both destabilize a person’s reality and offer any kind of stability or comfort. 
  Marie-Louise Nickerson Matthew’s account of Poe’s hoaxing in her 
dissertation suffers from similar difficulties with defining hoaxes and using that 
definition to psychoanalyze the author.  Matthew declares that all of Poe’s works 
are hoaxes, either “external” hoaxes intended to dupe readers and prove Poe’s 
superiority, or “internal” hoaxes Poe wrote to give himself a “provisional” fantasy 
of psychological stability (Matthew 3).  This classification breaks down because 
Matthew does not consider the self-revealing elements of Poe’s hoaxes that were 
designed to construct some of his readers as kindred savants, not dupes, and that 
deconstructed any stability the hoax offered during or immediately after the 
reading experience. 
The most fruitful studies of hoaxes, counterfeits, and fakes have been 
conducted outside of literary and rhetorical studies, in the fields of social history 
and science studies.  In The Counterfeiters Hugh Kenner develops hypotheses 
about how fakes and counterfeits function in society that can be productively 
extended to a study of scientific media hoaxes.  While many of the historical 
counterfeits Kenner studies are not textual, he does consider Swift’s satiric 
practices in A Modest Proposal among other texts.  Kenner argues that the 
principal social benefit of a counterfeit is the hyper-awareness it confers upon its 
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viewers, once they have recognized its artifice, of the “realness” of the object or 
skill the counterfeit is imitating (Kenner 30).  So, Maelzel’s chess-playing 
automaton, once Poe exposed it as a fake, highlighted the inimitable power of the 
human strategic faculty.  This special co-dependence between artifice and 
“reality,” and between belief and doubt, will prove crucial for this study of 
hoaxing, which seeks to locate the effect of a hoax in the reader’s perception of 
reality. 
Why has there been no scholarly treatment to date of these nineteenth-
century scientific media hoaxes by Americanists or rhetoricians?  First, media 
hoaxes in general have suffered from their association with mass culture, which at 
least until the 1960s was considered beneath the dignity of literary study.  
Certainly, communications and journalism departments have been consistently 
concerned with the historical rhetoric of the news, but in these types of analyses, 
of which Fred Fedler’s is a prime example, hoaxes are dismissed as a funny but 
unfortunate epiphenomenon of the “Dark Ages” of the penny press and yellow 
journalism.  More problematic for the study of hoaxing, however, is an active folk 
definition of the practice that contains promising elements but still fools us into 
thinking we know what hoaxing is without having to explain or examine our 
assumptions.  All of the studies reviewed above labor under this folk definition; 
they do not offer working definitions of hoaxing because they assume we all 
know what the newscaster means when she reports on the latest “anthrax hoax,” 
the “Sokal Hoax,” or a “fossil hoax.”  In daily use, the word “hoax” overgenerates 
to describe any situation in which the public initially mistakes an object or 
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communication.  It also connotes a sense that someone has intended this 
misapprehension.  This may be another cause for the critical neglect of hoaxes—
their sticky association with the intentional fallacy.  If people misapprehend a 
message or object, does the originator of the message or object have to have 
intended to fool people for it to be considered a hoax?  The question of 
intentionality will be taken up in the chapters on each author’s hoaxing and will 
be settled as far as possible in the conclusion to the project. 
A rhetorical redefinition of hoaxing, recognizing its expansive social 
textuality, will help clarify the useful aspects of the folk definition of hoaxing 
while constraining it from overgeneration.  The methodology of this project 
outlined at the end of this chapter instantiates these rhetorical goals.  However, to 
avoid the problem of defining hoaxes circularly—as essentially rhetorical simply 
because the methods of this project are rhetorical—I will begin with the folk 
definition of certain famous historical hoaxes.  I will show how that definition and 
some careful attention to the context of the hoaxes can build a negative definition 
of hoaxing by distinguishing a hoax from genres it is often conflated with:  satire, 
burlesque, parody, fraud, tall tale, and in the case of scientific media hoaxes 
specifically, science fiction. 
2.  A BRIEF NATURAL HISTORY OF HOAXING 
The word “hoax” is an industrial-age addition to the English language, 
according to the second edition of the Oxford English Dictionary; it first appeared 
in 1808, just a decade or so before the scientific hoaxes in question began to 
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appear.1  But the roots of the word can be traced back about two hundred years 
earlier to the phrase “hocus pocus,” apocryphally considered a parody of hoc est 
corpus, which a Catholic priest would intone during the Eucharist as the host 
underwent transubstantiation.  Since this project is in large part a definitional 
argument, however, we should not accept this definition implicitly.  In this 
section, I undertake a brief survey of famous rhetorical exchanges that have been 
recorded historically as hoaxes.  By accepting and analyzing this folk 
classification to see how it demarcates hoaxes from closely-related genres, I will 
arrive at the following list of hoax features that must be accounted for by my new 
rhetorical definition.  These features, unique to hoaxing, are as follows: 
• Treatment of particular societal tension(s) 
• Resistance to closure 
• Parasitism on other genres 
• Display of genius of hoaxer 
• Construction of agonistic relationship between author and reader 
• Argumentation at the stasis of existence 
• Effacement of textuality 
                                                 
1 The first hoax mentioned in the OED was the Great Stock Exchange 
Hoax of 1814, where a man dressed as a British soldier landed in Dover and 
traveled to London announcing the defeat of Napoleon.  It took a few days to get 
word that in fact Napoleon had defeated Blucher, and in the meantime, the news 
of “victory” caused a boom in the London stock exchange.  As it turned out, the 
“soldier” was in the employ of two Members of Parliament and a financial 
adviser, who all profited from the spike in stock prices by selling their shares.  
Because of this mercenary angle, the whole matter is more a fraud than a hoax, as 
will be argued shortly, since the revelation of the trick was the last thing the 
perpetrators wanted. 
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• Destabilization of reality 
• Construction of insider/outsider dynamic 
• Division of audience according to differing world-views 
• Dependence on news media 
These features will all emerge during the following historical analysis, 
beginning with the first recorded media hoax, by Jonathan Swift, and the ways in 
which it clarifies the differences between hoaxing and satire. 
2.1 Swift’s hoax and satires 
Alexander Boese’s Museum of Hoaxes provides the most complete 
chronology of Anglo-American hoaxes currently available.  The first published 
hoax on his timeline is a fake almanac by Isaac Bickerstaff in 1709.  Bickerstaff, 
better known to us as Jonathan Swift, predicted the death of famous astrologer 
John Partridge and backed up that hoax with a fake obituary for Partridge printed 
on the day he was supposed to have died.  Swift supposedly concocted his 
almanac to embarrass Partridge publicly, and indeed, Partridge stopped publishing 
his own astrological almanacs for a period of six years after the hoax (Boese 
Predictions).   
Contrasting the Bickerstaff almanac with Swift’s later inventions 
Gulliver’s Travels and A Modest Proposal helps distinguish hoaxes from satire.  
All three works were published widely and anonymously (the first Irish edition of 
A Modest Proposal was signed “Dr. Swift,” but the English editions were not).  
All three were designed to publicly humiliate a person or group of people.  But 
the latter two were satires; they could not have been taken seriously past a few 
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sentences’ reading, the one espousing cannibalism, and the other introducing 
talking horses.  The hoax almanac, on the other hand, was meant to be believed by 
readers and was believed, as Partridge himself reportedly learned after a local 
priest knocked on his door the day of Swift’s phony obituary to consult on funeral 
arrangements (Boese Predictions).  Two groups were meant to be embarrassed by 
the almanac:  Partridge and other astrologers on the one hand, and the gullible 
readers who believed in astrology on the other.  The readers, by believing the 
almanac, became unwitting targets of Swift’s two-pronged attack.   
This central difference between Swift’s satires and his hoax, hinging as it 
does on the role of the reader, points out that distinguishing a hoax from a satire is 
almost impossible at the level of the physical text, because a hoax shares many 
textual characteristics with satire.  Dustin Griffin's Satire:  A Critical 
Reintroduction redefines satire against its traditional classification as a comedic 
genre that offers its readers criticism of elite classes and standard mores, catharsis 
for potentially explosive social tensions, and a satisfying sense of closure.  Griffin 
claims that, in reality, satire is more complicated, deconstructing the “safe” 
critical distance it offers its readers even as it constructs it (35, 38).  Four textual 
hallmarks of satire, according to Griffin’s Post-Structural redefinition, apply to 
hoaxes as well:  controversial topics, resistance to closure, parasitism on other 
genres, and display of genius. 
First, hoaxes and satires are both strategies designed to redress power 
imbalances between conflicting cultural factions (37-38):  conservatism vs. 
liberalism, elite vs. middle class, or in the case of Swift’s hoax, science vs. 
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astrology.  Second, although satires are responses to entrenched cultural programs 
and values, the satire itself is resistance, a guerilla tactic of exposure and 
explosion, not a method of achieving closure.  Closure is superimposed on the 
satire by readers with counter-establishment agendas.  Thus, a satire like A 
Modest Proposal is not really a proposal or solution at all.  Rather, it performs the 
cruelty of the establishment (British landowners in Ireland) without offering any 
strategies for redressing the grievances of the Irish (95); those strategies must be 
brought to the reading experience by Irish reformers and other readers who 
subscribe to anti-establishment ideologies.  Similarly, hoaxes also refuse to tie 
controversial issues up neatly for their readers.  For those readers who “fall for it,” 
the last stroke of a hoax like Swift’s almanac is to embarrass them by revealing 
itself to be a fake.  Once the hoax has thus embarrassed its readers, it is done.  It 
offers no closure, no antidote or resolution to their discomfort.  It does not tell 
them how to stop believing in astrology or what to believe in instead. 
Third, Griffin points out that a satire like Gulliver’s Travels has a parasitic 
relationship with the textual genres it imitates (3), popular travel narratives in this 
instance.2  A satire makes fun of a genre or a person by exaggerating the contours 
of its target’s conventions or character.  The reader of the original genre 
                                                 
2 Most of the media hoaxes in the eighteenth century were fake travel 
narratives, like Defoe’s wildly successful and controversial hoax autobiography 
Robinson Crusoe.  This predilection for travel adventures likely fed the desire of 
readers to consume everything foreign during an era of imperialistic exploration 
and expansion by the English and other Western European nations.  Kaufer and 
Carley have added the suggestion that texts like Crusoe and Gulliver’s Travels fed 
a hunger for escapism created by the oppressive work schedules and landscapes of 
the Industrial Revolution in England (71). 
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recognizes both the correspondences between the target genre and the satire, and 
the departures; the gaps provoke the laughter, a reaction to lack, desire, 
difference.  This same dynamic certainly holds for a hoax like Swift’s almanac, 
which targeted and imitated perhaps the most widely-read genre of the time 
(Boese Predictions; Hall 342).   
Finally, satire is designed to display the genius of the satirist (Griffin  71).  
So is a hoax, which is one reason why revelation is so crucial to the hoax’s effect 
on the reader.  Nothing in Swift’s text revealed it to be a hoax; rumor later outed 
Swift as the author of both the almanac and the obituary.  Undoubtedly, the 
reputation as a wit that this hoax and his other satires built for Swift must have 
motivated him powerfully, for he endured censure and even imprisonment for his 
indirect criticisms.  However, what is interesting for this project is the fact that a 
huge part of the action of Swift’s hoax—the revelation—occurred outside the text, 
which is where we must look in order to distinguish hoaxes from satires. 
To tease apart the rhetorical effects of these two genres, it will be helpful 
to apply the approach of Kaufer and Carley and consider not just the texts of 
satires and hoaxes, but their status as events that instantiate communicative 
communities—communities comprised of an author, readers, a medium, a 
topic/issue, and groups indirectly influenced by the communicative event.  From 
this perspective important disjunctions between satire and hoaxing appear.  Most 
importantly, a hoax is distinguished from a satire by its singling out its readers for 
criticism—not just Parliament or Irish landholders or an astrologer.  Unlike a 
satire, which constructs author and audience as united in an act of indirect social 
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criticism, a hoax constructs an agonistic relationship between readership and 
author.  The whole point of a hoax, in revealing its artifice, is to embarrass its 
audience into admitting the inconsistency or poor foundation of their assumptions 
about what holds true in the world— much like the crux of instructive 
embarrassment or elenchus that was the goal of Socrates’s dialectic method.3  
Hoaxes can of course have educative results, but their refusal to offer their 
embarrassed readers closure by telling them what they can do to alleviate their 
embarrassment limits further comparison with Socrates’s method. 
A second distinction between a satire and a hoax is that they are 
arguments at different stases.  Stasis theory is a Classical system for structuring 
forensic (courtroom) arguments, adapted by Jeanne Fahnestock and Marie Secor 
to the analysis of scientific, civic, and literary discourse.  The Ancient Roman 
legal system recognized levels or stases of inquiry into a case that are reminiscent 
of the “Who, what, when, where, why, how” guidelines of journalistic 
presentation.  “What happened, if anything?” provokes argument at the stasis of 
existence.  “What sort of thing was this happening?” takes the argument to the 
stasis of definition.  “What are the causes of this happening?” addresses the stasis 
of cause.  “Was this a worthy or an unworthy action?” promotes the argument to 
the stasis of evaluation.  And “What should be done about this situation?” brings 
the argument finally to the stasis of action (Fahnestock "Stases" 428-429).  A 
purely text-based, arhetorical view of satires and hoaxes might rank them both as 
evaluative arguments.  But only a satire is principally an evaluative argument, 
                                                 
3 See Chapter Four for a fuller exploration of the Socratic dialectic in 
Twain’s hoaxing practices. 
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designed to call into discussion the goodness or badness of a person, style, genre, 
or policy; a hoax, on the other hand, is an argument at the stasis of existence, 
playing on the question of whether some happening—or, actually, a reliable 
witness to that happening—holds true in the world inhabited by the hoax’s 
readers.  In other words, what Swift’s readers were worried about initially was the 
question of John Partridge’s mortality, not his astrological methodology.   
Certainly, after Swift’s reader was embarrassed for falling for the trick, a 
sort of evaluation could be inferred from that embarrassment:  “Believing 
something just because it claims to be astrology is stupid.”  But that is an indirect 
rhetorical move of the hoax; the direct move is always to call reality and its 
construction into question.  By contrast, “satire proper,” according to Griffin, 
“rarely offers itself as ‘objective’ or documentary...Alerted by its generic signals, 
we are not likely to mistake a satire for fact, not likely to overlook its avowedly 
‘rhetorical’ nature”(132).  And indeed, Swift’s satire A Modest Proposal alerts its 
readers early on that it is not to be taken seriously: 
 I shall now therefore humbly propose my own thoughts, which I 
hope will not be liable to the least objection.   
 I have been assured by a very knowing American of my 
acquaintance in London, that a young healthy child well nursed is at a year 
old a most delicious, nourishing, and wholesome food, whether stewed, 
roasted, baked, or boiled; and I make no doubt that it will equally serve in 
a fricassee or a ragout.  
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The awful shock of Swift’s cannibalistic proposal steers its reader away 
from taking it seriously; instead, the reader makes the brunt of her angry revulsion 
the “cannibalistic” behavior of the Irish landlords.  A hoax like Swift’s almanac 
works very differently.  It crucially counts on at least a large percentage of its 
readership indeed “overlook[ing] its avowedly ‘rhetorical’ nature” and taking it 
seriously as the true report of Partridge’s demise (Griffin 132); if they do not, they 
do not put stock in astrology and thereby prove immune to Swift’s attack later 
when his astrology is revealed to be bogus.  The locus of the effect of a hoax is 
always in the reader, not in the physical text.  A reader who believes a hoax like 
Swift’s almanac, or Locke’s reports of moon bison, actually inhabits a different 
world—constructed by her new beliefs about what is possible in that world—from 
the world of a reader who “sees through” the hoax and reads it from a skeptic’s 
perspective.  Hoaxes build different epistemological worlds for different readers.  
A New-Critical approach to classifying hoaxes according to their textual features 
cannot account for this fact.  The whole raison d’etre of the hoax is to embarrass 
its readership for their misapprehension of the “real” world. 
2.2 Parody 
Eighteenth-century Enlightenment media were also fertile ground for 
parodies, like Pope’s Rape of the Lock.  Is a hoax just another form of parody, 
since, as pointed out above, a hoax must mimic whatever text it purports to be a 
true example of—whether a travel narrative, almanac, or science report? 
I will argue that these genres also differ, this time on grounds of mimesis.  
A hoax destabilizes reality for readers, calls into question the ways in which they 
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verify that the world they create for themselves through their beliefs is the “real” 
one.  Therefore, anything in a hoax’s style that calls attention to its textuality—
like hyperbole or punning, for example—is at least an initial hindrance to its 
rhetorical purpose of messing with readers’ realities.  Attention-getting textuality, 
on the other hand, is the hallmark of parody and burlesque.  For these genres to 
achieve their critical effects, the reader needs to recognize them as texts 
mimicking other texts—either a whole genre of writing or a particular author's 
style.  Pope’s Rape of the Lock was only funny to readers already fed up to the 
gills with the bad epic poetry written in the previous century: they were familiar 
with the various rhetorical features Pope employed to puff up an inconsequential 
topic (the snipping of a lock of hair), such as the Invocation to the Muse and deus 
ex machina.  Pope’s exaggerated mimicry of these features constituted the bite of 
his poem (“Alexander”).   Edgar Allan Poe's burlesques a century later, such as 
“How to Write a Blackwood Article,” “A Predicament,” or “Loss of Breath,” 
similarly focus reader attention on the hallmarks of the gothic “Blackwood” 
fiction.  Consider the opening sentences of Poe’s burlesque “A Predicament”: 
 It was a quiet and still afternoon when I strolled forth in the goodly 
city of Edina.  The confusion and bustle in the streets were terrible.  Men 
were talking.  Women were screaming.  Children were choking.  Pigs 
were whistling.  Carts they rattled.  Bulls they bellowed.  Cows they 
lowed.  Horses they neighed.  Cats they caterwauled.  Dogs they danced.  
Danced!  Could it then be possible? Danced!  Alas, thought I, my dancing 
days are over!  Thus it is in the mind of genius and imaginative 
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contemplation, especially of a genius doomed to the everlasting, an 
eternal, and continual, and, as one might say, the—continued—yes, the 
continued and continuous, bitter, harassing, disturbing, and if I may be 
allowed the expression, the very disturbing influence of the serene, and 
god-like, and heavenly, and exalting, and elevated, and purifying effect of 
what may be rightly termed the most enviable, the most truly enviable—
nay! the most benignly beautiful, the most deliciously ethereal, and as it 
were, the most pretty (if I may use so bold an expression) thing (pardon 
me, gentle reader!) in the world—but I am always led away by my 
feelings. (“A Predicament,” 328) 
Compare this hyperbolic catalogue of tropes typical of the sensational 
fiction Poe himself wrote for Blackwood’s Edinburgh Review to the opening of 
his self-described media hoax “Hans Phaall”: 
By late accounts from Rotterdam, that city seems to be in a high 
state of philosophical excitement.  Indeed, phenomena have there occurred 
of a nature so completely unexpected—so entirely novel—so utterly at 
variance with preconceived opinions—as to leave no doubt on my mind 
that long ere this all Europe is in an uproar, all physics in a ferment, all 
reason and astronomy together by the ears.  (“Hans Phaall,” 512-518) 
Certainly both the burlesque and the hoax open with an excited and exaggerated 
tone.  But the burlesque draws attention to its artifice immediately with its 
ludicrously repetitive hyperbole.  “Hans Phaall,” on the other hand, even though it 
is far and away the coyest of Poe’s hoaxes, does attempt to salvage its guise as a 
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news story with impersonal third person narration, science journalism jargon like 
“by late accounts” and “phenomena,” and an implicit argument that the story is 
true, as it will soon have “all Europe…in an uproar.”  
It is this argument for the truthfulness of the material presented that marks 
a primary difference between hoaxes and parodies/burlesques.  The focus on 
textuality and/or style in burlesque and parody serves to shift the reader’s 
attention away from the truth-status of the events reported in the story; for 
example, believing there actually was a drowning baby, a heroic diver, or a 
tortuous affair is irrelevant to appreciating Poe’s “The Assignation.”  The story is 
parodying the Byronic pose and Byron himself (Benton 193).  By contrast, what 
is at stake in a hoax like "Hans Phaall" or Swift’s almanac, what is salient to the 
audience and what they must decide upon, is not primarily who is being pilloried 
in the story, but whether the events portrayed in the story really happened or not.  
So what comparison with parody and burlesque reveals about the hoax is that a 
hoax resists textual definition by effacing (at least initially) its own textuality and 
authorship. 
2.3 Nineteenth-century fraud, tall tales, and science fiction in America 
The differences in media hoaxing in the hundred years between Swift’s 
and Defoe’s hoaxes and the scientific hoaxes that catalyzed this project are 
striking.  Not only are the eighteenth century hoaxes few and far between, but 
they are also published in pamphlet form and reflect the concerns of the English at 
the time with travel and foreign relations.  Hoaxes in nineteenth-century 
American news media, on the other hand, reflect the concerns of a new republic 
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that is finally getting up a good head of steam, literally as well as figuratively; 
thus, industry and technology, politics, and the scientific wonders being 
discovered on a daily basis on the new continent all loom large in hoaxes of this 
era.  Antebellum hoaxes, in further contrast to Enlightenment media hoaxes, also 
had at their disposal well-developed print media, including the important advents 
of the literary monthly and the penny daily.  These advances partially account for 
the proliferation of hoaxing in the decades before the Civil War, as will be 
discussed shortly.  But before we turn to the cultural kairos that fostered the 
explosion of antebellum hoaxes, it pays to distinguish hoaxing from a final crop 
of similar genres that sprang up at this time in response to similar stimuli:  the 
fraud, the tall tale, and science fiction. 
Warwick Wadlington in The Confidence Game in American Literature 
pinpoints the mid-nineteenth-century as the heyday of the con man in America.  
Certainly some of the same dynamics that favored hoaxing favored fraud:  a 
population boom that forced Americans to start doing business with strangers, 
whether they liked it or not; a westward-racing frontier that exposed new jaw-
dropping astonishments every day and that law enforcement could scarcely keep 
up with; and, competition for resources among immigrant groups and socio-
economic classes.  Why are the frauds these con men (and women) perpetrated 
not hoaxes, then, if they are responses to similar tensions and they both involve 
the duping of large numbers of people?  Steven Mailloux, during his analysis of 
the trope of conning in Huckleberry Finn, explains exactly how he believes a 
fraud goes beyond a hoax: 
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  For a con to work, the mark must be convinced by the con man's 
visual and verbal rhetoric.  Actual truth becomes irrelevant; what counts is 
successful persuasion.  But the confidence man is not interested in simply 
performing tricks for the fun of it.  He plays his game for a reason, seeking 
to turn rhetorical exchanges into economic ones, to transform impassioned 
rhetoric into cold cash.  The confidence man thus attempts not only to 
convince, to affect belief, but also to modify actions for his own benefit. 
(Mailloux  62) 
These mercenary concerns of fraud are probably the easiest fracture to 
identify between hoax and fraud.  Hoaxers are after their readers’ assumptions; 
frauds are after their cash.  Certainly, hoaxers are interested in a pay-off, too, in 
the subscription rates that come with publicity and notoriety.  But hoaxers must 
reveal their hoaxes to embarrass their readers.  Frauds avoid revelation and hope 
that the assumptions you made about reality that encouraged you to give them 
money will remain in place so they can do it again.   
A rebuttal to this argument about hoax and fraud might bring up the first 
hoax mentioned in the OED.  The Great Stock Exchange Hoax of 1814, while not 
a media hoax, was all about money.  A man dressed as a British soldier landed in 
Dover and traveled to London announcing the defeat of Napoleon.  It took a few 
days to get word that in fact Napoleon had defeated Blucher, and in the meantime, 
the news of “victory” caused a boom in the London stock exchange.  As it turned 
out, the “soldier” was in the employ of two MPs and a financial adviser, who all 
profited from the spike in stock prices by selling their shares.   
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The revelation of the trick was the last thing its perpetrators wanted, and 
so it seems this was a clear-cut case of fraud, rather than hoax, but the fact 
remains that contemporary commentary labeled it a hoax.  What is to be done 
with this historical assessment, then?  If we declare these contemporaries 
inadequate rhetoricians, and relabel the Great Stock Exchange Hoax a fraud 
instead, we risk stepping off the folk foundations of this definitional project and 
rendering it circular—defining a hoax as whatever we wish it to be to suit our 
purposes regardless of the historical data.  In fact, the historical judgment reminds 
us that money and belief are not always segregated commodities.  The media 
hoaxes examined in this project were also about money as their authors made a 
living selling them to newspapers and magazines.  And the most famous 
American hoaxer of all, P.T. Barnum, made piles of money by making people 
want to see for themselves if the Feejee Mermaid were the “real thing” or not.   
The best solution to this historical dilemma is to acknowledge two 
important differences between the goal of my project and the goals and judgments 
of the 1814 British media.  First, my goal is to define a rhetorical genre, while the 
purpose of the 1814 reporters was to pass judgment on a public crisis.  Beginning 
with the sense of shock and reality-inversion apparent in commentary about the 
Great Stock Exchange Hoax, I am continuing on to refine that sense into a model 
of how a hoax works rhetorically.  That very development may be have been 
mirrored by the ontology of hoaxing and fraud in the nineteenth century, thus 
highlighting a second difference between the Great Stock Exchange Hoax and our 
mid-nineteenth-century scientific media hoaxes.  The two phenomena are 
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substantially separated from each other by time, space, economy, and medium.  It 
is probable that as hoaxing proliferated after the 1830s in American newspapers, 
especially, and as both British and American economies expanded to the point 
where people were forced to trust their money to strangers in shops and banks, 
hoaxing and fraud became more distinct from each other as people accumulated 
experience with both forms of deception.  After all, these two different labels 
persist in the language today for a reason.  In the end, the best litmus test for 
distinguishing hoaxing as a rhetorical genre from fraud is the presence of an 
indirect message.  All of the media hoaxes in this project mounted an indirect 
criticism of the way the American public was assimilating scientific knowledge.  
The Great Stock Exchange Hoax was not designed to send a message, but to make 
a quick fortune for its perpetrators. 
The boundaries between hoaxes and the tall tales popular on the mid-
nineteenth century frontier are even trickier to nail down than the boundaries 
between hoaxes and fraud, if that is possible.  Tall tales are the oral forerunners of 
hoaxes.  This inheritance will be examined in greater depth in Chapters Three and 
Four on the Western hoaxers, but for now we can note that both tall tales and 
hoaxes play on the existence or witness of a remarkable phenomenon and that 
audience judgments about the verity of this phenomenon can serve to separate 
knowledgeable insiders in a community from impressionable outsiders.  This 
dynamic holds when tall tales are told by a conspiratorial group of locals to a 
tourist in order to demonstrate his/her outsider status, as in Chapter 34 of Mark 
Twain’s Roughing It, where frontiersmen fool a “city-slicker” lawyer into arguing 
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a fake property-rights case about a landslide that moved one ranch on top of 
another.   
A crucial distinction between tall tales and hoaxes lies once again outside 
the physical text in the medium of transmission.  Tall tales are an oral genre, 
whereas hoaxes rely on the relative distance and anonymity of print to fool their 
readers.  Also, fooling people is a relatively uncommon function of the 
prototypical tall tale.  Ormond Seavey in his analysis of Richard Adams Locke’s 
“Moon Hoax” says that usually "both the deadpan teller of the [tall] tale and his 
impassive listener [are] conspirators against reality" (Locke Moon Hoax xxiii).  
The “conspiracy” aspect of this description of the tall tale implies it is a joint 
activity between teller and hearer designed to entertain and distract both of them 
from daily worries.  Whether or not the events of the tall tale actually happened is 
beside the point in an archetypical tall tale like the “Pecos Bill” tall tales popular 
in the later nineteenth century where Bill breaks tornados like bucking broncs.  A 
comparison of one of Mark Twain’s tall tales with one of his hoaxes illustrates the 
differing emphasis on truth-value.  The authenticity of the talkative old-timer and 
the lead-burping frog in “The Celebrated Jumping Frog of Calaveras County” is 
not what is remarkable about the story; the humor of the situation is.  On the other 
hand, the central claim of Twain’s news hoax “The Petrified Man,” that a human 
being was found petrified outside Virginia City, is a scientific claim whose truth-
value must be assayed.  Twain also claims to have had in mind with “The 
Petrified Man” the very “unconspiratorial” aims of humiliating the local medical 
examiner and shaming his readers, to boot, for their naïve fascination with all 
 24 
things fossilized (Clemens "Memoranda" 859).  This is not a conspiratorial group 
of insiders putting on an outsider but rather a single journalist multiplying a 
practical joke through the mechanics of print into a hoax that targets his whole 
community.  These comparisons reveal that while a hoax and a tall tale both call 
reality and its construction into question, the tall tale is an oral genre emphasizing 
conspiracy while a hoax operates at the expense of its readership. 
Finally, a hoax is not science fiction.  The plausibility of this distinction 
may seem odd at first glance, since the media hoaxes under consideration take 
scientific and technological topics at the very moment in the history of American 
literature when the first science fiction stories were being developed.  Edgar Allan 
Poe, in fact, is still considered a pioneer of science fiction as well as a hoaxer 
(Franklin Future 93, 99).  Science fiction, like the scientific media hoax, attests to 
the ripple effect in literary communities of the increasing social power of science 
in antebellum America.  The function of science fiction is to dramatize both the 
best and worst case scenarios of allowing science to dictate social policy.  
Because of this function, science fiction critic Bruce Franklin claims that the 
genre helps popularize scientific ideas, i.e. inculcate them as moral and social 
values in lay culture (Future 96).  However, since science fiction by definition 
does not lay claim to being a true witness of the present or future state of science, 
it differs significantly from hoaxes, which do initially claim to be reports of the 
real state of affairs in the world.  This difference is nearly invisible in the physical 
text, as a comparison between the language of Poe’s science hoaxes with the 
language of science fiction stories written by his near-contemporary, Fitz-James 
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O’Brien, will reveal in Chapter Two.  Poe and O’Brien wrote stories on the same 
topics; however, Poe’s were published in news media, while O’Brien’s are 
published in literary magazines, and so O’Brien’s stories never created a public 
stir over their truth-value.  This powerful effect of different expectations about 
different types of media will help drive our analysis of a hoax’s changing 
interaction with its readership over time and space in the following chapters. 
3. KAIROS 
As is observable from the history of hoaxing above, the hoax is a 
relatively recent rhetorical innovation, dating from the eighteenth century.  The 
hoax, then, is an industrial genre, and this label is more than a matter of temporal 
coincidence.  To achieve its effect on readers, American scientific media hoaxing 
had to wait on certain structures of material and social culture that finally snapped 
into alignment in the 1830s.  Hoaxes could only occur in the kairos, or rhetorical 
opportunity, created when writers felt the need to interfere in the process of 
scientific truth becoming public truth in America.  Principal among these 
structural elements that opened up the kairos were these two tensions, both 
intensified by the American Industrial Revolution:  the social tension between the 
cultures of science and letters played out in the media; and, the tension between 
popular and specialized sectors of the American reading public. 
3.1 Science and art 
Poe, Richard Adams Locke, and the other media hoaxers at the heart of 
this project represent the mere crest of a wave of scientific hoaxes inundating 
nineteenth-century America—such as Maelzel’s chess playing automaton, the 
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Kinderhook Plates (mimicking Joseph Smith’s golden scriptures), and P.T. 
Barnum’s myriad artifactual hoaxes including the Feejee Mermaid.  All these 
hoaxes reflected the intense and very public activity of science and technology in 
American culture.  The Industrial Revolution in Jacksonian America both fed (and 
was fed by) a rapid expansion in “pure” and applied science, especially in the 
engineering fields and in the natural sciences of botany and geology.  The natural 
wonders of the American continent, continually being brought before the public 
eye by expeditions like the United States Exploring Expedition in 1838, provided 
a seemingly limitless body of data for measurement, cataloguing, classification, 
and publication.  In addition, publicly visible and useful technological innovations 
in the first third of the nineteenth century, like the railroad, street-paving, and gas 
lighting, created a clamor for more research and development of labor-saving 
inventions.  The “embarrassment of riches” of natural specimens and data—
coupled with incessant nagging from citizens, business, and the government to 
make scientific research pay off for the public—placed a huge burden on 
American scientists.  Scientists, at the beginning of the century, were either 
amateur landowners and clergy who had time to dabble in whatever scientific 
fields suited their fancy or scientists in the employ of universities like Harvard or 
Yale, whose time was divided between teaching natural philosophy and general 
science and keeping up with their personal researches on the side.  The pressure 
of the data and the public eventually became too much for scientists, and so they 
began in the 1820s to specialize and professionalize in order to organize the 
workload facing American science.  The professionalization of American science 
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also had a political agenda—to mount a patriotic, Jacksonian effort to catch up to 
the older and better-developed European sciences (Bruce  25-27).  Gradually, a 
professional American culture of “science” coalesced—actually a conglomeration 
of specialized societies in biology, geology, physics, chemistry, botany, and even 
phrenology and “magnetism” (mesmerism)—whose workings removed serious 
scientific activity from the lay public arena.  Dabblers and amateurs dropped out, 
unable to meet the expectations of the new scientific societies.  These societies 
began to publish specialized journals for circulation among their membership.  
Only a few “general” science journals remained to communicate the real business 
of science to the lay reader, signal among them Yale scientist Benjamin 
Silliman’s American Journal of Science.  But these journals, too, often employed 
jargon and assumed a level of education not universally found in the lay 
readership.     
At the same time this withdrawal was going on in scientific culture, a 
similar mechanism was at work in the culture of American literature.  Increased 
efficiency of both human and machine labor in America created a publishing 
boom in the 1820s and 1830s as printing suddenly became faster and cheaper.  
The Koenig steam press, invented in 1823, probably represents the most 
significant advance in this department, along with the Fourdrinier process of 
paper making, developed in 1799, and the cylinder press, which the London 
Times began using to increase their production in 1814.  All these innovations had 
a striking effect on American publishing.  In 1825, about 100 magazines were 
published nationwide.  In the next 25 years, that number would increase 600% 
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(Mott Magazines:  1741-1850  342).  Book publishing, too, went through a 
growth spurt, especially toward the middle of the century, according to Frank 
Luther Mott’s account in A History of American Magazines:  1850-1865.  In the 
years between 1850 and 1862, the number of books printed in the United States 
increased by 400% (Mott Magazines:  1850-1865  157).   
This, especially the magazine boom, was the first major surge in truly 
“American” texts, not just American reprints of European texts.  Universities and 
magazine publishers in particular, began to see a need for a critical apparatus and 
community to organize the barrage of texts and cull a “quality” American 
literature from it.  Accordingly, a series of university-funded literary magazines 
such as the Putnam Monthly and the Atlantic Monthly started to coalesce into a 
literary community that was unabashedly Brahministic in its membership 
requirements and in the tone of its rhetoric for outsiders (Mott  Magazines:  1850-
1865  498).  Edgar Allan Poe was actually close to the vanguard in this tradition.  
He abhorred “puffery,” the jingoistic tendency he noticed among literary “critics” 
in the 1830s to claim that anything written by an American author was good 
simply by virtue of its provenance (Mott  Magazines:  1741-1850  405).  As editor 
of journals such as the Broadway Journal and the Southern Literary Messenger, 
Poe became famous for “broad-axe” criticism—reviews that mercilessly 
catalogued the flaws of American books and called for standards of criticism that 
would distinguish a genre of American letters from the “rabble” (Mabbott 33).   In 
this way, the publishing industry in America, the writers it paid (off and on and 
poorly), and the magazine editors who relied on this industry for content to fill 
 29 
their pages—these factions began to form their own community just as 
specialized and perhaps even more openly anti-populist than the professional 
scientific communities. 
And then the trouble started.  As a narrative convenience, we may date it 
from the publication of Charles Lyell’s Principles of Geology in 1830-1833 and 
his 1841 lecture tour in the United States (Mott Magazines:  1741-1850  446.).  
Lyell’s Principles suggested a new chronology for geologic history, argued 
against catastrophic events like Noah’s Flood as major geologic processes, and 
argued for Hutton’s view that the earth was much older than traditional estimates 
based on genealogical calculations from the Bible.  Lyell created an uproar, not 
just between clergy and scientists, but between and within scientific and literary 
communities; for, to characterize the Principles controversy as a mere matter of 
science versus religion is to overlook the foundation of American public thought 
in the textual authorities of the Bible and the Word of preachers, writers, 
politicians, and philosophers.  Lyell essentially suggested that Truth was not to be 
sought in the Word, but in the World, through the seemingly anti-textual activities 
of observation and calculation. 
Men and women of letters reacted strongly but variously to this basic 
claim.  Some, including notably Melville and Hawthorne, saw little less than the 
death of the human soul in scientists’ methods.  Others, like Emerson, 
transformed an initial resistance to scientific methodology into a nearly rapturous 
embrace—catalyzed by a life-altering afternoon in the natural history collections 
in the Jardin des Plantes in Paris—of science as a truth-seeking epistemology on 
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a par with the Word and the imagination (Brown  60).  Scientists, for their part, 
perhaps sensing an opportunity in the fracas to expand their political power and 
garner more funding for their research, borrowed the trope of “progress” from a 
rapidly industrializing society they had helped create.  They used it to argue that 
the way they saw things was simply the way things were, and soon Americans 
would be forced to see them that same way.  There was no escaping either Nature 
or Progress. 
In the debate, each side had help.  Science had spectacle in its corner.  Past 
the mind’s-eye of the public paraded visions of Louis Agassiz’s gorgeous books 
full of color-plates of turtle specimens, P.T. Barnum’s natural wonders in his 
American Museum, and public exhibitions such as the “hydro-oxygen” 
microscope on a tour of New York museums during 1835.  In addition to these 
tantalizing material displays, scientists could also lay claim to a myriad of 
technological innovations that their researches authorized, if not actually created.  
However, these innovations partook in a fierce industrialization of both city and 
countryside that left many Americans overworked, worn out, and nervous about 
what machines might do to them.  Public literary representatives like Melville and 
Hawthorne had this fear on their side when they went public with their criticisms 
of scientific methods and motives.  The legacy of the British Romantics, who had 
mounted their own rebellion against an industrialization that started nearly a 
hundred years before the American Industrial Revolution, remained strong in the 
pages of novels, daily newspapers, and sermons delivered from Transcendentalist 
pulpits in the Northeastern states.  The “machine in the garden,” as Leo Marx has 
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termed the presence of technology in antebellum America, was a terrifying as 
well as a fascinating prospect to its viewers. 
These tensions might be the birth-pangs in America of what C.P. Snow 
deemed the “two cultures controversy” almost a hundred years later in 1959.  
Snow complained that his physicist friends did not read literature, and his literary 
friends had not even the most basic working knowledge of physical principles.  
Snow saw a palpable threat in this lack of inter-disciplinary communication.  
Fresh from WWII, Snow feared that scientists unchecked by moral philosophy 
could wreak havoc on the world again, and he felt it was literary scholars’ 
responsibility, as much as scientists’ responsibility, to keep science grounded in 
an ethos of humanism (Snow 30).  On the other hand, he credited science with an 
objectivity that humanists needed in order to avoid parochial infighting and arrest 
what was beginning to seem like a slide of literary studies into irrelevance in an 
increasingly scientific world.  Snow’s analysis was synchronic, not diachronic.  
He did not consider the contributions of history to the dilemma his science and 
literary friends faced.  But in the struggles between scientists and literary figures 
in antebellum American over who deserved the right to write truth for the 
American people, we can see the nascent shape of this debate. 
David Kaufer and Kathleen Carley argue that the boundaries between 
professional communities ossify if they specialize and remove themselves from 
public oversight, exacerbating the problem of inter-disciplinary rivalry.  
Increasing the permeability of boundaries, like the interchange Snow advocated 
among his friends, reduces confrontation over differences of values and 
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epistemology between professions (Kaufer and Carley  303).  Nothing of this sort 
of rapprochement transpired in the battle following Lyell’s Principles in the 
1830s.  Instead, public literary intellectuals used scientific media hoaxes to mount 
an attack against both scientists and the public who perhaps unwittingly supported 
scientists’ campaign to ground America’s social policy in scientific values.  The 
hoaxes were a wrench in the gears of the popularization of ideas like Lyell’s.  
Exploiting the public’s neophytic faith in the truth and beauty of science, the 
hoaxes—through their dual mechanism of deception and revelation—were able to 
transform those assumptions into an embarrassed self-awareness.  The hoaxes 
drew readers into admitting the foolishness of their readiness to believe anything 
that came stamped with the imprimatur of “science.”  Indirectly, the hoaxes also 
critiqued the scientists whose work they mimicked; the hoaxes implied by 
counterfeit that the scientists’ publicizing of their work—if not the work itself—
was a sham. 
3.2 Popular and specialized reading culture 
This critique by public literary figures of the mounting social power of 
science would not have been as effective if the hoaxers were not also able to 
exploit their readers’ appetites for and trust in the popular media.  The withdrawal 
of both scientific and literary discussion into specialized journals and professional 
societies left the lay public hungry for news of what was going on behind these 
closed doors and covers (Lee 3; Shapin 1001).4   A uniquely Jacksonian social 
                                                 
4 The term “elite” is often used to refer to the journals and societies 
forming during this period around a discourse that gradually became very difficult 
to follow for the readers of popular periodicals and the attendees of lyceum 
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dynamic of distrust intensified this desire for knowledge and control:  a fear of 
elite, undemocratic repositories of power hidden behind the rapidly bloating 
federal government, a fear that manifested itself in the persecution of the Masons 
and the disbanding of the Second National Bank (Brown, 138). 
Into this tense rhetorical vacuum stepped the genre of the popular science 
article, pacifying the public appetite for the most sensational of the current 
scientific discoveries and technological inventions with bold headlines and lots of 
engravings.  The penny dailies sported many specimens of this new genre, and 
publications dedicated solely to the edification of the popular or general science 
reader sprang up, including the American Journal of Science (1818) and later the 
Scientific American (1845).  These journals and papers printed renowned 
naturalist Louis Agassiz’s latest discoveries about glaciation on their front pages 
but were equally likely to showcase interviews with famous phrenologists and 
mesmerists and accounts of hay bales mysteriously levitating into the clouds 
(Mott Magazines:  1741-1850 446-447).  Catering to an audience hungry for 
scientific wonders and technological labor-and-health-saving gadgets, these ready 
media platforms created the perfect stage for the scientific hoaxing of Poe, Locke, 
Twain, and De Quille.   
                                                                                                                                     
lectures.  However, as Roger Cooter and Steven Pumfrey have pointed out, the 
use of the term elite implies a higher level of political as well as cultural power, 
and science’s "relation with dominant culture is frequently problematic" (252).  In 
this study I will prefer the term “specialized” to refer to the increasingly esoteric 
science journals proliferating in Antebellum America, and “professional” to refer 
to the scientific societies, which became allied with university departments in the 
second half of the century. 
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Public desires constitute a powerful force driving both the form and 
function of communication between scientists and lay reading communities.  In 
Counter-Statement Kenneth Burke claims that any rhetorical form both creates 
and satisfies desire for the reader, a desire—in the case of the “gee whiz” popular 
science articles of the 1830s—for identification with or control over the often 
alien social force of science and technology.  Steven Katz adopts Burke’s 
definition of rhetorical desire to argue that this desire for identification has led in 
this century to scientific discoveries being portrayed as epic quests, and scientists 
as heroes (Katz 384).  Dorothy Nelkin in Selling Science finds this dynamic 
operating even as early as 1890s, as popular science articles portrayed science as a 
“mystical” knowledge open only to nearly superhuman scientist initiates (78).  
Extending these observations a few decades earlier to the public hunger in the 
1830s for the quickly-distancing discourse of science, we could argue that the 
brand-new popular science genre was simply reinforcing a Burkean loop of desire 
already present in the reading culture.  The public desired canals and railroads and 
medicines to make their lives easier, and this desire drove scientists in the form of 
a constant social pressure; however, scientists’ discoveries and inventions also 
sparked desires within the public for “better, faster, more” of everything. 
The popular science article also represented an important transference of 
trust to the popular media, a shift that paved the way for the hoaxes.  Newspapers 
proliferated in the Jacksonian era as the population in the States expanded to the 
point where it was impossible to witness directly what was happening in one’s 
own community, much less in Virginia or New Hampshire.  Readers came to rely 
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on the news and the mail as vicarious witnesses to important social or political 
happenings.  The political reporting during this time, in particular, reflects an 
awareness on the part of newspapers that they were performing an experience of 
virtual witness for their readers; verbatim reports of proceedings of Congress take 
up pages and pages of newspapers and party-published monthlies such as The 
American Review:  A Whig Journal.  If readers wanted the information they 
needed to vote appropriately and to make decisions that affected their families, 
they had to sacrifice eyewitness and personal credibility and to put their trust 
instead in the institution of the newspaper and the forms of its anonymous articles.  
Miles Orvell argues that this coercion of trust was reinforced by a mechanical 
model of social economy becoming increasingly current in America with 
industrialization.  In The Real Thing, Orvell details the fascination of Jacksonian 
Americans with facsimiles produced by machines and argues that facsimile 
became an increasingly powerful trope for understanding social and commercial 
relationships.  Stereotyping became a common way to deal with unknown social 
groups, as Americans adapted the model of machine replication to their social 
relationships.  They became more and more apt to judge what they had not 
experienced as a carbon copy of their previous experience (Orvell xv; Seltzer 5).   
A further consequence of this copying mechanism in the rapidly 
expanding social economy of antebellum America was that transactions with 
institutions were gradually substituted for transactions with acquaintances—like 
familiar local shopkeepers or bankers (Orvell  xvii).  Trust in people had to be 
shifted to trust in corporations and rules of operation.  This shift, forced as it was 
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by the material conditions of a rapidly-expanding urbanized environment, created 
a deep unease in the public consciousness.  This unease was performed in the 
protests mentioned above against the Masons, Rosicrucians, and the national 
bank; however, an industrialized corporate economy was a fait accompli.  Even if 
they wished to, Americans could not shrink their society down, take the machines 
out of it, put things back to the way they were. 
The scientific media hoaxers took shameless advantage of this coerced 
trust.  They identified and replicated in journalistic form their readers’ desires for 
science, technology, and mechanical facsimile. By giving readers what they 
wanted and then pulling the rug out from under them, so to speak, the hoaxers 
confirmed their readers’ fears that they were being duped.  In fact, the defining 
feature of a hoax is the moment the reader realizes she has been duped (Berkove 
89; Bryant 16).  In this moment the hoax reveals its devices, which amount to the 
reader’s own assumptions that the hoax has exploited to achieve its humiliating 
effect.  This revelation can come either within the reading experience or in its 
immediate context:  Twain's hoax “The Petrified Man” revealed itself textually 
through sly details revealing that the petrified corpse was thumbing his nose at the 
reader; Poe revealed his “Balloon-Hoax” of 1844 within the reading context, by 
getting drunk and standing on the steps of the Sun trumpeting his forgery to 
potential subscribers.  In either event the revelation crucially depended on the 
reader’s trust in the newspapers’ vicarious witness of the “real world.”  American 
society had gotten too complex for readers to be able to verify for themselves 
everything they needed to know in order to function in it.  The hoaxes constitute 
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both a sharp criticism by literary intellectuals of this state of affairs and a voicing 
of a deep public uneasiness with it. 
4.  RELEVANCE OF HOAXES TO CURRENT SCHOLARLY CONCERNS 
Because hoaxes operate at the nexus of scientific and literary 
epistemologies, because they adopt the rhetoric of popular media to criticize the 
specialized rhetorics of groups viewed as politically threatening, studying them 
necessitates multiple critical approaches.  I will use a bricolage of techniques 
found within the disciplines of rhetoric of science, American historical reading 
criticism, and linguistic text pragmatics to answer these basic questions:  how did 
hoaxers fool their readers, and to what ends?  In return, the hoaxes contribute to 
the illumination of an issue that concerns all these schools of textual criticism:  
the negotiation of social reality between writers and readers through the mass 
media, in order to satisfy as many of the public’s (potentially competing) desires 
and expectations as possible (Eberly 20; Kaufer and Carley 11, 267).  
4.1 The rhetoric of science and its popularization 
Overall, hoaxes offer key opportunities to scholars of historical scientific 
rhetoric in three areas:  first, hoaxes are an intervention in the formation of 
“ethnoscience” or pervasive lay attitudes toward science in Antebellum America; 
we can use the resistance hoaxes represent to the process of popularization to 
structure that process in more detail.  Second, the scientific media hoax is an 
understudied, machine-age genre of science writing, and the considerable 
documentation of its innovation and development by different literary figures over 
a 30-year period will enable a valuable case-study history that will utilize both 
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synchronic and diachronic methods of rhetorical analysis.  Third, since the hoaxes 
ape the genre of the popular science article as it evolved from the 1830s to the 
1860s, we can use the hoax to map out the key features of this genre; further, 
since genres index communities, we can examine through the hoaxes the public 
reaction to science in this key period when science was gaining enough 
recognition to influence ethics and politics in America. 
4.11 Science popularization in nineteenth-century America 
Recent discussions of popularization have focused on reframing the 
discipline at its most foundational level, asking if there really is any such thing as 
popularization, and if there is, what methods will elucidate and recuperate it 
historically?  Ludwik Fleck’s groundbreaking analysis of the propagation of 
scientific knowledge in Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact (1935) 
marks the functional beginning of the study of science popularization.   Fleck 
argued for a feedback loop of support and authorization between esoteric 
scientific communities and “exoteric” publics that revised traditional assumptions 
that scientific popularization was a one-way street from the lab to the lay public.  
Roger Cooter and Stephen Pumfrey have recently argued that key studies in the 
development of popularization studies have forced revisions of even Fleck’s two-
way model:  chief among them are Michel Callon and John Law’s extension of 
Bruno Latour’s study of laboratory ecologies, which shows the enrolment of 
private and government agencies to be a third factor in the success of scientific 
research; in addition, studies of lay artisan communities like Adrian Desmond’s 
study of nineteenth-century British craftsmen have revealed that communities of 
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non-specialists have consistently created their own scientific knowledge from 
praxis and through revision of the claims of “specialized” science to fit their own 
agendas (Cooter 242,250).  These complications to the binary science/public 
models of popularization have cast doubt on the very definition of the field of 
study.  Is there really any such phenomenon as “popularization,” or is that simply 
a convenient reduction of the enormous, complicated work of making science to a 
more manageable dynamic that runs from lab to street?  There is no simple 
solution to this problem, but Cooter and Pumfrey call for more historical studies 
of the making of public scientific knowledge to help put the study of science 
popularization into proper context (Cooter 237).   
Cooter and Pumfrey’s call has been answered by scholars working on the 
twentieth century and nineteenth-century Britain.  Most of these studies have 
found that science is popularized by being sold as technology or paraded as 
spectacle.  Dorothy Nelkin’s study of press coverage of science since World War 
I in Selling Science found that the rhetoric of science journalism, from the birth of 
the first science writing syndicate in 1924, has pushed science in terms of the “-
est”:  the biggest, strangest, newest, or oldest (1).  Jeanne Fahnestock and Greg 
Myers have both inquired specifically into the adjusting of scientific claims to 
public desire.  In “Accommodating Science:  The Rhetorical Life of Scientific 
Facts,”  Fahnestock found scientists stick to forensic arguments about specific 
experiments when writing for each other, but when writing for the public, they 
make epideictic arguments, fitting their discoveries to lay readers’ values and 
goals—which can include the “gee whiz” mode of science appreciation and the 
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value of “more for less,” or what science can do for the public in terms of 
technology and medicine to improve the overall quality of public life.  Greg 
Myers’s study Writing Biology corroborates Fahnestock’s results.  Myers 
compared texts two biologists wrote for disciplinary journals with the versions 
they wrote for more general journals; overall, he found that the popular articles 
focused on the natural object of the investigation from a "wonders of the world" 
perspective, while the expert journal articles focused more on the experiment, its 
conditions, and methodology.   
This shift from limited experimental claims to bolder, value-laden claims 
in science popularization has been documented well before the 20th century.  In 
his landmark study of the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of 
London beginning in the 17th century, Charles Bazerman found that contributors 
cast their scientific work as revealing the spectacle of God's creation for a 
"novelty-hungry" readers (Shaping 133).  Steven Shapin in “Pump and 
Circumstance,” his study of English chemist Robert Boyle’s experimental 
rhetoric, found that Boyle coped with audience expectations in an ingenious way.  
He included detailed engravings of all of his apparatus so that the lay reader or an 
experimenter in some field other than chemistry could “virtually” witness Boyle’s 
experiment by examining his equipment and methods while reading. 
Studies similar to these have helped structure the “wonder-business,” as 
Mark Twain deemed it, of bringing science news to the public—especially in the 
seventeenth, eighteenth, and twentieth centuries (Clemens "Memoranda" 859).  
The methods developed in these studies have recently been fruitfully applied to 
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nineteenth-century British science popularization.  Jan Golinski has analyzed the 
“techniques, instrumentation, and discourse” that chemists Joseph Priestley and 
Sir Humphrey Davy utilized to publicly enlist chemistry as an institution 
preserving middle-class values from the Enlightenment to the early nineteenth 
century.  James Secord conducted a case study in the popularization of evolution 
by tracing the public life of a single Victorian text, the anonymously-published  
Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation (1844), through diaries, news 
clippings, and memoirs.   Greg Myers's study of the popularization of 
thermodynamics considers the joint construction of popular Victorian topoi, or 
public commonplaces, by lay and scientific communities.  In accommodating 
thermodynamics to a lay audience, physicists actually adopted a dominant topos 
in Victorian culture, “change is good.”  But in this attempt to accommodate their 
findings to Victorian values, the physicists, whether knowingly or not, contributed 
to popular culture two new topoi for understanding and plotting the trajectory of 
social relationships into the troubling future:  conservation of energy and entropy.   
These historiographical techniques—analyzing archived reader reactions 
to science and recuperating key topoi that accommodated scientific principles to 
lay values—need to be applied to antebellum America (Cooter 237n; Shapin 
Science 1001).  Just as the industrial revolution in England was a pivotal period 
for the rhetoric of science, as lay people began to talk and write about science and 
technology as major figures in their social landscape for the first time in history—
so with the mid-nineteenth century in America.  The scientific media hoaxes 
identified for study in this project constitute an intervention in the process of 
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science popularization during this time.  Hoaxers like Poe and Twain exploited 
reader assumptions about science and science news to fool their readers into 
believing the hoaxes were true witnesses to scientific reality.  Then, by revealing 
the hoaxes, either textually or contextually, the authors exposed the unconscious 
expectations the public had about science as vehicle to the Truth and implied that 
those expectations were unwarranted.   
Poe and Twain could only accomplish this effect by successfully 
identifying and re-performing in their hoaxes their readers’ expectations about 
science and science writing.  These common expectations readers held, like the 
topoi Myers identified in his thermodynamics study, formed the units of exchange 
that science writers and readers traded in popular science articles, and in the 
science hoaxes.  Identifying these expectations, suggesting their origins, and 
showing how they might have interacted with each other in the hoax-reading 
process are major goals of this project and its principal contribution to the study 
of popularization.  In the hoaxes we witness a unique game in meta-
popularization, as Poe and the other hoaxers strove to make the public aware of 
their being conditioned to accept scientific truth over the truths of faith, reason, 
and the imagination.  And even though the particular crisis between science and 
art that triggered these hoaxes in antebellum America is past, hoaxing is still alive 
and well as a strategy of intervention in the process of acculturating readers to 
either scientific or humanistic epistemologies.  The Epilogue to Chapter Five of 
this dissertation will extend findings from the historical section of the study to 
account for the controversy surrounding Alan Sokal’s recent hoax in Social Text.   
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4.12 Scientific genres 
Scholars of scientific genres are interested in how the genres are 
developed and codified over time and in how that process indexes the changing 
values and goals both of scientists and their readers (C. Miller 152-153).  Writing 
these kinds of histories of genres presents special problems of data collection and 
methodology that have recently elicited innovative solutions. David Kaufer and 
Kathleen Carley combined rhetorical analysis with quantitative models of 
knowledge dissemination over time in their study of print culture to argue that the 
development of scientific journals facilitated the flow of knowledge between 
disciplines starting in the eighteenth century (254, 267).  Carol Berkenkotter and 
Thomas Huckin used read-aloud protocols of scientists reading research reports, 
coupled with textual surveys of 350 articles from 12 scientific journals over a 
period of 45 years, to show that the scientific article is still changing to reflect 
reader preferences in the late twentieth century (Berkenkotter and Huckin  33-35).  
By contrast, Carolyn R. Miller focused her dissertation on a self-destructing 
genre.  She analyzed the Environmental Impact Statement over time in concert 
with environmental legislation to demonstrate that the E.I.S. failed to address 
competing interests in its governmental readership (Miller 164).  These studies all 
combine diverse textual and contextual approaches to write histories of the 
feedback loop between genre formation and reader goals and values. 
A lingering problem in scientific genre research, in spite of these advances 
in methodology, is a tendency to read the success of certain movements in science 
backwards into the conditions of production of their rhetoric.  In “Moving Beyond 
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the Moment,” Danette Paul, Davida Charney, and Aimee Kendall argue that a 
narrow focus on the production of scientific texts often exaggerates their 
importance for their communities of reception.  Instead, the authors argue, 
scholars of rhetoric of science should combine their analysis of the rhetoric of a 
text with analyses of its immediate reception, and its changing reception over 
time.  Only in this way can researchers avoid applying post hoc judgments, based 
on the eventual success or failure of the theories the author espoused, to the 
success or failure of the author’s strategies for adapting his/her claims to readers’ 
values and interests. 
With my approach to the nascent genre of scientific hoaxing, I hope to 
answer the challenge in “Moving Beyond the Moment,” first by taking as my 
primary object of study the immediate reception of the scientific media hoaxes, 
and second, by conducting a diachronic study of hoaxes by four different authors 
living in different communities within the United States over a roughly 30-year 
period.  The immediate reception of the hoaxes is accessible via the contemporary 
media, private diaries and memoirs of readers, and commentary by the hoaxers 
themselves.  Each hoaxer modified the genre of the hoax for his own purposes 
and to fit the cultural milieu in which he wrote, and a diachronic and geographic 
survey of all of these hoaxes will provide a detailed history, sensitive to time and 
place, of the development of a unique and unstudied scientific genre.  In addition, 
since, as Dwight Atkinson argues in his study of rhetoric of the research article, 
key values and contemporary issues referenced in a scientific text provide an 
index to “insider perspectives, and social practices or ideologies” of a given 
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readership, the hoaxes can provide a suggestive index to the role science played in 
the lives of lay readers from 1835 to 1880.   
This study of hoaxing makes a final novel contribution to the history of 
scientific genres, and that is a rhetorical analysis of the antebellum popular 
science article.  Since hoaxing is a meta-genre, it can serve as a useful tool for 
historical genre reconstruction.  Like parodies and burlesques, hoaxes must mimic 
another genre for their effect—science news articles, in this case.  In the case of 
the successful hoaxes, hoaxes that fooled thousands of readers, we know that they 
succeeded in identifying and re-performing the salient features of the science 
news article.  If imitation is the sincerest form of flattery—or perhaps the 
insincerest, in the case of hoaxing—it is also an excellent heuristic for 
reconstructing the rhetorical form of the antebellum popular science article.  
Much as John Swales has done for the academic article, this project hopes to do 
for the nascent American popular science article, positioned crucially as it was at 
the juncture of a social crisis between specialized and popular communities of 
science and literature in the mid-nineteenth century. 
4.2 Reading science in nineteenth-century America 
Reader-oriented critics of nineteenth century American literature currently 
find themselves in a difficult double bind, according to scholars of historical 
reading such as James Machor and Jane Tompkins.  On the one hand, situated, 
cognitively-focused readings—like those conducted by Roland Barthes, Wolfgang 
Iser, and reader-response critics like Stanley Fish and Jonathan Culler—produce 
compelling accounts of individual processes of interpretation but still take the text 
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as their “primary unit of meaning,” thus sacrificing a cultural perspective that 
would reveal the text as a “force exerted upon the world” (Tompkins 225).  On 
the other hand, New Historical studies of reading in the nineteenth century yield 
rich cultural contextualization, but as a practioner of this methodology, James 
Machor is concerned that this broadening of focus often sacrifices the ability to 
account for how individual historical readers actually read (Machor  x). 
Empirical studies of reading are one way out of this Heisenbergian sort of 
inability to keep both process and reading in focus at the same time.  Read-aloud 
or think-aloud protocols, interviews, and surveys help capture moments in the 
cognitive act of individual interpretation.  By studying multiple readers, these 
studies can average findings across the group in order to discern common reading 
strategies.  Both Berkenkotter and Huckin, and Charles Bazerman, have 
interviewed eminent scientists in their offices while they read experimental 
articles in order to discover generalities in these expert readers’ pattern of 
skimming/reading the articles.  A similar read-aloud study conducted by Davida 
Charney compared evolutionary biologists’ reactions to atypical claims made in 
an article by Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Lewontin with the reactions of 
biology graduate students; Charney used the differences in the responses of the 
two groups to draw conclusions about neophyte reading practices versus expert 
reading practices in the field of biology.  These empirical studies yield limited but 
suggestive claims about contextually-bound acts of reading. 
However, these methods cannot help scholars studying nineteenth-century 
readers and reading practices.  The absence in time and space of the original 
 47 
readers and contexts of reading have led reading scholars either to analyze the 
reactions of a reconstructed “ideal reader” (usually coextensive with the reactions 
of the scholar), or to elaborate the reading context and culture through archival 
and historical research.   
Hoaxes present a unique opportunity to move beyond this double-bind of 
reader-oriented historical criticism.  They are successful rhetorical experiments in 
identifying and re-performing common reader expectations.  In other words, 
authors of successful media hoaxes managed to guess correctly at least some of 
the expectations their readers had about news—expectations about the reality it 
reported, expectations about the content, style, and format of news itself.  The 
hoaxers exploited these expectations to produce texts that readers bought as the 
“real thing”; then, they revealed their hoaxes publicly to embarrass readers for 
adhering so blindly to those expectations.  In their guessing game, the authors had 
the immense advantage of living and reading among the people they were trying 
to fool.  However, in many cases, the hoaxers, their readers/victims, and 
contemporary historians of the hoaxing events have left us a paper trail of reader 
responses that encode certain “sticking points” or recurring topics in debates over 
the truth-value of the hoaxes.  These topoi in turn enable reconstruction of the 
crucial reader expectations about science and science news that the hoaxers 
exploited to achieve their desired goals.  These recovered expectations can 
provide a way of explaining the many similar interpretations of the same text—
“similarity” in this case defined as a function of “being fooled.”   The filter should 
enable limited claims about the culture of reading at the time of the hoaxes while 
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simultaneously providing a framework flexible enough to model individual 
experiences of the hoaxes at different times and places.  The next section is 
dedicated to reviewing the historical justification for an expectation-based model 
of reading and detailing the methods for recuperating reader expectations from 
historical documents and modeling their interaction in reader decisions about the 
truth-value of hoaxes.  While this new hermeneutic does not pretend to fully 
account for cultural context or for individual process, it does provide an extension 
of rhetorical methods for situating reader-oriented criticism in a specific historical 
moment.  In doing so, it offers a way out of the double-bind of context or process 
that has dogged reader-oriented criticism of nineteenth century texts. 
This study of hoaxing will make one final contribution to our 
understanding of nineteenth century rhetorical and literary practice in America, by 
raising the profile of a neglected American writer of the period:  Dan De Quille 
(William Wright).  Dan De Quille was a miner on the Comstock Lode before he 
became a successful journalist for the Territorial Enterprise in Virginia City, 
where he worked with Mark Twain.  Most of De Quille’s hoaxes were written 
during his tenure with the Enterprise, all of whose records for the years before 
1875 burned in the great fire of that year.  Lawrence Berkove at the University of 
Illinois, and Richard Dwyer and Richard Lingenfelter at the University of 
Nevada, Reno, have collected De Quille’s tall tales and published them along with 
several scholarly articles on his journalistic and historical writings.  However, 
very few other scholars have worked on De Quille, and no one has yet taken his 
hoaxing seriously as part of the impact of science on the American West.  De 
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Quille rivals or surpasses Poe as a hoaxer, and any consideration of scientific 
media hoaxing in the nineteenth century must reckon with De Quille or risk 
under-representing a remarkable strategic move in the literary reaction to science.  
De Quille’s science hoaxes and his historical texts, like The Big Bonanza, played 
a powerful role in the creation of the idea of the West—especially the conception 
of the West as a natural and scientific waste-and-wonderland; therefore, his 
cultural influence beckons examination. 
5.  PROJECT METHODOLOGY 
My decision to focus on reading expectations is not an innovation.  
Reader-oriented criticism generally acknowledges that “reading is not an innocent 
activity,” according to Jonathan Culler (116).  Readers bring preconceptions with 
them when they start to read a text, preconceptions based on their education, their 
personalities, their speech communities, and other resources.  Wolfgang Iser and 
Stanley Fish have argued that meaning-creation in reading arises from an 
interaction between the text and these preconceptions, which Fish calls 
“interpretive conventions” and Iser calls “codes” (Fish Is There a Text 16; Iser 
106, 118).   
In a review of the critical history of interpretive conventions, Steven 
Mailloux argues that they are not, as Fish and Iser have claimed, projections of 
real readers’ preconceptions but instead are sophisticated critical conventions 
sustained by a community of literary critics who share a certain methodology for 
approaching texts (Mailloux 29).  These high-level conventions do not translate 
well to interpreting nineteenth-century scientific media hoaxes, then, since the 
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hoaxes’ readers were not part of reader-response critical communities.  Instead, 
the hoaxes’ success depended on uncritical, unreflexive reading.  What is needed 
to analyze the hoaxes is a set of expectations arising from that culture of reading, 
from readers’ habitual contact with popular science articles and with 
“ethnoscience,” pervasive lay opinions about science in antebellum culture. 
Reconstructing reader expectations is a difficult project, but a critical 
understanding of hoaxing cannot be formed without attempting it.  Because 
expectations are critical abstractions, I need to address Mailloux’s criticisms of 
hermeneutic idealism in historical reception studies.  Hermeneutic idealism holds 
that the interpretive process can be characterized through the interpretive 
conventions that drive it, a characterization that could be taken to fit the proposed 
methodology in this project.  Mailloux believes this approach falls into either one 
or both of two traps:  “the infinite regress of conventions and the unformalizable 
nature of context” (Mailloux 10).  I will attempt to avoid the first of these traps by 
limiting both context and conventions.  My analysis of the reading culture of the 
hoaxes focuses narrowly on genre expectations and ethnoscientific expectations.  
In addition, although the number of interpretive games that could be played with 
expectations even in this selected arena may be infinite, I will constrain my focus 
to games concerning the truth-value of the hoaxes.  I expect that certain reader 
expectations will emerge as being more central to and powerful in these particular 
epistemological games.  However, Mailloux’s second charge against hermeneutic 
idealism is more complicated to handle:   
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When hermeneutic idealists attempt to describe the system of 
interpretive conventions that determine meaning, either they describe this 
system as independent of rhetorical situations or they do not realize that 
the conventions themselves are the topic of critical debate at specific 
historical moments.  In either case, idealists make a mistake similar to that 
of realists by presupposing the possibility of meaning outside specific 
historical contexts of rhetorical practices. (Mailloux  16) 
Talking about reader expectations is posing a level of abstraction; there is 
no escaping this criticism.  However, it is justified in this case because hoaxes 
themselves are abstracting genres.  They are meta-genres that manipulate salient 
features of other genres and readers’ expectations about those features.  To 
understand how these scientific media hoaxes achieved their effect with readers, 
we have to understand the expectations readers had about ethnoscience and 
science media.  In order to constrain the abstraction necessary to this project, 
however, I will recuperate expectations only from immediate, contemporary 
reader responses to the hoaxes.  The reception of each hoax will be considered 
independently, as a hoax is not a text but an event bound to a particular 
readership, a particular kairos, and all generalizations about hoaxing will be 
limited accordingly.   
Further, reconstructed as they are from the historical responses by readers, 
the reading expectations considered in this project are not the same as 
anachronistic “interpretive conventions” levied against the texts of the hoaxes by 
expert groups of literary critics.  While it is perhaps bold to claim a grass-roots 
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ethos for this project, its design is bottom-up, its focus specific, and its claims 
historically contingent. 
5.1 Rhetorical precedents for the recovery of reader expectations 
It is now necessary to develop a vocabulary for talking about readers’ 
expectations of genre and culture.  A combination of reader-oriented, rhetorical, 
and New Historicist methodologies lay the groundwork for this project and help 
recuperate reader expectations from archived reader responses.  After these 
expectations have been reconstructed, textual pragmatics methods, like Ellen 
Schauber and Ellen Spolsky’s “preference rules” and Optimality Theory, a 
constraint-satisfaction framework borrowed from linguistics, will help model the 
interaction of the expectations in decisions about the truth or falsehood of hoaxes.   
To avoid the limitations of previous analyses of hoaxes that have restricted 
their inquiry to the rhetoric of the physical texts, I need methodologies that allow 
me to inspect the reception of the hoaxes, which is where their effect truly lies.  
While physical texts always form an important source of evidence for their 
historical impact, as Dwight Atkinson argues in his study of the transactions of 
the Royal Society, current conceptions of textuality informed by New Historicism 
encompass reception, including elements of readers’ daily economic, social, and 
moral lives.  Richard Altick argued in his seminal study of the English common 
reader that we cannot understand the historical impact of texts unless we 
understand these mundane details affecting reading behavior.  Unless we enrich 
our definition of textuality, we will remain unable to explain historical acts of 
reading. 
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In addition to the historical details of antebellum readers lives outlined in 
the sections treating the kairos of the hoaxes above, there is another crucial source 
of evidence for the reception of the hoaxes—immediate reader responses and the 
common assumptions about reading science that they encode.  When nineteenth-
century readers debated the truth of the science hoaxes, they focused on certain 
topoi or “sticking points”—like the chances of the newspapers actually being able 
to get the information so quickly, the reputation of the scientists named in the 
article, or the “verisimilar” tone of the article.  These topoi all index key 
expectations readers had about science and science news.  There are good 
precedents for the recovery of these sorts of topoi in recent scholarship on the 
historical reception of science rhetoric and of American civic rhetoric.   
In Rhetorical Power Steven Mailloux retains some of the assumptions of 
the reader-response school—namely Iser’s and Fish’s claim that the text is an 
event of interpretation, not an object—while defining a new “rhetorical 
hermeneutics” that connects historical readings of a text with the wider cultural 
debates they participate in.  Mailloux develops the three critical moves of 
rhetorical hermeneutics through an analysis of the critical history of Huckleberry 
Finn.  First, Mailloux brings the rhetoric of race in the novel into conversation 
with a particular sociocultural debate at the time of its publication—the “Negro 
issue” and, in particular, the representation of black people in the minstrel shows 
of the 1880s.   Second, he discusses the critical history of the book from the 1880s 
to 1980 with respect to a particular cultural topos—the “bad boy” or juvenile 
delinquent.  Finally, Mailloux puts his own interpretation of the novel into play 
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with other critical perspectives on the book, reader-response approaches in 
particular.  With these three moves, Mailloux hopes to maintain the reader-
response tradition’s emphasis on the cognitive process of reading while bringing 
that tradition into contact with the culture of the text’s production.  His definition 
of rhetoric, in fact, is a definition of contact:  “the political effectivity of trope and 
argument in culture” (Mailloux  xii) 
Rosa Eberly has extended and revised Mailloux’s operational definition of 
rhetoric in her study of arguments about censored texts in Citizen Critics.  Eberly 
sets out the goals of her project as follows: “the processes through which literary 
texts affect social practices can be studied empirically by analyzing the contours 
of public debate as reflected in the rhetorical strategies of participants’ 
discourses” (Eberly  163).  Like Mailloux, Eberly is interested in what happens 
when rhetoric encounters society—in the form of groups of citizens debating each 
of four censored texts.  Eberly measures this debate through immediate reader 
response—Op/Ed pieces, letters to the editor, reviews, commentary in the media.  
She further structures the process of reception by identifying key topoi or stances 
from which citizen critics commonly launched their arguments about the 
controversial works, topics like obscenity, aesthetics, and authority. 
Michael Schudson’s The Good Citizen is another model of a historical 
rhetorical study that reconstructs changing conceptions of citizenship in America 
from the colonial period to the present day.  Schudson reads the topos of the 
“good citizen” through its historical permutations in constitutional law, voting 
statutes, and political debate about voting.  His study, like those reviewed above, 
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uses multiple historical sources in order to identify emergent cultural topoi that 
are powerful organizers of discourse at those historical moments. 
Similar methods for reconstruction of key concepts in the public discourse 
of science have recently been employed in New Historical approaches to the 
rhetoric of science.  In addition to integration of thermodynamic concepts into 
Victorian culture by Greg Myers discussed earlier, Charles Bazerman’s recent 
study of Edison’s rhetoric and Dwight Atkinson’s longitudinal study of the 
rhetoric of the Royal Society also provide excellent models for this project.  In 
The Languages of Edison’s Light, Bazerman considers a wealth of historical data 
in tracing the cultural history of a “technology on its way to successful 
integration” (339).  Bazerman studies a rhetorical maze of patent records, 
newspaper articles about Edison’s research, industry prospectuses, and 
advertisements in order to tease out the strands of argumentation that are key in 
the arduous process of accommodating a technology—not just the idea of its 
usefulness, but the idea of the technology as an avatar of public desire—in the 
American mind.  Writes Bazerman of his methodology:   
By focusing attention on situated, symbolic, discursive practices, 
the approach presented here moves us closer to the kind of micro-
empirical study that is associated with ethnomethodology, conversational 
analysis, and sociolinguistics, allowing us to locate and examine the exact 
sites of social production and reproduction in particular discursive 
moments. (344) 
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Dwight Atkinson also applies this close attention to language in his study 
of the changing rhetoric of the Royal Society.  Atkinson adapts Douglas Biber’s 
register analysis methodology from applied linguistics to the project of 
illuminating changes in the rhetoric of the experimental report over 400 years; he 
combines that empirical approach with close New Historical analysis of the social 
issues indexed in the articles to situate the register changes in the article within 
the concerns of its writers and readers as participators in an ever-changing British 
political ecology.  Methodologies like Atkinson’s and Bazerman’s, and the civic 
rhetorical projects as well, count on being able to “read off” key values of the 
reading culture from the archived texts under examination (Atkinson 59).  These 
values are compared with outside historical accounts of the cultures in question 
before any claims are made about what those cultures believed.  This 
methodology will prove useful for “reading off” reader expectations about science 
and science media from the texts of the initial reactions to the hoaxes in this 
study. 
5.2 Pragmatic-linguistic models of reader expectations 
Increasingly, rhetorical scholars of both civic and scientific discourse—as 
observable especially in Bazerman’s and Atkinson’s methodologies—are 
recognizing the utility for their research of pragmatic-linguistic methodologies 
that emphasize the social activities in which language is engaged.  Scholars in 
pragmatics, the study of language in use, have talked about discourse in terms of 
expectations and goals on the part of its participants for nearly a century.  Mikhail 
Bakhtin, in the process of criticizing the asocial tendencies of the Russian 
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Formalists, introduced a theory that grounded discussions of literary meaning in 
the communal values and speech practices of the reading community.  John Searle 
and J.L. Austin both claimed in their versions of speech act theory that meaning in 
dialogue did not result from the actual linguistic form of the exchange, but from 
the interaction of this message with the preconceptions and desires of the 
participants.  While they were not strictly interested in literary texts, their work 
was quickly adapted to those ends by Deconstructionists like Jacques Derrida.   
H. Paul Grice’s work extended Searle’s and Austin’s by bringing the pre-
existing expectations of discourse participants to the very forefront of the 
interpretive process.  Grice posited the Cooperativity Principle as a basic but 
powerful way of understanding human communication; it says, in effect, that 
participants in a discourse should assume that each is trying to help the other 
accomplish his/her goals.  This principle breaks down into more specific 
guidelines, or maxims, which may be violated for certain effects.  Maxims govern 
both the activity of the speaker and the hearer: 
• Maxim of Quality:  Tell the truth 
• Maxim of Quantity:  Be as informative as expected. 
• Maxim of Relevance:  Make your contribution relevant to what has come 
before. 
• Maxim of Manner:  Be brief, orderly, and clear.  
The maxims are usually adhered to in “normal” communication, including 
textual communication, but they can be departed from in significant ways.  
Flouting is consensual departure; violation is unilateral departure.  To take the 
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example of the maxim of Quality (telling the truth), a flouting of the maxim 
would be sarcasm, as in the following exchange: 
A:  What did you think of the statistics lecture? 
B:  Riveting. 
B does not think statistics is riveting, and she likely accompanies her 
response with a particular, flat intonation to help clue A in to the fact that she is 
flouting Quality, and he should understand her response ironically.  Compare this 
coordinated activity with lying, which is a violation of Quality.  When B lies to A, 
she gives no indication that she is not upholding Quality, and so A is deceived. 
The Gricean maxims and especially the notion of flouting have proved 
powerful and suggestive as research tools.  They help structure speech acts like 
sarcasm and irony as well as explain the effects of indirect speech acts.  Several 
theories of discourse interpretation have been based upon them.  One of these is 
Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson’s Relevance Theory, which models the 
interpretive process as an interpretive game driven by Gricean expectations that 
may come into tension with each other and therefore need to be ranked in some 
sort of  (provisional and shifting) order during the reading process so that the 
reader can produce momentarily stable meanings from the text while she reads.  
The basic engine of Sperber and Wilson’s interpretive model is a tension between 
the constraints of interpretive effort and effect.  In other words, the meaning a 
reader chooses to favor in a particular reading will be the one that satisfies the 
most of her expectations with the least amount of effort.  However, since Sperber 
and Wilson are not designing a reading theory per se, they make no provision for 
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a reader focusing on some textual elements over others; there is only one level, 
the “stimulus,” which the speaker/writer has manifested already before the 
interpretive act begins.  Within the stimulus, there are no levels to the notion of 
relevance, and levels are crucial because the reader’s multiple textual and extra-
textual expectations interact and compete with each other in the reading process; 
all these myriad expectations cannot be equally important to the reader.   
Given that the reading experience for an individual can be driven by 
expectations based on the reader’s dialect community, gender, prior exposure to 
text types, critical community, or lack of sleep the night before, a complete list of 
expectations for any single act, much less the acts of a reading community over 
time, are impossible.  Jacqueline Henkel (lecture notes) tells the story of her 
revelation that the movie Casablanca was all about back pain after she watched it 
while recuperating from a thrown-out back.  Scenes which she had once 
interpreted as significant in building toward Ilsa’s climactic decision to leave Rick 
for Victor, she now interpreted purely as wrenching exercises in standing up from 
piano benches and leaning over bars.  Henkel used her experience as an example 
of idiosyncratic interpretive expectations that must be discounted in any serious 
theory of reading expectations, but her story raises the same question Mailloux 
raises in Rhetorical Power—where to draw the line in any theory that treats 
reading as a constraint-satisfaction process. 
5.3 Pragmatic models of readers’ expectations of genre 
Some productive attempts to limit research into pragmatic conventions 
have focused on particular conventions—generic conventions being the most 
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popular.  These studies focus on generic cues within texts that trigger expectations 
based on readers’ past experience with these genres.  Rolf Zwaan has 
demonstrated that merely redirecting readers’ assumptions about what genre a 
single text belongs to—news or literature in his case—triggers differing reading 
behaviors for that text.5   
The most productive attempt to combine rule-based pragmatic approaches 
to discourse interpretation with reader-oriented criticism is Ellen Schauber and 
Ellen Spolsky’s Bounds of Interpretation.  Schauber and Spolsky identify three 
systems of conventions which constrain the literary reading process:  linguistic 
conventions, pragmatic conventions, and literary conventions.  They focus on 
literary conventions in the form of generic formulas (specifically for the 
romance).  In Schauber and Spolsky’s model, reader expectations are termed 
“preference rules,” which are active in any one reading of a text.  A reader starts a 
novel with just the title and any preference rules mentally associated with the 
genre of romance novels and with the author’s known style, if applicable.  These 
preference rules include necessary conditions for membership in a genre (listed in 
detail for romance novels), gradient necessary conditions which can still hold 
even though some parts are left unsatisfied, and typicality conditions, the weakest, 
which can be overridden based on conflicting information from the text being 
read.  In addition to these preference rules, the reader brings to the text 
“conditions of significance” which filter out aspects of the text unimportant to the 
reader, and which can interact with typicality conditions as the reader chooses to 
                                                 
5 See Chapter Three for a fuller analysis of Zwaan’s study. 
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emphasize (or to ignore) typical features of the text.  Interpretations are 
constructed as follows: 
1. Readers begin with a certain, weighted list of conditions; as these 
conditions are supported or disconfirmed during reading, the reader 
prefers some interpretive possibilities over others.    
2. In cases of conflict between conditions—say, in “A Modest Proposal” 
when the reader realizes that the Sincerity Condition (roughly, that the 
narrator must believe what s/he is saying) comes into conflict with the 
horrifying details of the proposal—the reader reweights the conditions.  In 
an ironic reading of “A Modest Proposal,” the Sincerity Condition is 
weighted less heavily than it was at the beginning of the reading.  But, as 
Schauber and Spolsky point out, “overriding is not canceling or 
suspending; tension is the price paid for whatever resolution is achieved” 
(34).  The Sincerity Condition does not disappear, it is just downgraded in 
significance to the reader—and could be upgraded again later in light of 
more data.   
3. In a case of a conflict between two conditions that is ultimately 
unresolvable through re-weighting of conditions, ambiguity results.  The 
reader may hold two or more readings as equal.  Schauber and Spolsky go 
through Wuthering Heights with their constraint-satisfaction process to 
account for its generic ambiguity between a romance and a tragedy, and 
they go on to interpret how this ambiguity is significant for that juncture in 
literary and social history in England.   
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As a model of reader expectations that could potentially be applied to 
analyzing the effects of hoaxes on their readers, Schauber and Spolsky’s model 
has many desirable features.  It admits more types of expectations than just high-
level critical conventions.  Also, it can cope with the differing strengths readers 
might assign to these expectations during the reading process.  However, a model 
of reading that can cope with readers’ decisions about truth while reading the 
hoaxes needs to detail more than just generic expectations, because conceptions of 
“truth” extend beyond genre to the world of the reader’s prior experience with 
science.  Unfortunately, Schauber and Spolsky’s model does not provide a 
mechanism for these differing expectations about genre and the “world” to 
interact with each other.  I have resources for recovering the reader expectations 
from historical documents, as outlined in the previous section.  What I need now 
is a method for holding these multiple expectations in view and modeling their 
interaction and competition with each other in the process of reading a hoax. 
5.4 Optimality Theory 
Over the last three years, I have been developing a model of reader 
expectations that may be applied more productively to explaining the effect of the 
hoaxes’ rhetoric on their readers.  It is based on Optimality Theory, a constraint-
satisfaction framework that models decision processes based on interacting 
constraints of various strengths.  I first applied the model to a project on re-
reading in a Jorge Luis Borges short story.  In it I demonstrated how specific 
competitions between expectations—about the reliability of the narrator, for 
example—can drive a single reader’s re-readings of a text.  I will give the results 
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of that experiment as examples of my adaptations of Optimality Theory after a 
brief description of the theory, its origins and current uses, and how I have 
adapted it to model the reading process. 
Optimality Theory (OT) is not actually a theory.  It is a model for 
constraint satisfaction processes in general (like workflow and decision problems, 
some cognitive processes, and biological processes like adaptation).  Prince and 
Smolensky brought Optimality Theory from economics into linguistics in 1993, 
where it proved useful for handling complex phonological problems previously 
inexplicable or oversimplified by generative grammar.  To see how it works in 
phonology, consider Table 1: 
Table 1:  Syllabification of “onset” /ansεt/ 
 FAITH ONS NOCODA 
 an-sεt  * ** 
   Ans-εt  * *!** 
   <a>nsεt *!  * 
The first column lists all (or the most realistic, in most cases) possible 
candidates for the phonological form of a word as speakers actually pronounce 
it—in this case, the three most probable syllabifications of the English word 
“onset.”  A hyphen indicates the syllable break in the word.   The bracketed <a> 
in the third candidate represents a deleted vowel (which is actually a fairly 
common phonological feature in colloquial English:  think of the nasal “N-n” with 
a head shake in place of “no, no”). 
The top row lists all phonological constraints applicable to the problem in 
order, left-to-right, from strongest (inviolable) to weakest (often violated in 
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practice).  In this case, the constraint FAITH, which states that all parts of a word 
should be pronounced, is ranked higher than both ONS, which says syllables 
should start with consonants, and NOCODA, which says syllables should not end 
in consonants.  ONS and NOCODA are not ranked with respect to each other 
because they never operate on the same part of the syllable and therefore never 
compete with each other; the vertical dotted line signifies this lack of competition.  
The ranking of the constraints in this tableau could also be notated in a linear 
form as FAITH >> {ONS, NOCODA}, where “>>” signifies domination and 
where bracketing with commas signifies equality of rank and therefore lack of 
competition.  This ranking applies to all English words and was determined via 
analysis of copious sets of English syllabification data by phonologists.   
The asterisks in the matrix of the table represent violations of particular 
constraints.  The violations add up like penalty points against a candidate, with a 
violation of a stronger (leftward) constraint counting more than a violation of a 
weaker one.  An “!” follows and indicates the fatal violation, the one that knocks 
the candidate out of the running for optimal form (violations are usually tallied up 
from right to left, weakest to strongest).  The check mark in the candidate column 
indicates the optimal phonological form, the one that satisfies the greatest number 
of highest-ranked constraints.  This is the form in which speakers actually 
pronounce the word “onset.” 
In the example in Table 1, “an-sεt” is the optimal form.  While it has more 
total violations than “<a>nsεt,” it nevertheless satisfies FAITH, the highest ranked 
constraint.  The runner-up, “<a>nsεt”, does not.  The third form, “ans-εt”, gets 
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knocked out of the running even earlier because it accrues more NOCODA 
violations than either of the other two forms due to a consonant cluster “ns” at the 
end of the first syllable. 
How are phonological constraints derived in Optimality Theory?  The 
constraints and their ranking were derived from looking at phonological 
paradigms.  Paradigms are microcosms of a language:  they are data sets listing all 
differing forms currently in use in the language for plural endings, syllable 
breaking patterns or whichever phonological phenomenon is under investigation.  
Looking at these paradigms, phonologists make general claims based on the 
patterns they see:  “This language never has closed syllables”; “in about half the 
forms here, consonant reduction occurs when the plural ending is added,” etc.  
These generalities become constraints on the actual spoken forms of words in the 
language because the forms that speakers actually use are the ones that satisfy the 
greatest number of these “rules.”  The total set of phonological constraints, claim 
phonologists, is universal; only their ranking changes from language to language.  
In Minyanka, a Niger-Congo language, there are never consonant clusters; this is 
an extremely high-ranked constraint.  In English, on the other hand, that 
constraint is very low-ranked, as evidenced by five of the words in this sentence.  
Once phonologists determine which of these universal constraints are important 
for syllabification, plurals, and so on, in a particular language, their ranking is 
determined by working backward from the paradigms again.  Examining the 
forms speakers actually use, the “optimal” forms, allows you to deduce which of 
your constraints are the most dominant, which are middle-ranked (coming into 
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play only to decide between two forms that both satisfy a more dominant 
constraint), and which are very weak (only “winning out” and appearing in actual 
speech in the absence of any competition with stronger constraints).   
Optimality Theory (OT) has worked spectacularly well in phonology, 
perhaps because phonological rules are a relatively circumscribed set, as there is a 
finite number of perturbations the human vocal tract can perform on sounds when 
they are combined with other sounds in words.  OT is now being applied to syntax 
with a more limited degree of success, as the universality of syntactic rules is still 
actively debated.  For one compilation of views, see Barbossa, et. al.  Is The Best 
Good Enough?  Optimality and Competition in Syntax.  A few studies have even 
applied OT to pragmatics, using Gricean rules for interaction, though these 
innovations are recent and relatively speculative.  Bruce Hall’s “Grice, Discourse 
Representation, and Optimal Intonation” is an example of this new work. 
Using Optimality Theory to help organize and model the interaction of 
reader expectations is a productive addition to expectation-based models of the 
reading process.  OT’s “constraints” are actually very similar to Schauber & 
Spolsky’s preference rules; OT just adds the benefits of a graphic model, which is 
easier to inspect visually and which allows both interaction between many 
different kinds of expectations and a greater degree of precision in the ranking 
and re-ranking of those expectations.   
5.41 OT and reading an unreliable narrator 
As an example of how OT can help explain reading expectations at the 
level of genre, specifically, expectations about the reliability of the narrator of a 
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short story, consider Wayne Booth’s “reliable narrator” rule.  The reliable narrator 
rule can be seen as an expectation or constraint with two parts:  one, that the 
narrator will provide the reader with all data relevant to understanding the 
progress of the story; two, that the narrator's evaluation of that data will be 
truthful and helpful (Booth 67).  These sound, in fact, a great deal like Grice’s 
maxims of relevance, quality, and quantity.  As with Grice’s maxims, Booth’s 
principles are default expectations and may be violated in order to produce 
various effects in stories.  Consider how an OT-type approach can be applied to 
the activity of re-reading in "The Garden of the Forking Paths" by Jorge Luis 
Borges.  This analysis refers to my own experience reading the story. 
The story is narrated by Yu Tsun, a Nazi spy.  Here the constraints of my 
personal values interact with Booth’s constraints on reliable narration; I cannot 
trust a Nazi spy.  There is no textual reason to think Tsun would lie to me simply 
because he is a Nazi sympathizer, but nevertheless, my negative judgment about 
his political ethics infects his narrative ethics.  While at the beginning of the story, 
I cannot locate Tsun’s unreliability specifically in his presentation of ir/relevant 
information or in his mis/evaluation of that information (the two parts of Booth’s 
“Reliable Narrator” constraint along with their negative or “unreliable” valences), 
my reading does reveal the exact disjunct of my interpretive experience from 
Tsun’s.  Suspicious, I re-read everything he tells me over his shoulder, so to 
speak.   
Tsun takes a desperate train ride into the country, closely pursued by a 
British Inspector, to find the one man who can help him communicate the location 
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of a British airstrip to Hitler’s forces in Berlin.  At the train stop he thinks is his, 
he asks some children on the platform if he is at Ashgrove, and they tell him yes.  
After he gets down from the train, the following scene ensues: 
 A lamp lit the platform, but the children’s faces remained in a 
shadow.  One of them asked me:  “Are you going to Dr. Stephen Albert’s 
house?”  Without waiting for my answer, another said:  “The house is a 
good distance away but you won’t get lost if you take the road to the left 
and bear to the left at every crossroad.”  I threw them a coin (my last), 
went down some stone steps and started along a deserted road. (93) 
Children with shadowy faces who seem to know exactly what a complete stranger 
is looking for—this seems dangerous to me.  Why else would Tsun have 
mentioned it, unless it were relevant, unless it were going to come back to haunt 
him later in the story?  After all, I know my detective fiction.  However, Tsun 
clearly evaluates the children as harmless and moves on without comment.  In my 
newfound distrust of Tsun, I re-evaluate the scene he has just presented me and 
decide the children are a threat to Tsun, as depicted in Table 2. 
Table 2:  Decision about Tsun’s narration of children 
   Relevant Info Reliable eval 
children a threat to Tsun  * 
   children not a threat *!  
My decision shows me just what my problem with Tsun as an unreliable 
narrator is.  Before, the two criteria, that a narrator must provide reliable access to 
relevant information and should reliably guide my evaluation of that information, 
were not ranked with respect to each other because they had not yet competed 
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with each other in my reading experience.  Now, however, they do compete, and 
my chosen interpretation of the scene with the children reveals that I rank 
relevance higher than evaluation in deciding whether or not to trust my narrator; 
the solid vertical line between the constraints indicates this crucial ranking.  If I 
believed Tsun’s assessment that the children were irrelevant to his mission in the 
long run, then I would have to admit he evaluated them reliably.  But that would 
mean he took up my attention with totally irrelevant characters at a pivotal 
juncture in the story, and I cannot accept that in my current nervous state, 
wondering what Tsun’s fate will be at the very climax of the story.  Tsun has 
violated the Gricean maxim of Relevance, leaving me no clues that would help 
me infer an ironic meaning from his irrelevant attention to the shadowy children; 
they thus loom in the background, unresolved and unrelated to any other action in 
the story.  So, I choose to believe, against Tsun, that the children are relevant, that 
Tsun has not evaluated their threat correctly, and I read on waiting for them to 
reappear from a dark alley at a crucial moment. 
They do not.  The story ends with no further reference to the children and 
no evidence of any effect they might have had on the outcome.  If I had not done 
this exercise in examining the interaction of my expectations about Tsun’s 
reliability, I would have remained unaware of a key element of my experience of 
Borges’s story-telling.  The children are not the only detail in Borges’s story that 
seems to lead nowhere, that proves irrelevant to anticipating and understanding 
Tsun’s mission.  But the story is, in the end, about a maze, the “Garden of the 
Forking Paths.”  The irrelevancies in the narration I encountered are like wrong 
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turns I took in the maze, leading to dead ends.  These “wrong turns” create a 
powerful atmosphere of disorientation, frustration, and foreboding that could not 
be constructed another way.  This exercise illustrates just one way in which an 
OT-type analysis can help explicate blockages or re-interpretations in the reading 
process and help the relative strengths of interpretive expectations to emerge at 
the same time. 
5.42 Strengths and weaknesses of OT 
This interpretive decision about the reliability of a narrator is a very small 
move in the incredibly complex activity of reading.  Taken together, all the 
reading expectations in play at any moment of reading (pragmatic, textual, 
personal, sociolinguistic, generic, etc.) describe the reader’s current set toward or 
“filter” on meanings arising from the text.  This is the most promising aspect of 
OT as applied to reading the hoaxes—the potential to recover from the immediate 
reader response to the hoaxes a ranked “filter” of expectations that both structures 
the individual reading process and provides a set of common reading expectations 
at the time.   
A few caveats are in order with respect to the adaptation of OT to reading 
hoaxes.  First, OT provides a descriptive model of hoax reading rather than a 
prescriptive or predictive one.  The purpose of the model is to describe as 
completely as possible all of the expectations readers held in common when they 
tried to decide about the truth-value of a hoax.  The model is testable, of course, 
against the final decisions readers made.  If the model fails to locate the “deciding 
factors” in their reading processes, to reflect all of the interpretive conflicts 
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apparent in the archived responses, then it must be edited until an explanatory 
description is achieved.  But the model itself does not predict if a particular hoax 
will or will not be successful.  The reason for this is that the expectations that 
form the engine of the model are expectations about science news, not hoaxes.  As 
an indirect project, one could apply the model to a particular hoax to see if it 
satisfied readers’ top expectations of a good science news story, but this would be 
a shaky prediction excluding key and uncontrollable factors in a hoax’s success 
such as its serendipitous timing with other similar stories in the news or with the 
political climate at the time of the hoax’s publication.  OT works with historical 
judgments to open up the process of hoaxing for close examination.  The 
conclusions that can be drawn from it pertain to the top-ranked reader 
expectations of science and why hoaxers chose to ridicule readers for these 
priorities. 
 A second caveat follows from the historicity of the project.  In the reading 
of the Borges story, I had access to my own moment-by-moment interpretations 
during the reading process.  The reader responses to the nineteenth-century 
hoaxes, on the other hand, are mostly post hoc evaluations of the hoaxes’ truth or 
falsehood.  So, while OT is capable of modeling the reading process online, as 
demonstrated above, the interpretive decisions modeled in this project will be 
after-the-fact evaluations, due to constraints in the historical data.   
A third point about the mismatch of OT and reading the hoaxes—OT as it 
is used in phonology assumes the universality of its constraints.  As we have seen 
from the levels involved in reading, however, few if any can be universal.  Yet, 
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some reading constraints are shared by reading communities with some common 
reading experience behind them, similar to Fish’s “interpretive communities.”  
While it is tempting to say that some reading expectations, especially the lower-
level linguistic and pragmatic expectations, likely hold up in an even broader 
arena, between communities, that is a problem for future applications of OT to 
literary reading.  The present project will focus quite specifically on reader 
expectations of the genre of popular science news and of ethnoscience. 
5.5 Summary of methodology 
A methodology combining rhetorical techniques for reconstructing the 
expectations of historical readers with an OT-type framework for modeling the 
interactions of those expectations will enable this project in several specific ways.  
First, it will help me achieve my goal of treating in a detailed and rigorous fashion 
the question of how exactly the authors of the hoaxes manipulated reader 
expectations to fool their readers.  It will help me account for the rhetorical effect 
of the hoaxes in terms of readers transforming (and being transformed by) their 
expectations of science and science news.  Hopefully, modeling these 
transformations will also allow me to make a principled contribution to the 
discussion of scientific genres by detailing the specific rhetorical moves an author 
makes when engaging readers in a hoax.  Most importantly, my methodology will 
help me recuperate from the historical data of contemporary reader responses a set 
of core expectations that 19th century readers may have put into play as they read 
scientific media hoaxes. 
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6.  SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS 
In this chapter I have outlined desiderata for a new rhetorical definition of 
a hoax as a rhetorical event, rather than a text.  I have established an exigence for 
studying nineteenth-century scientific media hoaxes because they speak directly 
to current historical and methodological problems in rhetoric of science and 
reader-oriented criticism of nineteenth-century literature.  I have also detailed the 
expectation-based methodology to be used in answering questions of how the 
hoaxes fooled their readers and what kind of rhetorical activities the hoaxers were 
engaging their readers in.   
In Chapter Two, “Poe’s Hoaxing and the Construction of Readerships,” I 
will put my methodology to the test in analyzing contemporary reactions to the 
hoaxes of Poe and his media rival Richard Adams Locke.  I develop a preliminary 
“filter” of ranked expectations held by antebellum science newsreaders in 1835.  
A careful examination of the rhetorical process by which a hoax creates a double 
readership—dupes and savants—when matched with Poe’s cosmology expressed 
in Eureka, reveals that Poe used hoaxes not just to demonstrate his superiority but 
also to materialize a community of like-minded savants who rejected the 
“illusion” of professional Baconian science in favor of an epistemology of 
imagination. 
In Chapter Three, “Twain and the Social Mechanics of Laughter,” close 
examination of reader responses to “The Petrified Man” (1862) and Twain’s other 
non-scientific hoaxes leads to changes to the filter of reader expectations in order 
to reflect changes in newsreading culture since 1835.  Twain’s commentary on his 
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hoaxes offers new insights into the psychology of hoax reading—specifically the 
power of attention and of reader agendas in constructing belief or doubt.  Twain’s 
scientific hoaxing emerges as a special social mechanics engineered to produce 
laughter as an affirmation of self-determination—engineered, also, to demonstrate 
Twain’s considerable authority over his readers.  These findings encourage 
revision of traditional characterizations of science as an antisocial, 
mechanistically destructive theme in Twain’s work. 
Chapter Four, “The Hoaxes of Dan De Quille—Building and Defending 
the West,” constitutes the first extensive rhetorical assessment of the hoaxes of 
miner and writer Dan De Quille (William Wright).  De Quille’s hoaxing is unique 
in that he embraces both science and the power of popular science writing, 
including hoaxes, to literally build worlds, to construct the state of Nevada and 
the idea of the West.  Critical of Eastern commercial appropriations of Western 
resources, De Quille enthusiastically championed self-made scientists and 
engineers as the new folk heroes of the West.   
In Chapter Five, “The Mechanics of Hoaxing,” based on the hoaxers’ 
preoccupation with machines, I propose the hoax as a rhetorical machine that 
transforms public assumptions about science into awareness that scientific truths 
are constructing a new reality for nineteenth-century Americans.  Then, I suggest 
extensions of a rhetorical method based on reader expectations—including 
empirical studies of differences in composition strategies between experts and 
novices, and historical studies of gender in reading.  In the Epilogue I analyze the 
Sokal hoax as yet another move in the construction of a tense relationship 
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between American arts and sciences in the media that began with the nineteenth-





Chapter Two:  Poe’s Hoaxing and the Construction of 
Readerships 
Edgar Allan Poe is the ideal figure with which to begin any study of 
scientific hoaxing in America.  Scientifically educated beyond many of his peers 
and a pioneer in the development of at least two genres that foreground scientific 
epistemologies—science fiction and detective fiction—he embodies the tensions 
between the arts and sciences in the Jacksonian era.  His hoaxes were public acts 
meant to call attention to these tensions, as they were written on science-related 
topics and carefully crafted and presented in popular news media for particular 
reading audiences.  His later two hoaxes, “The Facts in the Case of M. Valdemar” 
(1845) and “Von Kempelen and His Discovery” (1849) dealt with the 
psychological sciences, what are now deemed “pseudosciences”:  mesmerism and 
alchemy.  But his first two hoaxes, “Hans Phaall—A Tale” (1835) and “The 
Balloon-Hoax” (1844) built fantastically intricate flying machines whose structure 
encapsulated a striking argument about reality, an argument Poe also makes in 
Eureka:  that we should “put faith in dreams as the only realities” (1).  Poe asked 
with his technological hoaxes:  What was truer, or more real—that something 
actually existed and worked in the world, or that it could exist and work?  Or, as 
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Poe himself stated the case in his defense of his hoax “The Facts in the Case of M. 
Valdemar”:  "if the story was not true…it should have been" (Ljungquist 204). 
Poe developed this argument about reality through his hoaxing practices 
and the peculiar relationships with reality and readership that hoaxing enjoins.  He 
and Richard Adams Locke, through the competition of their moon hoaxes in the 
Eastern media in 1835, innovated the genre of the scientific media hoax in 
America.  Both writers baited their hooks with a cluster of rhetorical lures that 
mimicked the popular science reports their readers were accustomed to 
encountering in almost every newspaper and magazine.  Poe, particularly, was 
explicit about what he thought his readers expected from a science report; he 
discussed these reader expectations several times in different formats dating from 
the overshadowing of his first hoax by Locke’s hoax.  By intuiting and then re-
performing his readers’ expectations about how science was read, Poe managed to 
hoax a good percentage of his readers in at least two of his four attempts.  He did 
this for several purposes:  first, to demonstrate his creative authority over his 
readers even to the point of altering their realities; second, to criticize those 
readers for their admiration and funding of professional scientists instead of 
professional artists; thirdly, to reveal the vulnerability of purely inductive, 
Baconian science and thereby lay the groundwork for his own imaginative 
epistemology, outlined in Eureka; and fourth, to materialize a community of 
fellow geniuses sympathetic to Eureka’s epistemology. 
  Because of his explicit attention to what makes a hoax work, Poe’s 
hoaxing practices offer an ideal opportunity to test the methodology laid out in the 
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previous chapter—using contemporary reader responses to elicit and structure a 
“filter” of reading expectations that Poe’s readers might have held in common 
when coming to his hoaxes.  First, however, it is important to establish how Poe 
learned science and the conventions of writing it for a lay audience.  After that, 
we will examine the competition between Poe’s “Hans Phaall—A Tale” and 
Locke’s “Moon Hoax” in the media and the various reactions to the hoaxes in 
order to glean readers’ expectations of a “true” popular science report; as part of 
this project, we will also consider the rhetoric of the popular science article at the 
time as another source of conventions that readers came to expect.  Using7 
Optimality Theory, I will attempt to model how these expectations interacted and 
competed with each other in producing either belief or doubt in the moon hoaxes.  
Then, I will extend the method to examine the rest of Poe’s hoaxes and, based on 
reader reactions to them, to make changes to the filter of antebellum reader 
expectations for science news.  After a discussion of the ways in which a 
rhetorical methodology solves problems that have plagued Poe hoaxing 
scholarship—particularly problems with understanding his choice of hoaxing 
when constructing relationships with his public, I will conclude by connecting 
Poe’s hoaxing to his scientific epistemology in Eureka and suggesting that both 
projects reveal Poe gesturing toward community. 
1.  OVERVIEW OF POE’S SCIENTIFIC AND RHETORICAL ACCULTURATION 
This section considers how Poe came to know science as a cultural 
practice.  According to Roland Barthes, who analyzed the “structuration” of a Poe 
hoax in depth, Poe internalized, through learning to read and write about science, 
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a “cultural code…the code of knowledge, or rather of human knowledge, public 
opinion, of culture as transmitted through books, education, and in a more 
general, more diffuse way, through all sociality” (Barthes 94).  We will return to 
Barthes’s particular structuring of this notion of code after examining the media 
through which Poe acclimated himself to scientific culture and its popular 
rhetoric. 
Certainly, Poe’s excellent primary education played a crucial role in the 
development of his scientific rhetoric—particularly in terms of how to cope with 
an audience.  Under the aegis of his foster father, John Allan, Poe was educated in 
excellent private schools both in England and America.  From the age of about 
seven to the age of 11, Poe studied French, Latin, history, and literature at the 
Manor House School in Stoke-Newington outside London (Quinn 71).  When his 
family returned to the United States in 1820 after a business venture of Mr. 
Allan’s fell through, Poe was enrolled in Joseph Clarke’s private school in 
Richmond.  He studied more classical languages here; from tuition bills and 
letters from Clarke, we know Poe was reading Horace’s Odes and Cicero’s De 
Officiis (and likely De Oratore) in Latin, and Homer in Greek.  By the age of 16, 
Poe was fluent in French, dexterous in Latin, and triumphant in speech 
competitions with his classmates (Quinn 83-84).  While reading Cicero and 
copying and “capping” Latin verses likely amounted to his only formal rhetorical 
training at this point, his studies undoubtedly acquainted him with the classical 
structure of arguments and techniques for persuading audiences.  The sciences, 
even natural philosophy or theology, were not part of a traditional primary 
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education at this time.  They were more advanced studies reserved for the 
university. 
Poe entered the University of Virginia in 1826, and though he got himself 
kicked out for gambling by December of that year, he nonetheless distinguished 
himself in his course of modern and classical languages (Quinn 109).  His library 
card reveals that he checked out many history texts in addition to works by 
Voltaire and Byron.  Although Poe was not enrolled in any rhetoric classes and 
left behind no evidence of having checked out or bought any rhetoric texts, he 
was active in a debating society at the university, which indicates that his interest 
in argumentation, in engaging and persuading an audience to his point of view, 
had not waned (Quinn 104).  Susan Booker Welsh in her dissertation Edgar Allan 
Poe and the Rhetoric of Science argues that George Campbell’s Philosophy of 
Rhetoric was the primary rhetoric text in American colleges from 1800-1850, and 
that Poe must have read it.  Although there is no direct evidence of this, Welsh 
cites as circumstantial evidence Poe’s review of Leigh Hunt’s Imagination and 
Fancy that is very Campbellian in tenor, overall, as it criticizes Hunt for his purely 
inductive model that excludes speculation, which Poe believed was the duty of 
literary philosophers as public truth-makers (Welsh 90, 111).  Whatever his actual 
indebtedness to Campbell might be, Poe openly employed many of the principles 
of faculty psychology in Poe’s Dupin tales and in his Philosophy of Composition 
(Welsh 231).  And, famously, Poe touts the “faculty” of intuition and the 
imagination over syllogistic logic in Eureka (17).  Rather more crucial for the 
purposes of explaining Poe’s hoaxing practices is the possible Campbellian legacy 
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of a stochastic model of belief.  Poe recognized that belief, for his readers, was 
not a matter of positive demonstration, but a matter of likelihood.  This may 
explain his repeated emphasis, in his rhetorical analysis of Locke’s “Moon-
Hoax,” on scientific detail as the most important factor in making a hoax seem 
probable, and therefore acceptable, to the reader.   
Although Poe’s formal education ended with his withdrawal from the 
University of Virginia, Poe still read widely, especially in science, which 
monopolized his reading and writing attentions even from this early period.  He 
published Al Aaraaf, Tamerlane and Minor Poems in 1829, and the first poem in 
the collection was the “Sonnet—To Science.”  Traditionally viewed as an early 
expression of Poe’s antipathy toward contemporary Baconian inductive science, 
there is resident in the poem, however, an inkling of the fascination with 
science—especially mathematics, astronomy, mechanics, cryptography, and 
psychology—that would dictate Poe’s choice of topics for the rest of his writing 
career.  In the sonnet Poe concludes that science has “torn from me/The summer 
dream beneath the tamarind tree” (Poe “Sonnet” 771-72).  While this image 
amplifies the theme developed in the rest of the poem of the damage science has 
done to the arts, another meaning lies very close to the surface:  Poe cannot leave 
science alone.  It enthralls him, it disturbs his rest.  One might anticipate from this 
very early sentiment what Poe indeed goes on to attempt in Eureka—a 
reconciliation between science and imagination, the two forces that lay claim to 
Poe’s intellectual life. 
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Rather than continuing along this vein, however, and winding up 
psychoanalyzing Poe’s predilections for science and technology, this project, due 
to its focus on conventions of reading popular science, requires instead an 
examination of the scientific climate in which Poe read and wrote in the 1830s 
and 1840s.  In Barthes’s words once more, we will now survey for antebellum 
American science “the code of knowledge, or rather of human knowledge, public 
opinion, of culture as transmitted…in a more general, more diffuse way, through 
all sociality.” 
1.1 Science in antebellum America 
In Chapter One we discussed the most general cultural forces affecting 
scientific culture in the Jacksonian period.  Principal among these was a feedback 
loop of desire between professionalizing scientists and the lay public, driven by 
both an urgent desire for new technologies and an equally urgent need for funding 
and public support.  When considering Poe’s scientific acculturation, however, we 
must focus more closely on the lacunae that were developing between 
professional and lay readers and between professional scientific and artistic 
communities.  As Judith Yaross Lee put the situation in her case study of the 
“Fossil Feud” between paleontologists Edward Drinker Cope and Othniel Marsh 
later in the century, “the role of the lay public in nineteenth-century science 
shifted from participant to spectator” (Lee “Fossil” 3).  The public was constantly 
hungry for news of what was going on behind closed study doors and on distant 
expeditions.  Poe’s hoaxes addressed the lack of public scientific information and 
the widening divide between the professional conditions of scientists and artists, 
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and they did this by exploiting “bridging” institutions that were already trying to 
redress these imbalances:  specifically, technology—especially as commodified in 
advertisements in the popular press, “scientific” spectacles like those in Barnum’s 
American Museum, mesmerism and other “pseudosciences,” and scientific 
treatises and articles written for general audiences. 
The popular media did its best to satisfy its readers’ desires for science.  
Newspapers were filled with bombastic announcements of scientific triumphs:  
“The Annihilation of Space!” gushed the 4 June 1844 New York Herald over 
Morse’s invention of the telegraph.  Significantly, the papers were also packed 
with advertisements trumpeting the latest in pills, galvanic rings, lamps, and even 
hydraulics that, for installments of mere pennies, could revolutionize the 
subscriber’s lifestyle.  Via the technology market, science was sold, and thus 
reconciled, to the lay public as a commodity. 
This mercenary connection between science, publics, and art made 
spectacle as much a part of science during this period as research was.  Swiss 
naturalist Louis Agassiz attracted much of his funding through his impressive 
collections of exotic stuffed species of animals from all over the world, and he 
was not the only scientist to walk wide-eyed prospective investors down aisles of 
stuffed peacocks and tortoises (Miller “Political” 102).  It is little wonder, then, 
that P.T. Barnum’s collection of freaks of nature in his American Museum in 
Boston could flourish during the middle of the century and, yet, still be counted 
“scientific” by a distinguished natural scientist like Spencer Baird, himself a 
veteran peacock-stuffer (Betts 357).  Clearly, not only technology, but also 
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experimental science, were fully on the American market in the 1830s and 1840s 
and were considered entertainment as well as a commodity. 
This conflation of science and spectacle also created a space for play in 
the public sector for what are now considered pseudosciences, but what were then 
becoming known as “social sciences”:  magnetism (mesmerism) and phrenology 
in particular.  The public life of mesmerism is of the greatest interest to us, since 
Poe used it as the topic of his hoax, “The Facts in the Case of M. Valdemar.”  A 
more detailed discussion of Poe’s education in this field appears in the analysis of 
that hoax in section five of this chapter.  However, a few comments are pertinent 
here.  One important observation, given our anachronistic perspective, was that 
mesmerism was one of the best-reputed of the “pseudosciences” because the 
hypnotic trance was a real phenomenon and mesmerists’ claims about the myriad 
effects of the body’s magnetic fields were unfalsifiable at that time in medical 
history; also, mesmerism had no serious competitors in terms of explanatory 
theories of the subconscious.  Consequently, the American Journal of Science, 
Benjamin Silliman’s well-respected Yale general science journal regularly 
featured articles on mesmerism along with more standard reports of discoveries in 
chemistry, geology, and physics. 
Mesmerism, like medicine during this time, was a science with many lay 
practitioners.  Therefore, it helped create a sense of continuity between American 
public life and the increasingly rarified communities of science.  In addition to 
this liaison mesmerism built between the more elite scientific communities and 
the lay public, it forged a second connection between American science and daily 
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American life.  Pseudosciences like mesmerism earned a great deal of their 
credibility via their humanitarian aims.  Their practitioners preached them as 
efficacious for the improvement of human relations and living conditions, matters 
of real concern to antebellum Americans confronted daily with the social 
problems of slavery and of industrialization, with its attending abuse of women 
and immigrants.  Allying itself with the other budding “social sciences” of 
psychology, feminism, and sociology, mesmerism aimed at social reform (Stoehr 
27).  It applied scientific principles to the prediction of behavior; it offered an 
illusion of some kind of control over the bewildering array of motivations and 
styles of personal interaction that were coming into contact (and conflict) with 
each other during the population explosion of the Jacksonian era.  With this innate 
appeal of social control working to its advantage, mesmerism and “other equally 
delicious ism[s],” as Poe deemed them while lampooning their proliferation in 
Eureka (44), constituted a serious attempt at reconciling the explanatory power of 
the increasingly Brahministic academic sciences with the social concerns of the 
average working American.  Acknowledging the bridging function of practices 
like mesmerism is vital to understanding Poe’s hoaxing.  Ever a lover of the 
liminal, Poe recognized the power of the “isms” to tap into the sympathies of his 
readers; thus, he chose mesmerism and alchemy as engines ideally suited to 
driving home the effect of his last two hoaxes, “The Facts in the Case of M. 
Valdemar,” and “Von Kempelen and His Discovery.” 
Poe also availed himself of the last “bridge” to appear between popular 
and elite scientific culture—the rapidly increasing number of pages in the literary 
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weeklies and monthlies (and, beginning in 1835, the penny press) devoted to 
science and technology news.  The innovation of the penny press merits deeper 
discussion in the following section with respect to Locke’s “Moon Hoax,” but 
Poe’s other periodical science reading can be surveyed briefly here.  Poe clearly 
read Silliman’s Journal, but he also demonstrated familiarity with the science 
news in the Home Journal and Evert Duykinck’s Literary World, both magazines 
meant for the general reader (Poe "Von Kempelen"  608).  Special “general 
knowledge” magazines had even developed during Poe’s lifetime for instructional 
use in the home.  The Family Magazine, founded in 1833, published articles on 
the geology of earthquakes and volcanoes next to poetry for the family to read 
together.  Editors clearly recognized that the public thirst for science in the media 
could not longer be satisfied by the rapidly specializing scientific communities, 
and so a popular genre of “science writing” gradually developed, with some 
papers and magazines actually beginning to retain a science writer on staff.  
According to Carolyn D. Hay’s study of the founding of the National Association 
of Science Writers, antebellum newspapers covered a range of scientific topics 
mirrored by the advertisements mentioned earlier:  “medicine, agriculture, 
inventions and technology, pure science, exploration, aviation…,” with 
technology receiving by far the most press (Hay 5,9).   
Scientists themselves realized the popular press was stepping in where 
they had stepped out, and some were troubled by the resulting misinformation of 
the public.  Joseph Henry complained to a friend, “In this country, our newspapers 
are filled with the puffs of quackery and every man who can burn phosphorous in 
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oxygen and exhibit a few experiments to a class of young ladies is called a man of 
science” (Bruce 72).  But even if they felt some responsibility for the “quackery” 
running rampant in the papers, few scientists were willing to write for the public 
on a regular basis (Bruce 118).  It required time they simply did not feel they had.  
A few scientists perhaps even enjoyed treading the fine line that separated 
scientific fact from fantasy in the public gaze.  It is a persistent rumor, for 
instance, that French astronomer Jean-Nicolas Nicollet helped Richard Adams 
Locke craft the details of his “Moon Hoax” in 1835.  After the Civil War, Dr. 
William Osler, Professor of Medicine at Johns Hopkins, entertained himself by 
sending hoax medical reports, usually sexual in tenor, to prestigious medical 
journals through his alter ego Dr. Egerton Yorrick Davis (Boese).  Though hoaxes 
by scientists in this century are rare, the Sokal Hoax, which will be treated in the 
last chapter of this dissertation, is a notable exception. 
This brief survey of the scientific life of America in the Jacksonian period 
leaves us with the sense that even if Poe had restricted his scientific curiosity as a 
reader entirely to the popular press and the court of “public opinion” as Barthes 
would term it—Lyceum science lectures, advertisements and news about 
mesmerism and other scientific wonders, and the daily innovations in 
transportation and communication—he would have had an impressive scientific 
education.  However, Poe further sought out and eagerly devoured the writings of 
European scientists in American reprint.  Especially interesting, both for the 
purposes of considering his hoaxes and for appreciating the breadth of Poe’s 
scientific curiosity, are Poe’s readings of the works of astronomer Sir John 
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Herschel and chemist Sir Humphrey Davy, the journals of the balloonist Monck 
Mason, the mathematics of Pierre Laplace, and the travel narratives and 
cosmology of Alexander Humboldt.  Poe also consulted older works by Kepler, 
Newton, and Bacon in writing Eureka.  And, he armed himself with the natural 
philosophy of the German and English Romantic schools, including Kant and 
Byron and, most powerfully, the rhetoric of Coleridge in the Biographia Literaria, 
which figured centrally in Poe’s Philosophy of Composition and the Rationale of 
Verse (Hoffman 86-87).  From these last works he inherited the war between 
science and art that he would struggle to mediate throughout his literary career, 
beginning with “A Sonnet—To Science,” intensifying in the writing of his 
hoaxes, and culminating in Eureka. 
 The influences of these scientific and technological authors and others 
will be examined more closely as each of Poe’s hoaxes is considered in turn.  But 
even a sampling impresses the reader with the resources available to someone like 
Poe, who had a good education, a small amount of money, and wished to learn 
about science in the 1830s and 1840s.  However, neither money, nor breeding, nor 
education guaranteed a working knowledge of the most basic of scientific 
principles, or so lamented an essay by C.L. Barritt in the 22 February 1845 edition 
of the Poe-edited Broadway Journal entitled “Why Are Not the Sciences Better 
Understood?”  Barritt complains in his essay that the cultured “young gentlemen” 
of the day did not even know “why they are warmer in a woolen blanket than in a 
cotton one of equal weight…or why a white hat is cooler than a black one” (115).  
He lays some of the blame for this regrettable state of scientific ignorance on the 
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American primary education system; however, Barritt more squarely indicts the 
characters of these gentlemen, namely their laziness and fondness for the opera, 
fashion, and the romance novel over a little serious reading that would be “of 
more credit of the person, than being able to correct a false step at a cotillion” 
(116).6    Poe had certainly had an upper-class acculturation through John Allan’s 
family.  But whether because of that upbringing or in spite of it—since after he 
lost the post John Allan got for him at West Point, he had almost nothing further 
to do with the Allans—Poe seemed to take his own science education very 
seriously.  As evidenced by his reading and, in his early writing, by the copious 
scientific details of observation and navigation weighing down even such an un-
scientific story as “MS Found in a Bottle,” Poe was committed to the weird 
hybridization required in the writing of science between text on the one hand, and 
the anti-textuality of immediate sensory perception and measurement on the other.  
Indeed, if “MS Found in a Bottle” does not in fact begin autobiographically, it 
could have, as Poe would say: 
Of my country and of my family I have little to say.  Ill usage and length 
of years have driven me from the one, and estranged me from the other.  
                                                 
6 The negative implications of Barritt’s criticism are clear: Barritt does not 
mention educating the working classes or women about science.  With a few 
notable exceptions, like astronomer Maria Mitchell, women were not publicly 
recognized in the media as participants in science (Bois).  While upper class 
laymen were not participants either, exactly, they were at least educated to be 
spectators by the general science journals and other popular media.  Women and 
the working classes were written into the story of American science in the 
decades before the Civil War only as patients and subjects.  The advent of the 
penny press in 1835, which aimed below the upper class belt, altered this situation 
slightly by assuming women, laborers, and immigrants as readers of its 
sensational scientific articles. 
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Hereditary wealth afforded me an education of no common order, and a 
contemplative turn of mind enabled me to methodize the stores which 
early study very diligently garnered up.—Beyond all things, the study of 
the German moralists gave me great delight; not from any ill-advised 
admiration of their eloquent madness, but from the ease with which my 
habits of rigid thought enabled me to detect their falsities…Indeed, a 
strong relish for physical philosophy has, I fear, tinctured my mind with a 
very common error of this age—I mean the habit of referring occurrences, 
even the least susceptible of such reference, to the principles of that 
science.  (Poe “MS” 148) 
The story goes on to relate a horrible sea adventure both very supernatural 
and unscientific.  But Poe remained committed throughout his writings to finding 
that place where “physical philosophy” broke down and imagination took over, 
and marking that spot with words that partook of the traditions of both science 
and art.  Poe was certainly not unique for his time in his dedication to both the arts 
and the sciences:  Emerson’s study of natural history has been detailed in depth by 
Lee Rust Brown; Taylor Stoehr has documented Hawthorne’s fascination with 
nascent social sciences like phrenology; and Melville’s preoccupations with 
industrial and marine science and technology are manifest in stories like Moby 
Dick and “The Paradise of Bachelors and the Tartarus of Maids.”  However, Poe 
was unique in taking the failure envelope—the line at which the stress between art 
and science became too much, where words failed to describe experience, 
experience failed to adhere to scientific principle, and words and science and 
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experience all failed to reliably yield what was true—as the guiding arc for his 
thinking and writing life. 
Neither was Poe content to wrestle with these fractures alone.  Through 
the hoax he coerced his readers into experiencing those problems in a unique way.  
Poe lashed out at his readers through his hoaxes for creating a society he wanted 
to succeed in and could not, a society that made money its end-all-be-all and 
valued “dull realities,” as he expressed it in “Sonnet—To Science,” over what 
could be (Hoffman 185).  It galled Poe that he could barely make ends meet, that 
publishers and booksellers routinely abused writers like him while scientists (from 
his perspective) raked in government and private funding for their technological 
and medical inventions (Dinius 2).  To those readers he managed to dupe with his 
hoaxes, then, Poe communicated for at least a few moments the discomfort he felt 
living in the “reality” of an America committed to what science could do and buy, 
not the possibilities science afforded the imagination for apprehending the true 
core of the world.  This is a powerful motivation, indeed, for choosing the hoax as 
a means of criticizing the ascendancy of professionalized Baconian science in 
America. 
For a medium for this communication, Poe naturally gravitated toward the 
penny press—a place where science news was not only read by a greater 
percentage of the population than any other journal (judging from subscription 
rates), but where science was also sold on a daily basis, in tonics, divining rods, 
and furnaces.  The penny press was the paper crossroads where all the paths that 
Poe followed came together:  professional and lay, educated and uneducated, 
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scientific and supernatural, analytic and poetic, public and private.  There was not 
a better medium for a scientific hoax. 
2.  THE CONTEST BETWEEN “HANS PHAALL” AND LOCKE’S “MOON HOAX”:  
GUESSING READER EXPECTATIONS 
Poe’s first attempt at a hoax is a confusing one to begin with, because it is 
uncertain if Poe even meant “Hans Phaall—A Tale” to be taken as a news report 
of a journey to the moon when it came out in the June 1835 edition of the 
Southern Literary Messenger, which he was then editing for owner Thomas H. 
White.  Later, Poe would claim that it was both a “hoax” and a “jeu d’esprit,” 
both that it was meant to fool its readers, and that it could not have, given its 
“tone of mere banter” (Poe "Note to 'Hans Phaall'" 69).  The story concerns a 
burgher of Rotterdam, one Hans Phaall, who constructs a balloon and sails to the 
moon in order to escape creditors.  Along the way, Phaall pioneers an air 
compressor to help him breathe in space and experiments with the reactions of a 
cat to the vacuum between the earth and the moon.  The moon itself is apparently 
inhabited by dwarf-like people, or so reports a letter flown back to Rotterdam 
from the moon in the same balloon four years later.  Poe clearly intended to 
continue the tale, elaborating on the moon inhabitants, but Locke’s “Moon Hoax” 
stole his thunder, as will be seen shortly.  While much of the language of “Hans 
Phaall” is little short of goofy, in keeping with its original subtitle, “A Tale,” the 
opening of Poe’s first attempt at a hoax sounds newsy enough: 
By late accounts from Rotterdam that city seems to be in a singularly high 
state of philosophical excitement.  Indeed phenomena have there occurred 
of a nature so completely unexpected, so entirely novel, so utterly at 
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variance with pre-conceived opinions, as to leave no doubt on my mind 
that long ere this all Europe is in an uproar, all Physics in a ferment, all 
Dynamics and Astronomy together by the ears. (Poe "Hans Phaall--a Tale" 
565) 
As will be apparent when we examine the form of science reports at this 
time more carefully, this opening actually conforms remarkably well to reader 
expectations of true science discoveries.  However, at least four things in addition 
to the title of the story were already working against Poe if he expected Phaall to 
be taken seriously as an aeronaut.  The tone of “together by the ears” is off, and 
Poe has given his byline to the story, a practice more typical of literary than news 
writing at this juncture in the history of American journalism.  In addition, Poe’s 
literary reputation among Southern readers at this point was shaped largely by the 
award-winning “MS Found in a Bottle,” a horrifying and obviously fanciful tale 
of a phantom voyage, published in the Baltimore Visiter in 1833.  Finally, the 
editorial introduction to this issue of the SLM by Edward V. Sparkhawk claims 
that “Hans Phaall” “will add much to [Poe’s] reputation as an imaginative writer” 
even as he notes out of the other side of his quill that in the days of frequent and 
well-publicized experiments in balloon aviation, “a journey to the moon may not 
be considered a matter of mere moonshine” (Thomas 160). 
As might be expected after this caviling introduction, there was no serious 
debate over the truth of “Hans Phaall.”  Dwight Thomas and David Jackson in 
The Poe Log list nine notices of the story, and all of them focus on the humor of 
the piece, not its possibility.  The Charleston Daily Courier praised “the 
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minuteness of detail, which properly belongs to truth” in the story but went on to 
deem it “one of the most exquisite specimens of blended humor and science that 
we have ever perused” (161-162).  Poe mentions two reviews in a letter to 
Thomas White that focus on the opening as the weakness of the piece [Poe Letters 
65].  Indeed, as the story unfolds, it sounded very little like a news story.  As 
Phaall’s strange makeshift balloon descends from the sky over Rotterdam, Poe 
frames the Dutch response in a manner that contrasts sharply with both the 
relatively matter-of-fact language of the first paragraph of the story and with the 
parade of scientific minutiae about Phaall’s balloon a few columns later:   
What could it be?  In the name of all the vrows and devils in Rotterdam, 
what could it possibly portend?  No one knew—no one could imagine—
no one, not even the burgomaster Mynheer Superbus Von Underduk, had 
the slightest clue by which to unravel the mystery:  so, as nothing more 
reasonable could be done, every one to a man replaced his pipe carefully 
in the left corner of his mouth, and, cocking up his right eye towards the 
phenomenon, puffed, paused, waddled about, and grunted significantly—
then waddled back, grunted, paused, and finally—puffed again.” (Poe 
“Hans Phaall—A Tale” 565) 
Strange language indeed for a news report.  Poe acknowledged his critics’ 
negative reaction to the “tone of mere banter” in the tale; he believed, in fact, that 
the humorous tone of “Hans Phaall” was the principal reason it did not fly as a 
hoax (Poe Literati: Richard Adams Locke 160).  Accordingly, he tuned the 
language of his future hoaxes to a more newsy resonance.  However, in spite of its 
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initial fizzling, “Hans Phaall’s” public career was just beginning.  It got a kick 
start from another fantastical moon story that appeared just two months later in 
the brand new penny daily the New York Sun. 
Before the second moon hoax is considered, a digression is in order to 
explain the place of the Sun in the reading life of antebellum New York.  Founded 
in 1833 by Benjamin Day, the Sun was the harbinger of what would be termed the 
“penny press”; it was a single sheet folded to four pages and sold for a penny, 
containing, in addition to the usual copious advertisements, news items appealing 
especially to the working class and new immigrants, its target demographic 
(Fedler 68).  The Sun contained notices of all the sorts of things that still make up 
the bulk of conversations at coffee shops and street corners:  fires, accidents, the 
daily police blotter, spectacles and scientific wonders on display at local 
museums, and even humorous recitals of domestic disputes and other “human 
interest” stories.  These quotidian topics actually constituted a radical departure 
from the reading material New Yorkers previously had at their disposal.  The 
literary weeklies, which cost six cents instead of a penny, were almost all owned 
by political organizations that filled their pages with political news and party 
propaganda.  The penny paper’s low price and gossipy material aligned it with the 
Jacksonian democratic spirit in general and with the working class and 
immigrants in particular. New York Herald editor James Gordon Bennett 
trumpeted in the pages of his penny daily:  "I feel myself in this land to be 
engaged in a great cause--the cause of truth, public faith, and science against 
falsehood, fraud, and ignorance" (Nelkin 85).  He had some justification for his 
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claim to being the paper of “public faith” because of the sheer number of people 
who read the penny dailies.  Frank Luther Mott argues in American Journalism: A 
History that the 1830s saw more American newsreaders than ever with an influx 
of immigrants who took their voting rights seriously and read the papers for 
political information; with public education squashing illiteracy to 9% or less and 
creating an ever-growing percentage of women readers;7 and, with advancements 
in the material conditions of reading as simple as better lighting in homes and 
streets (303).  So, the penny press had a broad-based lower-and-middle class 
audience who were interested in information both for entertainment and for 
political use. 
The New York Sun had on staff a science writer, one of the few at the 
time, named Richard Adams Locke.  Benjamin Day had hired him to cover the 
trail of the infamous cult leader Matthias the Prophet.  Locke’s skillful handling 
of the bizarre metaphysical and religious elements of the story put the Sun ahead 
of its rival penny dailies, Bennett’s Herald and the New York Transcript, in 
subscriptions.  So, after that Locke was employed to cover topics of general 
interest in the sciences and philosophy especially for the Sun (Locke Moon Hoax  
xxxi). 
                                                 
7 Sandra Harding claims the industrial revolution had the opposite effect 
on the woman reader—that it kept her out of all serious centers of policy-making 
because the industrial economy constructed her as less productive of market 
goods, and therefore less valuable.  Consequently, her education was not a 
priority.  However, Mott and Harding are not necessarily arguing incommensurate 
points; it is feasible that women could be educated well enough to read the penny 
dailies but might still be excluded from the elite literary and scientific 
communities—therefore, the political communities. 
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On 21 August 1835, a blurb appeared on page two of the Sun claiming 
that Sir John Herschel, who was known to most news readers to be engaged in 
observations in South Africa with his new telescope, had made some remarkable 
discoveries.  There was nothing further for four days, and then, on the front page 
of the 25 August Sun, after an editorial note advising readers that the following 
story was reprinted from the Edinburgh Journal of Science, minus most of the 
“more abstruse and mathematical parts” of the discovery, the story commenced: 
 In this unusual addition to our Journal, we have the happiness of 
making known to the British public, and thence to the whole civilized 
world, recent discoveries in Astronomy which will build an imperishable 
monument to the age in which we live, and confer upon the present 
generation of the human race a proud distinction through all future time.  
It has been poetically said, that the stars of heaven are the hereditary 
regalia of man, as the intellectual sovereign of the animal creation.  He 
may now fold the Zodiack around him with a loftier consciousness of his 
mental supremacy.  (Locke Moon Hoax 7) 
After some preliminary reflections on the wonders of astronomy, the story 
went on to detail how the lens for Herschel’s telescope was ground, how it was 
transported to South Africa and the observatory assembled, how the problem of 
insufficient lighting was overcome, etc., to an almost overwhelmingly technical 
degree.  The next day the Sun ran the columns revealing what readers had been 
waiting for:  the moon bison, man-bats, moon poppies, and moon beavers that 
Herschel had glimpsed through his telescope.  The paper sold 19,360 copies, the 
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largest circulation of any paper ever in America (Locke Moon Hoax vii).  The 
series went on for a week, and the reaction of the competing media was almost 
perfectly divided.  Of the major New York newspapers surveyed by Ormond 
Seavey in his 1975 edition of Locke’s story, six came out in support of the 
Herschel report, three stayed on the fence, and five criticized it, although most of 
the negative responses were indirect or ironic, perhaps hedging strategies just in 
case a confirmation from Herschel came through.  Two of the critical papers, the 
Journal of Commerce and the Herald, suggested that the whole thing was a hoax; 
the Journal of Commerce even connected Richard Adams Locke’s name with the 
story, on the strength of a “confession” by Locke to a Commerce reporter in a 
pub.  James Gordon Bennett attacked Locke’s character in a Herald editorial, 
intimating aristocratic dissolution involving a chambermaid.  Locke’s only public 
response to any aspect of the brouhaha was to take the moral high ground in a 
defense of his good name (Locke Moon Hoax xvi).  Bennett and the other editors 
then proceeded with a more indirect tone for the duration of the two-week media 
debate following the appearance of the story.  A rumor cropped up that scientists 
from Yale had taken a train up to New York to consult with Locke about the story 
but had to return unsatisfied; the rumor, though repeated often in histories of the 
hoax, remains unsubstantiated (Locke Moon Hoax xiii). 
Whatever people may have finally decided about the “Moon Hoax,” it was 
the first major hoax of its kind (Roggenkamp), and it fooled a good percentage of 
New Yorkers at first—educated people like clergy and scientists as well—
according to Locke’s contemporary Benson Lossing in his History of New York 
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City (Moss 87).  Another contemporary, British writer Harriet Martineau, said she 
encountered on her 1835 visit to the Northeastern states an atmosphere of almost 
complete credulity surrounding the hoax, with very few exceptions.  She defended 
American readers, however, by claiming that the “Moon Hoax” would have gone 
even further in Europe, since she deemed the quality of science education in 
American comparatively high (22-23).   
People either believed or suspected Locke’s story; parodies immediately 
flourished in the Herald and elsewhere, but nothing was certain except for the 
Sun’s subscription figures.  Locke’s unwitting accomplice in the hoax, Sir John 
Herschel, did not find out about the hoax until four months later, and his reaction 
evinced an appreciation of the human imagination that even Poe would have 
approved: Herschel claimed in a letter to the American captain who brought him a 
clipping of the hoax that it was a “perpetual reminder how trivial are the 
discoveries which all our boasted science has yet revealed or is [likely?] to reveal 
for ages to come in comparison of what exists unknown and unsuspected among 
the realities of nature” (1).  Locke himself claimed ex post facto that he had meant 
his story as a satire of the famous astronomer Thomas K. Dick’s bizarre plan to 
communicate with moon-beings through geometric shapes; however, in view of 
how the report was taken, Locke felt it was an “abortive satire… and in either 
case I am the best self-hoaxed man in the whole community” (Locke Celebrated 
"Moon Story" 30). 
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Edgar Allan Poe, on the other hand, made up his mind almost immediately 
about the hoax.  In a letter to editor John Kennedy dated less than two weeks after 
the “Moon Hoax” finished its run in the Sun, Poe accused Locke of plagiarism: 
 Have you seen the "Discoveries in the Moon"? Do you not think it 
altogether suggested by Hans Phaall? It is very singular, — but when I 
first purposed writing a Tale concerning the Moon, the idea of Telescopic 
discoveries suggested itself to me — but I afterwards abandoned it. I had 
however spoken of it freely, & from many little incidents & apparently 
trivial remarks in those Discoveries I am convinced that the idea was 
stolen from myself. (Poe Letters, vol. 1, 74) 
Apparently Poe pursued these charges publicly in the papers but not 
legally, and he was not the only one who saw a similarity between the two moon 
stories; the New York Transcript printed them together and speculated they were 
by the same person (Locke Moon Hoax 69).  Poe eventually had to relinquish his 
literary vendetta against Locke as it proved unproductive (Poe Literati:  Richard 
Adams Locke  162).  However, in the process of protesting both the similarities 
and the differences between the two hoaxes, Poe revealed a great deal about the 
construction of “Hans Phaall” and the assumptions that he made about popular 
science reading habits while fuming over the “Moon Hoax.”  These assumptions 
should concern us because they were tested on real readers, and at least some of 
them rang true.  In other words, we know that Poe and Locke correctly guessed a 
percentage of their readers’ expectations because the “Moon Hoax,” in particular, 
worked.  It was in toto a successful experiment in producing a certain reader 
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response via a series of certain rhetorical moves.  It is these expected rhetorical 
moves that this project aims to recollect and use as the basis for analysis of Poe’s 
future hoaxing practices. 
3.  COLLECTING READER EXPECTATIONS 
It is impossible to determine precisely how readers in the 1830s and 1840s 
read popular science reports.  No judgments made from our perspective are 
accurate or comprehensive, and contemporary opinions are biased by their 
imbrication in the reading culture.  As James Machor describes the difficulty, 
“…the impossibility of full and unmediated access to historical readers 
ineluctably limits efforts to ‘recapture’ reading as a historical act" (xxii).  This is 
precisely the problem that has dogged historical reading researchers, as discussed 
in the methods section of Chapter One.  To briefly recap the double bind of 
historical rhetorical analysis, many New Historical assessments of reading in the 
nineteenth century have provided rich historical detail and context that still, 
however, fall short of describing how readers read at the time, (Machor x).  On 
the other hand, modern Reader Response approaches to nineteenth century texts 
can produce anachronistic readings that communicate little besides the 
idiosyncratic reactions of a single twentieth or twenty-first-century reader.  
Although it is certainly not of the Reader Response school, Roland Barthes’s 
influential reading of Poe’s hoax “The Facts in the Case of M. Valdemar” is a 
good case study in the methodological pitfalls of a reading that ignores the 
original publication context of the text.   
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Barthes’s study begins by claiming history is unnecessary for the reading 
of “M. Valdemar,” but he cannot avoid invoking it to explain how the story taps 
into a roiling nineteenth-century craze over mesmerism (Barthes 86).  When it 
comes to interpreting the cultural codes the story supposedly carries, Barthes 
eschews the publication history of “M. Valdemar”—including the crucial fact that 
it was originally read not as science fiction, as Barthes reads it, but as news.  That 
basic assumption about the truth-value of the piece radically alters the 
interpretation of all codes in “M. Valdemar,” but Barthes does not acknowledge 
this dynamic in his reading. 
The present project is an attempt to find a corrective to this sort of 
Heisenbergian paradox of losing either the context or process of a reading event 
by focusing too closely on the other term.  In order to balance the terms, this 
project will treat the hoaxes as case studies in the successful identification and re-
performance of expectations that readers of popular science in the 1830s and 
1840s might have had.  The recuperation of these expectations—in essence a set 
of default beliefs readers may have held in common when approaching science 
news—will provide a portrait of science news reading in the nineteenth century 
that takes into account the historical context of that reading while still providing a 
framework for describing an individual reading of a text. 
These reading expectations naturally range over a broad field, from 
expectations about particular authors’ writing styles to expectations completely 
beyond the pale of study—like a personal predisposition to disbelieve anything 
anyone says because of a recent betrayal by a friend.  For the purposes of this 
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study, I will focus on recuperating only expectations concerning the genre of the 
popular science report and “ethnoscience” or lay beliefs about science—what 
Barthes terms the “code” of science. 
Further, since this is an experiment in this type of reader-oriented 
criticism, there is no protocol for reconstructing reader expectations.  In this case, 
some will be collected from Poe’s and Locke’s own words about the literary 
contest between their hoaxes.  In addition, some reader expectations are 
discernable in the comments in the contemporary papers about both hoaxes.  
Finally, a small sample of popular science reports of the time will be examined 
for similarities in form, style, and content, and those similarities will be treated as 
conventional expectations that antebellum newsreaders developed from repeated 
readings in this genre.   
3.1 Wrangling over the “Moon Hoax” 
Poe attacked the “Moon Hoax” repeatedly in the years between its 
publication and his final burying of the hatchet in his 1846 portrait of Locke for 
his Literati of New York City installments in Godey’s Lady’s Book.  When he 
reprinted “Hans Phaall” as “The Unparalleled Adventure of One Hans Pfaall” in 
Tales of the Grotesque and Arabesque in 1840, he attached a “Note” to it 
comparing the two hoaxes and criticizing Locke’s for its factual shortcomings.  
This essay was repeated in essence in one of Poe’s freelance letters for the 
Columbia Spy in 1845 and again in the Literati portrait of Locke in 1846. 
Poe’s list of the errors in Locke’s hoax is lengthy, and most of his 
complaints are easy to verify on a close examination of the text.  Poe’s list of 
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errata includes these facts:  that creatures seen on other planets would all appear 
upside down—if  in fact you could see any more than the tops of their heads—and 
that Locke had made several simple multiplication errors in reporting the 
magnification power of Herschel’s telescope and the relative sizes of the earth and 
moon.  That Poe was able to catch all of these errors is a testament to his wide 
reading and acumen in astronomy and physics.  In fact, both he and Locke 
benefited from the 1834 American reprint of Herschel’s Treatise on Astronomy in 
preparing their hoaxes (Poe Literati:  Richard Adams Locke  159; Locke Moon 
Hoax  xxv).  However, as Poe points out in his essay, Locke’s scientific gaffes did 
not seem to have much effect on his readership, who suffered from the “gross 
ignorance which is so generally prevalent upon subjects of an astronomical 
nature” (Poe “Note” 70).  Overall, Poe attributes the success of Locke’s hoax to 
the following factors, as summarized in Table 3. 
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Table 3:  Poe’s characteristics of a successful hoax* 
Content of Hoax Novelty:  being "first in the field" and thus finding readers 
unprepared to analyze the merits of the discovery because of 
lack of previous experience with it. 
Sensation:  The "rich...fancy" of the amazing man-bats, moon-
beavers, etc. 
Detail:  Its "execution of details"; the minute observations about 
the construction and dimensions of the telescope and the labors 
of Herschel and his assistants to solve methodological problems. 
(Mabbott 52-55) 
Foreign:  “Exclusive information from a foreign country”; by 
this Poe seems to imply not only the strategy of making the hoax 
hard to confirm, but also the name-dropping of the famous 
foreign scientists and journals. 
Plausibility:  “Analogical truth” and “plausibility,” which Poe 
believes were performed to perfection in his “Hans Phaall.” 
Presentation of 
Hoax in its 
Medium 
Medium:  The reputation of its medium.  The Sun was not yet 
known for printing hoaxes. 
Presentation:  The “consummate tact with which the deception 
was brought forth”; Poe was undoubtedly recalling the blurb on 
page two of the 21 August 1835 Sun forecasting the discovery 





Internal Coherence:  consistency of the argument, an issue 
separate from accuracy. 
Verisimilitude:  “The exquisite vraisemblance of the narration”; 
more than one critic of Locke’s hoax remarked on his elegant 
style, appropriate to such an awesome discovery, and the 
realistic sound of the research diaries “transcribed” by the 
Edinburgh Journal of Science and belonging to Herschel’s chief 
assistant, Andrew Grant. 
Poe’s criteria are internally consistent because each point is independently 
verifiable upon examination of both texts.  However, are his criteria externally 
valid as accurate observations of the reading culture at that time?  Before moving 
                                                 
* Most of the criteria come from the version of the essay appearing in the 
Columbia Spy.  The Foreign, Presentation, Verisimilitude, and Plausibility criteria 
are added in the version of the essay incorporated into Poe’s Literati sketch of 
Locke. 
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on to collect further reader expectations, a brief comparison of the three 
overarching categories of expectations—scientific content, scientific style, and the 
penny press medium—against public conceptions of them at the time will help 
determine if Poe’s observations of reader habits have any external validity.  This 
analytical move comparing Poe’s claims to the culture comes from Steven 
Mailloux’s methodology in Rhetorical Power and helps keep Poe’s reading in 
check culturally (Mailloux 57). 
Regarding the novelty of the scientific content of the hoaxes—
astronomy—Poe claims that the general reading public was woefully under-
informed.  This complaint anticipates C. L. Barritt’s criticism in his 1845 
Broadway Journal article concerning physics.  In 1835 all eyes were trained on 
the night sky watching for Halley’s comet, and some believed it would smash into 
the earth; in general, people were ignorant of what shooting stars and comets even 
were, according to an article on that subject in the July 1835 American Journal of 
Science.  The well-educated members of the upper class and business class had 
access to Herschel’s Treatise on Astronomy and Scottish astronomer Thomas 
Dick’s popular works.  Almanacs were popular in the first quarter of the 
nineteenth century among the middle and agricultural classes, and most general 
weeklies and monthlies carried articles on astronomy (Locke Moon Hoax xxviii-
xxix).  The urban working class and immigrant class, however, would have 
received most of their astronomical acculturation through rumor and the penny 
press.  This educational inequity notwithstanding, even Thomas Dick, as 
mentioned above, thought the moon was inhabited.  No one had seen enough of it 
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to know differently.  Locke’s hoax stepped into a kairos, a rhetorical opportunity, 
afforded by the excited desire to know more about the moon on the one hand, and 
the scantiness of hard information about it among all classes of readers, on the 
other.  Benson Lossing wrote in 1884 of the sad state of astronomical 
understanding that Locke exploited with his hoax:  "Locke had...engaged in 
preparing the 'Moon Hoax'....for the purpose of testing the extent of public 
credulity.  It was a successful experiment” (Moss 87). 
So, the observation Poe makes about the scientific ignorance of Locke’s 
readers seems valid.  His observations about the power of foreign name-dropping 
in the hoax, the sensational nature of the discoveries, and the weight of scientific 
detail are more difficult to verify culturally.  It is hardly worth belaboring name-
dropping as a key element of Locke’s hoax since it is still a powerful ethos-
oriented device in current popular rhetoric of all kinds, from celebrity 
endorsements to society columns.  In terms of the sensational elements of Locke’s 
hoax, the moon-bison and poppies, the graduated races of intelligent beings, one 
needs look no further than P.T. Barnum’s Feejee Mermaid and the other 
“artifacts” in his American Museum to appreciate the appetite in Jacksonian 
America for the spectacular.   
Barnum himself was only exploiting a tendency in America at that time to 
believe in natural wonders, a “predisposition to accept the mechanically probable 
or the organically possible...[that] was a peculiarly patriotic position in Jacksonian 
America" (Harris 73).  There were legitimate reasons for Americans to put their 
faith in the seemingly fantastic.  The American subcontinent was being actively 
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explored by expeditions like Lewis and Clark’s and the Wilkes Expedition (the 
United States Exploring Expedition).  These adventurers returned with an 
astounding bounty of natural specimens along with Native American cultural 
artifacts.  The first bison and gila monsters appeared just as outlandish to New 
Yorkers as Barnum’s Feejee mermaid (cobbled together from a mummified 
monkey and a fish).  In a way the feeling of many Americans toward new 
scientific discoveries was like Poe’s toward his flying machines: an optimistic 
focus beyond what was to what could be.  Barnum thus capitalized on a nearly 
inexhaustible supply of cheerful, patriotic credulity on the part of Americans who 
were as agape on their new home continent as children in a candy store.  To 
illustrate this good-natured naïvete, cultural scholar Jonathan Elmer discusses the 
sign in Barnum’s American Museum that pointed “To the Egress.” When patrons, 
curious to see a female “egre,” would pass through the door, they would find 
themselves out in the alley with no way back into the museum but to pay the fee 
again.  Elmer claims that being duped provided no small amount of pleasure for 
those whose egos were not caught up in being right all the time and that 
Americans, in general, loved to be fooled.  "What Barnum [sold], by means of his 
objects, [was] interpretation" (Elmer 184).  It was the experience of perceiving 
and deciding that Americans enjoyed, the freedom they felt in the Jacksonian era 
to make the reality they wanted to live in.  When Poe sniped that Locke’s 
readership valued sensation over hard fact, he feigned disdain for their comfort 
with ambiguous truth-values.  However, as already evidenced by his tendency to 
argue for the value of his stories on the basis of their plausibility and potentiality, 
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not their factuality, Poe clearly shared some of Locke’s readers’ love of 
suspended meanings and multiple possible realities. 
In terms of the “weight of scientific detail” criterion that Poe felt was 
crucial for a successful scientific hoax, his high valuation of it was corroborated 
to some extent by the rhetoric the Sun used to introduce Locke’s story.  It issued 
the following caveat: 
We are necessarily compelled to omit the more abstruse and mathematical 
parts of the extracts however important they may be as a demonstration of 
those which we have marked for publications; but even the latter cannot 
fail to excite more ardent curiosity and afford more sublime gratification 
than could be created and supplied by any thing short of a direct revelation 
from heaven (Locke Moon Hoax ix).   
Here was the dual implication that the Sun’s readers would not understand 
the math, but they would nonetheless be impressed by it.  It was precisely because 
the typical reader of the hoax could not understand the science that it was so 
valuable in providing a hard veneer beneath which s/he could not penetrate to 
check the facts.  Poe prided himself on being able to do just this, but he repeatedly 
claimed himself to be in the minority.  He constructed “Hans Phaall” with more 
attention to its mechanics than did Locke, perhaps in an attempt to impress a more 
scientifically cultured set of readers.  We will return to this possibility in the 
discussion of Eureka and Poe’s relationship to his readership in the final section 
of this chapter.  Notwithstanding, it appears probable that Poe was in tune with 
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the expectations of his readers when he championed scientific detail as a capital 
method of pulling formulas over their eyes. 
The next category of expectations, concerning the medium of the hoaxes, 
is crucially important for any study of hoaxing, because it is obvious that “Hans 
Phaall” was read differently published in Tales of the Grotesque and Arabesque 
than it was as originally published in the Southern Literary Messenger; and, 
Locke’s story is read very differently when published as The Gregg Press’s 
edition of The Moon Hoax in 1975 or even as The Celebrated Moon Story in 
1852 than it was read as originally published in the Sun.  Despite Bennett’s 
protestation that the penny press stood for “the cause of truth, public faith, and 
science against falsehood, fraud, and ignorance," its readers knew it to publish the 
opposite on occasion (Nelkin 85).  However, on balance, the Sun did publish 
perhaps a greater percentage of factual information than false, so it seems unlikely 
that any story in the Sun would have been judged false out of hand until the facts 
were in.  The “Discoveries in the Moon,” as Poe pointed out in the Presentation 
criterion above, was certainly presented by the Sun exactly as any other important 
discovery just received from abroad would have been.  This could not have but 
helped to contribute to its appearance as a factual report. 
Current research into the effects of presentation and medium on readers 
validates Poe’s claims about their power.  Rolf Zwaan has demonstrated recently 
that the same text will be interpreted differently by two groups of readers if one 
group believes that the text comes from a newspaper and the other group believes 
it came from a short story collection.  The two groups of readers employ different 
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cognitive processes during reading and read for different purposes.  When readers 
believed they were reading a short story, Zwaan’s subjects took longer to read the 
text and had better memory for surface features, i.e. exact wording and phrasing 
of the text.  However, these readers were less likely to pay attention to situational 
aspects of the story, meaning those aspects that connected the story to the real 
world of the reader’s experience—the “who, what, when, where, and why.”  
Subjects who read the story as a news article, on the other hand, read much more 
quickly than the literary readers but had poor recall for exact phrasing.  They 
exhibited better recall for situational information than the literary readers, 
evincing more integration of the elements of the story with the world of their 
experience.  Zwaan’s findings suggest that hoaxes must be examined through the 
lens of reader expectations about medium.  When read in a news context, “Hans 
Phaall” plays with issues of reality and world-view construction; thus, it is a hoax.  
However, when read in Poe’s Collected Tales and Poems, the story is science 
fiction, and truth-value questions are not part of the reading experience. 
Recent research in cognitive psychology supports these separate fields of 
expectations for fiction and non-fiction media.  Leda Cosmides and John Tooby at 
the University of California at Santa Barbara have studied “decoupling,” or the 
ability to suspend a meaning or restrict its scope so that it does not apply to the 
whole epistemological field of the reader—which “truth” does, in Cosmides and 
Tooby’s model.  In fiction reading interpretations arising from the reading process 
are “tagged” with a scope operator that prevents them from changing the world-
view of the reader until further information is gathered, or, indeed, perhaps ever.  
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While news articles would potentially be read as communicating “truth,” and 
therefore their meanings would be applied globally in the readers’ world-view, 
fictional interpretations would be “decoupled” and their truth-values held in 
suspension (Zunshine 219).  This distinction will be useful for separating the 
reading activities of the majority of readers who read Poe’s hoaxes as news from 
those of the few readers who read the story as fiction, purely for entertainment. 
Not only are these observations of Poe’s about Locke’s successful 
rhetorical strategies backed up by recent research, but even more significantly, 
they were also noted and discussed by contemporary commentators on the hoax.  
These criticisms are worth considering before turning to a more detailed 
examination of how well the style of Locke’s hoax matched the style of science 
news articles in general at the time. 
3.2 Reacting to the “Moon Hoax” 
As already discussed, the papers in New York City took up the topic of the 
Moon Hoax with relish in the two weeks after it was printed in the Sun.  The 
papers that professed confidence in the story as it was presented pointed to the 
following features as hallmarks of the report’s authenticity:  Sir John Herschel’s 
name and reputation and the attendant “marks of transatlantic origin,” the 
“intrinsic evidence” of the story, its “versimilitude,” its probability, and its 
novelty in the field of astronomy.  Those papers that expressed suspicion of the 
Sun’s report pointed to factual errors primarily, since an absolute discrediting of 
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the story was not possible without Sir John Herschel’s testimony.8  Significantly, 
the New York  Sunday News, one of the few papers at the outset to express grave 
doubts about the truth of the story, seemed to defer its judgments for fear of 
offending Herschel:  “After all, however, our doubts and incredulity may be a 
wrong to the learned astronomer, and the circumstances of this wonderful 
discovery may be correct.  Let us do him justice, and allow him to tell his story in 
his own way” (Locke Moon Hoax 62).  It would seem, then, from the point of 
view of this paper and the others that were waiting for a decisive word from 
Herschel, that ethos, or personal credibility, was a stronger factor than logos, or 
the facts of the story, in constituting their judgments about Locke’s report.  A few 
papers, interestingly, chose to downplay the issue of authenticity in favor of 
praising Locke’s story for its entertainment value.  The Philadelphia Inquirer 
wrote, “Whether true or false, the article is written with consummate ability, and 
possesses intense interest” (Locke Moon Hoax  62).  And the Sun, which had 
stuck by the veracity of Locke’s story from its first installment on 25 August to 
Benjamin Day’s last editorial on the subject on 16 September, claimed in that 
final piece that Locke’s report, if eventually proven to be nothing more than 
rumors from Scotland, still had a “useful effect in diverting the public mind, for a 
                                                 
8 Ormond Seavey has also collected a few responses from public figures in 
New York City, via letters or diaries, and as with the papers, many commentators 
who suspected the hoax did so on the grounds of its faulty science.  Contemporary 
Michael Floy complained in his diary, “The author of these wonders says that an 
enormous lens of 30 feet diameter was constructed…but he should have said a 
lens of 100 feet diameter, as it is shown by writers on optics that such a diameter 
would be required to ascertain if [sic] any inhabitants in the Moon.  Why not 
make a good lie at once?” (Locke Moon Hoax xiii) 
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while, from that bitter apple of discord, the abolition of slavery”(Locke Moon 
Hoax  xxii).9  Many New Yorkers, then, seemed surprisingly content to keep the 
issue of truth suspended, and to preserve the essence of the hoax, what Poe would 
find so appealing about it: its ability to put reality in play, in tension. 
3.21 Parody 
In the heat of the public debate over the hoax, J. Gordon Bennett’s Herald 
mounted a different sort of critique of Locke’s story, one that is extremely useful 
for our purposes of identifying reader expectations—a parody.  On 2 September 
1835, the Herald printed “A BETTER STORY.—MOST WONDERFUL AND 
ASTOUNDING DISCOVERIES, BY HERSCHELL, THE GRANDSON, L.L.D., 
F.R.S., R.F.L, P.Q.R., &C. &C. &C.””  A parody, like a hoax, must foreground 
what is salient to the reader to achieve its effect.  If a reader did not notice a 
particular feature in the original, the parody cannot achieve a comic effect by 
mimicking it.  So, the parody of Locke’s story is a good barometer of what people 
                                                 
9 The connections between contemporary theories of race and Locke’s 
“Moon-Hoax” is intriguing but beyond the scope of this chapter.  It is ironic that 
Day claims the hoax is a “diversion,” because in fact the hoax is deeply racist: the 
more advanced Locke’s moon-beings become, the lighter their skin.  This motif 
ties in with theories of the day, like Samuel Morton’s (championed by no less a 
personage than famous naturalist Louis Agassiz), that justified slavery through 
“scientific” proof of inferior brain capacity on the part of Blacks and Native 
Americans.  By this reasoning, these groups were not even human, and so slavery 
was no different and no morally worse than owning livestock.  Stephen Jay Gould 
replicated Morton’s study and found no significant differences in brain capacity.  
His results and discussion of the relationship of ideology to science can be found 
in his article "American Polygeny and Craniometry before Darwin:  Blacks and 
Indians as Separate, Inferior Species," a chapter in editor Sandra Harding’s The 
Racial Economy of Science. 
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paid attention to in the story.  This parody mocks five particular features of 
Locke’s tale, as diagrammed in Table 4. 
Table 4:  Salient features of “Moon Hoax” parodied by Herald 
 
Feature of “Moon Hoax” 
 
Feature’s “double” in Herald Parody 
Credentials/authority of 
foreign scientists 
In the title:  “…BY HERSCHELL, THE GRANDSON, 
L.L.D., F.R.S., R.F.L, P.Q.R., &C. &C. &C.””   
Locke’s grandiose metaphors 
like “cloak of the Zodiack” 
Phrases like “stellar diadems” and “more numerous than 
the sparks which escape from a blacksmith’s forge”  
astronomical jargon “hydro, philo, solar, high pressure steam telescope.”   
Locke’s use of real-life 
analogies to make sense of 
immense astronomical 
distances and figures 
“Latitude and longitude can be determined, in less time 
than an alderman could swallow a basin of turtle 
soup….” 
the “weight of scientific 
detail” 
 “Herschell then tasted the water of said ocean, by means 
of a very long hydrostatic tube, attached to the telescope.  
It has a very curious taste.  He found it was composed of 
the following mixture, viz:  2 parts of lemonade, 1 part 
printer’s ink, 1-2 parts mint julep, 1-2 parts flower of 
brimstone.  There was also a slight tincture of blue 
vitriol” (Locke Moon Hoax 65). 
The Herald’s parody thus corroborates at least three major judgments of 
Poe’s about what was salient to readers of science news: authority, precision, and 
“verisimilar” jargon.  Readers would have immediately recognized the bombastic 
metaphors and real-life analogies as characteristic features of science news 
articles.  We turn next to these expectations, which readers of Locke’s hoax 
would have developed quasi-unconsciously through their reading of science news. 
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3.3 Science writing in America, 1830-1845 
To validate Poe’s observations about how closely Locke’s rhetoric 
mimicked the style of a “real” science report, we need to compare his hoax, and 
Poe’s, with contemporary popular science writing.  Specifically, we need to 
consider what might have been salient to readers of science news in the 1830s and 
1840s. 
Antebellum news readers knew what to expect from science writing not 
because they were educated to view it in a certain way, but because they read it 
and developed assumptions based on their repeated experiences with it.  It is well-
documented that readers employ schemata (structured assumptions about speech 
and reading activities) to save cognitive effort (Kintsch 94, 111).  The more 
assumptions that can be made about a text based on past experience with texts like 
it, the greater the processing capacity that can be dedicated to remembering new 
information in the text and evaluating it appropriately.  Genre is probably the 
usual arena for exploring these assumptions, since a genre is itself a sort of 
schema or pattern of rhetorical moves that has been codified in medium, format, 
style, and content over the course of repeated interactions between author and 
reader through a certain textual medium.  As discussed in Chapter One, just this 
sort of feedback loop operated in the development of the research article, 
according to Charles Bazerman’s study of the Philosophical Transactions of the 
Royal Society. 
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3.4 Generic cues in antebellum science news 
Since genre is such a powerful operator in the reading experience, it is 
reasonable to expect that the original readers of Locke’s Moon Hoax and “Hans 
Phaall” came to these texts with definite expectations of what they were going to 
read, based on their past experiences with popular science articles in newspapers 
and magazines.  To try to discern what some of these expectations might have 
been, I examined a small sample of 11 contemporary newspapers and literary 
magazines for two purposes: first, simply to count how many and what kinds of 
science articles appeared in them, and second, to examine those articles for shared 
cues that might have become codified as genre expectations by readers through 
experience. 
The eleven newspapers and magazines selected are listed in Table 6 
below.  They were chosen either because Poe specifically mentioned having read 
science in them, or because Frank Luther Mott listed them as examples of general 
science magazines in A History of American Magazines:  1741-1850.  The one 
slightly anomalous journal in this survey is the American Journal of Science 
(AJS), which was certainly considered a general science journal, and was read 
more widely than the technical journals of the scientific societies.  However, the 
AJS was not likely to have been read by the working-class target demographic of 
the penny dailies due to constraints of money, time, and education.  It is included 
here to represent the general science reading material available to the five percent 
of Americans with a college education at this time, like Poe himself (Lagemann). 
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For each newspaper or magazine, I selected a sample issue during the 
range of years of Poe’s writing career, roughly 1830 to 1850.  Whenever possible, 
an issue was selected from 1835, the year of the contest of Poe’s and Locke’s 
hoaxes, just to sample the kinds of topics readers were seeing in the media that 
year.  This was not always possible as many journals, like the Scientific American 
(est. 1845), did not begin publishing until after that year; and, some years of some 
older newspapers are missing from the microfilm series collected by the 
American Antiquarian Society.   
Within each issue selected, all of the articles and advertisements 
concerning issues of science and technology were categorized and counted to 
provide a snapshot of popular or general science reading in Antebellum America.  
The precise categorization of the articles is not as important for our purposes as an 
overall feel for the range of genres dealing with science and technology that was 
available to readers.  I found three major types of science writing: 
Major Types 
• technology articles 
• short, popular science blurbs and items 
• longer articles treating “pure” science either as experimental report 
or educational piece 
The definitional difference between science and technology is largely a 
product-driven one:  if the article treated an invention, medicine, or machine, it 
was counted as technological.  If it treated principles of science (including 
“pseudosciences” like mesmerism) or the history of the sciences, I counted it 
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scientific.  Within these three categories, several sub-categories were discernable.  
First, there were nine shorter popular science and technology subtypes:   
Shorter Popular Science/Technology Subtypes 
• meta-commentary:  articles specifically treating the state of science 
and/or technology in America 
• blurb/factoid:  short (100 words or fewer) items announcing a new 
scientific or technological discovery or simply stating a “gee whiz” 




• sensation/spectacle announcement 
• educational item 
• how-to:  treats technological or practical procedures for the lay 
reader 
• home experiment:  designed so the reader could observe a more 
abstract scientific principle at work 
Within the category of longer “pure” science articles, three subtypes emerged: 
Longer “Pure” Science Subtypes 
• experimental reports 
• observations 
• reviews of science books.     
The results of the survey are presented in Tables 5 and 6. 
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Table 5:  Antebellum media surveyed with number of science articles per issue 
Magazine/Newspaper Total science articles 
Scientific American 80 
Family Magazine 60 
American Journal of Science 28 
NY Sun 15 
New York Herald 14 
American (Whig) Review 7 
Albany Argus 5 
North American Review 2 
New Yorker 1 
Southern Literary Messenger 1 
Broadway Journal 1 
Table 6:  Distribution of categories of science articles across media sample 
Major  
category 




of total science 
articles 
Major category 
% of total 
science articles 
 Meta 4     2.5%  
 Poem 5     3.1%  
Pop. Sci. Spectacle 1       .6% 27% 
 Joke 7     4.3%  
 Blurb 27   16.5%  
 Educational 5    3.1%  
 Ad 47  28.8%  
Pop Tech. How-to 3    1.8% 46% 
 Blurb 9    5.5%  
 Invention 11    6.7%  
 Educational 24.2*    14.8%*  
“Pure” sci. Experiment 2   1.2% 27% 
 Observation 10   6.1%  
 Review 8   4.9%  
 
                                                 
* Totals and percentages for this category were adjusted as follows:  the 
large number of articles in the educational biannual Family Magazine (53) was 
proportionally reduced in order to treat it statistically as a monthly, thus enabling 
a more equitable comparison with the other magazines and newspapers. 
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These results show, unsurprisingly, that the more specialized science 
journals carried the most science pieces.  The dominance of the Popular 
Technology category is due to the prevalence of Ads, which accounted for almost 
29% of all science articles, the largest “market share” of any of the sub-
categories.  The strong showing of Educational pieces (17.9% total) is slightly 
misleading as these pieces were almost entirely confined to three of the 11 
journals in the sample—the Scientific American, the American Journal of 
Science, and the general-education Family Magazine—and thus were not evenly 
distributed throughout the media, as were the Ads and the Blurb/Factoids, which 
showed a 16.5% market share.  In these shorter pieces, science was marketed to 
the reader as a vendor of goods and services—technologies, in other words; or, as 
in the case of the Blurb/Factoids, as “gee whiz” entertainment.  This sample from 
the media corroborates Robert Bruce’s study of antebellum science, The 
Launching of Modern American Science.  In a review of the letters and journals 
of American scientists of the era, Bruce found that they felt a constant pressure to 
produce technologies; many felt they had to be tied to industry in order to get 
even the most basic funding for their research (72).  The predominance of articles 
selling or advertising science here in part confirms the anxieties of these 
scientists. 
An examination of the rhetoric of the longer articles bears out these 
observations to some extent, as science was figured as solving problems that 
faced average Americans, whether abstractly or concretely via technologies.  
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While no two articles share exactly the same rhetoric, there are some striking 
recurring rhetorical features, summarized in Tables 7-9 below with examples: 
Table 7:  Typical opening of antebellum science articles 
Rhetorical Feature Examples (with features emphasized) 
“Mystery” opening 
• emphasizes sublimity of 
phenomenon with words like 
“wonder,” “enigma,” “mystery,” 
“puzzle,” “awe-inspiring,” 
“amazing,” etc. 
• often employs rhetorical questions 
to emphasize “mystery” aspect of 
phenomenon. 
• often implies that the phenomenon 
is a matter of almost universal 
attention and wonder. 
“Every person of a reflecting mind must 
have often asked himself the question, 
what are shooting stars?  The suddenness 
of their appearance, the rapidity of their 
motions, their brilliancy, the trains which 
they frequently leave behind them are well 
calculated to awaken curiosity…”AJS 
“Few subjects of improvement have 
received more attention for the last twenty 
years than this, and it is with many people 
a matter of astonishment, that as late as 
within fifty years, and in most enlightened 
parts of this country, chimneys have been 
erected with fire places in which more 
than twelve times the fuel was required to 
be consumed in order to warm the room, 
that is now required for the same, or an 
equal purpose, in a modern approved 
stove.”Scientific American 
“CURIOUS EXPERIMENT—Last 
Saturday a novel sight was seen in our 
harbor…”Herald 
“This instrument [hydro-oxygen 
microscope] presents to our view a world 
of wonders.  Its magnifying powers are 
astonishingly great.”Herald 
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Table 8:  Typical structuring of “problem” phase of antebellum science articles 
Problem:  ignorance on subject 
• typically follows the “mystery” 
opening immediately  
• claims that virtually no one knows 
the causes of the phenomenon 
• occasionally provides a folk 
explanation for phenomenon as 
comic relief 
“…and in the absence of definite 
knowledge respecting them [shooting 
stars], it is not perhaps strange that we 
have been favored with an abundance of 
speculation and crude conjecture…”AJS 
“Still there are those who appear to 
understand little of the true principles of 
economy in this respect…”Sci. Am. 
“It was thought that [the boat] had a little 
infernal machine in her bottom…”Herald 
Transition:  “smart people, however, 
know the answer….”  
• immediately follows Ignorance 
segment 
• implies the existence of a 
solution/explanation for the 
phenomenon 
• often includes name-dropping of 
cognoscenti 
“Among the most extensive observations 
of this kind are those made by Professor 
Brandes of Lipsic; and as they are but 
little known in this country, it may be 
acceptable to some readers of the Journal, 
to be furnished with an abstract of 
them”AJS 
“But we are glad to find many who 
understand the thing better, having looked 
into the theory of it…”Sci. Am. 
“It was finally discovered, however, that 
she was ‘pulled’ over the water by a large 
kite”…Herald 
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Table 9:  Typical structuring of “solution” phase of antebellum science articles 
Solution 1:  Details of 
solution/explanation, often with 
illustration by example or 
scenario 
• illustrations often invite readers to 
test out the solution/explanation 
for themselves 
• abstract principles are often made 
more familiar through the use of 
“real-life” analogies to things in 
the readers’ experience. 
“…and the quantity of heat thus 
circulated, is in some measure 
proportionate to the velocity of this 
current.  For an illustrative experiment on 
this subject, let any person select a spot on 
the surface of a stove that is red-hot, and 
blow with a common hand bellows 
directly on that spot for a few 
minutes…”Sci. Am. 
“…a large kite, at a great altitude, the line 
of which was fastened to the bows of the 
boat.” Herald 
“The interstices of the finest lace appear 
wide enough for a body of a man to pass 
through them: the threads themselves are 
like cables.  The softest down of the 
thistle appears stiff and thick as the quills 
of a porcupine” Herald 
Solution 2:  use/benefit of principle 
• often introduced by a concluding 
sentential adverb like “therefore,” 
“thus,” “then,” “so,” etc. 
• gives the pay-off of the 
solution/principle, in terms of 
money, efficiency, or occasionally, 
new perspective or knowledge 
• often contains sense of immediate 
benefit using words like “soon,” 
“now,” “shortly,” “immediately” 
“Now, therefore, we would recommend 
that in the construction of stoves, regard 
may be had to facilitating a free 
circulation or current of air over the 
exterior heated surface.” Sci. Am. 
“We shall soon hear of our packet ships 
going over the Atlantic by the aid of kites 
at the rate of a mile a minute.” Herald 
“…man, then, in comparison to those 
beings, would dwindle into 
animalculae…how humiliating the 
thought!  And yet how true the 
possibility!” Herald 
 
Overall, the pieces seem to be structured along a problem/solution line, the 
problem in many cases being an “ignorance” of some scientific or technological 
principle, and the solution being a way to improve the average American lifestyle 
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by application of that principle or technology.  Another way to view this 
rhetorical dynamic is as a narrative of control, where some untamable natural 
force becomes domesticated through American scientific and technological 
methods.   
Charles Bazerman finds the problem/solution topos underlying the 
structure of the research article as early as 1800 in the Philosophical Transactions 
of the Royal Society of London, so there is a potential rhetorical inheritance here 
from the academic article to its popular kin (Bazerman "Reporting" 183).  The 
problem/solution topos also operates powerfully today in the research report, in 
fact, argues John Swales in his close study of the rhetoric of research articles in 
Genre Analysis:  English in Academic and Research Settings (118-119).  
However, Swales also notices a special link between the problem/solution topos 
and popularization.  While specialized, intra-disciplinary reports of scientific 
research usually exhibit more complex introductions keyed to the particular 
interests and topoi of their disciplines, popularizations of those same findings 
often reduce these complexities to a problem/solution model in their 
introductions, since this is a topos that appeals more generally to a lay readership 
interested in what science can do for them (Swales 138,140).  Indeed, in this small 
sample of mid-nineteenth century popular science articles, even abstruse scientific 
concepts tend to be discussed in terms of a pay-off, whether physical or 
metaphysical.  This is consistent with Jeanne Fahnestock’s observations, in her 
study of the present-day accommodation of science in popular media.  She found 
that the emphasis in popularized accounts of scientific findings still rests on the 
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“pay-off” of those findings in terms of new knowledge, valuable technology, or 
an index to a course of social action (291).  It bears noting that this 
problem/solution/”pay-off” pattern is eerily similar to that of the advertisements 
that pack the pages of all of these papers; a problem (health or otherwise) can be 
solved cheaply by an amazing scientific solution, at great benefit to the purchaser.  
Closer examination of this connection is required before we can determine if 
advertisements in the popular press formed a rhetorical precedent for the popular 
science article.  But the similarities are striking and suggestive. 
Narrowing our focus from the global structuring principles of the texts in 
the sample, a few important local patterns can be discerned.  The first lies in the 
rhetoric of the introductions or opening statements of these science articles.  Even 
in the more staid American Journal of Science articles, the opening rhetorical 
move is consistently mystery-generating: the words “wonder,” “astonishment,” 
“curious,” “novel,” “surprise” are repeated with uncanny consistency in all of the 
longer blurbs, educational pieces, and reports of discoveries.  The only exceptions 
to this rule are found in a few of the AJS articles, which imitate the developing 
Transactions-type experimental reports of this time period in restricting their 
claims to a specific hypothesis and its proof, a strategy that resists 
overgeneralization and sensationalism (Bazerman "Reporting" 174,183).  The 
purpose of these popular pieces’ inflated introductory rhetoric can surely be 
chalked up in great measure to the same sort of impulse motivating the all-caps 
headlines of the science advertisements they share the pages with—attracting and 
exciting attention.  In Selling Science Dorothy Nelkin characterizes the science 
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journalism of this period as pushing for the “-est”:  the biggest, coldest, strangest, 
etc. (1).   However, this “mystery” rhetoric possibly ties into other traditions and 
reader expectations.  Jeanne Fahnestock finds this same tendency in 20th century 
popularizations, and she claims that this pattern finds its way back to Aristotelian 
theory:  "In the Rhetoric, Aristotle pointed out the perennial epideictic appeal that 
'a thing is greater when it is harder or rarer than other things'" (Fahnestock 
“Accommodating” 280-281).  One of the pillars of Fahnestock’s theory about 
popularization is that it is essentially epideictic, in contrast to the forensic rhetoric 
of the lab report, because popularizing scientific findings requires “the adjustment 
of new information to an audience's already held values and assumptions" (278-
279).  A Jacksonian readership, convinced that America was the “-est” of 
everything, would certainly have valued epideictic rhetoric touting the originality 
and novelty of its scientists’ ideas. 
Interestingly, there is a second implication of the “mystery” opening that 
corroborates this resonance between popular science reporting and epideictic 
rhetoric, and that is the frequent move these pieces make to establish their topics 
as matters of general or, indeed, universal concern.  Everyone wonders about this, 
the articles imply, just as the advertisements do; everyone has worried about this, 
everyone needs an answer to this question.  This move is very similar to one John 
Swales has identified in the introductions to research articles:  arguing for 
centrality.  One of the first moves research scientists often make in their public 
arguments is to claim that the topic they are working on is of paramount 
importance to the majority of their field (Swales 144).  In light of the epideictic 
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functions of appeals to mystery, uniqueness, and centrality, it would appear that 
arguing for centrality or universal concern is an epideictic move to establish the 
scientist’s work solidly within the goals and values of the reading community.  
The “wonder” openings of the popular science pieces in the sample could function 
in a similar fashion with their readerships. 
The last local-level rhetorical feature visible in the sample is the use of 
detail to convince the readers of the aptness of the author’s solution to the 
acknowledged gap or lack.  The AJS articles are the most detailed, likely due to 
their greater length and technicality.  However, all of the popular science reports, 
including the blurbs/factoids, give details of functions, principles, and operations 
as part of their strategy to persuade the reader that their claims are true and 
valuable.  Poe, of course, practically obsessed over this attention to “analogical 
detail” and “verisimilitude” in his hoaxes, believing these qualities to be the 
hallmark of scientific writing.  His “Balloon-Hoax,” in particular, barely stays 
afloat with its heavy ballast of technical engineering details about Mason’s 
Atlantic-hurdling balloon.   
As discussed in Chapter One, both Bazerman’s and Shapin’s work on the 
development of the research article indicates that the article evolved to provide a 
vicarious experience of the experiment for the reader.  Rhetoric thus supplanted 
witness, crucial for empirical science’s verification and reproducibility.  By the 
nineteenth century, then, science had embarked on its grand pretense that 
scientific language was transparent, that what you read was what had happened; 
indeed, your reading and acceptance of the claims of the research article verified 
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them (Bazerman Shaping 14).  Of course, news reporting cultivated a similar trust 
in its readers, who could not themselves be in all the places the reporters could be 
to witness all the discoveries, disasters, and decisions that filled each day 
everywhere in Jacksonian America.  As discussed earlier, political papers even 
adopted a rhetoric of verbatim transcription of political events that gave the 
semblance of a virtual experience of direct democracy.  All of this 
“verisimilitude” was likely aimed at giving readers the vicarious experience of 
governing, a highly desirable experience in a day when Americans were being 
cultured by Jackson to distrust anyone—the Masons and the Second National 
Bank included—who wished to separate them from the governance of their 
nation.  Hoaxers like Poe and Locke could not have helped but take advantage of 
the blind trust that their readers had been taught, through reading science and 
reading the news, to put in “verisimilitude,” in the vicarious witness of the word. 
All of these rhetorical moves listed above—the problem/solution/pay-off 
structure, the “mystery” opening, the dense detail, also the name-dropping of 
cognoscenti—since they appear fairly consistently throughout the different 
publications, could be considered expectations readers would hold, unconsciously 
or consciously, when approaching an article such as Locke’s or Poe’s hoax.  In 
addition, as already mentioned with respect to the more technical science reports, 
the reader could expect copious woodblock engravings that illustrated inventions, 
principles of astronomy or physics, or botanical or zoological specimens.  The 
pages of all of the papers and magazines were rife with them.  Elizabeth Tebeaux 
argues in her study of Renaissance technical manuscripts that illustrations and text 
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layouts, which helped the reader visualize topic structure, strengthened the 
perception that the text communicated the structure of reality.  This effect of 
engravings could not help but be useful to the hoaxers, and in fact Poe includes 
engravings of the balloon Victoria and the workings of its propeller in his 
“Balloon-Hoax” to augment the story’s persuasive effect.  Another element of 
lay-out, bold-print headlines augmented the “mystery” openings; both Locke and 
Poe utilized this strategy to catch readers’ attentions.  Overall, the effect of these 
popular science reports was very close to that of the papers’ advertisements—
sensation, mystery, uniqueness, and immediate practical benefit. 
3.5 Summary of reader expectations of popular science news 
As discussed in the Methods section in the last chapter, a “reader 
expectation” is a sort of cognitive constraint on the process of creating meaning 
during the reading experience.  In other words, the expectation functions as an 
assumption that favors the acceptance of certain interpretations of a text over 
others in constructing a “world view,” which is the sum total of all the beliefs the 
reader holds about the world.10  That is why understanding hoaxing is crucial to 
                                                 
10 In general this belief or “doxastic” is coherent, disallowing 
contradictory beliefs about a single proposition.  See Lehrer (1978) for a 
discussion of this sort of doxastic systems in epistemology.  However, discourse 
researchers like Lascarides and Asher (1993) have found that discourse 
interpretation usually involves the acceptance of beliefs into the doxastic system 
that would be incompatible under a strict interpretation of the logical form of 
those beliefs.  For example, we have no trouble accepting that penguins are birds 
although they cannot fly, and flight counts as a defining feature of birds.  
Lascarides and Asher argue that “defeasible” beliefs, beliefs that hold in general 
but that can be overridden by specific exceptions, allow more realistic modeling 
of the cognitive process of discourse interpretation and the update of belief 
systems that accompanies it. 
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understanding the dynamic between science and literature in nineteenth century 
American social epistemology:  hoaxing bears on the construction (reconstruction, 
from our standpoint) of the world that readers of that era thought they lived in.  
Those who believed Locke’s hoax inhabited a different epistemic world than 
those who did not, a world where there were or could be man-bats and moon-
bison.  The words of Locke’s story in the Sun were the only witness to the moon’s 
surface, just as for many readers, words about Japan or the West or politics in 
Washington D.C. would be their only contact with those parts of the world.  It is 
this nascent power of witness to construct different realities for readers that Poe 
was beginning to exploit when he wrote “Hans Phaall” and spent so much time 
studying and worrying about the success of Locke’s hoax.   
All of the expectations that a reader has for a certain genre of text—
popular science writing, in this case—interact to form a filter on all the possible 
meanings arising from the reading of any exemplar text from that genre.  Only the 
meaning(s) that satisfies the greatest number of the reader’s expectations will 
make it through the holes in the filter, will be allowed to change or “update” her 
world view.  Walter Kintsch’s work on the cognitive processes involved in 
comprehending text supports this kind of constraint-satisfaction model of reading.  
Kintsch’s CI or Construction-Integration model of reading presented in 
Comprehension:  A Paradigm of Cognition (1998), is an extension of the 
comprehension model he developed with Teun van Dijk in the 1980s.  The CI 
model maintains that all possible meanings of words and phrases are generated as 
a reader reads a sentence.  Then, through a process of “spreading activation” only 
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those meanings reinforced by the reader’s prior reading experience and life 
experience are strengthened, where meanings irrelevant to the reader’s goals and 
experiences are weakened and eventually die off (Kintsch 95).  Kintsch’s 
connectionist model of the reading process, while it provides support for a model 
of reading as an expectation-satisfaction process, mostly applies at a sub-
conscious level and so cannot cope with high-level, conscious decisions about 
truth-value of a text.  Decisions about the truth of a text happen after the reader 
has already decided on the meanings of words and built a mental model of the text 
in her head; deciding about truth is deciding to what extent that model will 
interact with her model of the world.  For that reason, the truth-value judgments 
modeled in this project are strictly post hoc.  It might be possible to model 
readers’ moment-by-moment evaluation of different aspects of the text during the 
reading experience, if we were conducting a read-aloud protocol with live 
subjects.  However, the historical reader responses to the hoaxes that we have 
available to us do not contain those data.  They are post hoc judgments on the 
truth-value of the hoaxes, and so this project can only model those judgments.   
Below is as complete as possible a list of those expectations that have 
been recuperated so far from the media contest over Poe’s and Locke’s hoaxes.  
Notice that the expectations all have the form of propositions; this is so that a 
possible interpretation arising from the text (say, “Herschel’s telescope really 
works the way Locke says it does”) can be tested for agreement with a particular 
proposition and either agree with it or violate it.  They, along with additional 
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expectations recuperated through analysis of Twain’s and De Quille’s hoaxes, are 
also listed in the Glossary at the end of this dissertation for reference: 
Authority:  The author or authority figure’s previous reputation holds. 
Entertainment:  Reading of popular science articles is for entertainment, 
not truth, value. 
Foreign:  Anything foreign is good and probably true. 
Internal Coherence:  If a story’s claims are logically consistent, it is 
probably true. 
Medium:  The previous reputation of the medium holds. 
Novelty:  New discoveries are highly valued and probably true. 
Plausibility:  If it seems like it could happen, it probably did. 
Popsci:  Stories that sound like true science reports probably are.  Sub-
expectations within this category are as follows: 
  Long:  Longer popular science articles are often given in 
installments. 
  Decoration:  Popular science reports will often be decorated with 
bold headlines and woodcuts. 
  Mystery:  Popular science reports often have a “mystery” opening 
signaled by words like “wonders” 
  Ignorance:  After the opening, popular science reports generally 
indicate that the public is ignorant of a particular 
principle/phenomenon. 
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  Wisdom:  After the lament for ignorance, popular science reports 
generally point out a wise person who knows better. 
  Detail:  Popular science articles will often have a lot of technical 
detail, which is a good indicator of truth. 
  Analogy:  The details in a popular science article will often be 
explained with analogy to well-known phenomena. 
  Use:  Popular science articles often finish with an evaluation of 
the benefit, physical or metaphysical, of the scientific 
principle/phenomenon. 
Sensation:  Sensational elements in a story have a high literary and truth-
value. 
Some expectations are clearly more powerful than others, because for all 
readers, certain assumptions override others.  For example, in the media debate 
over the “Moon Hoax,” the NY Sunday News deferred its own judgment about 
the illogicality of Locke’s report to Herschel’s authority, whenever the 
astronomer could be reached for comment.  Poe weighted some of his own criteria 
for a successful hoax over others, a ranking impossible to observe in the 
extraction of criteria given above.  However, comments in all versions of his 
essay about the competition of his hoax with Locke’s hoax indicate that Poe 
ranked four of the criteria (the Novelty, Sensation, Presentation, and 
Verisimilitude criteria from Table 4) in order of the strength of their impact on 
readers:   
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The singular blunders to which I have referred being properly understood, 
we shall have all the better reason for wonder at the prodigious success of 
the hoax.  Not one person in ten discredited it, and (strangest point of all!) 
the doubters were chiefly those who doubted without being able to say 
why — the ignorant, those uninformed in astronomy, people who would 
not believe because the thing was so novel, so entirely "out of the usual 
way." A grave professor of mathematics in a Virginian college told me 
seriously that he had no doubt of the truth of the whole affair!  The great 
effect wrought upon the public mind is referable, first, to the novelty of the 
idea; secondly, to the fancy-exciting and reason-repressing character of 
the alleged discoveries; thirdly, to the consummate tact with which the 
deception was brought forth; fourthly, to the exquisite vraisemblance of 
the narration. (Poe Literati:  Richard Adams Locke  161 [emphasis is 
mine]) 
Poe feels overall that when it came to weighing the scientific inaccuracies 
of Locke’s story against the novelty of moon-bison and man-bats, people allowed 
themselves to be swayed by the novel and sensational.  Competitions like this 
between readerly expectations only emerge in the face of a particular interpretive 
question such as, “Are the moon-bison real?”  So, the following is a graphic 
representation in Optimality Theory of a possible “filter” that a reader of the 
moon story would have had when faced with deciding on its truth-value.  The 
reader in Table 10 ranks his/her expectations as Poe projects: 
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Table 10:  Graph of decision about truth-value of Locke’s moon bison* 
 Novelty Sensation Popsci. Plausibility Internal 
Coh. 
TRUE    ******** * 
FALSE * * *!   
This table is simply another way of expressing Poe’s argument.  Poe 
claimed readers who believed Locke’s hoax ranked novelty, sensation, and 
“verisimilitude” (the story’s resemblance to a real science report) over no fewer 
than nine math errors and one internal inconsistency (Locke equivocated on the 
focusing power of the telescope).  The solid vertical line locates the 
competition—between first impressions and factuality, essentially.  The dotted 
lines denote a lack of evidence for competition in this particular decision about 
the truth of the hoaxes:  i.e., Novelty, Sensation and Popsci. (“verisimilitude”), 
since they are separated by dotted lines, are equally ranked in this reader’s 
estimation; thus, these expectations “work together” rather than compete with 
each other as the reader reads.   
In the graph the nine factual errors in Locke’s story are counted with nine 
asterisks representing eight violations of Plausibility and one of Internal 
Coherence.  This, of course, assumes that the average reader recognized all nine 
                                                 
* In general in this notation, which is an inheritance from Optimality 
Theory as described in Methods, where there is a competition between two 
constraints (for example, authority vs. logic) a solid line appears between them.  
Where there is no competition, either because the constraints do not interact with 
each other or because we do not have enough data to determine if they compete 
with each other, there is a dotted line between them.  An asterisk indicates a 
violation of a particular expectation under a certain interpretation, and an 
exclamation mark indicates a fatal violation that ends the game and decides a 
winning interpretation, which is indicated by a check mark. 
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errors, which was indeed the assumption Poe was making in the passage from his 
Literati essay just above.  In spite of all the faulty evidence, Poe’s projected 
reader believes Locke’s story to be true simply because to consider it false would 
force the admission that something novel, sensational, and “verisimilar” is not 
true; in this reader’s world-view, the correlation between spectacular first 
impressions and truth cannot bear violation.  The exclamation point on the chart 
indicates that all violations at this highest level of expectation are unacceptable 
(the convention is to mark unacceptability on the very first violation that renders 
the candidate interpretation unacceptable, and this is usually the weakest or right-
most violation on a given level, as expectation strength increases from right to 
left).  Thus, the candidate with more total violations actually wins in this case 
because of the very low value assigned to scientific accuracy by the reader.  This 
accurately represents Poe’s complaint about Locke’s readers’ values.  Now, a 
table of Poe’s personal reading of the story would be almost exactly the reverse of 
the one above, with his precious “analogical truth” in the form of plausibility and 
consistency ranked very firmly over novelty, sensation, and “verisimilitude.”  
The number of interpretive “games” or decisions that could be played with 
these expectations is potentially infinite; as Barthes rightly comments, the text is 
“always open” and produces new meanings with each reading and with each 
reader.  Some of the games we could play with Locke’s hoax would bring other 
pairs of expectations into competition with each other.  As already mentioned, the 
New York Sunday News ranked Authority over Plausibility in its interpretive 
game.  Entertainment is a particularly interesting constraint, because when it is in 
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operation as an expectation, it forecloses on games about truth-value.  
Entertainment would be the highest-ranked expectation for those readers who read 
Locke’s story for pleasure, enjoying its colorful images and turns of language, but 
who did not care if the details of the story were real or not.  In terms of the 
discussion above about the psychological bases of reading fiction, these 
Entertainment readers would “decouple” the meanings arising from their reading 
of Locke’s story from their world-view.  So, Entertainment actually deactivates 
truth-value expectations like Authority and Plausibility.  Entertainment readers 
are engaged in a reading game a great deal more like fiction reading than news 
reading.  This issue will be addressed below in an examination of the reading of 
Poe’s hoaxes as news compared to their later interpretation as science fiction. 
Another worthwhile observation about these reading expectations is that 
they were employed both by Poe and Locke and by the readers of the hoaxes, 
because writing hoaxes is itself a game in reading readers and guessing their 
expectations.  For instance, Locke and his editors knew scientific detail was 
crucial for floating their hoax, but they did not wish to bog down the sensational 
elements of the story in formulas, so they claim to have cut out a lot of the math 
for the general reader.  This shows that in their writing strategy (which is also a 
game in reading their readers), Sensation was ranked over Detail. 
What we have collected now is a set of expectations—some of which 
interact and compete with each other, and some of which foreclose on others—
that we can use as a filter through which to view the rest of Poe’s hoaxing 
attempts.  These expectations may illuminate which of the readers’ values were at 
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stake in the writing and interpretation of the hoaxes, and they may help explain 
the success or failure of the hoaxes with those readers.  Once we have a clearer 
view of these questions, then we can finally turn to the question of what kind of 
game Poe was playing with his readership in these hoaxes, and why. 
4.  THE “BALLOON-HOAX” 
Poe’s next attempt at a hoax was on April 13, 1844, when an “Extra” to 
the regular Saturday edition of the New York Sun trumpeted the following in 
“magnificent capitals”: 
[Astounding News by Express, via Norfolk!—The Atlantic Crossed in 
Three Days!  Signal Triumph of Mr. Monck Mason’s Flying Machine!---
Arrival at Sullivan’s Island, near Charleston, S.C., of Mr. Mason, Mr. 
Robert Holland, Mr. Henson, Mr. Harrison Ainsworth, and four others, in 
the Steering Balloon, “Victoria,” after a Passage of Seventy-five Hours 
from Land to Land!  Full Particulars of the Voyage!….]  (Poe “Balloon-
Hoax” 496) 
The original article continues, “The great problem is at length solved!  The 
air, as well as the earth and the ocean, has been subdued by science, and will 
become a common and convenient highway for mankind.” 
Certainly, this opening must have satisfied readers’ demands for novelty 
and sensation, as aeronautics were a hot topic in the popular scientific and 
technical articles of the late 1830s and early 1840s.  British Balloonist Monck 
Mason had recently published a memoir of his crossing of the English Channel in 
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a balloon, and there was high anticipation that Mason would soon attempt 
something longer.   
However, more significantly, Poe had worked harder on the rhetoric of his 
piece.  Almost immediately apparent are several ways in which Poe has crafted 
the language of his new hoax to better match reader expectations:  First, the tone 
of the opening, with its exclamation marks and use of adjectives like 
“astounding,” is completely in keeping with the Mystery introductions of other 
science articles.  The “bantering” tone of “Hans Phaall” is gone, replaced by a 
serious, if sensational, journalistic style.  Also, notice that Poe immediately 
invokes the problem/solution paradigm current in the popular science reporting of 
the day with the sentence “The great problem is at length solved!”. 
The article goes on to imitate the Ignorance phase of the problem/solution 
topos by detailing past failures in aeronautical experiments.  To satisfy reader 
expectations about Wisdom, Poe then name-drops the famed appellations of 
balloonist Monck Mason, whose diaries Poe copies for large sections of his report 
(Franklin Future 94), and of popular British historical romance writer Harrison 
Ainsworth.  After that, the mechanical Details of the balloons construction are 
focused on to minute extremes, and a Decorative woodcut of the wedge-spiral 
propeller of the balloon is included.  The account ends true to the reader’s Use 
expectations with an overblown assessment of the importance of the voyage and 
the speculation, “What magnificent events may ensue, it would be useless now to 
think of determining” (Poe “Balloon-Hoax” 505). 
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Did readers respond better to this hoax that seemingly conformed better to 
their expectations of how a true science report should read?  The short answer is 
yes, but complicating it is the fact that the only extant eyewitness to the reaction 
to the hoax is Poe himself, who undoubtedly exaggerates it in his 21 May 1844 
letter for the Columbia Spy: 
The 'Balloon-Hoax' made a far more intense sensation than anything of 
that character since the "Moon-Story" of Locke.  On the morning 
(Saturday) of its announcement, the whole square surrounding the "Sun" 
building was literally besieged, blocked up--ingress and egress being alike 
impossible, from a period soon after sunrise until about two o'clock P. M. 
(Mabbott 33) 
The Sun did indeed sell a record number of copies of the Saturday extra 
containing the hoax, 50,000 according to the estimate in the Philadelphia Saturday 
Courier (Thomas 461), and so Poe’s jubilation is perhaps founded in reality.  He 
admits that “of course there was great discrepancy of opinion as regards the 
authenticity of the story; but I observed that the more intelligent believed, while 
the rabble, for the most part, rejected the whole with disdain” (Mabbott 33).  This 
is the same argument, curiously, that he made about Locke’s hoax, but in this case 
he is using it to aggrandize his intelligence and the craftsmanship he invested in 
the scientific detail of this hoax.  “As for internal evidence of falsehood, there is, 
positively, none--while the more generally accredited fable of Locke would not 
bear even momentary examination by the scientific.  There is nothing put forth in 
the Balloon-Story which is not in keeping with the known facts of aeronautic 
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experience--which might not really have occurred” (Mabbott 33).  Poe claims 
further that he listened in on people’s discussions of the Extra, and the only 
quibbles he heard with the story were on account of the reputation of the Sun, 
since it had published the “Moon Hoax,” and the difficulty of having gotten news 
from Charleston so quickly.  Indeed, the editors of the New York American 
record this criticism of the story’s plausibility:  “The express, which has hardly 
outstripped the ordinary mail, must also have brought along a woodcut of the 
balloon, as the Sun has the picture as well as the story—one as good as the other” 
(Thomas 458).  These doubts on the part of readers correspond to the Medium and 
Plausibility expectations and, depending on their strength with particular readers, 
might well have had the effect Poe reports.  Table 11 presents the “filter” of 
expectations of readers like the editors of the New York American who 
disbelieved the “Balloon-Hoax” on the basis of Medium and Plausibility. 
Table 11:  Decision about the truth-value of Poe’s “Balloon-Hoax” by readers 
valuing plausibility and the reputation of the news medium 
 Medium Plausibility Popsci. 
TRUE * *!  
FALSE   * 
For these readers, the fatal violations were of Medium and Plausibility, 
equally ranked over Popsci., or the story’s “verisimilitude” in conforming to 
reader expectations of a popular science article.  Even though denying the truth of 
the article meant negating the article’s convincingly-constructed scientific 
rhetoric, the Sun’s tarnished reputation and readers’ background knowledge of the 
difficulty of getting mail so quickly from Charleston sway readers’ decisions.   
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The “Balloon-Hoax” did not have the life of the “Moon Hoax,” however, 
and that is because Poe revealed himself as the perpetrator that afternoon.  An 
acquaintance of Poe, New York journalist and “free love” advocate Thomas Low 
Nichols, wrote in his autobiography that Poe got drunk on wine and stood on the 
steps of the Sun building the very afternoon of the hoax’s debut, shouting out to 
potential buyers of the Extra that it was a fake (Falk 48).  A corroborating bit of 
evidence is that the Sun printed a retraction for the hoax two days after its 
publication, an admission that it had stubbornly refused to stoop to in the case of 
the “Moon Hoax” (Falk 49).  By this account, Poe witnessed the run-away 
success of his hoax and could not bear for its readers not to know that he was its 
creator.  At most that admission cost him a day or two of entertainment, because 
the mails from Charleston almost certainly would have arrived on Monday or 
Tuesday, shutting the hoax down.  Locke’s hoax had benefited from a much 
longer window of play before Herschel could be reached for comment. 
Two dynamics within the “Balloon-Hoax” event deserve special 
consideration.  First, Poe used it as a stage to construct himself publicly as a 
notorious expert; secondly, as Poe constructed his phantom balloon, he also 
developed a textual mechanics that came to characterize his detective and science 
fiction. 
4.1 Professionalism, Expertise, and Hoaxing 
The image of Poe gloating triumphantly over newsreaders gawking up at 
him with his hoax still open in their hands—this is a pose worth investigating.  
For one of the many rhetorical functions of a hoax is the public notoriety it 
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constructs for its creator.  Poe’s willingness to step into that role on the front steps 
of the Sun suggests that it may have been a powerfully motivating factor in 
encouraging him to continue attempts at hoaxing.  Scrupulously hiding his 
identity as a hoaxer, as did Locke, was not for Poe.  Poe wished to be publicly 
recognized as a writer whose scientific expertise enabled him to beat scientists at 
their own game and to construct “discoveries” for the public that they could not 
tell from the real thing.  Because of this motivating force, Poe’s hoaxing is bound 
up with the history of professionalism and the construction of public expertise in 
America.   
As mentioned above, Poe grumbled about the difficulty of making a living 
as a professional author and editor while scientists prospered.  Although Poe 
chalks up this inequity to deficiencies in public taste—and so uses hoaxes to 
embarrass his readers for these deficiencies—the truth is that a whole complex of 
historical and economic factors had made it possible for both Poe and the 
scientists he resented to make their livings as professionals.  William Charvat, in 
his study of the profession of authorship in America, says the most common 
definition of professionalism is getting paid to do something.  As a corrective to 
this truism, he notes that even before James Fenimore Cooper became the first 
financially successful author in American history, writers like Susanna Rowson 
and Joel Barlow could be counted professionals even in the absence of economic 
success because they publicly claimed the vocation of an author (28).  Their ethos 
as professional writers, by this account, qualifies them as much as or more than 
their account ledgers. 
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The expansion of the publishing industry in the 1820s finally created an 
economic niche to match the rhetorical claim-staking of professional authors like 
Cooper.  At the same time, as discussed in Chapter One, rapid industrialization 
created similar economic niches for scientists and engineers as professionals.  
While the term “professional” might constitute their economic identity, the term 
“expert” described their social and epistemological identity.  These experts 
embodied the ways in which abstruse fields of study like electromagnetics, 
physics, and chemistry were becoming assimilated into the human social system; 
they personified the taming of nature.  As such, they served as oracles through 
which the lay public could interrogate the natural world. 
But this culture of expertise did not develop without resistance.  The 
mistrust of elitism that characterized Jacksonian politics derived in part from a 
deep public discomfort with second-hand access to crucial knowledge and a 
suspicion of private agendas on the part of the professionals who dispensed it.  
Theodore Porter, in Trust in Numbers, marks these factors as signal for the 
development of a culture of objectivity.  Porter defines objectivity as 
“technologies of trust” in place of personal trust.  Measurements, standards, and 
rules, also enabled by an industrial urbanized economy, allowed lay people to 
determine the extent of their assets and experiences for themselves without the 
questionable intervention of experts.  In these ways, a culture of objectivity grew 
up and stood opposed to the culture of expertise (202-203). 
Poe’s “Balloon-Hoax” fed directly off these tensions between objectivity 
and expertise in his culture and allowed him to construct himself as a notorious 
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(read, counter-cultural) public expert.  By publicly revealing his hoax he 
demonstrated that the objective “rules” his readers had used to determine the truth 
of his science report for themselves had let them down.  His public humiliation of 
them formed an implicit argument that they could not trust themselves to 
understand science, and they could not even trust scientists, since Poe had clearly 
bested them at their own game.  Poe and his imaginative artistic colleagues alone 
were qualified as experts in social truth.  If readers wanted the truth, they would 
have to go through professional artists like him.  By this chain of implications, 
Poe’s hoax struck against Baconian empiricism and objectivity and for the culture 
of expertise, with himself at the center of it.  In the next chapters, we will see this 
function of hoaxing reasserting itself as a motivation for the hoaxes of Mark 
Twain, Dan De Quille, and Alan Sokal. 
4.2 Textual mechanics 
Another striking element of the “Balloon-Hoax,” and of “Hans Phaall” as 
well, is Poe’s almost obsessive attention to mechanics—mechanics of the 
machines in the story, mechanics of the story itself.  In both hoaxes mechanism 
fairly overwhelms the plot; one could argue the details about the balloons are the 
plot.  With the “Balloon-Hoax,” however, the very rhetoric of Poe’s hoaxing is 
becoming mechanical.  In 1836 he had laboriously detailed and exposed 
Maelzel’s Chess-Playing Automaton as a fake; the gears and cogs in the cabinet 
were merely a front for a chess expert who, from his cramped position, 
manipulated the automaton’s arm via levers to move the pieces.  Poe was actually 
practicing his own brand of legerdemain in this exposé, as he lifted most of it 
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directly from magician David Brewster (Pollin 14).  Writing hoaxes seems to be 
an extension of this engineering rhetoric.  With each new attempt (including 
Locke’s), Poe tests the rhetorical impact of these “jeux d’esprit” on the reader, 
tweaks an appeal here, adjusts the tone there.  He even comes to construct his 
hoaxes by a method of salvage by recycling, in the case of the Balloon-Hoax, 
whole parts of Monck Mason’s Account of a Late Aeronautical Expedition from 
London to Weilberg as well as a contemporary science report “Remarks on the 
Ellipsoidal Balloon propelled by the Archimedean Screw, described as the New 
Aerial Machine” (Franklin Future 94).  Poe’s prose in these hoaxes builds flying 
machines.  His hoaxes are flying machines, after a fashion.  Contemporary 
William Griggs appraised Locke’s hoax as a mere “balloon” that was mistaken for 
a while for a “celestial luminary” (Locke Celebrated "Moon Story" 21).  Poe’s 
hoaxes answer these charges to the letter.  In constructing the Victoria, Poe makes 
his readers move with him, a step at a time, through the building and piloting of 
the balloon and thus makes them co-engineers in his hoaxes.  Here is the 
painstaking detail with which Poe describes the principle means of locomotion for 
the Victoria, the Archimedean screw: 
The screw consists of an axis of hollow brass tube, eighteen inches in 
length, through which, upon a semi-spiral inclined at fifteen degrees, pass 
a series of steel wire radii, two feet long, and thus projecting a foot on 
either side.  These radii are connected at the outer extremities by two 
bands of flattened wire — the whole in this manner forming the 
framework of the screw, which is completed by a covering of oiled silk cut 
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into gores, and tightened so as to present a tolerably uniform surface.  At 
each end of its axis this screw is supported by pillars of hollow brass tube 
descending from the hoop.  In the lower ends of these tubes are holes in 
which the pivots of the axis revolve.  From the end of the axis which is 
next the car, proceeds a shaft of steel, connecting the screw with the 
pinion of a piece of spring machinery fixed in the car.  By the operation of 
this spring, the screw is made to revolve with great rapidity, 
communicating a progressive motion to the whole. (Poe, “Balloon-Hoax,” 
497-498 [emphasis mine]) 
This lengthy schematic is approximately one-eighth of the total amount of 
technical description in the story.  I have highlighted certain words in the passage 
that are repeated, and by focusing on them, we can appreciate some of  Poe’s 
rhetorical mechanics.  First, the screw is constructed as a unit.  Poe uses the word 
“whole” to alert the reader that what they have read to that point completes the 
construction of the screw proper.  The second mention of the “whole” at the end 
of the passage, refers to the balloon and tells the reader how the screw fits and 
functions as a part of the balloon.  In finer detail, the screw is constructed 
rhetorically a step at a time, with each component fitting into the next until the 
function of the entire screw in context is apparent.  The words “screw,” “axis,” 
“radii,” “tube,” “spring,” and “car” are repeated, and their repetitions are layered 
in with each other such that each piece of the screw leads the reader to the next 
piece in the assembly.  The screw is literally constructed and put into play before 
the reader’s eyes.  Poe’s readers are reading an engineering schematic.  Recall, 
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too, that this story was accompanied by an engraving of the Archimedean screw, 
so at each stage in the construction the reader could compare her mental model of 
what she had constructed so far to the graphic.   
Poe’s casting of the reader as co-engineer is not insignificant.  Not only 
does the reader mentally construct a balloon as she reads, she also constructs the 
hoax, because the balloon—its very existence, its successful functioning—is the 
hoax.  Notice Poe’s use of the verb “communicate” to describe the energy transfer 
in the Victoria’s propeller.  Both the balloon and the text are performing the same 
function—implicating the reader in pulling the wool over her own eyes, as by the 
time she is done reading, she can see nothing but the gears, shafts, and pinions 
spinning in the text, cleverly hiding, while also mechanically accomplishing, 
Poe’s real agenda.  Poe is practicing a mechanics of rhetoric with these hoaxes 
that will in Eureka, influence his very conception of how reality works. 
5.  “THE FACTS IN THE CASE OF M. VALDEMAR” 
In the December 1845 edition of The American Review:  A Whig Journal, 
subscribers read “The Facts in the Case of M. Valdemar” by Edgar A. Poe, which 
began as follows: 
 Of course I shall not pretend to consider it any matter for wonder, 
that the extraordinary case of M. Valdemar has excited discussion.  It 
would have been a miracle had it not—especially under the circumstances.  
Through the desire of all parties concerned to keep the affair from the 
public, at least for the present, or until we had farther opportunities for 
investigation—through our endeavors to effect this—a garbled or 
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exaggerated account made its way into society, and became the source of 
many unpleasant misrepresentations, and, very naturally, of a great deal of 
disbelief. 
 It is now rendered necessary that I give the facts—as far as I 
comprehend them myself.  They are, succinctly, these:  [Poe, 1845 #30 
561] 
Roland Barthes has done a close reading of the language Poe uses in this 
piece, and in the opening, Barthes finds two “codes” operating (codes are 
complex constraints on interpretations similar to the “filters” of reading 
expectations we have been examining):  the code of the enigma, and the code of 
science (Barthes 87-89). 
The enigma code, as Barthes describes it, is very similar to the 
requirements for the Mystery expectation.  An enigma operates by lack—
astonishment, wonder, ignorance.  Barthes points to the linguistic cue of the 
definite article “the” introducing “the extraordinary case” and “the affair”; the 
definite article registers a linguistic presupposition that the case/affair exists in the 
world of Poe’s readers and that they should be aware of it.  “The facts” and “the 
circumstances” presuppose an enigma or misunderstanding that will now be 
cleared up.   
The noun phrase “the facts” also invokes the code of science, through 
which, according to Barthes, scientists try to position their endeavors outside the 
realm of literature.  The code of science is a concentrated attempt by scientists 
writing science to supplant symbols—and, indeed, all symbolic construction of 
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meaning where one thing stands for another—with “facts” which simply are and 
communicate truth immediately.  Of course, Barthes would probably be the first 
to agree that science has its own symbols, but his point here is that Poe uses 
language in the opening of “M. Valdemar” the way that scientists use language in 
order to convince his readers to put their trust in his eyewitness account of the 
“extraordinary case.”  The enigma code and the scientific code are in competition 
with each other throughout this story, inasmuch as enigmas disguise truth behind 
symbols or clues, while science seeks to channel truth asymbolically through 
facts, according to Barthes. 
Poe’s story continues past this enigmatic opening to detail a case of 
mesmeric suspended animation, in which the dying M. Valdemar is hypnotized at 
the point of death.  When he is taken out of the trance state, months later, he 
immediately decomposes in his bed, having been in fact dead the entire time.  Poe 
discusses Valdemar’s medical condition prior to his death in great scientific detail 
and lists the names of several important doctors attending the case but excises all 
but the first letters of their names:  Dr. D____, Dr. L____, etc.  This device is an 
interesting variant of the name-dropping that is characteristic of the Wisdom and 
Authority expectations from popular science writings.  This elision possibly 
derives from eighteenth and nineteenth-century novels of social critique and 
exposé such as Laurence Sterne’s Sentimental Journey.  The design of the 
convention is to convince readers that this case is so sensational and extraordinary 
that the famous people involved (doctors, in this case) wish their involvement in it 
to be kept private in order to insulate their public reputations.  Poe refers to 
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Valdemar himself as “well-known” as a translator of various famous European 
works and provides a list of phony credentials. 
The Popsci. expectation is met in this story because the language of Poe’s 
account of the mesmerism itself matches very closely the medical case studies at 
this time, particularly mesmeric case studies which include dialogue with the 
mesmerized subject.  It is likely that Poe consulted several sources in giving 
Valdemar an authentic rhetorical feel, particularly a reprint of the Rev. Gibson 
Smith’s pamphlet “Lectures on Clairmativeness, of Human Magnetism” featuring 
the work of clairvoyant Andrew Jackson Davis (Carter 36). 
The story was believed widely and reprinted copiously in England, even in 
the London Times (Poe Letters Vol. 2 319).  Elizabeth B. Barrett herself wrote to 
Poe exclaiming that the story was “throwing us all into ‘most admired disorder,’ 
and dreadful doubts as to whether ‘it can be true,’ as the children say of ghost 
stories.”  Poe’s responses to the mesmerists who wrote to him asking for 
confirmation of the account’s truth are strangely cagey equivocations, rather than 
gloating denials.  Poe wrote the following to Arch Ramsay in Stonehaven, 
Scotland, in response to a query about “M. Valdemar’s” authenticity: 
“Hoax” is precisely the word suited to M. Valdemar's case. The 
story appeared originally in "The American Review", a Monthly 
Magazine, published in this city. The London papers, commencing with 
the "Morning Post" and the "Popular Record of Science", took up the 
theme. The article was generally copied in England and is now circulating 
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in France. Some few persons believe it—but I do not—and don't you. (Poe 
Letters Vol. 2 337) 
Poe curiously adopts the stance not of an author but of a bystander lacking 
the authority to pronounce definitively on the truth of the hoax when he writes, 
“Some few persons believe it—but I do not—and don’t you.”   
Whether Poe actually intended “M. Valdemar” as a hoax when he wrote it 
is unclear.  He claims he did not, in a letter to Evert Duykinck in 1848.  However, 
it is quite possible Poe was continuing his deliberate tinkering with the 
expectations of his reading public with this tale.  It certainly seems that way, 
given that he re-performed all of the Popsci. reader expectations performed in the 
“Balloon-Hoax.”  In addition, Poe satisfies the Sensation and Novelty 
expectations in spades because the effect of Valdemar speaking from the dead and 
rotting away in front of the reader was very unusual for a staid political journal 
like the Whig Review.  Also, as Barrett testifies, Poe chooses for this tale a topic 
just as brimming with novelty as aviation—mesmerism. 
As Barthes points out in one of the rare “crossings” of history into his 
analysis, 1845 was perhaps the height of the madness and “scientific illusion” 
concerning mesmerism (called magnetism in Europe) (Barthes 89).  This is one of 
the many ways in which we are hampered in our readings of Poe’s hoaxes.  While 
to us hypnotism and mesmerism are the last things we would call hard science, 
the situation was markedly different in Poe’s time, when painless births and 
surgeries were allegedly being performed under hypnosis (Barthes 92).  As 
mentioned earlier, articles on mesmerism appeared as late as 1840 in respected 
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science journals like Silliman’s American Journal of Science.  Poe’s hoax was 
launched into a perfect opening, again, created by intense public desire to know 
more of a scientific world that the lay reader had scant access to, a desire to which 
mesmerism was also responding as a lay-practiced “scientific” profession. 
In spite of all this evidence for deliberate design, it is just as likely, 
however, that in “M. Valdemar” Poe may have been experimenting with 
mesmerism in fiction along the vein of his detective stories, since he demystifies 
the enigma of M. Valdemar’s case step-by-step much as he does with Dupin’s 
mysteries.  Poe may have inadvertently created a hoax through his publication of 
the story in a magazine known for news reporting as well as fiction, through his 
adherence to a style of writing consistent with science writing in general and 
medical case studies in particular, through his pretense of name-dropping, and 
through his fortunate exploitation of an issue at the forefront of public 
consciousness—the validity of mesmerism.  This second explanation accounts 
equally well for Poe’s ambivalent reactions to readers’ requests for verification.   
The telling clue in this dilemma is Poe’s reaction to readers’ responses.  
Once Poe realized he had fooled some of “M. Valdemar’s” readers, he decided to 
own the hoax and capitalize on its publicity.  This reaction is a piece to our puzzle 
of author intentionality in hoaxing, a piece that would not be available to us in a 
strictly text-based analysis of the genre.  “M. Valdemar” counts as a hoax because 
readers constructed it as such and Poe owned that construction.  Whether he 
intended to make a hoax when he wrote the story is irrelevant.  Since the hoax is 
not a text, but time-and-space-bound exchange with readers, Poe had many 
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opportunities over the months of debate surrounding the story to construct himself 
as a hoaxer, and he indeed did.  Therefore, “M. Valdemar” counts as a hoax.  
Even putting the vexed question of author intentionality aside, “M. Valdemar” 
still adhered to Popsci. expectations and appeared in a journal carrying news, so 
readers still had to decide on its truth-value.  For the purposes of our project, it is 
that interpretive decision that makes “M. Valdemar” worthwhile as a site to 
examine the interaction of reading expectations about science news. 
There is a fascinating dynamic operating in “M. Valdemar” that may help 
explain its complex effect on readers and that can only be explained in terms of 
readerly expectations.  Barthes attributes the appeal of “M. Valdemar” to its 
“undecidability,” to the fact that Poe invokes several competing codes 
simultaneously with his language in the tale—as when he invokes the enigma 
code and the scientific code, for example, with the phrase “the facts” but does not 
give the reader enough information to “chose which is ‘true,’” the mystery story 
or the scientific report on mesmerism (Barthes 96).  The story’s adherence to 
Popsci. expectations invokes the code of science.  But the enigma code, with its 
presupposition of mystery, with its elided names and ejaculations of disbelief, 
constructs a puzzle instead of truth.  We have not witnessed the enigma code in 
operation in popular science writing outside of the Mystery expectation for 
introductions; it is a code that perhaps belongs more properly to genres like folk 
tales, ghost stories, and mystical religious rhetoric. 
This confusion of two “filters” of reading expectations may explain why 
Poe reported receiving so many questions about the truth of the tale.  His story, 
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strung stylistically between two genres, disabled many readers from making even 
a provisional decision for themselves about its truth-value.  Through the 
invocation of two conflicting codes or “filters” of reader expectations—one 
applicable to reports of scientific fact, and the other employed in the 
reading/hearing of mysteries and “ghost stories” in Elizabeth Barrett’s words—
Poe gave his readers a truly troubling reading experience.  Poe was known for 
generic innovation.  The craze over mesmerism in 1845 afforded him a chance to 
play with the curious blend of epistemologies it represented—scientific and 
mystical—in order to destabilize both readers’ perceptions of reality and of 
generic convention. 
6.  “VON KEMPELEN AND HIS DISCOVERY”  
Poe’s last hoax, published just months before he died, was the most 
calculated and highly engineered of his hoaxing attempts.  The story purported to 
be a more personal follow-up to a series of other “scientific” reports already 
published in the American media about an incredible discovery by German 
alchemist, Von Kempelen.  A lengthy preamble discussed and disparaged many 
of these other accounts, saying of one that it had a very “moon-hoax-y air” (606).  
Then, still without announcing what exactly the amazing discovery was, Poe 
claimed that famous chemist Sir Humphrey Davy had reported coming very close 
to making the same discovery in his “Diary”; an editorial comment immediately 
interjected that, lacking “the algebraic signs necessary, and as the ‘Diary’ is to be 
found at the Athenaeum Library, we omit here a small portion of Mr. Poe’s 
manuscript.-ED” (606).   
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Poe went on to link Von Kempelen with the Maelzel family, the creators 
of the famous chess-playing automaton which magician David Brewster and then 
Poe himself debunked.  Von Kempelen’s supposed reputation in the American 
media as a misanthrope was next raised and dismissed, and then, finally, nine long 
paragraphs into the account, Poe reported Von Kempelen’s attempts to keep his 
discovery secret and the subsequent raiding of his Bremen flat by police to reveal 
that he had changed a trunk full of lead into “gold, in fact, absolutely pure, virgin, 
without the slightest appreciable alloy!”(610).  The account finished with the 
news that the price of gold was plummeting in Europe and would soon do the 
same in America, as a result of Von Kempelen’s discovery.   
Poe ostensibly wrote the hoax to take the shine off the gold rush of 1849, 
or so he claimed in his letter to Evert A. Duykinck of 8 March 1849, where he 
attempted unsuccessfully to convince Duykinck to publish “Von Kempelen” in 
his journal the Literary World: 
Dear Sir,  
If you have looked over the Von Kempelen article which I left with 
your brother, you will have fully perceived its drift. I mean it as a kind of 
"exercise", or experiment, in the plausible or verisimilar style. Of course, 
there is not one word of truth in it from beginning to end. I thought that 
such a style, applied to the gold-excitement, could not fail of effect. My 
sincere opinion is that nine persons out of ten (even among the best-
informed) will believe the quiz (provided the design does not leak out 
before publication) and that thus, acting as a sudden, although of course a 
 158 
very temporary, check to the gold-fever, it will create a stir to some 
purpose.  
I had prepared the hoax for a Boston weekly called "The Flag"-- 
where it will be quite thrown away. The proprietor will give me $15 for it 
on presentation to his agent here; and [page 2:] my object in referring the 
article to you is simply to see if you could not venture to take it for the 
"World". If so, I am willing to take for it $10-- or, in fact, whatever you 
think you can afford.  
I believe the quiz is the first deliberate literary attempt of the kind 
on record. In the story of Mrs Veal, we are permitted, now & then, to 
perceive a tone of banter. In "Robinson Crusoe" the design was far more 
to please, or excite, than to deceive by verisimilitude, in which particular 
merely, Sir Ed. Seaward's narrative is the more skilful book. In my 
"Valdemar Case" (which was credited by many) I had not the slightest 
idea that any person should credit it as any thing more than a "Magazine-
paper"--but here the whole strength is laid out in verisimilitude.  
I am very much obliged to you for your reprint of "Ulalume".  
Truly Yours,  
Edgar A Poe.  
[page 3:] P.S. If you feel the least shy about the article, make no hesitation 
in returning it, of course:--for I willingly admit that it is not a paper which 
every editor would like to "take the responsibility', of printing--although 
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merely as a contribution with a known name:--but if you decline the quiz, 
please do not let out the secret.  
Poe’s references to Mrs. Veal and Crusoe were to Daniel Defoe’s literary 
adventure hoaxes, and “Seaward’s Narrative” was a diary forged by Jane Porter 
published in London in 1831 (Poe Letters Vol. 2 434). 
Bernard Pollin takes Poe’s high expectations for his last hoax seriously 
based on the success of “M. Valdemar” (Pollin 13); however, the claim that he 
could cure Americans of their gold fever might rather have been a ruse to entice 
Duykinck to publish the story.  Daniel Hoffman argues that Poe’s hoaxing was 
never aimed at “show[ing] men how to amend their ways,” but rather in 
“display[ing] the follies of mankind--and the personal superiority of the Artist-
Genius to the generality of fools" (192). 
“Von Kempelen” was sold to The Flag of Our Union in Boston after 
Duykinck turned it down, where it appeared on 14 April 1849.  From the 
beginning, the story stumbles over dropped names and borrowed authority:   
After the very minute and elaborate paper by Arago, to say nothing 
of the summary in Silliman’s Journal, with the detailed statement just 
published by Lieutenant Maury, it will not be supposed, of course, that in 
offering a few hurried remarks in reference to Von Kempelen’s discovery, 
I have any design to look at the subject from a scientific point of view 
(Poe “Von Kempelen” 605-606). 
Dominique Arago was a renowned French physicist, head of the 
Observatoire de Paris at the time of Poe’s hoax; interestingly, Arago had been 
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one of the first European scientists to publicly denounce Locke’s “Moon Hoax” in 
1835 on behalf of his friend Sir John Herschel.  Silliman’s Journal, a.k.a the 
American Journal of Science, has already been discussed in some detail, and 
Lieutenant Maury was referred to briefly; he was a Navy engineer responsible for 
great improvements in American navigation before the Civil War.  Curiously, he 
was also at the helm of the Southern Literary Messenger for a few years in the 
1840s after Poe had left the paper. 
Poe seems bent on fulfilling his readers’ Authority and Wisdom 
expectations in this hoax, along with his usual obsession with detail.  He lifts 
whole sections of chemist Sir Humphrey Davy’s memoirs, and claims reports of 
Von Kempelen’s discovery and personality have already appeared in no fewer 
than three major papers of the time, the Courier and Enquirer, the Home Journal, 
and Duykinck’s Literary World.  The details from Davy’s diary, which would 
ostensibly satisfy readers’ Detail expectation, are in fact abstracted, fragmentary, 
and would likely have seemed nearly impenetrable and distracting to Poe’s 
readers: 
But to return to the “Diary” of Sir Humphrey Davy.  This pamphlet 
was not designed for the public eye….  At page 13, for example, near the 
middle, we read, in reference to his researches about the protoxide of 
azote;  “In less than half a minute the respiration being continued, 
diminished gradually and were succeeded by analogous to gentle pressure 
on all the muscles.” (607) 
 161 
The story is chock full of these sorts of “samplings” of institutions, 
journals, or individuals Poe must have felt his reader would recognize and place 
confidence in.  He sticks tight to the Foreign expectation by using Von 
Kempelen’s name and nationality to tap into the superior reputation of German 
science (Bruce 26).  To conform to his readers’ Sensation expectation, Poe winds 
his story up with the sensational police raid of Von Kempelen’s flat and the report 
of the plummeting gold market in Europe.  The sagging markets, in fact, appeal to 
the Use expectation by showing readers the immediate pay-off (although 
negative) of Von Kempelen’s discovery. 
Thus, on the surface, “Von Kempelen” appears to meet most of the 
expectations identified in this project, with the exception of Popsci. sub-
expectations Long (since no further news was promised), Decoration (decorative 
woodcuts) and Analogy (explanation of phenomenon with reference to “real-life” 
experiences); however, these expectations are somewhat marginal compared to 
the high-ranked constraints of Sensation, Medium, and Authority.  All of these 
central expectations “Von Kempelen” apparently satisfied.  And The Flag of Our 
Union did report science news and political news, so Poe’s hoax had a fair chance 
at being bolstered by its readers’ Medium expectations.  We would therefore 
expect the hoax to have been very successful with its readers.   
In fact, however, there is no recorded reaction to “Von Kempelen” 
whatsoever, and while Poe biographer Arthur Hobson Quinn claims that the hoax 
was one of the most “successful attempts of Poe to imitate a science report” 
(Quinn 596), other scholars seem to agree that “Von Kempelen” did not make 
 162 
anything like the stir Poe had intended.  There could be many reasons for this, 
some of which may simply be due to poor recording: issues of the Flag of our 
Union for several years surrounding 1849 are missing, and Poe does not discuss 
the story in his letters.  He wrote few letters, anyway, between April and his death 
six months later in October, and they were mostly frantic pleas for money and 
comfort.  “Von Kempelen” was simply not a priority with him at that time. 
However, assuming that we have all the reception data we need, and 
therefore that the public simply failed to fall for “Von Kempelen,” can the reader 
expectations we have collected help explain the failure of Poe’s final, and most 
deliberately crafted, hoax?  In fact, given the lack of reception information, the 
common reader expectations we have collected throughout an examination of 
Poe’s and Locke’s hoaxes so far are the only chance we have to explain “Von 
Kempelen’s” failure. 
A few simple observations suggest themselves immediately.  The 
Authority expectation states that the previous reputation of the author holds, and 
Poe’s readers would, by 1849, associate him with the “Balloon-Hoax” at least, if 
not also “M. Valdemar,” “Hans Phaall” and the public debate over the “Moon-
Hoax.”  It did not help his chances for ending up on the right side of the Authority 
expectation that he made mention in “Von Kempelen” not only of the Moon 
Hoax, but also the Maelzel exposé, which, even if readers did not know he had 
forged it, would still strengthen the tie between “Poe” and “hoax” in their minds.  
So, the Authority expectation would actually work against him in this hoax. 
 163 
What, then, can be said for the incredible weight of foreign names and 
domestic sources Poe used to keep “Von Kemplen” ballasted in reality?  Bernard 
Pollin is of the opinion that Poe actually shot himself in the foot with his slavish 
attention to the Wisdom and Foreign expectations:  "…[‘Von Kempelen’] is, 
indeed, a 'tired' kind of hoax, which defeats its purpose by presenting too much of 
the familiar from which readers could check on its authenticity" (Pollin 14).  
Poe’s overboard name-dropping might well have made his story ring a bit off-key, 
as popular science reports usually sacrificed extensive citation to keep up the 
excited pace of discovery.  It appears Poe might have employed so much detail in 
this hoax—with much of it fragmentary and random, violating expectations of 
Internal Coherence—that he bogged down the sensational element.  Overall, Poe 
made a misguided guess that his readers would rank Foreign, Wisdom, and Detail 
over Sensation.   
It is also possible that Poe’s hoax violated Novelty and Plausibility to a 
small extent.  While alchemy was certainly the fodder for popular fiction in the 
nineteenth century—the Rosicrucian novel St. Leon by William Godwin being the 
stand-out example of this sub-genre (Pollin 19)—the “pseudoscience” sustained 
no discussion in popular science journals and was probably counted too medieval 
to have a hold on public faith.  Poe’s seemingly unerring sense of what “wowed” 
the public—like aviation, automatons, exploration, cryptography, and 
hypnotism—seems to have gone awry in this final hoax.   
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In conclusion, three important observations can be made about the 
interaction of reader expectations in the hoax-reading experience as a result of 
“Von Kempelen’s” failure: 
• Novelty and Plausibility may be consistently ranked above Popsci., 
contrary to Poe’s ranking, which puts Popsci. or “verisimilitude” over 
Plausibility.  “Von Kempelen’s” failure shows us that if alchemy is simply 
not a novel or plausible scientific topic, it will not matter to the reader how 
close its presentation mimics a “true” science report.  This indicates a 
ranking of experience with the topic over trust in rhetorical form. 
• Expectations are not met or violated in isolation, but in interaction with 
other expectations.  Poe had a great deal of detail in this story.  But since 
Detail appears to compete with Sensation in popular science reading, too 
much detail retards sensation.  Expectations can fail by being over-met 
just as well as by being under-met, depending upon their interactions with 
other expectations. 
• Poe interpolated a great deal of “tangential” information between the 
Popsci. elements.  In many places, the tone of “Von Kempelen” is chatty 
and gossipy, more typical of one of Poe’s Literati portraits than a news 
story.11  Interpolation of material from other genres, as seen in the case of  
                                                 
11 One of these tangents is a section that mocks George Eveleth, a medical 
student and regular correspondent of Poe, who tried to steal some of Poe’s glory 
after the publication of Eureka by claiming to have already had and circulated 
some of the central ideas in it, according to Bernard Pollin (17).  Poe renames 
Eveleth “Kissam…or is it Mr. Quizzem….”  The passage reads in part, “It seems 
to me quite incredible that any man of common understanding could have 
discovered what Mr. Kissam says he did, and yet have subsequently acted so like 
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“M. Valdemar,” can confuse readers and make it difficult for them to play 
decisive interpretive games.  Poe’s non-linear personal commentary in 
“Von Kempelen” may have obscured the Popsci. elements for his readers. 
When viewed from the perspective of common reading expectations, Poe’s final 
hoax appears to have failed because, ironically, Poe tried too hard.  In a 
concentrated attempt to mimic all the features he believed to drive a successful 
hoax, he overloaded the story with fragmentary details, citations, and comments 
that blurred its structure and confused its readers. 
7.  SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS IN POE SCHOLARSHIP 
In this project I have redefined hoaxing as a meta-genre—a game played 
between author and reader in a news medium over readers’ expectations about a 
particular genre, science news, in this case.  This approach to Poe’s hoaxing 
revises previous work on it in two important ways:  it accounts for the multiple 
generic classifications of Poe’s hoaxes over the years, and it restrains the over-
application of the term “hoax” that has plagued Poe scholarship since the 1960s.   
First, acknowledging that we must theorize reader expectations to 
understand hoaxing helps account for the confusion over how to classify Poe’s 
hoaxes since their original printings.  For example, we are now prepared to 
explain why “M. Valdemar” is classified both as a hoax—by Poe’s 
                                                                                                                                     
a baby—so like an owl—as Mr. Kissam admits that he did.  By-the-way, who is 
Mr. Kissam?  And is not the whole paragraph in the Courier and Enquirer a 
fabrication got up to ‘make a talk’?  It must be confessed that it has an amazingly 
moon-hoax-y air” (606).  The snide similes and chatty tone of this passage are 
very out-of-keeping even with the relatively serious language of the first 
paragraph of the story, reproduced in the text above.  This language had to have 
thrown a wrench in readers’ interpretive processes. 
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contemporaries and by current science studies scholars like Alexander Boese—
and as a science fiction tale by critics like Roland Barthes and Bruce Franklin.  
The generic ambiguity is not a strictly textual function but resides in shifting 
reader expectations about medium and context.   
Changing the medium of publication changes the criteria by which the 
reader assesses the truth-value of the story.  When a reader encounters “M. 
Valdemar” in a literary collection, it is most likely that she suspends judgments on 
truth-values altogether, since those are not decisions pertinent to fiction reading.  
When the original readers of “M. Valdemar,” however, encountered the story in 
The American Review, which regularly carried political and science news, 
decisions about truth figured centrally in their interpretation of the text. 
Shifts in context have occurred as the society in which Poe’s readers’ live 
in has changed.  George Kennedy describes this transformation through the lens 
of the interpretation of classical rhetoric texts throughout European history in 
Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to 
Modern Times.  Letteraturizzazione is the process by which a rhetorical text 
comes to be read under literary, or “decoupled” genre expectations.  Kennedy 
tracks the progress of Cicero’s De Oratore and Longinus’s On the Sublime from 
their Roman reception as technical manuals for the production of political 
discourse, to their nineteenth-century Belletristic employment as catalogues of 
tropes and rhetorical devices to be reproduced in literary writings divorced from 
action in the public sphere.  Many forces can drive this shift in reading 
expectations, but primary among them is the outmoding of the text’s original 
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arena of application—a democratic assembly, in the case of Cicero’s and 
Longinus’s texts (Kennedy 111-112).   
In the case of “M. Valdemar,” to take one of Poe’s hoaxes for comparison, 
removing it from its original news medium and from a heated kairos of debate 
over mesmerism’s scientific potential forces generic reevaluation.  Readers are 
incapable of taking mesmerism as seriously ten years after the hoax’s original 
publication, much less 150 years later.  “M. Valdemar” has undergone 
letturaturizzazione, has become science fiction by default because its topic is 
outmoded in the modern reading context and it now appears in literary media 
rather than news media; thus, it has lost its ability to affect readers’ perceptions of 
reality.  Any analysis of Poe’s hoaxes that ignores the reader’s expectations about 
medium and context in assigning a text to a genre will miss this crucial point. 
It is hard to concretely illustrate the letturaturizzazione of “M. Valdemar” 
because of the difficulty of producing diachronic readings of the story.  However, 
comparison of the hoax with a near-contemporaneous piece of science fiction may 
be helpful in illustrating the transformations that a literary context can effect on 
arguments about scientific reality.  Writer Fitz-James O’Brien came to New York 
in 1852 a few years after Poe’s death and published science fiction stories in 
literary magazines like Harper’s New Monthly and Atlantic Monthly until he died 
fighting for the Union in 1862.  His stories were on topics remarkably similar to 
Poe’s hoaxes:  “How I Overcame My Own Gravity” recounted the experience of 
someone who flies into the atmosphere with the aid of a gyroscope, and “The 
Bohemian” concerned the gold rush and mesmerism, as did “M. Valdemar” and 
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“Von Kempelen” (Franklin Future 319-320).  O’Brien’s stories, however, were 
never called hoaxes, likely because they were never framed in a news context, 
which several of Poe’s were.  Even in the borderline case of “Hans Phaall,” which 
appeared not in a newspaper but in the Southern Literary Messenger, our 
reconstructed reader expectations are still sufficient to distinguish Poe’s hoax 
from O’Brien’s science fiction. 
O’Brien’s “How I Overcame My Gravity” appeared in Harper’s Monthly 
Magazine, which began publishing in 1850, the year after Poe’s death.  It is on a 
topic very close to “Hans Phaall”:  in the story, a scientific dabbler manages to fly 
high into the atmosphere with the aid of a gyroscope.  Both stories are contained 
in literary monthlies, though because of its lack of competition, the Southern 
Literary Messenger was forced to carry a great deal more political and general 
news than Harper’s was, so Poe’s hoax had that advantage.  However, compare 
the openings of the two stories: 
“How I Overcame My Gravity” 
I have all my life been dallying with science.  I have coquetted 
with electricity, and had a serious flirtation with pneumatics.  I have never 
discovered any thing, nevertheless I am continually experimentalizing.  
My chambers are like the Hall of Physics in a University.  Air-pumps, 
pendulums, prisms, galvanic batteries, horse-shoe magnets with big 
weights continually suspended to them:  in short, all the paraphernalia of a 
modern man of science are strewn here and there, or stowed away on 
shelves, much to the disgust of the maid-servant, who on cleaning-day 
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longs to enter the sanctuary, yet dare not trust her broom amidst such 
brittle furniture.  (O’Brien 779) 
“Hans Phaall—A Tale” 
By late accounts from Rotterdam that city seems to be in a 
singularly high state of philosophical excitement.  Indeed phenomena have 
there occurred of a nature so completely unexpected, so entirely novel, so 
utterly at variance with pre-conceived opinions, as to leave no doubt on 
my mind that long ere this all Europe is in an uproar, all Physics in a 
ferment, all Dynamics and Astronomy together by the ears. (Poe "Hans 
Phaall--a Tale" 565) 
It is not difficult to sense the difference between the rhetorics of these 
openings intuitively.  Poe’s seems much more serious and newsy than O’Brien’s.  
The difference is actually attributable to the Mystery expectation.  Poe is 
introducing an “unexpected” “novel” discovery.  O’Brien is rather humorously 
setting the stage for a personal account of misadventures in science.  Readers 
would not be likely to confuse O’Brien’s rhetoric for that of a science news 
report, especially as in its original print context it immediately followed an 
extraordinarily sappy love story entitled “Cool Captain.”  At least “Hans Phaall” 
had the good fortune, for its hoaxing project, to share the page with a non-fiction 
piece—a critical history of English poetry.  This simple comparison of the 
rhetoric and immediate print context of O’Brien’s science fiction with Poe’s hoax 
does not settle the issue of the confused classification of Poe’s hoaxes, but it 
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offers additional evidence that reader expectations must be consulted when 
assigning texts to genres. 
The other major contribution a reader-expectation-based methodology 
makes to the conversation about Poe’s hoaxing is to help salvage that activity as 
something special and significant as compared to Poe’s other fiction practices.  
Beginning in the 1960s, there was a strong tendency in Poe scholarship to re-
categorize most, if not all, of his tales as “hoaxes.”  In the vanguard of this trend 
was Richard Benton’s “Is Poe’s ‘The Assignation’ a Hoax?” in 1963 followed by 
G.R. Thompson’s “Is Poe’s ‘A Tale of the Ragged Mountains’ a Hoax?” and a 
slew of other analyses claiming hoax status for “The Mystery of Marie Rogêt,” 
“The System of Dr. Tarr and Prof. Fether,” “The Murders in the Rue Morgue,” 
“The Premature Burial,” and Eureka, among other texts.  Marie-Louise Nickerson 
Matthew, in her 1975 dissertation “Forms of the Hoax in the Tales of Edgar Allan 
Poe,” finds that all of his tales are hoaxes—either external hoaxes fooling readers 
or internal hoaxes giving Poe himself provisional illusions of epistemological 
stability.  Published a few years after that analysis, the essays in Dennis Eddings’s 
1983 collection The Naiad Voice:  Essays on Poe’s Satiric Hoaxing mark the 
height of this fashion of hoax-hunting. 
This trend was ostensibly well-motivated, as Poe actually used the word 
“hoax” in reference to his jeux d’esprit in the news media; in addition, his 
predilection for codes, cryptograms, and other forms of “mystification” was 
legendary.  Complicating these re-analyses of Poe’s tales, however, is the fact that 
in most of them, the same story was indiscriminately assigned to several related 
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genres.  For example, G.R. Thompson refers to tales like “The Assignation” as 
“hoaxlike parodies” (454), and Benjamin Franklin Fisher variously categorizes 
the rhetoric of “Tarr and Fether” as “hoaxing,” “self-parody,” “satiric,” and 
“burlesque” all in a single page (136).  Some of this generic confusion can be 
easily clarified through more rigorous attention to the special effects of parody, 
satire, and burlesque on readers, as demonstrated in Chapter One.  However, in 
addition, viewing hoaxing as a special game in guessing and satisfying reader 
expectations provides a powerful tool for focusing the application of the term 
“hoax” correctly and precisely in Poe criticism.  To illustrate this point we can 
revise from a rhetorical perspective two of the more recent reclassifications of 
Poe’s fiction as hoaxes. 
John Bryant, in his study of “Murders in the Rue Morgue” in “Poe’s Ape 
of UnReason,” determines that the story is in reality a hoax.  Bryant cites the 
sociology of Johan Huizinga and Clifford Geertz in a definition of Poe’s hoaxing 
practice as a “satiric antiritual” that in its mean-spiritedness denies its readers the 
comic closure of being able to laugh at themselves and thus to release the tension 
of the author’s attack on them (Bryant 28).  This analysis jibes with the picture of 
hoaxing we have been developing in many ways.  However, in illustrating the 
“satiric antiritual” of Poe’s hoaxing, Bryant does not choose one of the media 
hoaxes.  Instead, he focuses on what is widely considered to be the first detective 
story.  Bryant claims that “Rue Morgue” is a hoax because Poe hides the clues to 
the L’Esplanayes’ deaths so well that the reader cannot figure them out and must 
defer to Dupin’s genius and his eleventh-hour revelation of the clump of 
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orangutan hair that clinches everything.  Thus, hoaxing, in Bryant’s analysis of 
“Rue Morgue,” is simply not playing straight with the reader.   
While “Rue Morgue” and the media hoaxes indeed share a common theme 
of science—the newly-developing field of forensic science, in the case of “Rue 
Morgue”—several dissimilarities between the rhetoric of the two practices, and 
the conditions of their publication, suggest that Bryant’s crying hoax over “Rue 
Morgue” is premature and threatens to efface a rich and important distinction in 
Poe’s rhetorical practices.  Poe was very aware of the rhetorical game he was 
playing with readers in his detective tales like “Rue Morgue,” and it was a game 
quite different from the one he played in his media hoaxes.  He intended the secret 
machinery of his hoaxes to remain concealed for the duration of the reading, for at 
least some of his readers.  By contrast, in his detective fiction, Poe admitted to 
having "woven" highly artificial mysteries that he would then set about 
"unraveling" before the reader’s eye; this became such a standard rhetorical 
procedure for him, in fact, that he grew weary of it and openly burlesqued himself 
doing it in "Thou Art the Man!" (Fusco 92).  So, the first and most obvious 
response to Bryant’s hypothesis about the hoax status of “Rue Morgue” is 
Occam’s Razor: what do we have to gain by reclassifying “Rue Morgue” as a 
hoax when Poe has already identified it as a special sort of rhetorical mystery-
making distinct from the parasitic meta-rhetoric of the science hoax?  Bryant 
would perhaps argue that acknowledging “Rue Morgue” as a hoax uniquely 
reveals the “satiric antiritual” Poe puts his readership through to his benefit and 
their shame.  But it is hard to see how a reader encountering “Rue Morgue” in the 
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very literary Graham’s Magazine in 1841 would experience that tale in the same 
way as Locke’s “Moon Hoax” or Poe’s “Balloon-Hoax” in the New York Sun; 
thus, the Medium expectation serves to classify “Rue Morgue” as literary fiction 
rather than news.  Admittedly, the opening of “Rue Morgue” does use a few 
words that would fit the Mystery expectations of science newsreaders, words like 
“glories” and “enigmas.”  However, they do not describe a new discovery, but 
rather abstract psychological concepts: 
The mental features discoursed of as the analytical, are, in 
themselves, but little susceptible of analysis.  We appreciate them only in 
their effects.  We know of them, among other things, that they are always 
to their possessor, when inordinately possessed, a source of the liveliest 
enjoyment.  As the strong man exults in his physical ability, delighting in 
such exercises as call his muscles into action, so glories the analyst in that 
moral activity which disentangles.  He derives pleasure from even the 
most trivial occupations bringing his talents into play.  He is fond of 
enigmas, of conundrums, of hieroglyphics; exhibiting in his solutions of 
each a degree of acumen which appears to the ordinary apprehension 
preternatural (2) 
This opening is very non-news-like in its musing abstraction and its failure 
to lay claim to the witness of a spectacular new scientific or technological 
phenomenon.  Already the reader is alerted that the interpretive decisions they 
must make here will have little to do with establishing the truth-value of the story 
to follow.  The immediate failure of “Rue Morgue” to satisfy the crucial reader 
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expectations of Popsci. and Medium about science news ensures that the story 
will not be read as fact, but as fiction.  How, then, can Poe target the readers of 
“Rue Morgue” to embarrass them for their dim-wittedness, if they are not 
prepared to make interpretive decisions that engage their assumptions about 
reality?  The readers of “Rue Morgue” are likely practicing “willing suspension of 
disbelief,” to borrow Coleridge’s original description in the Biographia Literaria 
of the “decoupling” of meaning from world-view that is the hallmark of fiction 
(6). 
Probably the most general attempt to reclassify Poe’s fiction as hoaxing 
was Marie-Louise Nickerson Matthew’s 1975 dissertation “Forms of Hoax in the 
Tales of Edgar Allan Poe.”  As mentioned briefly above, Matthew claimed that all 
of Poe’s fiction was hoaxing, either external hoaxes to dupe readers, or internal 
hoaxes to provide Poe himself with fantasies that provisionally stabilized his 
erratic mind.  Matthew’s definition of hoax fails at a high level, not at a more 
local level like Benton’s and Bryant’s.  Her analysis elides the hoax’s primary 
function of identifying and transforming reader expectations; this crucial mistake 
is what allows her to over-apply the term.  Matthew ignores the fact that Poe’s 
hoaxes transform reader expectations about genre and about the world.  This 
transformation is accomplished through revelation of “the truth,” which runs 
counter to the argument of the hoax and thus forces readers to reexamine their 
assumptions.  Either Poe’s hoaxes reveal themselves during the reading process, 
for cannier readers, or Poe himself reveals them, for the less canny.  No one stays 
in the dark, or it is not a hoax (“hoax” again denotes not strictly the text but the 
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whole game over truth between an author and a reader through a news medium).  
A hoax’s very raison d’etre is to undermine expectations.  Where, then, is even 
the “provisional” stability that Matthew claims that the “internal” hoaxes like 
“Murders in the Rue Morgue” provided for Poe?  Hoaxes are in the business of 
destabilizing reality, not stabilizing it. 
The preceding are three examples of how attention to reader expectations 
about genre can help prevent over-application of the term “hoax” to all of Poe’s 
work.  However, consideration of these problems has in turn provided a crucial 
contribution to this project:  a provisional overall ranking of the reader 
expectations collected so far.  The fact that readers read Poe’s hoaxes as hoaxes 
when they are in newspapers but as science fiction or detective fiction when they 
are in literary collections indicates that the expectations of Medium and Authority 
dominate other reader expectations.  These high level expectations of medium and 
author determine the kind of interpretive game that will be played from there on 
in.  If Medium and Authority support factual news-reading, then games over truth 
will be played, utilizing the expectations about the “real world” and the rhetoric of 
science news collected in this project.  If Medium and Authority support a fiction 
reading game, then the Entertainment expectation kicks in, the game is 
“decoupled” from decisions about truth, and other important literary sub-
expectations under Entertainment apply, which are beyond the scope of this 
dissertation.12  Combining this new perspective on expectation-ranking with that 
                                                 
12 Interestingly, Zwaan found in his study of the effects of media that 
participants who believed they were reading fiction reported appreciating the 
language of the story.  His finding jives well with the reactions of contemporary 
readers of Locke’s hoax who ranked Entertainment highly in their interpretive 
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garnered from consideration of the failure of “Von Kempelen” and Poe’s own 
overt ranking of reader expectations, I suggest the following provisional ranking 
of reader expectations for antebellum science news: 
{Medium, Authority}>> {Novelty, Sensation, Plausibility} >>  
{Popsci., Foreign, Internal Coh.} 
Again, ranking is from right to left, lowest-ranked to highest-ranked.  
Double angle brackets “>>” denote levels of rank, as would solid vertical lines in 
the tabular notation.  Commas, like the dotted lines in the tabular notation, 
indicate lack of evidence for competition, and therefore equality of strength, 
among expectations in a given level of rank.  Starting at the lowest level of rank, 
Foreign and Internal Coherence are relatively local expectations that seem to have 
the same strength as Popsci. (verisimilitude) expectations so far.  Clearly more 
important than these expectations are Novelty, Sensation, and Plausibility, in 
agreement with Poe’s own estimation.  Finally, expectations about Medium and 
Authority are highest-ranked, “trumping” any other expectations in the case of 
conflict between them.  Only when these higher-level expectations have been 
satisfied are lower-level ones allowed to play decisive roles in decisions about 
truth.   
The only disagreement so far with Poe’s own rankings is my placement of 
Plausibility above Popsci.; Poe felt that readers valued “verisimilitude” more than 
plausibility in a science news article.  The reception of “Von Kempelen,” 
however, illustrated the opposite case:  a story whose rhetoric conformed very 
                                                                                                                                     
decisions.  While they did not care about the truth-value of the story, they 
reported enjoying its imaginative structure and language. 
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well to the schema laid out in Popsci. still failed to convince its readers.  I 
surmised in the analysis of that tale that alchemy was not a novel or plausible 
enough topic to engage readers’s belief, and so Plausibility of topic was ranked 
along with Novelty, higher than Popsci.  Although this is a provisional re-ranking 
of Poe’s intuitions, in defense of it, the plausibility Poe criticized in the “Moon-
Hoax” was a fine-grained, somewhat expert notion, requiring Poe’s deeper-than-
average familiarity with astronomical principles to be appreciated.  The 
plausibility concerned in “Von Kempelen” is a rough-grained notion based on 
general public opinion about the modern applicability of alchemy, a very dusty 
medieval discipline.  I believe this latter conception of Plausibility will be more 
widely useful in analyzing hoaxes. 
This provisional ranking represents the filter the majority of Poe’s readers 
may have been (unconsciously) using when approaching his hoaxes.  It is unlikely 
that all of the expectations would have figured in any single reader’s 
interpretation of one of Poe’s hoaxes; reader decisions, as we have seen, tend to 
focus on just a few competing expectations, even if others are in play 
unconsciously.  The filter, then, synthesizes the ranking information from the 17 
or so extant individual reading decisions about Poe’s and Locke’s hoaxes.  It 
therefore represents in skeleton form part of Poe’s readers’ world-view, their 
beliefs about science and science news—the ideational place where Poe engaged 
them and built a public relationship with them through his hoaxing. 
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8.  POE’S RELATIONSHIP TO SCIENCE AND TO HIS READERSHIP:  HOW THE 
HOAXES INTERACT WITH EUREKA  
Now that we have examined the rules for the game Poe was playing with 
his readership in his hoaxes, the more interesting questions remain:  What was he 
after?  And why?  These questions both come into focus by examining his 
hoaxing practices against Eureka, Poe’s fullest statement of the relationship of the 
writer to reality and to his/her readership. 
Eureka was published in 1848, between the hoaxes “M. Valdemar” and 
“Von Kempelen.”  There is every evidence that Poe felt Eureka would be the 
crowning achievement of his literary career, from the excited letters he wrote 
friends and publishers about the book.  It represented an astounding range of 
scientific and philosophical reading.  John Limon finds that the book’s clearest 
debt is to the German school of Naturphilosophie, specifically to Schelling and 
Hegel, whose works had been published in English in America just a few years 
before the publication of Eureka (Limon 21). 
It is actually easy to put the point of Eureka briefly because it was an 
argument that the entire universe was constructed and sustained by two and only 
two opposing forces, gravitation and electricity, called elsewhere attraction and 
repulsion, and Unity and difference (Poe Eureka 33,40-41).  Poe anticipates 
deconstructive argument by claiming the universe is always in the process of its 
own undoing:  “My general proposition, then, is this: --In the Original Unity of 
the First Thing lies the Secondary Cause of All Things, with the Germ of their 
Inevitable Annihiliation” (5-6).  In a slightly ironic twist of fate, Poe was indebted 
to Richard Adams Locke for this idea.  At the age of 18, Locke had written a 
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poem in six cantos about the cyclic destruction and rebirth of the universe, and at 
a Lyceum lecture he gave in Boston on magnetism, he expounded a refined 
version of this theory.  Poe availed himself of the pamphlet and the concept for 
Eureka (Locke Moon Hoax  xxxiii). 
Poe begins the body of argument in Eureka with what has been called a 
“hoax,” but what is really a bizarre recap of “Mellonta Tauta,” where a letter 
fallen from a balloon time-traveling from the year 2848 criticizes the nineteenth 
century for its scientific backwardness.  The old syllogistic system of “a Turkish 
philosopher called Aries and surnamed Tottle,” is ridiculed for its rigidity, as is 
the “crawling” inductive system of “one Hog surnamed, ‘the Ettrick shepherd’” 
(8-9).  The only way to truth, implies Poe through the tinny voice of the letter-
writer, is through the imagination: 
"…you can understand how restrictions so absurd on their very face must 
have operated, in those days, to retard the progress of true Science, which 
makes its most important advances, as all History will show, by seemingly 
intuitive leaps.  These ancient ideas confined investigation to crawling; 
and I need not suggest to you that crawling, among varieties of 
locomotion, is a very capital thing of its kind; but because the snail is sure 
of foot, for this reason must we clip the wings of the eagles?” (9-10)   
The letter-writer goes on to complain that the Baconican school of 
philosophy demanded that every truth be demonstrated empirically.  Because true 
demonstration of anything is impossible due to the essentially individual and 
contingent nature of perception and belief, this unjust requirement stultified the 
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growth of science, and  "No man dared utter a truth for which he felt himself 
indebted to his soul alone" (10). 
On the contrary, Poe says when he is done ventriloquizing, to understand a 
concept as awesome and indemonstrable as the nature of the very universe, a 
different methodology must be developed.  His new science sounds in places a 
great deal like Dupin’s intuitive ratiocination.  Here, Poe describes it as a 
“whirling on the heel” on the top of a mountain in order to take in the whole 
panorama in one sublime blur (6). 
Of course, the rest of his argument about how gravitation and electricity 
work in the universe smacks a great deal of both Aristotelian syllogism in some 
places and Baconian induction in others.  Although he claims that it is impossible 
to prove anything “axiomatically,” he often works through syllogisms to build one 
part of his argument on another.  And he seems to have a compulsive need to 
measure his ideas against the “real world.”  But Poe is actually attempting a great 
experiment in a slightly different system of reasoning here—analogy, through 
which truth is determined on the basis of correspondence of unknown phenomena 
to known phenomena, like the radiation of light and heat (Welsh 170).  Poe writes 
“a perfect consistency can be nothing but an absolute truth”(16), and as he does, 
he indentures himself to Francis Wayland’s conception of analogical reasoning, as 
well as to Humboldt’s Cosmos, and to Laplace’s nebular theory (Welsh 170, 185-
186). 
It has often been ventured, particularly by critics who have chosen to view 
him as a Romantic, that Poe hated science.  Certainly, a cursory reading of 
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“Sonnet—to Science” and of his catty comments about Bacon in Eureka and 
elsewhere lend credence to this notion.  But a careful examination of Poe’s hoaxes 
and Eureka show that Poe was fascinated with science.  He just favored his own 
science of imaginative leaps over what he viewed as the baby-stepping of 
Baconian induction.  Further, he was not against all modern induction, just the 
version he believed to be common currency in America.  His disdain for this 
plodding sample-collection with no inductive speculation is apparent in a letter 
for the Columbia Spy where he reviews the Wilkes expedition.13  He calls it 
"encumbered with 'men of science.'  Let some Yankee open the way (as, 
assuredly, some Yankee yet will), and let men of science follow his footsteps, and 
geologize at their leisure" (Mabbott 50).  Again, Poe champions the adventurer 
with imagination over professional Baconian scientists…. 
 “…merely perceptive men…those inter-Tritonic minnows, the 
microscopical savants, the diggers and pedlers [sic] of minute facts, for the 
most part in physical science; facts, all of which they retailed at the same 
price upon the highway; their value depending, it was supposed, simply 
upon the fact of their fact, without reference to their applicability or 
inapplicability in the development of those ultimate and only legitimate 
facts, called Law" (Eureka 11). 
                                                 
13 The United States Exploring Expedition, begun in 1834, commanded by 
Captain Charles Wilkes.  Along with Yale geologist James Dwight Dana, an 
illustrator and ethnographer attended the naval expedition to collect and record 
samples along the West Coast of the United States, the South Pacific, and 
Australia. 
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Poe’s hoaxing dovetails neatly with this credo about the imagination.  His 
hoaxes, as already pointed out, were designed to embarrass readers, but for what, 
and to what end?  Daniel Hoffman has already argued convincingly that Poe was 
not interested in helping any of his readers learn more about science.  With his 
hoaxes, Poe was engaged in a campaign to embarrass people for letting the rigid 
limits of modern science blind them to the truth they could have apprehended if 
they had freed up their minds intuitively.  Thus, Poe points out his superior 
scientific-imaginative genius in being able to connive rhetorical contraptions that 
will dupe the reading public.  The hoaxes, seen in this light, become an indirect 
argument, an advertisement, almost, for the transcendence of Poe’s intuitive 
ratiocination over Baconian induction or Aristotelian deduction. 
In the discussion of Poe’s “Balloon-Hoax,” the mechanistic nature of both 
the hoax and Poe’s rhetoric was highlighted.  I argued there that the hoax was 
actually a sort of machine or automaton that took in reader expectations and 
transformed them into an experience of shame or embarrassment.  Daniel 
Hoffman has found the same mechanical aesthetic at work in Eureka.  By boiling 
down the entire universe into two inexorable and completely balanced forces, 
Hoffman argues that Poe shouts to his readers, "The entire universe is a huge 
coherent contraption!" (Hoffman 281).  Further, Hoffman contends, Poe proves 
through Eureka, through the Philosophy of Composition, the Poetic Principle, and 
other writings that he is essentially a "mechanician of literature and his theories a 
program for the production of verbal contraptions" (281).  The hoaxes are some of 
these “verbal contraptions”: Poe carefully built them, tinkered with them, watched 
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their progress in the world with the worried and elated anxiety of an inventor.  
They are designed to transform readers.  When they work, they suck readers in 
and then, after spitting them out, leave them to look over the gears and pistons 
and marvel at the genius of the man who was able to do this to them. 
This leads us to the question of what kind of relationship Poe wanted with 
his readership, because humiliation does not endear.  Most analyses leave the 
relationship where we just did:  traditionally, Poe feels “contempt” for his reading 
audience (Matthew 73).  He is the insecure genius who uses his hoaxes to 
humiliate his readership so he can feel superior.  Poe’s own behavior and writings 
admittedly support this easy dichotomy of “hoaxers” and “hoaxees.”  In addition 
to his low opinion of the “readily gullible” public expressed in his Literati note on 
Richard Adams Locke, Poe elsewhere mocks the public as “believers in every 
thing Odd,” whose “Credulity:--let us call it Insanity at once,” marks them as 
“ignorant people” (“Fifty Suggestions,” 1303).  And why else would he throw a 
monkey wrench in the potentially lucrative run on copies of his “Balloon Hoax” 
by announcing it was a hoax, unless he wanted more than money (and he wanted 
money!), unless he wanted the face-to-face experience of forcing a crowd of his 
readers to admit their gullibility and his creative authority. 
But this one-dimensional view of Poe’s complex literary behavior in his 
hoaxes is dangerously reductionist.  In an alternative view outlined in his Reading 
at the Social Limit, Jonathan Elmer attributes Poe’s difficult relationship with the 
public to an essential incompatibility in American democracy between 
individuality and social assimilation.  Elmer argues that, for a society that 
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champions the individual, it is ironic that both the “we” of American society and 
the “I” of the individual cannot be held in view at the same time because each 
implies the absence of the other.  "'I' become riven by my participation in the 
social whole, and 'it' becomes riven by my exemption from it"(30).  This dynamic 
is exactly reflected in the tension between attraction and repulsion in Eureka.  As 
Poe points out in the preface, this tension in the universe is not primarily a 
physical, but a spiritual, social, and poetic principle as well.  In spiritual terms the 
philosopher’s independent thought creates a difference that always pulls him/her 
against the gravitational force trying to coalesce everything in a primordial state 
of Unity.  And even though Poe tries to reassure the ardent individualist that it 
will not really sting to lose one’s identity and get sucked into the One, he does not 
seem to buy his own rhetoric: 
The utter impossibility of any one's soul feeling itself inferior to 
another; the intense, overwhelming dissatisfaction and rebellion at the 
thought; these…are, to my mind at least, a species of proof far surpassing 
what Man terms demonstration, that no one soul is inferior to another; that 
nothing is, or can be, superior to one soul; that each soul is, in part, its own 
God--its own creator….(135)   
The spiritual principle is fast becoming a social principle here.  For in true 
Heisenbergian form, the closer Poe gets to determining himself as an individual, 
the more isolated he feels from his community; conversely, the more he allows 
himself to be absorbed into the mass of American culture, the more anxiety and 
uncertainty he experiences about his personal identity.  Karen Roggenkamp 
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claims this anxiety explains Poe’s courting of the penny press, a journalistic 
forum he considered beneath him.  The fame and notoriety Locke attracted with 
his hoax made Poe want some of it for himself.  Yet, the closer he got to 
identifying with his readers, while trying to guess their expectations, the more 
anxious he became that he was one of them, that he, too, was a member of the 
mediocre “masses” that he so longed to prove his superiority to.  He commented 
somewhat ironically on this dilemma by way of discussing the social effect of 
satire in an unpublished draft of his Literati portrait of Laughton Osborn: 
…thus in satirizing the people we satirize only ourselves, and can never be 
in a condition to sympathize with the satire.   
It is forgotten that no individual considers himself as one of the 
mass.  Each person, in his own estimate, is the pivot on which all the rest 
of the world spins round.  He may abuse the people by wholesale, and 
with a clear conscience so far as regards any compunction for offending 
any one from among the multitude of which that people is composed.  
Every one of the crowd will cry "encore!--give it to them, the vagabonds!-
-it serves them right." [Poe, 1846 #58 79] 
The hoaxes are in many ways the instantiation of Poe’s insecurity about 
his social identity; they show him both longing to be absorbed in a community of 
fellow thinkers, while attempting to distance and dichotomize the “multitude” he 
feared he actually belonged to.  A hoax, the process of reading a hoax, 
materializes a double readership—the readers who fall for it, and those who catch 
on and read it as a co-conspirator of the hoaxer rather than as his/her victim.  As 
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mentioned before, those two sets of readers actually live in different worlds 
formed by their beliefs.  It is this second world of readers that is often overlooked 
in assessments of Poe’s hoaxing, an audience Poe invoked, created, in fact, with 
the clues he left in his hoaxes for the acute observer:  the goofy underlying 
meanings of his foreign names like Schnellpost, and the fact that “Hans Phaall” 
sets out in his balloon on April 1, and the use of the name “Kissam” as a reference 
to a sycophantic correspondent whom Poe’s friends would have recognized 
immediately.  Kent Ljungquist argues that this verbal play is deliberate and 
“central to [the] hoax, a form that establishes two audiences:  those deceived by 
the author's ironic dissembling and those cognizant of his satiric purpose" 
(Ljungquist 204).   
Poe would have immediately recognized this potential for duality in the 
mechanics of the hoax because he was already at home with doublings and double 
motions in his writing.  His tales contain many pairs of characters who twin each 
other, reflecting back to each other complementary (and often annihilatory) 
characteristics:  Madeline and Roderick Usher, Dupin and the Minister D, Dupin 
and the narrator in Murders in the Rue Morgue (Guthrie 94).  Eureka, in fact, is a 
double motion, both poem and scientific treatise, and the universe in it is a 
constant double motion of attraction and repulsion, Unity and difference.   
It is exactly this double motion of attraction and repulsion that Poe was 
engaging in with his readership:  distancing himself from a readership “too 
exclusively intent on the making of money” to use their imaginations or to 
support artists (Hoffman 185), while drawing to him those few to whom he 
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dedicated Eureka, those “who love me and whom I love, to those who feel rather 
than to those who think, to the dreamers and those who put faith in dreams as in 
the only realities” (6) (Swirski 28).  These people Poe deemed worthy of 
communion; they could join him “spinning on his heel” on the summit of Aetna 
and agree with him that reality was not what actually happened but what could 
happen.  These “few gifted individuals, who kneel around the summit, beholding, 
face to face, the master spirit who stands upon the pinnacle” (“Letter to B____” 
5), could become god-like writers of reality for American readers.  Like the 
suffocating but strangely compelling vision of communion between the narrator 
and Dupin in “Murders in the Rue Morgue,” Poe’s hoaxes, when defined as 
carefully engineered rhetorical transactions with a double audience, reveal him 
not just yearning for community, but actually designing and building it.  
Accordingly, even his most traditionally esoteric texts, like Eureka and The Poetic 
Principle, deserve re-examination not as uneven attempts at creating theory, but as 
complex exercises in creating publics, seeking communion.   Such re-readings, 
although beyond the scope of the present project, promise to provide a richer 













Chapter Three:  Mark Twain and the Social Mechanics of 
Laughter 
It seems inevitable that Twain would turn to hoaxing given his penchant 
for satire—expressed as early as the age of 17 with his first published story, “The 
Dandy Frightening the Squatter,” for the humor magazine The Carpet Bag.  That 
he would choose scientific media hoaxing for the mode of his first published 
hoax, “The Petrified Man,” seems an equally natural turn for Twain.  Science and 
technology were preoccupations of his writings and business dealings from his 
jaw-dropping admiration of the World’s Fair in New York in 1853 to his 
disastrous investment beginning in 1880 in the Paige automatic typesetting 
machine, which Twain was certain would revolutionize the print business.   
However, until now, Twain’s fascination with these topics, and with the 
philosophy of mechanism, has mostly been treated as a biographical vehicle 
through which to psychoanalyze Twain in his final depressed years as a writer and 
bereaved husband and father.  This has been the approach of scholars such as 
Lawrence Berkove, Tom Burnam, Pascal Covici, Sherwood Cummings, and 
Hyatt Waggoner.  While Covici attempts to use the hoax as a figure for Twain’s 
late-life determinism, none of these authors look to Twain’s hoaxing as a 
necessary component of his philosophy of science.  Connecting Twain’s hoaxing 
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in “The Petrified Man” and the “Empire City Massacre” with his philosophy of 
science and culture in later works like A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s 
Court suggests a different conclusion.  Instead of ambivalence about the value of 
science in society, or fatalism about the increasing mechanization of human 
culture, Twain’s hoaxing practices point to a more complicated response to 
science and technology in American culture.  They reveal the double-edged sword 
of rhetoric as an instrument of social control—and laughter as a complex and 
constructive response to that rhetoric, promoting self-determination and 
independence. 
To build an argument about Twain’s hoaxing toward that conclusion, I 
will first examine Twain’s rhetorical and scientific acculturation, focusing 
especially on his experience with the tall tale and how that rhetorical activity 
helped lay the groundwork for the development of the media hoax.  Next, I will 
consider in detail Twain’s first and major scientific hoax, “The Petrified Man”—
both its motivations, as stated by Twain, and the reaction to it.  I will use reader 
reactions and Twain’s characterization of them to further modify the filter of 
science-newsreading expectations developed in the last chapter to accommodate 
changes in kairos since Poe’s time.  Finally, I will compare the results from the 
study of Twain’s hoaxing against his scientific thinking expressed in three of his 
later major fiction works dealing with science and technology:  3,000 Years 
Among the Microbes, The American Claimant, and A Connecticut Yankee in 
King Arthur’s Court.  Claims that Twain had no social program with his hoaxing 
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will be reevaluated in light of these works, his early hoaxes, and evidence of his 
deploying laughter as an attack against the power of science in American politics.   
1.  RHETORICAL ACCULTURATION 
1.1 Formal education 
If Poe received from his schooling everything he would need in terms of 
rhetorical and scientific training to prepare him to write science hoaxes, Twain’s 
education presents a different picture.  In a letter to his brother Orion in 1865, 
Twain laments having little formal rhetorical cultivation of his native talents:  
“Though the Almighty did His part by me--for the talent is a mighty engine when 
supplied with the steam of education--which I have not got, & so its pistons & 
cylinders & shafts move feebly & for a holiday show & are useless for any good 
purpose” (Clemens Mark Twain's Letters 323).  Needless to say, in light of our 
investigation of the connection between Twain’s rhetoric and his scientific and 
technological thinking, it is significant to find him thinking of rhetoric in 
mechanical terms at about the same time he is composing his first hoaxes.  The 
dramatic self-regret performed in this letter, on the other hand, is misleading.    
Twain prided himself on his work-a-day background and practical self-education 
as a riverboat pilot, a miner, and a writer. 
As a young boy, Twain attended a private school in Hannibal costing a 
quarter a week, and that only infrequently, whenever the fishing was no good, 
according to his Autobiography (40).  There, he learned spelling and math, recited 
poetry and prose selections, and was taught to explicate bible stories (41).  He 
may even have been exposed to some Latin and French on the days he deigned to 
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come to class (Hoffman 15).  The most vivid pictures of what his classroom life 
might have been like do not come from his autobiography but from his fiction—
for example, the school scenes in Tom Sawyer—and from his reports on schools 
for the Territorial Enterprise in Nevada.  On a visit to Miss Clapp’s private school 
in Carson City in 1864, Twain found that the schoolroom had not changed much 
since the days of his formal tutelage.  Neither had the form of student 
compositions, in which Twain claimed to recognize these features of his own 
schoolboy writing: 
The cutting to the bone of the subject with the very first gash, 
without any preliminary foolishness in the way of a gorgeous introductory; 
the inevitable and persevering tautology; the brief, monosyllabic sentences 
(beginning, as a very general thing, with the pronoun “I”); the penchant 
for presenting rigid, uncompromising facts for the consideration of the 
hearer, rather than ornamental fancies; the depending for the success of the 
composition upon its general merits, without tacking artificial aids to the 
end of it, in the shape of deductions or conclusions, or clap-trap climaxes, 
albeit their absence sometimes imparts to these essays the semblance of 
having come to an end before they were finished--of arriving at full speed 
at a jumping-off place and going suddenly overboard, as it were, leaving a 
sensation such as one feels when he stumbles without previous warning 
upon that infernal 'To Be Continued' in the midst of a thrilling magazine 
story. (Clemens MT of the Enterprise 136-7) 
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Twain’s perceptive dissection of this genre of composition indicates a 
facility for rhetorical analysis that doubtless served him well when he wrote in 
parasitic genres like satires, parodies, and hoaxes.  Clearly, Twain himself did not 
remain at this childish level for long in his own composition practices, as he was 
published by the age of 17.  The classroom was not instrumental in developing his 
rhetorical skills.  Rather, his newspaper apprenticeships, beginning at the age of 
12, and his affinity with oral narrative and humorous traditions account for the 
bulk of Twain’s rhetorical preparation for hoaxing. 
1.2 Newspaper apprenticeships 
After the death of his father in 1857, Twain dropped out of school for 
good and was apprenticed to his brother Orion at the Hannibal Journal, which 
Orion edited.  Twain’s duties included setting type, proofing sheets, and 
occasionally composing advertisements and news items.  Working at the paper 
acquainted Twain with the actual mechanics of newspaper production as well as 
the role the paper’s rhetoric played in its readers’ lives.  At a young age, he 
proved himself already aware of the news medium’s authority to startle people 
and remake their world.  An early hoax-like joke was printed on the front page of 
the Journal in 1853:  “Terrible Accident! 500 Men Killed and Missing!!” read the 
headline.  The story went on, “We had set the above headline up, expecting (of 
course) to use it, but as the accident hasn't happened yet, we'll say (to be 
continued)” (Lauber 46-47). 
It was during this time that Twain published his first satire in The Carpet 
Bag in 1852.  Then, in 1853, tired of his brother never having enough money to 
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pay him his wages, he left for St. Louis to work principally as a typesetter on the 
Evening News.  He stayed only a few months before moving on to New York 
City to see the World’s Fair and to try his hand as a compositor for a printer.  
Here he embarked on a program of self-education through reading at the local 
printer’s library in the evenings, or so he assured his mother, who undoubtedly 
feared for his moral life in the big city.  Sometime during this period, he read the 
satire of Laurence Sterne, Thomas Hood, and George W. Curtis.  Twain also liked 
Oliver Goldsmith's Citizens of the World, and Cervantes’s Don Quixote.  In a 
February, 1861, letter to his brother Orion, he alluded to reading Dickens.  Other 
early reading for which we have evidence includes Thomas Paine's Age of 
Reason, Voltaire, and William Tappan Thompson’s Major Jones's Sketches of 
Travel  (Emerson 8).  Twain enjoyed travel books in general and Herndon’s 
Travels in the Amazon in particular (Clemens Autobiography 128).  The 
influences of these writers, especially the satirists, began to emerge in the pieces 
Twain wrote for the Spirit of the Times, a sporting magazine that emphasized in 
the style of its articles the "distinction between the false and the real and between 
the pretentious and the unsophisticated"—all characteristic of oral humor genres 
like the tall tale and the practical joke (Emerson  4).  The satire and travel 
narratives he read, when combined with the frontier humor tradition and his 
experience with the mechanics and authority of news media, made media hoaxing 
a natural next step for Twain. 
 194 
1.3 Frontier humor:  the practical joke and the tall tale 
Probably the greatest influence on Twain’s hoaxing practices was his 
experience with frontier humor—prefigured by his early reading of Spirit of the 
Times and actualized by his stint as a riverboat pilot and his migration to the 
territory of Nevada during the Civil War.  This exposure marks a major difference 
between Poe’s and Twain’s hoaxing, but also a significant common thread.  Poe 
went through much of the same preparation for hoaxing as Twain did—living in 
the North and South with different classes of Americans, reading travel narratives, 
writing for newspapers.  But Poe did not live in the West, while Twain did for 
nearly half his life (Missouri counted as the West at that time).  Twain situated his 
hoaxes on the frontier, since that was a liminal epistemological realm for his 
readers.  Poe, living in the urbane east, had to situate his hoaxes on other borders 
of American experience—Europe, space, life/death, matter/energy.  While frontier 
humor did not have the impact on Poe that it did on Twain, the idea of the frontier 
insinuated itself into both of their hoaxes as the line where human knowledge 
became insecure, and thus where a hoax was most effective.  It is significant that 
hoaxing activity died down in New York and the East Coast at the same time it 
was working up a good head of steam in the West—also, that Western hoaxes 
were about the West, not Europe or Fiji or the moon.14  Twain’s hoaxing thus 
responded to two shifts in American humor, according to Walter Blair and 
Hamlin Hill.  It championed the little guy, the pioneer, over the powerful and rich, 
                                                 
14 The one exception to this rule of which I am aware was an 1899 hoax 
by Denver newsmen about the Great Wall of China being dismantled.  However, 
China, too, was a sort of American frontier as it was the focus of foreign trade 
efforts after the Civil War (cf. the “trade dollar” controversy in Chapter Five). 
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and it was essentially regional, one reaction of humor to the national stresses of 
the Civil War (Blair 260).  The frontier was the new locus of reality-making for 
Americans in many significant ways, and it is appropriate that Twain and other 
news writers on the frontier took advantage of that fact to demonstrate authority 
over their readers and over the powerful new culture of science. 
Frontier humor, also often called southwestern humor, is exemplified best 
by the tall tale and the practical joke.  Pascal Covici characterizes these forms as 
follows:  “If there is any one pattern basic to the humor of the Southwest it is 
precisely this:  a character is pushed by the author into a situation in which he 
either exposes the pretensions of others or himself emerges as ridiculous because 
of his pretentious behavior” (Covici  8).15   The satiric or critical gist of the tall 
tale and the practical joke initially appears incongruous with the historical notion 
of the frontier as a very serious zone of danger and wonder—until the social 
dynamics of pioneer life are more closely considered.  The frontier was indeed 
replete with elements beyond the control of the pioneers—native peoples, lethal 
plants and animals, ghastly weather.  In addition to contending with this 
environment, pioneers had to contend with each other for resources and 
respectability.  The old hallmarks of class and caste did not apply on the frontier.  
Other methods were developed to secure coveted status as a savvy insider and to 
ostracize outsiders. 
                                                 
15 The phrase “author” is slightly misleading because these forms were 
primarily oral and were only recorded by authors, as Hooper recorded the Suggs 
stories, after they had been in circulation for decades.   
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The tall tale and practical joke emerged as rhetorical mechanisms of 
control along the frontier, which is, after all, “a country without a history” (Cox  
98), the boundary at which human knowledge becomes unstable.  Both rhetorical 
modes excited laughter which provided much-needed detachment from—and 
therefore a sense of objective control over—the dangers of frontier life (Covici 7, 
31).  Neil Harris describes the psychological functionality of the tall tale and the 
practical joke as “a way of reducing a hostile and threatening environment to 
human scale by manipulating its elements and so demonstrating control over 
them” (Harris  71).  A good example of this use of the tall tale in Twain’s work is 
the story from Roughing It of Bemis and the buffalo hunt.  The band of travelers 
that the narrator joins gets stuck after crossing the Platte River when their 
stagecoach breaks down.  They decide to go on a buffalo hunt while they wait for 
rescue by the next stage, and in the process, the passenger Bemis gets chased by a 
buffalo and stuck up a tree until he can be retrieved by the other passengers.  To 
regain some face, he tells an elaborate story about the ferocity of this particular 
buffalo and the amazing self-restraint he demonstrated in not shooting it because 
if he had, he claimed, his gun was so powerful it would have killed not only the 
buffalo but also several of the other passengers in the hunt (61-66).  Not only does 
his tale entertain the other passengers, but it is also an attempt by Bemis to regain 
symbolic control over both the buffalo and the ensuing humiliation. 
This illusion of control served a social function, too, with respect to 
outsiders on the frontier—“greenhorns” or “city slickers.”  The telling of the tall 
tale or performing of the practical joke demonstrated, on the part of the insider, a 
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superior level of comfort with and control over elements of the frontier—wild 
animals, storms, vicious ruffians—that terrified and bewildered the outsiders 
(Covici  27; Rourke, 2:4).  Thus, these rhetorical modes pitted knowledgeable 
insiders against greenhorns and used mechanisms of deception and revelation to 
force the greenhorns to publicly acknowledge their outsider status—much like the 
revelatory and humbling mechanisms of the hoax (Lee 142; Cox 15).  A good 
example of this aspect of the tall tale is the Buncombe Trial in Roughing It.  
Buncombe, a city lawyer, comes out to a frontier town to try a case in which a 
house has been moved on top of another house by an avalanche; the owner of the 
topmost house is now laying claim to the land of the bottommost house-owner 
and wishes Buncombe to represent him.  The trial gets more and more ridiculous, 
and more and more exasperating for Buncombe, until it is revealed that the whole 
thing was an elaborate charade by the townfolk to “put one over” on the city 
lawyer (241-247).  A group of insiders construct an elaborate tale to consolidate 
their status and to publicly ostracize an outsider who pretends to have authority on 
the frontier. 
In this way, the tall tale and practical joke both served a leveling function.  
Pioneers bought enthusiastically into the Jacksonian ideal of the absolute equality 
of common Americans and its attendant suspicion of any kind of aristocracy or 
undemocratic privilege.  The worst charge that could be leveled against someone 
was that of “social impersonation,” pretending to be an insider when you were 
not, pretending to belong to a higher class than someone else (Cook 26-27).  The 
tall tale and practical joke demonstrated the superiority of the seasoned pioneer 
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over the more “sophisticated” Easterner, thus rendering old Eastern hierarchies 
and mores “bootless” on the frontier. 
An interesting micro-example of this rhetoric is observable in a practical 
joke played on Mark Twain by Artemus Ward, reported by C.C. Goodwin in his 
memoir about the salad days of the Territorial Enterprise.  Ward visited Virginia 
City for several weeks in 1863 and went out drinking with the writers and editors 
for the paper.  With at least three humorists in the group—Twain, Ward, and Dan 
De Quille—there was no small amount of grandstanding as each tried to better the 
others with quips, stories, and jokes.  Ward chose an interesting tactic to “take the 
stuffing” out of Twain’s pretensions to literary superiority when he played a 
practical joke on Twain in which he defined the word “sulphurets” in three 
increasingly incomprehensible ways while Goodwin, De Quille, and the others all 
nodded in mock comprehension.  Twain got increasingly flustered at his inability 
to keep up with Ward’s condescending nonsense until Ward finally managed to 
convince Twain via his dullness that he was drunk silly.  Twain was livid when 
the joke was revealed (Covici 146). 
The practical joke and the tall tale differ from each other in a few 
important ways, although Twain was a regular practitioner of both, especially 
during his Western years.  The tall tale is told to the outsider, while the practical 
joke is performed upon the outsider.  The practical joke is usually more individual 
and circumstantially-bound than is the tall tale, which possesses a formula which 
may be repeated in different circumstances to a similar effect.  However, the 
similar functions of these rhetorical forms with respect to frontier epistemology 
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and sociology make them natural predecessors to the scientific media hoax; in 
fact, Constance Rourke, in her famous study of modes of American humor, marks 
frontier humor as the immediate progenitor of the “Moon Hoax” in 1835 (Rourke 
2:6).  The hoax differs from frontier humor in important ways, which Twain 
exploited, and these will be discussed after consideration of his first hoax, “The 
Petrified Man.”  Before we can account for the rhetoric of that hoax, however, we 
need to consider how Twain acquired not only the “insider” knowledge of science 
necessary to pulling off a science hoax successfully, but also the motivation for 
doing it. 
2. SCIENTIFIC ACCULTURATION 
The questions about the influence of science on Mark Twain’s hoaxing 
amount to these:  how did he get interested and educated in science?  And, what 
kind of relationship with scientific culture he was trying to establish by hoaxing 
his readers?  Twain’s scientific education was quite different from Poe’s.  It was 
informal and trade-based, developed first through riverboat piloting and mining, 
and later through reading and investing in inventions.  Twain did not have the 
same bone to pick with science and scientists that Poe did, since Twain did not 
have a competing epistemology he wished to publish.  Science impacted Twain’s 
practices at the level of authority.  Scientists were competitive authors in creating 
the West for readers and in taking credit for that creation.  During Twain’s tenure 
in the West, the United States launched myriad scientific expeditions, like 
Powell’s Grand Canyon expeditions and other sorties of the United States 
Exploring Expedition.  The newspapers and publishing houses were full of their 
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reports, which effectively created these unknown regions for readers ex nihilo 
(Blair 228).  Often the reports were exaggerated.  Twain must have sensed 
competition with his own exaggerated stylings of the West, because he set out to 
“kill” his readers’ overblown opinion of the authority of paleontologists with 
“The Petrified Man” hoax.  The hoax was Twain’s way of cutting competing 
scientific authors and their “stories” down to size, while re-establishing his 
authority over his readership as the one writer who could deliver the authentic 
West. 
Scholars have gone back and forth on Twain’s scientific education.  
Certainly, science figured centrally in his reading.  Albert Bigelow Paine quotes 
him in his Biography as saying "I like history, biography, travels, curious facts 
and strange happenings, and science” (512).  In his Autobiography Twain 
describes learning the basic tenets of evolution from one McFarlane, a well-read 
boarding-house laborer, several years before Darwin’s Origin of Species was 
published (127).  Throughout Twain’s life, he evinced interest in other sciences 
than just biology: geology in particular—due to his mining experience—as well 
as anthropology and astronomy.  Post-1870 we have evidence of him reading 
Thomas H. Huxley’s Evolution and Ethics, Darwin’s Descent of Man, Bayne’s 
Pith of Astronomy, and the writings of physicist and philosopher Sir Oliver Lodge 
(Waggoner 362).  Twain also showed some fascination with phrenology, 
palmistry, “dream science,” and telepathy, although in later years he dismissed 
almost all of these as bunk (Ketterer 69; Waggoner 361). 
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Twain had no formal scientific education, however, and this shortcoming 
has sparked the debate over his “insider” status with respect to science and 
technology.  The prevailing opinion until recently, according to Judith Yaross 
Lee’s reconstruction of the debate, was established in 1937 by Hyatt Waggoner.  
Waggoner argued that Twain’s lifelong reading in the sciences and his technical 
experience as a printer, pilot, miner, and inventor qualified him with a level of 
scientific expertise in spite of his lack of formal education (Waggoner 359).  Lee, 
however, takes issue with the Waggoner school of reading Twain’s scientific 
expertise.  She points out that scientific knowledge was becoming increasingly 
specialized and academic in the 1860s and that Twain’s casual reading in 
scientific books written for consumption by a popular audience did not gain him 
entrance into the scientific community; she figures Twain for an outsider, not an 
insider, and backs up her argument by comparing the humor of educated scientific 
experts like West Point engineer George Derby (a.k.a. the madcap astronomer 
“John Phoenix”) with amateurs like Twain:   
Writers with technical expertise tend to parody scientific discourse, 
play with scientific ideas, or experiment with science fiction.  Their humor 
may debunk individual scientists or projects, but learning itself retains its 
positive value.  By contrast, humorists without technical backgrounds—
that is, amateurs—tend to ridicule science and the scientist as one. (Lee 
29)   
Lee puts Twain in the latter category, citing stories of his such as “How 
the Animals of the Woods Sent Out a Scientific Expedition,” where scientists are 
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figured as insects who redraw the world’s latitudes based on their finding a set of 
train tracks.  Both science and scientists are made to appear woefully short-
sighted and inadequate in this sketch (132).   
Part of the disagreement about Twain’s scientific knowledge is due to 
Lee’s framing of the debate.  She reads Waggoner as claiming scientific expertise 
for Twain, while what Waggoner really wrote was this:  "A study of the 
Notebook, the Letters, the Autobiography, the official Biography, and several 
unpublished sketches, discloses a knowledge of science that, while not profound 
or in any sense rigorously accurate, was nevertheless inspired by enthusiastic 
interest, and was, for the average layman of the day, comparatively 
comprehensive" (359).  This claim is a far cry from championing Twain as a lay 
scientist.   
In fact, Waggoner is close to expressing an observation which helps 
resolve the issue of Twain’s scientific experience:  while Twain’s formal 
scientific training was indeed nonexistent, his technical knowledge was 
impressive.  Even in the mid-nineteenth century, there was a distinction between 
scientific and technical practice.  Scientists and engineers recognized a difference 
in each other’s methods, which boiled down to the use of theory:  scientists used 
it; engineers did not (Bruce 150-155).  Engineers employed (and still do to an 
extent) an instinctive, hands-on, “tinkering” approach to invention that used 
feedback from real work environments to direct changes and improvements to 
technology.  Engineers, mechanics, and inventors were rarely college-educated, 
unlike most scientists of the time.   
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Twain’s experience of science could in fact be better characterized as 
engineering knowledge.  He gained extensive technical and mechanical know-
how from his work as a printer’s apprentice and as a riverboat pilot.  A famous 
passage in Life on the Mississippi describes Twain’s regretful transformation 
from a neophyte worshipper of the Mississippi to an expert pilot of the river.  He 
claims that he came to resent the fateful sunset during which he looked at the river 
and could no longer enjoy its beauty as he had in his youth because it was now a 
complicated, technical map of shoals, submerged logs, and shallows (Marx 321).  
Thus, Twain evinced an awareness of having crossed from novice to expert status 
as a “river technician.”   
When Twain headed West with his brother Orion to try his hand at mining 
in 1861, he continued his technical self-education with experience in mine 
engineering and metallurgy.  And in his later years, he turned to inventing, 
officially registering three patents (a board game, a self-pasting scrapbook, and 
“garment straps”).  Finally, his celebrated and costly obsession with the Paige 
typesetter, and his installation of the first private telephone in America in his own 
home, are evidence of a lifelong enthusiasm for technological advancement.  
Overall, Twain’s extensive knowledge of machines and their use is a practical 
knowledge, which is not as easy to document historically as theoretical 
knowledge and education, but which nonetheless is a noteworthy accomplishment 
for an American writer. 
Clarifying the confusion between scientific and technical knowledge in 
both Lee and Waggoner’s critiques produces a vantage point from which both 
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scholars’ assessments of Twain’s expertise are correct.  Waggoner is right in 
pointing to Twain’s readings as unusually scientific for a layman; Lee is right that 
Twain had no formal scientific indoctrination.  It is Twain’s extensive technical 
knowledge, allied traditionally with the working class and the self-made 
Jacksonian man, that explains both his fascination with science and technology 
(especially machines) and his satiric, outsider stance toward professional 
scientists. 
At the time he wrote “The Petrified Man,” Twain had already accumulated 
an impressive amount of this practical education—everything but the inventing 
phase.  He was also subject to ethnoscientific influences from the media and the 
public discourse around him.  Two major influences among these are the Civil 
War and the publication of Darwin’s Origin of Species. 
2.1 The Civil War 
The Civil War did not have the effect that people often assume it did—
boosting scientific prestige, progress, and funding through weapons research.  In 
fact, argues Robert V. Bruce in The Launching of Modern American Science, the 
Civil War was a huge setback for scientific research.  The weapons that debuted 
in the war, like the Gatling gun, were previous inventions, and no innovative war 
technology was developed in the early 1860s (276).  Instead, Southern scientific 
research was set back for decades with the destruction of facilities and the 
leveling of the economy.  Even Northern universities could not get their funding 
back up to normal levels and begin to move forward with the organization of new 
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programs until the mid-1870s.16  Scientifically and technologically speaking, then, 
the war was a bust. 
Twain was briefly involved in the war before deserting and heading west 
with his brother.  He saw no fighting, but he communicated his discomfort with 
his role as a soldier in the burlesque “A Private History of the Campaign that 
Failed,” which includes the eerie portrayal of a soldier whom Twain and a few 
others in his unit shot in the dark; he turned out to be an unarmed, non-uniformed 
stranger merely riding past their outpost (276-279).  Twain’s appreciation of the 
horrors that science and technology had wrought on modern warfare during the 
Civil War are also manifestly apparent in the “Sand Belt” chapter of A 
Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court.   
Twain was not alone in his developing awareness of the dangers of 
technology when bent to the purposes of American imperialism, which Twain 
strenuously opposed.  H. Bruce Franklin documents the distribution of this 
fundamental unease throughout Twain’s culture:   
As Twain wrote, American culture was generating a contradictory 
vision of the relations between industrial capitalism and modern warfare, 
one that exalted weapons technology as the path to peace and progress.  
American popular fiction was shaping the cult of the superweapon—an 
                                                 
16 The one exception was the field of medicine, which seemed the least 
affected by the Civil War, and which was perhaps even advanced by the service 
of field doctors and by the abolition of slavery.  Darlene Clark Hine describes the 
tangible gains for blacks in the south due to the medical schools established for 
blacks after the Civil War.  In the 25 years following the war, 115 black women 
were certified as physicians, and by 1890 there were 909 black male doctors (210-
211). 
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invincible product of American ingenuity that would defeat all the 
backward and evil forces of the plant, thereby ending war and bringing 
about a global Pax Americana. (Franklin Traveling 166) 
Twain’s contemporary and fellow examiner of the impact of the machine 
on American society, Henry Adams, rendered both the awe and terror of the 
situation in his “The Virgin and the Dynamo” chapter of the Education of Henry 
Adams.  Adams sees in the dynamo the destruction of everything pure and 
beautiful about civilization, as figured by the medieval virgin.  Adams’s imagery 
is more violent than, but akin to, the annihilation of the mysterious beauty of the 
Mississippi by Twain’s technological knowledge of it—or, the cleaving of Huck 
Finn’s idyllic raft by the bow of the steamboat in Huckleberry Finn (Marx 330).  
Twain was obviously responding to a cultural nervousness about technology and 
its easy adaptation to war, and he was responding to it as early as his desertion 
from the Marion Rangers. 
2.2 Darwinism 
In addition to the fall-out from the Civil War, another powerful scientific 
trope pervaded Twain’s culture, and that was Darwin’s theory of evolution.  An 
editor for the Galaxy, which Twain wrote for, exclaimed upon the “universal 
drenching” of literature and journalism in American with Darwinian ideas during 
the 1860s and 1870s (Russett 11).  Although Twain was a fan of Darwin’s later 
Descent of Man, there is no evidence that Twain read the Origin, but most 
Americans did not.  Instead, they relied on what they heard about it and what they 
read in the newspapers—including satiric reports and cartoons.  American 
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Darwinism was, for the most part, filtered through Lamarckianism, which stressed 
an element of design in development that made evolution more compatible with 
traditional Protestant beliefs (Russett 10).  It was also filtered through a strong 
bias toward organicism and individualism inherited from the American Romantics 
and Transcendentalists.  Cynthia Russett argues that “romantic philosophy 
appealed to a more congenial scientific concept, that of the organism, against a 
less congenial one, the machine" (18).  Thus, the idea of evolution as an 
organizing principle for all of life—especially when directed by a benevolent 
God, as figured by American Lamarckians—seemed a safe haven compared to the 
inhuman mechanisms of a clockwork Enlightenment universe. 
However, evolution insinuated its own sort of mechanics into American 
scientific and social thinking, the fierce law of survival of the fittest.  This was 
Huxley’s nature, “red in tooth and claw,” laid out in his 1893 Evolution and 
Ethics, a favorite on Twain’s bookshelf.  Russett describes the discomfort of 
American moral thinkers with the vanquishing of Newtonian mechanism by 
Darwinian evolution, which seemed like an “iron maiden presiding over endless 
panoramas of anguish and extinction” (3).  Within Twain’s lifetime, American 
writers were already dramatizing the cruel results of capitalist appropriations of 
survival of the fittest, or Social Darwinism:  Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle (1906) is 
one of the most notable instances of literary criticism of the inhuman aspects of 
Darwinism as social policy.   
American Darwinism, in short, sets up a pattern of embracing the elegant 
story evolution told about the development of self-sufficient life, while 
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simultaneously shuddering at the cold amorality of a universe that was not 
designed but just happened at an astounding rate of attrition.  This pattern shows 
up clearly in Twain’s thinking, whether he came to it himself, borrowed it from 
Darwin and Huxley, or simply used parts of it to reinforce his own native 
cynicism about man’s inhumanity to man.  As mentioned above, Twain was 
sympathetic to the broad idea of evolution, as evidenced by his enthusiastic 
reporting of the conversations he had with his boarding-house philosopher friend 
McFarlane.  His predisposition to believe in an evolutionary—and atheistic—
model of life development, however, did not insulate the scientists who adopted 
Darwin’s theory from his sharp, satirical pen.  Twain satirized paleontologists at 
least three times—in “How the Animals of the Woods Sent Out a Scientific 
Expedition,” “The Petrified Man,” and 3,000 Years Among the Microbes—for 
jumping to evolutionary conclusions on the basis of scanty fossil data (Wilson 
79).  Twain celebrated the idea of biological determinism, reinforced by his belief 
that people really behaved no differently than animals, and perhaps worse.  But at 
moments, the determinism of a Godless universe motivated merely by 
competition for resources seemed to knock the wind out of him.  Contrary to 
many scholars’ beliefs that Twain simply succumbed to despair in a mechanistic 
universe, however, his hoaxing practices show Twain developing a coping 
strategy that asserts self-determination without necessarily buying into any 
established belief system—including evolution.  His strategy is laughter, which 
remains both the simplest and the most complex response to the rhetoric of social 
determinism.  The laughter also creates a bond between Twain and his readers, 
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reasserting his, rather than science’s, authority over them as their channel to the 
truth in the West.  An examination of Twain’s only scientific media hoax, “The 
Petrified Man” alongside his other media hoax, “Empire City Massacre” will 
show how these dynamics of self-determination and authority enter Twain’s 
writings about science. 
After studying “The Petrified Man” as a hoaxing event, I will use an OT-
based approach to reconsider other, more traditional rhetorical analyses of 
Twain’s hoaxing.  And finally, I will develop a theory of Twain’s use of laughter 
as a counter-move against the rhetoric of social control, showing how this 
changes our perception of his writings about science in his later works. 
3. “THE PETRIFIED MAN” 
Twain hired on at the Territorial Enterprise in the late summer of 1862 to 
fill in for the local editor, Dan De Quille (William Wright), who was visiting his 
family in Iowa.  The first extant story Twain wrote for the Enterprise is a 
scientific hoax, “The Petrified Man,” which was printed in the Enterprise on 5 
October 1862.  However, due to a fire in 1875 that destroyed the Enterprise’s 
archives, the only remaining copies of the story are twelve reprints in other area 
papers, beginning with the San Francisco Evening Bulletin on 15 October 1862. 
The hoax can be examined in its entirety, since it is relatively brief.  This 
is the text of the first reprint of the hoax in the San Francisco Evening Bulletin on 
15 October 1862: 
A petrified man was found some time ago in the mountains south 
of Gravelly Ford.  Every limb and feature of the stony mummy as perfect, 
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not even excepting the left leg, which has evidently been a wooden one 
during the lifetime of the owner—which lifetime, by the way, came to a 
close about a century ago, in the opinion of a savan who has examined the 
defunct.  The body was in a sitting posture and leaning against a huge 
mass of croppings; the attitude was pensive, the right thumb resting 
against the side of the nose; the left thumb partially supported the chin, the 
forefinger pressing the inner corner of the left eye and drawing it partly 
open; the right eye was closed and the fingers of the right hand spread 
apart.  This strange freak of nature created a profound sensation in the 
vicinity, and our informant states that, by request, Justice Sewell or Sowell 
of Humboldt City at once proceeded to the spot and held an inquest on the 
body.  The verdict of the jury was that “deceased came to his death from 
protracted exposure,” etc.  The people of the neighborhood volunteered to 
bury the poor unfortunate, and were even anxious to do so; but it was 
discovered, when they attempted to remove him, that the water which had 
dropped upon him for ages from the crag above, had coursed down his 
back and deposited a limestone sediment under him which had glued him 
to the bed rock upon which he sat, as with a cement of adamant, and Judge 
S. refused to allow the charitable citizens to blast him from his position.  
The opinion expressed by his Honor that such a course would be little less 
than sacrilege, was eminently just and proper.  Everybody goes to see the 
stone man, as many as 300 persons having visited the hardened creature 
during the past five or six weeks. 
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Reader expectations can be recuperated from this hoax by the same 
methods I applied to Poe’s first hoaxing attempt.  First, I will examine Twain’s 
writings about the hoax, what he claimed to have been trying to accomplish with 
it, and how he explained the construction of its rhetoric.  Those claims will be 
compared to the contemporary reaction to the hoax in newspapers and memoirs.  
Then, I will reconstruct the popular science article of 1865, since changes are 
bound to have accrued to the genre since 1835, and this portrait will reveal the 
generic expectations newsreaders might have had when coming to Twain’s hoax.  
Finally, based on these collected expectations, I will make changes to the filter of 
expectations as constructed so far to account for historical change. 
3.1 Twain’s analysis of “The Petrified Man” and “Empire City Massacre” 
Twain wrote in detail about his motivations and strategy in constructing 
“The Petrified Man,” and the best summary is his own: 
Now, to show how really hard it is to foist a moral or a truth upon 
an unsuspecting public through a burlesque without entirely and absurdly 
missing one’s mark, I will here set down two experiences of my own in 
this thing.  In the fall of 1862, in Nevada and California, the people got to 
running wild about extraordinary petrifactions and other natural marvels.  
One could scarcely pick up a paper without finding in it one or two 
glorified discoveries of this kind.  The mania was becoming a little 
ridiculous.  I was a brand-new local editor in Virginia City, and I fell 
called upon to destroy this growing evil:  we all have our benignant, 
fatherly moods at one time or another, I suppose.  I chose to kill the 
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petrifaction mania with a delicate, a very delicate, satire.  But maybe it 
was altogether too delicate, for nobody ever perceived the satire part of it 
at all.  I put my scheme in the shape of the discovery of a remarkable 
petrified man.  I had had a temporary falling out with Mr. Sewall, the new 
coroner and justice of the peace of Humboldt, and I thought I might as 
well touch him up at the same time and make him ridiculous, and thus 
combine pleasure with business. (Clemens "Memoranda "  858-859) [my 
emphasis] 
Twain mentions many dynamics here that are significant for our study of 
hoaxing from the perspective of reader expectations.  The key points, for our 
purposes, are as follows:   
1. Twain was embarking on a project of social education or control by trying 
to “foist a moral” on his readers.   
2. He intended “The Petrified Man” to be a satire, not a hoax—the principal 
difference here, both in Twain’s thinking and as discussed in Chapter One, 
being that in a satire the audience is “in” on the joke, whereas in a hoax 
the reader is a victim of the joke.  Thus, he felt his satire failed because 
readers were duped by the story and missed the satiric bent.   
3. The dual butts of Twain’s “satire” were the Virginia City medical 
examiner, Judge Sewall, whom Twain had an unspecified grudge against; 
and, a recent “petrifaction mania.”   
This “mania” was a supposed slew of articles in newspapers from all over 
the country about the finding of fossils and petrified plants and even people.  
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Recent attempts to reconstruct Twain’s claims by a survey of contemporary media 
have not yielded evidence of this “mania.”  However, it is well known that much 
of the Enterprise and of the other California and Nevada papers was dedicated to 
geologic and mining news, since readers were mostly miners.  Twain’s 
contemporary hoaxer Dan De Quille wrote at least one hoax and two humorous 
stories about petrifaction.  Judith Yaross Lee claims the West was a particularly 
fertile ground for humor about paleontological finds:  "The goldrush and railway 
construction excited interest in rock-collecting and other forms of amateur 
geology and mineralogy, and descriptions of fictitious fossils began to constitute a 
subgenre" (Lee 141).  Catalysts for this “excited interest” may include reports 
from government scientific expeditions like the Wilkes Expedition and the Owen 
Survey, whose fossil finds were being debated as either supporting or refuting 
Darwin’s theory of evolution.  So, there was likely some basis for Twain’s 
exasperation. 
Twain recorded his perceptions of readers’ reactions to “The Petrified 
Man.”  In the “Memoranda” article for the Galaxy, he makes strong claims about 
the dissemination of the hoax:   
As a satire on the petrifaction mania, or anything else, my Petrified 
Man was a disheartening failure; for everybody received him in innocent 
good faith, and I was stunned to see the creature I had begotten to pull 
down the wonder-business with and bring derision upon it, calmly exalted 
to the grand chief place in the list of the genuine marvels our Nevada had 
produced.  I was so disappointed at the curious miscarriage of my scheme 
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that at first I was angry and did not like to think about it; but by and by, 
when the exchanges began to come in with the Petrified Man copied and 
guilelessly glorified, I began to feel a soothing secret satisfaction; and as 
my gentleman’s field of travel broadened, and by the exchanges I saw that 
he steadily and implacably penetrated territory after territory, State after 
State, and land after land, till he swept the great globe and culminated in 
sublime and unimpeached legitimacy in the august, “London Lancet,” my 
cup was full, and I said I was glad I had done it.  It think that for about 
eleven months, as nearly as I can remember, Mr. Sewall’s daily mail 
contained along in the neighborhood of half a bushel of newspapers 
hailing from many climes with the Petrified Man in them, marked around 
with a prominent belt of ink.  I sent them to him.  I did it for spite, not for 
fun.  He used to shovel them into his back yard and curse.  And every day 
during all those months the miners, his constituents (for miners never quit 
joking a person when they get started), would call on him and ask if he 
could tell them where they could get hold of a paper with the Petrified 
Man in it.  He could have accommodated a continent with them.  I hated 
Sewall in those days, and these things pacified me and pleased me.  I 
could not have gotten more real comfort out of him without killing him.  
(Clemens "Memoranda" 859-860) 
In 1937 DeLancey Ferguson, in what was probably the first scholarly 
treatment of the hoax, did a survey of the London Lancet for three years following 
the publication of “Petrified Man” and found no mention of it in the paper.  
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Likewise, Ferguson finds no mention of it in the Eastern magazines he surveyed 
(Ferguson 193).  Twain was probably exaggerating the dissemination of his hoax, 
although locally it created a stir, as we will see in the next section. 
What is really interesting about this hoax, however, is Twain’s claim that 
the piece was in fact a failed satire.  His analysis of its “failure” provides insights 
into the expectations of his readers, as he constructs them, and Twain is certainly 
a member of his own readership in this instance, being a pioneer and placer miner 
in Nevada.  Twain wrote first of all that he expected the inaccuracies of “Petrified 
Man” to reveal it:   
From beginning to end the 'Petrified Man' squib was a string of 
roaring absurdities, albeit they were told with an unfair pretence of truth 
that even imposed upon me to some extent, and I was in some danger of 
believing in my own fraud.  But I really had no desire to deceive anybody, 
and no expectation of doing it.  I depended on the way the petrified man 
was sitting to explain to the public that he was a swindle. (Clemens 
"Memoranda" 859) 
Twain goes on to point out that locals were provided with further clues to 
the fake, such as the fact that there were no “people of the neighborhood” in 
Gravelly Ford, which was a five-day ride into the wilderness and populated only 
by “a few starving Indians, some grasshoppers, and four or five buzzards out of 
meat and too feeble to get away” (859). 
However, Twain contradicts his own claims of innocence somewhat as he 
admits the “unfair pretence to truth” he employed.  Elsewhere in the same article, 
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Twain once again confesses that he worked at making the “Petrified Man” sound 
like an authentic news article:  “So I told, in patient, belief-compelling detail, all 
about the finding of a petrified man at Gravelly Ford” (859).  And when he wrote 
to his brother Orion on 21 October 1862, he made the imposture of his “squib” 
sound quite deliberate: 
(Between us, now)--did you see that squib of mine headed 
"Petrified Man?"  It is an unmitigated lie, made from whole cloth.  I got it 
up to worry Sewall.  Every day, I send him some California paper 
containing it; moreover, I am getting things so arranged that he will soon 
begin to receive letters from all parts of the country, purporting to come 
from scientific men, asking for further information concerning the 
wonderful stone man.  If I had plenty of time, I would worry the life out of 
the poor cuss.  (Clemens Mark Twain's Letters  242) 
There is no evidence that Twain ever “arranged” for corroboration from 
scientists.  But the claim shows him prepared to provide outside support for the 
hoax, which would not have been required if the story were simply a satire that 
flopped.  Further, Twain published a follow-up piece in the Enterprise in 
November with the testimony of individuals who had been to see the “stone 
mummy” on display (Clemens Early Tales and Sketches  157).  So, there are 
several solid reasons to doubt Twain’s protestations that he did not intend to 
create a hoax.  But his commentary on what makes the difference between a 
telling satire and a good hoax are instructive for our purposes of reconstructing 
reader expectations because Twain was savvy to what is now called the 
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psychology of reading—the cognitive process through which readers approach a 
text and interpret it.    We will consider each of his insights through the lens of the 
reader expectations that they will affect. 
In Twain’s analysis of his early media hoaxes, “The Petrified Man,” and 
“The Empire City Massacre,” he makes clear why he thinks he “accidentally” 
created hoaxes instead of satires.  “The Petrified Man,” as we have seen, was 
intended to satirize a popular-science mania over fossils and petrifaction; “The 
Empire City Massacre” was a horrifying report of a multiple murder/suicide that, 
Twain, argues, was originally designed to criticize a shifty policy of misreporting 
stock values by mining companies, something akin to the recent Enron scandal, 
which was prevalent in California and Nevada in the 1860s.  In the hoax Twain 
claims a man driven mad by his losses on the stock market kills his entire family, 
cuts his own throat, and then rides into town and collapses in front of a saloon full 
of people, brandishing the scalp of one of his children.  The hoax was apparently 
believed locally and resulted in a media furor, once it came out that Twain had 
faked it.  According to Dan De Quille, Twain’s fellow writer and roommate at the 
time, Nevada news editors called the story a “cruel and idiotic hoax,” and 
California news editors threatened never to reprint another Enterprise item if J.T. 
Goodman did not fire Twain.  Twain lost a great deal of sleep until De Quille 
reassured him that the whole thing would blow over eventually, which it did 
(Wright Reporting 72). 
In his “Memoranda” for the Galaxy, Twain chalks up the phenomenon of 
his “satires” being read as hoaxes to three unanticipated factors:  readers’ 
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extremely high valuation of sensation and novelty, the guiding principles by 
which his readers read science news, and the structure of that news reading 
activity.  All these observations are corroborated by contemporary reports of 
reactions to his hoaxes and anticipate current findings in reading psychology.  
These reports will be cited to justify modification of the ranked filter of science 
newsreading expectations.  A final adjustment to the ranking will come through 
an examination of the public reputation of both the Enterprise and Twain himself, 
which complicates the assumption made to this point that newsreaders expected 
truth. 
3.11 High ranking of Sensation and Novelty 
Twain commented extensively on the power of the “wonder-business” of 
science to overwhelm readers’ critical faculties.  He claimed that this 
phenomenon, equivalent to a high valuation of the novelty and sensation, caused 
the “moral” of his satires to be missed.  In the “Memoranda” he reflects, “…we 
never read the dull explanatory surroundings of marvellously exciting things 
when we have no occasion to suppose that some irresponsible scribbler is trying 
to defraud us; we skip all that, and hasten to revel in the blood-curdling 
particulars and be happy" (861).  As to readers overlooking of the clues he left in 
his “satires” and reading them as hoaxes, Twain cautions, “One can deliver a 
satire with telling force through the insidious medium of a travesty, if he is careful 
not to overwhelm the satire with the extraneous interest of the travesty, and so 
bury it from the readers' sight and leave him a joked and defrauded victim, when 
the honest intent was to add to either his knowledge or his wisdom” (859).  
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Although it would be hasty to attribute any sort of “honest intent” to Twain’s 
“satires,” he makes it clear that the powerful sensational and novel aspects of a 
petrified man and a bloody massacre leave vivid images in readers’ minds that are 
difficult to replace with subtle arguments about an over-reliance on Darwinian 
paleontology or underhanded dividend cooking.  About the “Empire City 
Massacre,” Twain laments, “To drop in with a poor little moral at the fag-end of 
such a gorgeous massacre, was to follow the expiring sun with a candle and hope 
to attract the world's attention to it" (861).  Indeed, the “moral” chastising the 
dividend-cooking companies appears only in the last six sentences of the lengthy 
piece after some relatively dry biographical details about the murderer. 
That “expiring sun” of novelty and sensation was Twain’s lifelong 
whipping boy, according to Pascal Covici in Mark Twain’s Humor.  In that study 
Covici explicates Twain’s “use of the hoax to ridicule the reader's penchant for 
collecting thrills” (150).  He claims that Twain consistently used forms like the 
hoax and the tall tale as deflating pins for the balloon-like sensations of the 
“wonder-business” of popular science and any other mania that grabbed readers’ 
attention through the media.  Covici argues that Twain felt American’s slavish 
love of sensation was blinding them to the very real and unglamorous problems of 
poverty, racial inequality, and exploitation of ethnic minorities in the post-bellum 
era (150-151).  This social function of the hoax will be discussed in the final 
section of this chapter with respect to Twain’s activism. 
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3.12 Process of reading 
Twain identified another major cause for the failure of his “satires.”  He 
claimed the exposing details he buried in his “satires” did not surface into his 
readers’ consciousness because his readers were reading too fast and simply 
missed them.  “Skimming” as a strategy to optimize expenditure of time and 
effort during reading is well-documented in recent studies of scientific readers.  
Charles Bazerman found patterns in the way physicists skipped over parts of 
articles in their field to select the parts that were most useful to their own research 
in “Physicists Reading Physics.”  Davida Charney got similar results in her read-
aloud protocol study of biologists reading Stephen Jay Gould’s article “The 
Spandrels of San Marco.” 
Skimming has actually been treated as an OT-type constraint-satisfaction 
process by Bertrand Gervais, a reader-oriented critic.  He describes the process 
Twain witnessed as a continual tension between two competing constraints, 
progression and comprehension.  Progression expresses the desire of the reader to 
get through the material as quickly as possible.  Comprehension expresses the 
reader’s desire to understand the details of what s/he has read.  The reading 
activity proceeds as a negotiation between these two constraints, with reading 
generally proceeding as fast as will allow the reader to glean what s/he wishes to 
learn from the text (Gervais 857).   
Twain observed this progression/comprehension dynamic in the reading of 
his “satires” and attributed their “failure” in large part to readers skimming.  In 
the “Memoranda,” while discussing a recent “agricultural” satire he wrote that 
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was taken as the real thing, he theorizes, “Shall I tell you the real reason why I 
have unintentionally succeeded in fooling so many people?  It is because some of 
them only read a little of the squib I wrote and jumped to the conclusion that it 
was serious, and the rest did not read it at all, but heard of my agricultural venture 
at second-hand” (858).  In his discussion of “Empire City Massacre,” Twain 
reports watching readers read the story just as Poe spied on readers reacting to the 
“Balloon-Hoax.”  Twain describes sitting at breakfast and observing a couple of 
farmers reading his article in a spontaneous early read-aloud protocol experiment.  
"I saw that the heedless son of a hay-mow was skipping with all his might, in 
order to get to the bloody details as quickly as possible; and so he was missing the 
guide-boards I had set up to warn him that the whole thing was a fraud" (861).   
Naturally, as we have witnessed with Poe’s hoaxes, a hoaxer, unlike a 
satirist, relies on just this reading habit twice over:  first, when s/he uses readers’ 
hasty judgments to secure their confidence in the hoax; and, later, when s/he 
encourages re-reading or simply confesses the hoax in order to produce the gestalt 
that is the hallmark of the hoax experience.  The nice fit of this hoax strategy with 
Twain’s lament about readers’ carelessness seems further indication that he was 
crafting hoaxes when he wrote “The Petrified Man” and “Empire City Massacre.”  
His tears over his failed “satires” appear increasingly crocodilian.   
 Half of Twain’s observation about his readers’ reading styles attributes 
the failure of his “satire” to readers skimming too quickly to catch his “guide-
boards.”  Naturally, the other half of his observation has to do with what readers 
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were looking for in their headlong rush, what they were skimming over the rest of 
the text in order to reach.  This has to do with industrial modes of reading news. 
3.13 Newsreading 
Twain also noticed that people consistently skipped to certain parts of his 
stories.  As he pointed out with the “Empire City Massacre,” his readers were 
skimming to find the “bloody details” and the “blood-curdling particulars.”  In a 
recent study of newsreaders, Berkenkotter and Huckin found that readers indeed 
do not read linearly but skim for information: “Because the text schema is quite 
standardized, experienced readers know where to look for certain information and 
can skip around quite efficiently” (31).  They cite Van Dijk’s (1986) empirical 
study of the topics of a news article in the order they generally appear:  first, the 
summary, which consists of headline and lead; then the news story, which 
proceeds with the main event, details of main event, background, consequences, 
comments, etc.  Berkenkotter and Hucken claim that repeated experience with this 
form allows readers to treat it hypertextually, organizing their reading experience 
non-linearly in response to their desire to maximize novelty, or new information.   
The form of the modern news article differs slightly, of course, from the 
Popsci. criteria that we have observed in action.  The modern article lacks the 
degree of “mystery” in its opening that the 1835 science news articles contained; 
the earlier articles also put background before the details of the main event in the 
form of failed attempts at discovery or understanding in the past; finally, the 
commentary in the early science articles often contains speculations that modern 
articles eschew in the interest of preserving an objective stance.  However, as we 
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will see in this chapter, the genre of the science news article was changing in 
Twain’s time to conform more closely to the pattern Van Dijk observed.   
If the form of the news article has changed over the last 150 years, 
however, the principle of the reader learning the form and then using it to adapt 
the reading experience to his/her goals remains the same.  As discussed in Chapter 
Two, Rolf Zwaan has found that labeling the same text either a “story” or a “news 
article” for different sets of readers changes the way these groups read.  His 
results showed that readers who believed they were reading news read for the 
details—the “who-what-when-where-why”—and had better recall for these 
details, and worse recall for fine details of language and presentation, as 
compared to readers who thought they were reading a fiction story.   
Twain recognized that this structured reading activity was important for 
perpetrating a hoax.  He noted that leaving his revelatory clues or “moral” until 
the end of the article caused it to fail as a satire because “the reader, not knowing 
that it is the key of the whole thing and the only important paragraph in the 
article, tranquilly turns up his nose and leaves it unread” (Clemens “Memoranda” 
858).  Twain evinces awareness of a front-loaded structure for news articles in his 
time.  Since he had already had a similar problem with readers missing the “fine 
print” of the revelatory details of the “Petrified Man,” one would think he would 
have done something to foreground the revelatory details of “Empire City 
Massacre” if he genuinely intended to make a satire rather than a hoax.  Dan De 
Quille claims in his memoirs to have suggested this to Twain during the 
composition of the story (Wright Reporting 172).  According to De Quille, Twain 
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was defensive in the face of these suggestions, claiming that the small 
inconsistencies he had sprinkled throughout the article—like calling the murderer 
a “bachelor” even though he killed his wife and children, and mentioning a pine 
forest where locals should have known there was desert—were all “plain 
enough,” and he refused to foreground the “moral” about dividend cooking that 
resided at the end of the story (171).  It seems clear that Twain intended to exploit 
what we now understand as a familiarity with the news article format in order to 
make “Empire City Massacre” seem like a “real” news story to his readers—in 
order to write a hoax, not a satire. 
Since we have discussed Twain’s farmers reading his “Empire City 
Massacre” over breakfast, we should consider how progression/comprehension 
and the familiar structure of news reading might have interacted to produce belief 
in the hoax.  The news-reading strategy operates on a similar level as progression 
and comprehension, since it determines which parts of the text are admitted to the 
interpretive process.  Thus, we can argue for our news-reading strategy (News), 
Progression, and Sensation all driving the reading process at the expense of 
Comprehension (of details), as depicted in Table 12. 
Table 12:  Skimming guided by news-reading conventions 
 Sensation Progression News Comprehension 
True    * 
   False * * *!  
The “False” judgment represents a reading that would have—Twain 
believed—led the farmers to understanding Twain’s satire about dividend 
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cooking rather than missing the tell-tale clues and being hoaxed.  In this fantasy 
case, the violation of Sensation would indicate that what is sensational is of low 
value to the reader.  The violation of Progression would mean the reader slowed 
down to understand the details of the story; and the violation of News would 
imply a strict linear reading.   Since none of these statements matched the 
farmers’ actual expectations (in Twain’s view), they result in a fatal violation.  An 
interpretation of the story as “true,” in spite of lack of comprehension of all of the 
text, wins out.  This table thus represents Twain belief about how 
progression/comprehension and news skimming interacted to make his readers 
jump to the wrong conclusion while reading his hoaxes. 
3.14 Medium 
Twain did not comment on the effects of medium and reputation on the 
reception of the hoaxes, but they are crucial to this analysis because of the 
previous importance of readers’ attitudes towards newspapers as disseminators of 
truth.  Basically, we have a conundrum.  Readers knew that the Enterprise often 
printed tall tales and falsehoods.  On the other hand, they relied on the Enterprise 
for real mining news and true details of events and scandals in the Nevada 
Territory.  What, then, were reader expectations of the medium when they came 
to read a story like “The Petrified Man”? 
The Enterprise was “the largest paper in the West of the gold and silver 
rushes,” according to Judith Yaross Lee (Lee 129) although the Great Fire of 1875 
wiped out the newspaper’s records, so circulation figures from that era are 
unavailable.  It was the major paper in Virginia City and was read by miners, 
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businessmen, politicians, and their families.  It often courted its women readers 
with items specifically “for the ladies.”  The local miners relied on it for news of 
what was happening in other mines on the Comstock lode and for new claims and 
patents (Lee 129; Mott 298).  Politics was also big news, as Nevada’s legislature 
was making a bid for Statehood.  Twain’s brother Orion was the Territorial 
Secretary, and Twain himself covered the legislative sessions from 1862-1864.   
However, the Enterprise was also known for having rather young bachelor 
editors who enjoyed drinking their “reporter’s cobblers” and playing practical 
jokes on each other.  Henry Nash Smith sums the situation up in this fashion:  
“Nevada journalism of the 1860's was nonchalant and uninhibited, and a report of 
the most commonplace event was likely to veer into fantasy or humorous 
diatribe” (Clemens MT of the Enterprise 7).  Humorous stories, tall tales, and 
comic takes on local news filled in the gaps in the “real news” in every issue.  
Dan De Quille and Twain both used the paper to get in jabs at each other and at 
local politicians whom they did not like, as in the case of Twain using “The 
Petrified Man” to get back at Judge Sewall for some unrecorded offense.  Twain 
was practically run out of town on a rail because of a satirical article he wrote 
about the Carson City Sanitary Ball in 1864, which offended the powerful 
organizers (Clemens MT of the Enterprise 27). 
Frank Luther Mott in the History of American Journalism argues that the 
editors of the Enterprise knew it was widely read and therefore used its substantial 
subscription as a platform to launch tall tales and hoaxes into the Eastern media 
through the practice of clipping (Mott 289).  Certainly, from the evidence of the 
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eastward migration of De Quille’s hoaxes, this claim seems to be justified.  How 
then, could readers of the Enterprise depend on its journalism at all?  Twain’s 
colleague on the paper, Dan De Quille, depended on his readers to use their 
common sense to distinguish what was real from what was fake; of course, he was 
always pleased when they could not manage to do so (Lee 142). Twain wrote 
many anonymous pieces for the local columns of the Enterprise that mixed 
together fiction and fact, so it appears he also left the burden of proof on the 
reader many times. 
Knowing all of this, Twain claimed a final reason he felt his “satires” 
failed, and “It is because, in some instances, the reader is a person who never tries 
to deceive anybody himself, and therefore is not expecting any one to wantonly 
practise a deception upon him” (Clemens "Memoranda" 858).  Again, he supports 
the basic tendency of news readers towards credulity when he says in the “Empire 
City Massacre” analysis quoted above, “…we never read the dull explanatory 
surroundings of marvellously exciting things when we have no occasion to 
suppose that some irresponsible scribbler is trying to defraud us” (Clemens 
"Memoranda" 861).  Twain seems to support De Quille’s reading of readers’ trust 
in the Enterprise.  They needed the information the paper provided, and so they 
trusted what they read unless signaled to do otherwise by humorous commentary 
or insider knowledge as a local (e.g. that there were no “neighbors” around 
Gravelly Ford). 
The local readers were miners, and often the difference between them 
“striking it rich” or not came down to whether or not they acted swiftly on new 
 228 
information, whether they received it through rumor or in the pages of the 
Enterprise; if they did not, someone else staked the big claim first.  They were a 
group whose urgent need for novel information necessitated a level of trust in 
Nevada journalism that might not otherwise be warranted.  Interestingly, David 
Perlman finds this mercenary urgency is still a major contributor to instances of 
hasty or inaccurate reporting of science news in the United States (253).   
In addition to a trust in the Enterprise forced by an urgent need for new 
information, there could be a much more basic reason that readers continued to 
believe what they read, one that gets back to Twain’s comments that “we have no 
occasion to suspect” someone is hoaxing us.  Grice’s maxim of Quality acts as a 
constraint on all speech activities, including the reading of newspapers.  The 
maxim of Quality says to tell the truth, and to assume others are too, unless you 
receive overt signals of flouting of the maxim—like an exaggerated, sarcastic tone 
of voice, eye-rolling, or the name “Mark Twain” at the head of an article.  In 
addition to his insight into the psychology of reading, Twain seems to have tapped 
into a very basic operating principle of linguistic pragmatics—tapped into it, and 
exploited it, in the case of “The Petrified Man” and his other unsigned hoaxes. 
3.15 Twain’s reputation as an author (Authority) 
Another peripheral issue to Twain’s assessment of the reaction to 
the”Petrified Man” hoax is his readers’ expectations about his behavior as an 
author at this juncture in his career.  In fact his career was just getting started.  
“Petrified Man” is the first confirmed piece of journalism that Twain wrote as a 
staff newspaper reporter.  We know he wrote items for the local column around 
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this time, many of them sarcastic.  However, his legislative reporting was exact 
and trustworthy, if also occasionally critical and humorous (Clemens MT of the 
Enterprise 9).  
In February of 1863, just four months after the publication of “Petrified 
Man,” Twain began using the pseudonym he would use for the rest of his career.  
After that his readers had a heuristic for helping them decide if Authority, or the 
reputation of the author, would have a positive or negative valence in their 
decisions about the truth of items in the Enterprise.  Twain signed his serious 
political pieces Sam Clemens and his humorous bits Mark Twain (Clemens MT of 
the Enterprise 9).  But plenty of his articles were unsigned, like “Petrified Man,” 
leaving the burden of deciding the values of both Medium and Authority on the 
reader. 
3.16  Summary of Twain’s portrait of his readers’ expectations 
Twain, like Poe, seemed to think in terms of what readers expect or 
anticipate when he analyzed what went “wrong” with his “satires.”  Therefore, he 
makes the following significant contributions to our understanding of reader 
expectations of science journalism as practiced in the West: 
• Novelty and Sensation, representing the “wonder-business” of popular 
science, are perceived by Twain as the highest-ranked reader expectations, 
thereby making them salient targets for his satirical attacks. 
• The needs of core readers—miners and scientific expeditionists like 
Cope—for novel information may corroborate a ranking of Novelty above 
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Medium for miners who knew the Enterprise lied but who could not afford 
to pass up any tip on a new prospect.   
• In signed pieces by Mark Twain/Sam Clemens, Authority (“The reputation 
of the author holds”) develops a schizoid status, as each name is 
associated with a different style of reporting:  humorous/lying for Twain, 
and straight-shooting for Clemens.  Of course, many pieces, like “The 
Petrified Man,” were unsigned altogether. 
• Grice’s maxim of Quality may interact with Medium and Authority to 
actually encourage credulity, as truth-telling is the default mode of human 
communication (if it were not, nothing would ever get accomplished 
between people and lying would have no stigma attached to it). 
• The competing constraints of Progression and Comprehension govern the 
hoax-reading experience and may work in the hoaxer’s favor due to 
readers’ skimming habits.  The competition between 
progression/comprehension may for some readers indicate a high ranking 
for Sensation and Novelty, but a low ranking or even a deactivation of 
Detail and Internal Coherence, due to skipping these background details to 
get to the “juicy parts.” 
• A news-specific reading pattern may interact with the 
progression/comprehension dynamic to facilitate hoaxing and frustrate 
satire. 
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Twain’s observations will be tested against the reactions of other readers of his 
hoaxes.  Then, the filter of science news reading expectations will be modified to 
account for the observable innovations in Twain’s scientific media hoaxing.   
3.2 Contemporary reaction to “The Petrified Man” 
When Twain wrote in the “Memoranda” that “everyone was receiving [the 
petrified man] in innocent and good faith,” he was exaggerating.  Even if they 
ignored the obvious nose-thumbing of the unfortunate petrifactee, several of the 
papers who reprinted it did so tongue-in-cheek.  In Early Tales and Sketches, 
Branch et. al. note that a majority of the 12 reprints were introduced straight-
faced (158).  Of the five reprints I was able to locate in the Berkeley periodicals 
library, three were introduced ironically: 
• The San Francisco Evening Bulletin introduces the story with this 
commentary:  A WASHOE JOKE.—The Territorial Enterprise has a joke 
of a “petrified man” having been found on the plains, which the interior 
journals seem to be copying in good faith.  Our authority gravely says:…”   
• The Sacramento Bee on 16 October 1862 prefaces the story, “THAT 
PIECE OF PETRIFIED HUMANITY.—The Enterprise, published in 
Virginia City, has the following, probably a hoax, about the discovery of a 
petrified man near Gravelly Ford, in Nevada Territory.  It says….”   
• The San Francisco Alta California for 15 October 1862 quips the 
following:  “A PETRIFIED MAN IN NEVADA TERRITORY. –The 
Virgina City Enterprise gets off the following sell about the discovery of a 
petrified man near Gravelly Ford, in Nevada Territory.”   
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Twain’s protestations of universal hoodwinking are obviously exaggerated.  In 
addition to the overt criticism by the reprinting media, readers and editors most 
likely knew that the Enterprise routinely published humorous squibs and tall tales 
alongside legitimate news items.   
There is little doubt that San Francisco’s media encouraged an image of 
the city as more savvy and cosmopolitan than the upstart mining camps in the 
Nevada territory.  This attitude is apparent in the introductory commentary on 
“The Petrified Man” in reprint in the San Francisco Evening Bulletin, whose 
editors distinguished themselves and their readers from the “interior journals” 
who were “copying it [the joke] in good faith.”  I will consider their reading of the 
hoax and then their projection of how their readers would read it.   
The editors clearly rank highly the reputation of the medium—with a 
definite negative valence—in their decision to discount Twain’s tale.  So Medium 
wins out over the Novelty and Sensation of a petrified human being for these 
editors.  It is safe to assume that they were not skimming the article, as they 
picked up the exposing details of the mummy’s posture and recognized the story 
for a hoax.  Internal Coherence would therefore be highly-ranked for these 
editorial readers, too, because the impossibility of a man being petrified while 
thumbing his nose is what gives the story away. 
Some of the usual expectations do not enter into the editors’ interpretive 
decision.  For example, there are no foreign authorities quoted, so Foreign is a 
moot point.  These editors’ commentary gives no indication of how plausible they 
found the petrifaction of a man, in general, so Plausibility may or may not have 
 233 
entered into their interpretive process.  The Plausibility clues Twain left for 
Virginia City locals—like the lack of “neighbors” at Gravelly Ford—would not 
help editors who lived in San Francisco.  By contrast, for the editors of the 
Auburn Placer Herald, Plausibility must have been satisfied, or at least powerfully 
outranked by other expectations, since they reprinted the story as real news; the 
Placer Herald editors could have employed either of these rankings of Plausibility, 
since they make no comments when reprinting “The Petrified Man.”17   
Finally, the option of the editors of the Evening Bulletin’s respecting 
Twain’s adherence to Popsci. criteria in the original story are impossible to judge 
because that article is not extant.  Chances are good that the body of the story was 
reproduced relatively accurately in the Evening Bulletin; this has been determined 
through comparison with the other reprints and Twain’s own reprint of the story 
in Sketches New and Old (Clemens Early Tales and Sketches  157).  However, 
the original heading of the story and perhaps some concluding commentary would 
not have been reprinted by the Bulletin and are thus unavailable for analysis. 
So, the reconstruction of the editors’ rejection of “The Petrified Man,” 
based on their commentary appears in Table 13: 
                                                 
17 The editors of the Placer Herald made no overt commentary, but they 
did entitle the article “Petrified Men,” which presupposes several findings and 
thus may indicate the editors found the discovery plausible because of prior 
experience with petrifactions.  Of course, the substitution of “Men” for “Man” 
could also be the result of a sloppy reading of the text or a typo, so any definite 
judgment on it would be hasty. 
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Table 13:  Decision of rival editors about “The Petrified Man” 
 Medium Internal 
Coherence 
Novelty Sensation 
   True * *!   
False   * * 
Even though deciding that the “Petrified Man” is a “false” science report 
requires the editors to deny that novel and sensational scientific reports are 
usually true, they are more concerned with the reputation of the Enterprise and the 
internal consistency of the story.  The “!” by the violation for Internal Coherence, 
indicating that it is the fatal violation in the contest between the two 
interpretations, is a little misleading, for in fact, there is not enough data to 
determine which was the absolute deciding factor for the editors—the internal 
inconsistencies of “The Petrified Man,” or simply the story’s appearance in a 
local-yokel “interior journal.”  The vertical dotted line between the expectations 
indicates this indeterminacy.  The convention in Optimality Theory is simply to 
indicate the “fatal violation” as far right as possible in a given level of rank, thus 
indicating the very first or weakest violation (*) that is enough to knock a 
candidate interpretation out of the running.   
Progression and Comprehension are harder to represent because they have 
to do with the allocation of attention during the reading process.  The other 
expectations figure in post hoc judgments after reading is complete.  While the 
continual activity and tension between Progression and Comprehension determine 
what gets admitted to the interpretive process as data, and thus produce an indirect 
effect on decisions about truth-value, Progression and Comprehension operate at a 
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different level than our other interpretive expectations.18  They vary continually 
with a reader’s emotional and mental states and thus are subject to factors like 
impatience, excitability, and fatigue.  As a result of the powerful but oscillating 
nature of Progression and Comprehension, all that can be determined about them 
from these editors’ readings is that during the phase of their reading experience 
where they were scanning the “details of main events” part of the text, 
Comprehension was temporarily ranked above Progression in a successful effort 
to sort out the tangled-up details about the mummy’s posture. 
There are two models of reader interpretation inhering in the Evening 
Bulletin’s comments that are not visible unless we focus on recuperating reader 
expectations from the textual evidence.  In addition to the editors’ reading of the 
hoax, the Bulletin also presents a projected model of what the editors thought 
their readers expected, similar to the one Twain presented in his analysis of why 
his “satires” failed, or to Poe’s model of antebellum newsreader expectations in 
his analysis of the success of Locke’s “Moon Hoax” versus “Hans Phaall.”  
Simply put, while the San Francisco editors believed their readers to share their 
parochial disdain for the shoddy journalism of the Enterprise, they feared along 
with Twain that their readers’ excited desire to progress through all the pertinent 
points of the story (perhaps motivated by a high-ranked value for Sensation and 
                                                 
18 Two exceptions to this observation are perhaps Sensation and News, 
which may operate selectively during the reading experience.  A highly ranked 
expectation of sensation or titillation may push progression ahead of 
comprehension as readers excitedly scan the text for vivid adjectives and “bloody 
particulars”; similarly, skimming according to newsreading conventions may 
work with progression to reduce comprehension of embedded details.   
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Novelty as well as a preference for Progression over Comprehension) would 
cause them to read too quickly and miss the exposing details.  We know this 
because the editors of the Evening Bulletin interpolated a bracketed exclamation 
mark “[!]” right after the description of the mummy’s posture when they reprinted 
“The Petrified Man,” so that readers who had been skimming would stop at the 
mark, go back, and reevaluate the position of the petrified man to see that he was 
thumbing his nose at them.  In short, the editors were educating their readers to 
read as the editors had read, to rank their expectations the same.  But the fact that 
the editors felt the need to educate their readers in this fashion indicates that the 
editors believed their readers read differently and too quickly.  The editors’ model 
of their readers’ expectations is depicted in Table 14: 
Table 14:  Editors’ projection of their readers’ interpretive process 
 Sensation Progression Comprehension 
True  *!  
False   * 
In the editors’ view, their warning sign would force the readers to stop 
their headlong rush and to re-read the details of Twain’s story carefully enough to 
comprehend the paradox of the petrified man’s posture.19  The only evidence at 
this point that Sensation and Progression work together comes from Twain’s 
report, detailed above, of watching his readers rush through his stories because 
they are bent on “collecting thrills” as Covici calls it, or “hastening to revel in all 
                                                 
19 There is another consequence of Comprehension losing this 
competition, and that is the deactivation of Internal Consistency and Detail, or 
internal consistency and the evidentiary weight of detail, as working expectations, 
because a reader’s ability to judge the internal consistency of a story is severely 
hampered by skimming and missing the details which may or may not add up. 
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the blood-curdling particulars” as Twain himself described it.  Dan De Quille 
seemed to share Twain’s assumption, as he cautioned Twain to include more 
clues to the satire in the story (which Twain suspiciously refused to do).   
So, Twain’s observations about the way his readers read science news—
that they expected sensation and novelty, and that they skimmed using their 
knowledge of news conventions—seem to be corroborated by the editorial 
commentary accompanying the reprinting of “Petrified Man.”  The editorial 
comment also offered an alternative reading, as compared to Twain’s projected 
miner readers, to the relationship between Medium and Novelty; that is, we have 
evidence now that for at least one group of readers, the negative reputation of the 
Enterprise trumped the desires to “keep up with the times” and take novel 
scientific reports at face value.  Now, a portrait of how science news had changed 
since Poe’s time will give us an idea of what Twain’s readers expected to find 
when they opening the pages of the Enterprise. 
3.3 The American popular science genre in 1865 
The “Petrified Man” adheres to the rhetorical form we have been studying 
in Poe’s and Locke’s hoaxes (the Popsci. criteria) in several ways.  First, the 
report plays on readers’ actual experience with fossilization and petrifaction and 
on reports of these things in the media (Novelty, Plausibility); further, it purports 
to describe a petrified man, which is a unique and suggestive discovery, especially 
in light of contemporary debates over the age of the earth and the evolution of 
humans on it (Sensation).  The story also includes painstaking detail in the 
description of the wooden leg and the attitude of the various limbs of the body 
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and includes technical jargon like “limestone sediment” (Detail).  There are 
certainly humorous colorings to some of the descriptions, including the chiming 
phrase “stony mummy” and the irony of “refused to allow the charitable citizens 
to blast him from his position.”  But these elements are not out of keeping with 
the Enterprise’s usual style of reporting actual events and discoveries in the 
Nevada territory in a joking manner, as discussed above. 
We notice that the story is introduced without the typical “mystery” 
opening, though the mystery rhetoric is invoked later in the story with the phrase 
“strange freak of nature.”  Is this an early instance of the “who, what, when, 
where, why” rhetoric of the news article gradually phasing out the older, more 
elaborate style of the 1835 popular science article?  It is of course impossible to 
determine this without a wide study, but a sample of eight contemporary journals, 
a count of the type of articles they contained, and a brief rhetorical analysis of the 
style of those articles may help suggest directions for future inquiry. 
For this sample, as with the 1835 sample, I tried to select newspapers local 
to the Nevada/California region or Eastern papers which De Quille and/or Twain 
were known to read.  I have included the American Journal of Science and the 
Scientific American again for comparison with their earlier manifestations, to see 
what changes might have arisen the previous thirty years (an immediate 
observation is that both journals were publishing more science by volume in 1865 
than in 1835).  A few category labels have also changed.  There were no meta-
commentary articles or poems in the Popular Science category in this survey, and 
I have added an Almanac sub-category under Popular Science to reflect frequent 
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weather, tide, and astronomical reports appearing in the daily papers mid-century.  
Under Popular Technology, I lumped Educational and How-Two articles together 
since most Educational articles at this time were about how to build or do 
something rather than general histories.  Tables 15 and 16 present the results of 
the survey. 
Table 15:  1865 media surveyed with number of science articles per issue 
Magazine/Newspaper Total Science Articles 
Am. Journal of Science 150 
Scientific American 117 
SF Daily Examiner 26 
NY Sun 17 
NY Times 17 
St. Louis Missouri Reporter 8 
Sacramento Transcript 5 
Virginia City, MT, Post 2 
Table 16:  Distribution of categories of science articles across 1865 media sample 
Major  
category 




of total science 
articles 
Major category 
% of total 
science articles 
 Ad 24 25%  
Pop. Sci. Blurb  1 1% 35% 
 Spectacle  5 5%  
 Almanac  4 4%  
 How-to/Educ    2.4 3%  
Pop Tech. Blurb    3.9 4% 55% 
 Ad  41.3 43%  
 Invention  3.7 5%  
 Discovery    .2    .2%  
 Education  3.7 4%  
“Pure” sci. Joke 2 2% 10% 
 Observation    .8    .8%  
 Review/Bio  2.6 3%  
                                                 
* Totals for AJS (semi-annual) and Scientific American (weekly) have been 
adjusted to be comparable with the dailies. 
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 Because there is such a discrepancy in the circulation of the 
newspapers/journals considered, the totals by journal merely tell us that small 
town papers carried less science news than big city papers, an unremarkable 
result.  However, the totals by category yield a snapshot of some changes in 
science journalism since 1835. 
In 1865 Popular Technology was still by far the best-represented category 
in science news, and ads account for an even higher percentage of the total 
number of science articles included in each paper/journal.  This could simply be 
because papers were carrying more ads in general as cities expanded.  There was 
a 1.5% increase in jokes and a 1.7% increase in announcements of spectacles or 
exhibitions since 1835, and both of these increases, while inconclusive, are 
consistent with the upsurge of Barnum and other medicine-show type 
entertainments since the 1830s.  There was a marked drop-off in general 
educational items at the hard science level (10.8%), and this could reflect the 
increasing professionalization of science media, including a general journal like 
the AJS.  This was accompanied by a decrease in blurb/factoid items in the 
Popular Science category (11.6%).  Together, these results might reflect the 
pulling-out of scientific education from the popular press into more specialized 
journals, professional associations, and university courses.  A more extensive 
survey would of course have to be conducted to confirm these results. 
The rhetoric of scientific articles at this time is even more important to the 
project of updating our Popsci. expectations to account for the thirty-year 
development in science journalism between 1835 and 1865.  While the articles 
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from the sample were still structured in a problem/solution/benefits format that 
provided a narrative of control over the awesome or uncontrollable, Tables 17-19 
demonstrates among other things that the “mystery” opening is not as sharply in 
evidence: 
Table 17:  Opening structure of 1865 popular science articles 
Rhetorical Feature/Pattern Example 
Opening:  Utility/the facts 
• Often gives a 
“who,what,when, 
where, why” 
snapshot in the 
first sentence 






“Clams:  How They Are Regarded and what is done 
with them by the Barn Island Club.  Clams are of 
various kinds, their usefulness is undoubted, their 
ameliorating effect upon human nature is undisputed; so 
say the members of the “Great Barn Island chowder 
Club,” and so say we all.  On Friday afternoon, in 
compliance with an elaborately elegant programme of 
invitation and arrangements, we went to Barn Island…”  
NY Times 
SURGICAL FEAT.—Wednesday last, one of the most 
successful surgical operations was performed by our 
townsman, Dr. J. S. Glick, which speaks well for his skill.  
The particulars, we learn, are as follows…”  Virginia 
City, Montana, Post 
“PROFESSOR WHITNEY, the State geologist of 
California, found among the Sierre Nevadas, about 2,000 
feet above the level of the ocean, an almost perfect jaw of 
a rhinoceros.”  Scientific American 
“Spectral Analysis.  A practical application is likely to 
be made of the beautiful results of spectral analysis in the 
casting of steel.” Scientific American 
“Cannonading at Bull Run.—The cannonading at the 
battle of Bull Run was heard in Preston county, Virginia, 
125 miles distant.”  American Journal of Science 
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Table 18:  Structure of “problem” phase of 1865 popular science articles 
Problem 









“…Perhaps the readers of the Times, who have enjoyed 
now and then a humble clam, would like to know how, 
on such a high and mighty occasion, those delicious 
bivalves are prepared.” NY Times 
“Mr. Jas. W. Brown, in the summer of 1862, when in the 
employ of Ben Holladay received a gun shot in the left 
cheek, in a fight with Indians….  Mr. B’s wound being 
dangerous, Ben Holladay took him to San Francisco to 
have the ball taken out, but he surgeons could not find it, 
supposing it to lay close to the occipital bone.”  Post 
“It is important to know the exact moment at which to 
shut down the cover of the furnace during the melting of 
metal; time must be allowed for the escape of the 
gaseous products which are injurious to steel, but if that 
time be prolonged, an injurious effect of another kind is 
produced.” Sci. Am. 
“The sounds heard were faint, yet distinct, and so 
obviously due to artillery as to attract the attention of 
people and produce the conviction that a ballet was 
going on…at no great distance.” AJS 
 243 
Table 19:  Structure of “solution” phase of 1865 popular science article 
Solution 






• contains great 




“First from a blazing fire the blaze was brushed, and the 
embers left bare.  The hard clams by the bushel were put 
on, then soft clams…after which the entire mass is 
covered with a profusion of seaweed which keeps the 
steam in….” NY Times 
“On Wednesday Dr. Glick casually observed that he 
thought he could find the ball.  Mr. B. was ready 
immediately for the operation, which was successfully 
performed in twenty minutes.  The Dr. first extracted a 
piece of the superior maxillary…and then found the ball 
to have lodged at the extreme lower portion of the ear and 
removed it by forceps through the cavity of the ear.” Post 
“To meet this contingency, it has been proposed to test 
the gases as they fly off by means of the spectroscope” 
Sci. Am. 
“There was no cannonading that day, that could have 
caused [the reports] nearer than that at Bull 
Run….Note.—It is a commonly received opinion that 
sound travels farther and more loudly on the earth’s 
surface than through the air—thus the cannonading at 
Jena in 1806 was very feebly heard in the open fields 
about Dresden—distant 92 miles—but very distinct in the 
casemates of the fortifications of Dresden.” AJS 
Benefit/Use 







“…which nicely bakes the soft clams, nicely bakes the 
hard clams, cruelly stifles and beautifully colors the 
lobsters, and perfectly fits the potatoes for the dainty 
palate of the most epicuean Irishman.” NY Times 
“We congratulate Dr. Glick on so well and successfully 
performed an operation.”  Post 
“..and as soon as the particular color is observed, peculiar 
to the gas which begins to escape at the moment the 
molten metal is in proper condition, the manufacturer will 
then have an infallible sign of the proper moment for 
closing the furnace.” Sci. Am. 
In short what we are seeing in this small sample is a greater conformation 
of science news to the rhetoric of regular news, with a structure very similar to 
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that Van Dijk found in his survey of news articles, discussed above in section 
3.13:  summary, story (main event, details of main event), then background, 
consequences, and commentary.  The problem/solution schema particular to 
science news is still in effect, but the object now is not explaining wondrous and 
inexplicable forces of nature, but solving practical problems in health and 
industry.  A more extensive comparison of news items between 1835 and 1865 
might well corroborate this finding and support both the solidification of 
American journalistic style and the industrialization of American popular science. 
Twain’s “Petrified Man,” as least as it was reprinted in the Evening 
Bulletin, conforms well to this new template.  The petrified man is introduced 
straightforwardly, with “who, what, when, where” foregrounded in the first 
sentence.  The main event is detailed next, and then the 
“consequences/commentary” section is entered into with the words “This strange 
freak of nature has created a profound sensation in our vicinity.”  “Empire City 
Massacre” is structured much the same way.  The popular science article was 
undergoing a change in Twain’s time to conform to an event-oriented journalistic 
style. 
These changes to the format of the popular science article will enter into 
the adjustment of the filter of newsreading expectations in the next section.  
Twain’s considerable insight into the psychology of his readers offers us new 
perspectives on reader expectations in the 1860s.  In addition, the reaction to 
“Petrified Man” offers evidence of a multi-layered news readership made up of 
groups of readers who each read the story differently to suit their differing 
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agendas.  All of this new historical evidence—including the changes to the 
popular science genre—can be accommodated by our Optimality-based model of 
reading expectations. 
4.  ADJUSTING THE FILTER OF EXPECTATIONS TO ACCOUNT FOR TWAIN’S 
HOAXING 
After analyzing Poe’s hoaxing, I developed the following working 
definition of a hoax—that it was a rhetorical exchange in a news medium between 
an author and a readership that served to sensitize readers to their collusion in the 
redefinition of reality according to ethnoscientific values.  From the contemporary 
reaction to Poe’s and Locke’s hoaxes, I reconstructed the following provisional 
ranking of reader expectations about science news: 
{Medium, Authority}>> {Novelty, Sensation, Plausibility} >>  
{Popsci., Foreign, Internal Coh.} 
This notation represents three basic levels of ranking.  Medium and 
Authority were the strongest determiners of decisions about truth-value for 
newsreaders, equally ranked because these expectations did not compete with 
each other in the reaction data.  Novelty, Sensation, and Plausibility represent 
readers’ comparisons of the content of science news with the real world of their 
desires and experiences (we are dealing with a rough-grained Plausibility here, 
like reader judgments about alchemy as a plausible field of scientific innovation); 
these expectations formed a mid-strength filter on truth-value judgments.  The 
weakest constraints on truth-value decisions when reading science news (or 
science hoaxes) were textual and generic expectations:  Popsci., Foreign, and 
Internal Coherence.   
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After analyzing the response to “The Petrified Man” and the “Empire City 
Massacre,” both in Twain’s commentary and in the reprinting editors’ 
introductions, important modifications need to be made both to the definition of 
hoaxing and to the ranking of reader expectations to reflect the elapsed thirty 
years in hoaxing practices.  Twain offers us a valuable vantage point into hoaxing 
via his analysis of why his “satires” failed and turned into media hoaxes.  First 
and foremost, his denial of deliberate intentions to hoax his readers makes us 
further revise our notions of author intentionality in hoaxing.   
After Poe’s cagey self-construction as a hoaxer in the case of “M. 
Valdemar” we recognized that initial authorial intentions interact with reader 
expectations of medium and reader responses over time in constructing a hoax.  
An author has many opportunities during a hoaxing exchange to claim 
responsibility for the hoax.   In the case of Twain’s denials of having deliberately 
crafted a hoax, we saw that textual and contextual evidence can argue against an 
author’s claims of innocence.  The evidence in his letter to his brother of Twain’s 
gleeful plotting to further the effects of the hoax on Sewall, coupled with his 
follow-up of the “The Petrified Man” with further hoax material both argue that 
Twain was engaged in more than merely post hoc play with the unexpectedly 
credulous reaction to his “satire.”  Further, Twain went on to write the “Empire 
City Massacre” without correcting any of his rhetorical “failures” in “The 
Petrified Man.”  He also wrote, during this time and after, many successful satires 
that no one took for hoaxes.  It seems probable that Twain had intended to catch 
readers off-guard with “The Petrified Man” all along and humiliate them for their 
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naïve trust in paleontologists and geologists.  A satire, after all, as we saw in the 
first chapter, pits both author and reader together against a socially superior target 
that needs a comeuppance.  A hoax, on the other hand, is “the sort of scientific 
humor that aims directly at the audience's ignorance” and reveals it to them (Lee 
141).  “The Petrified Man” was called a hoax publicly by several of the reprinting 
editors, and Twain himself revealed it to be such in his letter to Orion and in the 
“Memoranda” article for the Galaxy in 1870. 
However, Twain’s claim that he “accidentally” produced a hoax is crucial 
to our study of author intentionality in hoaxing because it reveals once more that a 
hoax is not a monologic statement by an author but rather a rhetorical interaction, 
residing only in the coordinated activity among author, medium, and readership.  
Twain’s point is that even if he did not intend a hoax, his audience’s belief in his 
story created a hoax anyway.  While the author’s intention can direct readers’ 
experience to a certain degree, it still does not constitute the hoax. 
What Twain has tuned us into is the realization that reader desires and 
expectations are powerful determiners of hoaxing events.  The Enterprise’s core 
readers needed new information more than they needed to save face.  This led 
them to place trust in reports that the paper’s reputation clearly did not warrant.  
This is not merely a repetition of the old saw, “People believe what they want to,” 
but an opportunity to witness how specific readerly expectations, especially 
Sensation and Novelty and Medium and Authority, can be ranked differently 
based on different reader desires.  We saw, through Twain’s perspective and the 
perspective of rival editors, how different groups of Enterprise readers might be 
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characterized by their different ranking of these expectations:  miners would rank 
Novelty over Medium; most of the other core readers would simply suspend 
Medium in their judgments; and “outsider” readers like competing editors and 
Eastern readers would rank Medium over Novelty.  Further, for all readers who 
ranked Novelty highest, Entertainment (reading hoaxes purely as entertainment) 
would be deactivated because of their need to decide upon and use the 
information presented in the newspapers.  Editors and Eastern readers were the 
only ones with the luxury to rank Entertainment highly and suspend truth-
judgments about Twain’s story. 
Twain’s final contribution to the redefinition of hoaxing is the awareness 
his commentary raised about the interaction of psychological constraints with 
interpretive expectations in the reading process.  Constraints like Progression and 
Comprehension do not directly participate in decisions about truth-value, but they 
do act as an early filter on the information that gets admitted to the decision 
process.  In addition, a high-ranked desire for Sensation may both interact with 
attention-allocating expectations while also assisting in post hoc judgments about 
truth-value.  After an analysis of “The Petrified Man” and the commentary 
surrounding it, I propose a new, dual ranking of reader expectations.  The second 
tier represents the interaction of Sensation with the new psychological reading 
constraints: 
Authority >> {Novelty, Sensation} >> {(Medium), Plausibility, Popsci., Internal Coh.} 
{Sensation, News, Progression} >> Comprehension 
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We will analyze the first tier of expectations first, taking them level by 
level in order to be clear about the changes they register between newsreading in 
Poe’s era in New York City and newsreading in Virginia City in 1865: 
1. First level:  Authority.  The privileging of Authority in this new ranking is 
not a change from Poe’s era; however, it reflects a slightly different 
dynamic between author and reader.  Twain’s reputation was an excellent 
predictor of truth or falsehood for his readers since he was fairly consistent 
with signing “Sam Clemens” only to his serious political reporting; 
anything signed “Mark Twain” was obviously of low truth-value.  Of 
course, just because Authority was the highest ranked does not deactivate 
the rest of the expectations.  In the event that Authority did not decide the 
issue conclusively, readers resorted to the mid-strength expectations to 
help them decide about truth-value. 
2. Second level:  {Novelty, Sensation}.  This mid-strength level reflects the 
instincts of both Twain and his competing editors that their readers 
attached high truth-value to what was new or amazing; it also reflects the 
needs of miners for a constant stream of “inside” information.  The 
downgrading of Plausibility from this level to the lower level since Poe’s 
time reflects miners’ emphasis on novelty as well as their tacit acceptance 
of a wide range of seemingly bizarre phenomena on the frontier. 
3. Third level: {(Medium), Plausibility, Popsci., Internal Coherence}.  These 
expectations reflect internal and external measurements of the story 
against itself and against “reality,” in other words, the elements of 
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“common sense” readers had to use to make truth-value judgments in spite 
of conflicting or absent cues from the medium and author—provided they 
had not already been swept away by the “extraneous interest” of the story, 
in Twain’s words.  The biggest change since Poe’s era is the downgrading 
and partial deactivation of Medium.  In this ranking, Medium is presented 
in parenthesis to reflect the Enterprise’s habitual mixing of fact and 
fiction, which rendered its reputation an unreliable barometer of truth for 
most readers; Medium remains provisionally in the ranking because 
editors and miners did have to weigh the tempting new information the 
paper published against its reputation for lying (Medium with a negative 
valence). 
The second tier of rankings expresses the way in which news-reading 
strategies (News), the excitement of Sensation, and the desire to get to the good 
stuff (Progression) often defeated Comprehension of textual details, thus actually 
facilitating the hoax’s initial effect of credulity.  For this reason, another of the 
“morals” that Twain embedded in his hoaxes, aside from “don’t believe 
paleontologists” and “don’t get swept up in poor investing schemes,” could be 
stated “always read the fine print.” 
5.  APPLYING THE ANALYSIS TO PROBLEMS IN TWAIN SCHOLARSHIP 
As with Poe, several Twain scholars have researched Twain’s hoaxing and 
attempted to define it and examine possible influences it may have had on other 
genres of his work.  These analyses generally break down into two categories:  
some extend an analysis of Twain’s media hoaxes, like “The Petrified Man,” and 
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“Empire City Massacre” to find hoaxing behavior in Twain’s fiction; others use 
the trope of illusion and humiliating revelation in the hoaxing activity to 
psychoanalyze Twain’s relationship to science and technology, especially in the 
final years of his career.  My approach—clarifying the relationships with science 
and readers that Twain constructs in the hoaxes first, and then tracking the 
development of these relationships through his later “scientific” fiction—validates 
the rhetorical methods of some of my predecessors while revising their tendencies 
to read Twain’s late-life depression back onto his scientific rhetoric. 
The scholarly tradition that reads the hoax as an organizing trope of 
Twain’s other fictions can be represented by Joan Belcourt Ross, Lawrence 
Berkove, and Pascal Covici.  Their project, overall, is hampered by a loose 
definition of hoaxing that fails to distinguish Twain’s literary projects from his 
social projects.  The necessity of covering the “several hundred” examples of 
hoaxes that Joan Ross finds in the Twain oeuvre leads her to create a vague 
definition of the practice that cannot help but contradict itself when applied to 
moments as diverse as Huck playing a practical joke on Jim in Huckleberry Finn 
and the identity switch at the heart of The Prince and the Pauper.  For example, 
Ross initially defines a hoax by saying it provides its writer with human 
comforts—like security and money (1), but two pages later she claims that 
hoaxers risk “shame, humiliation, and in extreme cases, death” by perpetrating 
their hoaxes (3).    
Lawrence Berkove attempts to avoid self-contradiction by constraining his 
definition of hoaxing.  He identifies A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s 
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Court as a “tragic hoax” as opposed to a comedic hoax like “Petrified Man.”  He 
writes, “Readers expect the target of the hoax to be one or more of the characters 
in a work of fiction; it always comes as a shock, when they learn that they are the 
author’s real target” (Berkove 89).  The central problem with this definition is that 
once readers know they are reading a novel like A Connecticut Yankee and have 
therefore decoupled their interpretation of it from their construction of the real 
world they live in, it is impossible for the author to make them the “target”; 
therefore, it is impossible to hoax them in the same way that Twain hoaxed his 
farmer-readers or the editors who blithely reprinted “The Petrified Man” as news.  
Reality as readers know it—i.e., the reality in which they pick up their kids from 
school, go to church, or buy stock—does not change to match the world of the 
science fiction novel they have just finished.  The realities of those who believe 
media hoaxes, on the other hand, change until the hoax is revealed, and perhaps 
even after that. 
Pascal Covici’s conception of hoaxing is, of this school, the most 
congenial to the aims of this project; he thinks of hoaxes in terms of reader 
expectations.  He was the one who first pointed out that Twain was using hoaxes 
like “The Petrified Man” and “Empire City Massacre” as weapons against post-
bellum readers’ tendency toward sensationalism or “collecting thrills.”  Covici 
concluded, “The hoax is aimed at the assumptions that make the romantic 
appreciation of sensationalism possible” (154), because the hoax must match 
those assumptions, at least initially, in order to achieve its humbling effect.  
However, Covici’s definition of hoaxing is still too broad.  He wishes to 
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recuperate an excised section of Life on the Mississippi concerning a grisly 
balloon journey as a lost Twain hoax.  When he points out that the story is almost 
certainly a parody of Poe’s “M.S. Found in a Bottle” and “Hans Phaall,” he is in 
fact correct.  With its exaggerated descriptions, like “dead people in all possible 
stages of greenness & mildew, & all of them grinning & staring…& a lot of dried 
animals of one sort & another” (256), and its being marked for inclusion in a 
hyperbolic memoir, the tale is indeed a parody rather than a hoax; it cannot play 
with its readers’ conceptions of reality.  Neither can the other “missing hoax” 
Covici wishes to include in the Twain hoax canon, the parodic opening of 
Twain’s “Double-Barreled Detective Story” where Twain sets the mood with “a 
solitary esophagus sle[eping] upon motionless wing” (Clemens “Double-
Barreled” 264).  In this second case, Covici argues that Twain’s “double-speak” 
with scientific terminology like the word “esophagus” “suggests the formal 
prerequisites of any hoax” (144), and he is again right.   Choosing (or creating) 
words that are read over and accepted without comprehension or analysis by 
readers who just assume the concept is over their heads—this is perhaps the most 
fundamental move toward building a media hoax.  But the “esophagus” paragraph 
and the excised balloon chapter of “Roughing It” are both literary parodies, 
appearing in literary contexts where they are disabled from altering readers’ 
expectations of reality.  So, Covici’s criticism of Twain’s hoaxing, while the most 
rhetorical and perceptive of the school we have just reviewed, still conflates 
playing with literary conventions and playing with epistemology.  This mistake 
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obscures the choice that Twain made to address his readers’ construction of 
reality with his hoaxes and his social criticism, as we will see momentarily. 
The second category of Twain hoax scholarship is the psychoanalytic 
category.  The basic critical move made by the foundational scholars in this 
school is to use Twain’s disappointments with scientists and machines to argue 
that he, though initially gulled by a vision of utopian progress through science, 
became disillusioned with science in his later years and feared it would be used by 
people merely to destroy each other.  The more rhetorical angle of this view holds 
that Twain performed hoaxes to dramatize to himself and to his readers his sense 
of betrayal by promises of technological utopias that delivered only dystopic self-
annihilation.  This approach to Twain’s relationship to science tends to get the 
cart before the horse, reading Twain’s bitter losses and disappointments with 
science and medicine later in his life back onto his scientific rhetoric. 
The psychological school of Twain’s scientific philosophy was opened by 
Hyatt Waggoner, who claimed Twain came to the conclusion that self-
determination was an illusion.  “Mark Twain lived the last fifteen years of his life 
a bitter pessimist and a philosophical mechanist...He came to think of man as a 
machine buffeted by an indifferent, if not hostile, mechanical universe” (357).  
This essential point has been repeated with small variations in studies of Twain’s 
science by Tom Burnam, James Wilson, and Sherwood Cummings.   Shelley 
Fisher Fishkin instead invokes “ambivalence,” the prevailing trope in criticism of 
the American Romantics’ attitudes toward science, to label Twain’s own 
scientific philosophy.  She claims that Twain’s disappointments with science, 
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figured by the death of his brother Henry in a steamboat explosion and Twain’s 
failed investment in the Paige typesetter, made him ambivalent toward science’s 
intense promise for improvement of American life on the one hand and its 
“potential for dehumanization and devastation" on the other (179-180). 
 Joan Belcourt Ross and Lawrence Berkove extended this mode of 
criticism in the last phases of their more rhetorical analyses of Twain’s hoaxing.  
Both of them take the hoax as the organizing principle of Twain’s scientific 
philosophy and cosmology.  Berkove figures the “Sand Belt” chapter of A 
Connecticut Yankee, in which Hank Morgan ironically ends up barbequing 
11,000 knights on his electric fences after working for years to “rescue” feudal 
England from its barbaric ignorance, as a dramatization of Twain’s own belief 
that humans are merely the “butt of God’s rather grim practical joke or ‘hoax’” 
(90).  Ross’s arguments about the power of the hoax in Twain’s personal 
philosophy are not centered specifically on his view of science, but on his 
determinist view of human nature in general, the “propensity of all men, 
everywhere, consciously or unconsciously, to be implicated in the creation and/or 
the sustaining of illusion ” (5).  Ross claims that Twain used laughter to try to 
shock his readers out of this state into fleeting moments of self-realization, an 
interesting argument we will turn to in the final section.  The consensus of these 
scholars’ readings of the hoax in Twain’s scientific and moral philosophy is that 
the hoax became the organizing trope of his thought—that Twain came to view 
human beings as gullible victims of a universal hoax and that, except for the brief 
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respite offered by laughter, there was no way out of this grim cycle of illusion and 
disillusionment. 
These theories tell us less about Twain’s views on science than they do 
about our own desires as scholars to reduce Twain’s personality, philosophy, and 
rhetorical practices to formulae.  Unfortunately, this reduction accidentally pares 
away the social aspects of Twain’s hoaxing.  The hoax is an essentially social 
transaction, requiring for its dual effect of illusion/revelation all of the disparities 
in knowledge and imperfect transfers of information that obtain between author, 
medium, and audience in a newsreading culture.  As a social transaction, the hoax 
was a conscious rhetorical choice of stance for Twain, not an inevitable side-
effect of his “mechanistic” world view.  Twain chose many other genres of 
interaction with his readers as well:  satire, novels, essays, editorials, travelogues, 
and lectures.  Why not examine Twain’s science through these rhetorical lenses 
instead?  Scholars are attracted to the idea of viewing Twain’s personal 
philosophy through the hoax because it presents an appearance/reality dichotomy 
as well as a rhetorical model for social control, and these issues definitely mirror 
fears that Twain harbored about the role of science in human society.  However, 
these scholars have not yet succeeded in establishing any kind of necessary 
connection between Twain’s use of the hoax and Twain’s moral or scientific 
philosophy.  In fact, the one scientific media hoax Twain actually pulled off, “The 
Petrified Man,” was written when Twain was young and optimistic.  It does not 
discuss machines or the mechanistic world view that these scholars believe was 
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Twain’s last resort in his later years after he rejected the illusion of the scientific 
salvation of humanity. 
The promising aspects of these approaches to Twain’s philosophy of 
science, then, are relatively restricted.  In the final phases of Joan Belcourt Ross’s 
argument, she inquires into what sort of relationship Twain was attempting to 
build with his readership via the rhetoric of the hoax.  That question will be the 
focus of the next and final section of this chapter.  In establishing the significance 
of the hoax in Twain’s scientific thought, we must work against the grain of 
Twain scholarship to this point.  Instead of projecting Twain’s mechanistic 
depression backward and reading it onto his scientific hoaxing behavior, we must 
work from his early hoaxing forward through his thinking, traveling along the 
threads of arguments introduced by the hoaxes to see how they are developed in 
Twain’s writing about science. 
6.  RELATIONSHIP OF THE HOAX TO TWAIN’S SCIENTIFIC THINKING 
We have already discussed Twain’s early hoaxes, “The Petrified Man,” 
and “Empire City Massacre,” in some detail.  Identifying the arguments Twain 
makes about science here is relatively easy, as Twain’s philosophy of science is 
simple and relatively undeveloped at this stage.  “The Petrified Man” argues that 
both scientists and lay readers jump to conclusions, that the desire to prove a 
theory (Darwinism) or the desire for titillation makes people overlook facts that 
would lead them to a different and more sobering conclusion if they took the time 
to consider them.  “The Petrified Man” also performs two additional arguments 
about science in culture:  one, that scientists are competing with journalists for the 
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authority to create the West for readers; two, that the media both exacerbates this 
problem by reprinting sensational science news willy-nilly, and provides a 
potential remedy in the form of gate-keeping editors who exercise their common 
sense.  However, Twain’s hoax dramatizes the extreme difficulty of using rhetoric 
to sensitize readers to their naïve assumptions.  Namely, if they will not slow 
down long enough to read what has been written, the best and most telling 
argument against their naïveté can turn easily into a confirmation of it.  A brief 
review of three of Twain’s important later works concerning science, 3,000 Years 
Among the Microbes, Connecticut Yankee, and An American Claimant, will 
reveal to what extent these early fibres of Twain’s scientific rhetoric are taken up 
by an older and wiser Twain. 
6.1 3,000 Years Among the Microbes 
This unfinished novel promotes a fractal model of human society through 
the investigation of one of its microcosms:  germ society.  Twain’s basic postulate 
is that every being is made up of a society of smaller beings who are not aware 
that the “universe” they inhabit is really just a larger, more complex organism 
that, in turn, belongs to a society of its own.  The narrator is a cholera-germ who 
calls himself “Huck,” among other names, and he alone knows that all of his germ 
compatriots in all their levels and castes of society are merely cells in the body of 
a diseased tramp named Blitzkowski; Huck bears this privileged awareness 
because he was a human, and a scientist, before he was accidentally turned into a 
germ by an “alchemist.”  The implication pervading Huck’s stories about his life 
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among the germs is that humans themselves are various types of germs—good 
and bad—in a greater organism they call the universe. 
Twain’s research into microbiology, manifest in this book, is impressive 
for a writer in the early twentieth century.  His ecological sensitivity is 
noteworthy, too, as he considers the ignorance of disease germs as they wreck 
their “environment.” A yellow-fever germ friend of Huck’s complains that the 
tiny microorganisms that infest the germs themselves are not aware of the pain 
they are causing their hosts; if they knew, they would stop.  Huck muses at this, 
“You notice that?  He did not suspect that he, also, was engaged in gnawing, 
torturing, defiling, rotting, and murdering a fellow-creature—he and all the 
swarming billions of his race.  None of them suspects it” (454).  Huck goes on to 
make it clear that this statement applies to human ecology as well:   
It hints at the possibility that the procession of known and listed 
devourers and persecutors is not complete.  It suggests the possibility, and 
substantially the certainty, that man is himself a microbe, and his globe a 
blood-corpuscle drifting with its shining brethren of the Milky Way down 
a vein of the Master and Maker of all things, Whose body, mayhap,—
glimpsed partwise from the earth by night, and receding and lost to view 
in the measureless remotenesses of Space—is what men name the 
Universe (454). 
Huck persists with his human scientific activities even as a germ.  He and 
some friends put together a scientific society on the basis of having “excavated” a 
calcified flea imbedded in one of Blitzkowski’s arteries.  They gather at the 
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“fossil mine” and pick over the bones as human paleontologists would with a 
dinosaur.  Here, it appears Twain intended a second satire of paleontologists who 
build monsters out of a single bone chip, similar to the mocking portrait he crafted 
in “How the Animals of the Woods Sent Out a Scientific Expedition”—but he cut 
all 18 pages of it from the manuscript.  He does not excise, however, a stinging 
satire of scientists for being so absorbed in their methods that they miss the truth.  
Huck explains to his scientist germ friends that he was once a human and that the 
organism they inhabit is part of a whole other and bigger universe.  He is either 
scoffed at for a liar or lauded for his beautiful “poetry” (487).  Twain also 
satirizes the mercenary turn of science as its shoulder inevitably bends to the 
wheel of capitalism in America.  Huck discovers a gold mine in one of 
Blitzkowski’s molars—actually, he imagines it is there and convinces all the other 
scientists that it is, too.  But the more he considers working the mine with them, 
the smaller and smaller a share of the profits he is willing to give his friends (551-
553).  The manuscript ends there, leaving a perhaps unfair but powerful 
impression that Twain believes the ultimate goal of American science is not 
finding the truth but making a buck.  This rather cynical ending leads Beverly 
Hume to speculate that 3,000 Years Among the Microbes is an exercise for Twain 
in exorcising his own get-rich-quick demons in the wake of the Paige typesetter 
disaster (80). 
6.2 A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court 
This novel is probably the most discussed in the reconstruction of Twain’s 
views of the role of science and technology in human society.  It is the 
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cornerstone of psychoanalytic arguments that Twain felt hoaxed by technology 
and by the universe—particularly the final chapter, “The Sand Belt.”  For a book 
that is in general a humorous satire on systems of primogeniture and aristocracy, 
which Twain found residually operative in Southern plantation culture, the 
straight-faced brutality of the final chapter is a shock.  But it is also an indication 
that the “improvements” that have come before—Morgan’s caste-leveling schools 
and factories, his capitalism, his introduction of Victorian hygiene and work 
ethic—are in the end deadly improvements, or at the least, null improvements, as 
Morgan destroys any trace of them that history might have hoped to find. 
H. Bruce Franklin points out that this sharp denunciation of the dystopic 
future offered by science is not the only social criticism of science Twain worked 
into the “Sand Belt” chapter of Connecticut Yankee.  Franklin argues that Twain, 
innovating the genre of time-travel fiction with Morgan’s trip back to feudal 
England, institutes a new social time-scale, one based on technological 
advancement rather than chronology.  It is a time-scale Twain senses underlying 
the myth of progress in his own culture, and in Connecticut Yankee he rejects its 
utopic teleology: 
Hank's apocalyptic weapons resolve the paradoxes of time travel 
by destroying everything that the nineteenth century has anachronistically 
introduced into the dark ages.  But this resolution itself is paradoxical.  
The science and technology that mark progress, that distinguish forward 
from backward in time, become the means to annihilate all that humanity 
has created.  Thus they display their potential to transform the future into 
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the prehuman primeval past, that is, mindless oblivion. (Franklin 
Traveling 170) 
From this viewpoint Connecticut Yankee is not just a criticism of the damaging 
power of technology bent to the human desire to dominate others.  It is also a 
refutation of the entire social epistemology resulting from equating scientific 
advancement with human development. 
6.3 The American Claimant  
This novel is another round-about attack on aristocratic systems—this 
time in the guise of a young earl’s son who, to resolve a century-long dispute 
between the currently recognized Earl of Ross and an American “claimant” to that 
title, gives up his inheritance to come to America and live as a common 
American.  Technology figures in this book in a positive and humorous light in 
comparison to most of Twain’s later works.  Colonel Sellers, the American 
claimant, spends half his time writing letters to the Earl of Ross in England 
pleading his claim to the title; the other half of his time, he spends inventing.  
Both activities are pure comic relief in Twain’s novel.  The invention that Sellers 
is dead serious about—a system for reanimating the dead for the purposes of 
soldiery and slave labor—amounts only to black comedy.  However, the items he 
tosses off in his spare time—like a little tangle puzzle called “Pigs in Clover”—
ironically make him loads of money, which he merely squanders in the pursuit of 
his re-animation system.   
In addition to comedy, invention serves as a serious symbol of the positive 
face of American democracy in the novel.  The young Tracy (the American name 
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the young British Ross adopts after all evidence of his true identity is destroyed in 
a hotel fire) visits a Mechanics Club debate in Virginia and is awed and pleased at 
the democratic construction of knowledge he finds underway there.  In his journal 
Tracy reproduces the speech given by a Club member on the value of mechanics 
as citizens, over and against college-educated scientists: 
It can no doubt be easily shown that the colleges have contributed 
the intellectual part of this progress, and that that part is vast; but that the 
material progress has been immeasurably vaster I think you will concede.  
Now I have been looking over a list of inventors—the creators of this 
amazing material development—and I find that they were not college-bred 
men...It is not overstatement to say that the imagination-stunning material 
development of this century, the only century worth living in since time 
itself was invented, is the creation of men not college-bred.  We think we 
see what these inventors have done; no, we see only the visible vast 
frontage of their work; behind it is their far vaster work, and it is invisible 
to the careless glance.  They have reconstructed this nation--made it over, 
that is--and, metaphorically speaking, have multiplied its numbers almost 
beyond the power of figures to express. (83) 
 The speaker proceeds to a calculation of how the machines that inventors 
have created have multiplied man-power.  "You look around you and you see a 
nation of sixty millions—apparently; but secreted in their hands and brains, and 
invisible to your eyes, is the true population of this Republic, and it numbers forty 
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billions!  It is the stupendous creation of those humble, unlettered, un-college-
bred inventors—all honor to their name" (83).   
In light of Twain’s background as a journeyman printer, riverboat pilot, 
and novice miner, it is not surprising to find his young British protagonist 
celebrating the advantage of tradesman over the college-educated.  However, 
interestingly, Tracy also enthusiastically records the speaker’s praise of the 
American media for its work exposing the schemes and illusions of the elite 
classes in America:  “For its mission…is to stand guard over a nation’s liberties, 
not its humbugs and shams” (80).  This equation of the press with the revelation 
of “shams” perpetrated by powerful classes in America is crucial for our 
discussion of Twain’s social project of hoaxing.   
6.4 Analysis 
In Twain’s later works we find confirmation and development of nearly 
every strand of argument about science present in “The Petrified Man” with some 
additional lines of argument added.  Twain still believes scientists are hurting 
themselves as much as the public when they make simple judgments about 
complicated systems motivated more by their commercial and political agendas 
then by an authentic hunger for truth.  He still believes the media can help expose 
scientific and other social humbugs; however, he still respects and fears the power 
of readers/hearers to extract uncontrollably many interpretations from the same 
discourse, as illustrated by the “beautiful palace/beautiful lie” conundrum of 
Huck’s exposition of the “real” human universe in 3,000 Years Among the 
Microbes. 
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To these lines of argument Twain has added others based on his life 
experience.  They include an enthusiasm for invention in the spirit of the self-
made Jacksonian tradesman—evident both in American Claimant and 
Connecticut Yankee—counterbalanced by a very real horror of what American 
inventions can do when put to the task of “correcting” the backward ways of less 
technologically developed countries.  This “ambivalence” is what has led 
psychoanalytic scholars to identify Twain’s experience with science and 
technology as the last straw in confirming his late-life depression.  However, there 
is another, more rhetorical way to construct Twain’s relationship to science 
suggested by his own works. 
  Twain’s treatment of science in “The Mysterious Stranger” manuscripts, 
written in his dark later years, tells a slightly different story about Twain’s beliefs 
about the relationship between science and human society than has regularly been 
assumed by scholars.  In this work Little Satan argues that humanity damns itself 
with its “moral sense” and simply uses the products of science to help (Wilson 
81).  It is human nature that is to blame for the inability of the human race to 
progress past the brutal dominance of those who think and live differently.  
Science and technology simply aid that project both philosophically (i.e. with 
Morton’s craniological theories of the inferiority of non-White races as discussed 
in Chapter 2) and physically (with the Gatling gun and other war machines).  
Some of the same scholars who see Twain as a bitter mechanist do acknowledge 
this turn in Twain’s thinking.  Waggoner writes that Twain “used science to 
reinforce his thinking” (367).  And James Wilson concludes after reading the 
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“Mysterious Stranger” that Twain believes the worst of “man”: “Science here 
is…merely a handmaiden to his depraved nature, creating a world even worse 
than the one preceding it" (81). 
But at this point, this line of argument reaches a disconnect for most 
Twain scholars, for they generally evince a belief that Twain was not a social 
activist—a social satirist, certainly, but not someone who dealt seriously with 
contemporary social issues and tried to persuade Americans to adopt certain 
solutions.  According to this view, when Twain said that science would not 
destroy human society but that human nature would, he was certainly criticizing, 
but not constructively.  Indeed, Twain’s pessimistic view of human nature, his 
determinism and mechanism, would not seem to foster any kind of ideal of 
progress or improvement for the human lot.  But reexamining the question of 
what kind of relationship Twain was building with his readers through his hoaxes, 
coupled with a more careful analysis of Twain’s social activism, leaves a very 
different impression.  Twain did indeed have a social agenda, “to help a man to 
see himself true”(Ross 189).   This turns out to be not merely a static goal, but a 
constructive one, accomplished through the social mechanics of laughter.  To 
arrive at this conclusion, we will return to Twain’s early roots in frontier humor 
and its social function, review the modifications he made to that mode with his 
media hoaxes, and consider how this activity meshed with his social criticism in 
his later years. 
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7.  THE SOCIAL MECHANICS OF LAUGHTER 
Laughter is an extremely specialized reaction to an argument of 
difference, specifically, a difference between our assumptions and a revelation of 
how things “really” are or how they are “really” being constructed for us by 
others.  Laughter, especially in America, is a response to juxtaposition of the 
reader/viewer’s assumptions with a very different presentation of reality—a big 
man riding a bike that is much too small for him, a man wearing women’s clothes, 
a baby talking with an adult’s voice, a pack of wolves chasing a marching band 
instead of a herd of reindeer.  In all of these cases, we perceive a gap between our 
a priori assumptions about the world and a surprise revelation of how it is really 
working at this moment (in irony, we find it works exactly counter to our 
assumptions).  The perception of this gap triggers laughter as a response.  For 
some of us, the laughter also expresses a desire to close the gap, to adjust our 
assumptions so as not to be caught off guard again.  For others of us, the laughter 
is pure play, an appreciation of the imperfections and incompleteness of our 
understanding, a good-natured sympathy with the “joke being on us.”   
James Cox argues that, for Twain, laughter is the conversion of pain into 
pleasure, and Twain’s own writings seem to support this hypothesis (Cox 146).  
Twain argues in “Down the Rhone” that, just as an ice-cube on your bare back 
cannot be told from a hot brand for a second or so, so can the shock or recognition 
that you have misperceived reality as a result of someone’s performance of it feel 
like both pain and pleasure (Ross 9).  At first there is just the shock, and the 
question of how you respond to it is a question of social control.  If you feel you 
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were made, against your will, to misperceive reality by those who played on your 
assumptions to perpetrate an illusion on you, then anger and fear may result.  
However, your laughter can convert the shock of the experience to a reassertion of 
self-determination.  It demonstrates a gap now between your self that was duped 
and your real, wiser self that can appreciate a good joke and will be harder to 
dupe the next time.  Laughter creates distance between your old mode of 
perception and your new, enlightened self; anger and fear do not.  That is what we 
mean when we say that people took something “personally.”  They were unable to 
create a distance between their negative face (how they see themselves) and their 
positive face (how they think others see them) through laughter.20 
Twain knew all about this dynamic from his experience with frontier 
humor.  Briefly, let us recap the social functions of the tall tale that bear on our 
discussion of Twain’s social mechanics of laughter: 
• The tall tale demonstrates control of unknown/frightening social and 
natural environment 
• The tall tale constructs a group of “outsiders” who fall for the tale, and 
sets them apart from the “insider” or “insiders” who tell the tale. 
• The tall tale criticizes the unwarranted (in the opinion of the insiders) elite 
status the outsiders enjoy and argues that their established traditions are 
useless on the frontier (cowboys vs. “city slickers”) 
                                                 
20 For a discussion of negative and positive face as they bear on politeness 
and other pragmatic aspects of human communication, see Brown, P. and 
Levinson, S.C. Politeness: some universals in language usage. Studies in 
Interactional Sociolinguistics 4. Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1987.  
 
 269 
Telling a tall tale was a powerful way to rebuild confidence, solidify 
insider status, and criticize outsiders.  Being a victim of a tall tale left you with 
several options, the two primary ones being anger and laughter.  Anger cemented 
your outsider status, and then you were left to other means—violence or the 
law—to challenge the insiders and re-take control.  Laughter, on the other hand, 
did not necessarily make you an insider, but it distanced you from the “outsider” 
values that the tall tale criticized.  This laughter may not have felt at all 
pleasurable, despite Cox’s argument, but it was a counter-move to regain self-
control against the social control exerted by the teller of the tall tale.  That social 
control consisted of an awe-inspiring power to set community values and allocate 
community resources on the frontier.  Insiders “got it,” in more ways that one.  
Outsiders did not. 
Twain made several important changes to this basic social machinery 
when he engineered his “Petrified Man” and “Empire City Massacre” hoaxes for 
the Enterprise.  He was clearly familiar with Poe’s hoaxes, as we saw above in the 
excised balloon chapter from Life on the Mississippi, and though he was born just 
a few months after the publication of Locke’s “Moon Hoax,” he had undoubtedly 
heard of it by the time he worked on the Enterprise.  Perhaps he even read it; the 
first re-issue of the hoax, in an edition by William Griggs, was published in New 
York in 1852 just a few months before Twain moved to New York City.  Twain 
knew that, in order to fly, hoaxes needed an “unfair pretense at truth” that the 
ephemeral orality of the tall tale could not quite produce.  This “pretense” entailed 
appearing in print, in a news medium that people relied on exclusively for 
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knowledge of what was going on outside their small Western town.  It also 
entailed the adoption of standard dialect and all the formal features encapsulated 
in readers’ Popsci. expectations (Rourke 2:6), as opposed to the vernacular dialect 
and narrative form of the tall tale.  The print media offered both anonymity and 
distance that the telling of a tall tale could not; these mechanisms were crucial for 
slowing down any “facts” that might filter, through conversation between readers, 
into the workings of the hoax and grind its gears to a halt.  A hoax also 
presupposed a level of publicity that the oral modality of the tall tale could not 
possibly achieve, thus increasing and speeding the diffusion of the hoax through 
multiple readerships and aggrandizing the reputation of its author (Kaufer 411, 
416).  In short, Twain knew a hoax worked its effect by pretending two things in 
one—pretending to be a “real” news story, thereby pretending that the events it 
reported had really happened.  A tall tale simply pretended that the events it 
related were real—and sometimes it lost even that pretense with all its 
exaggerations for humorous effect. 
A good tinkerer, Twain adapted the mechanics of the tall tale to suit his 
purposes.  A tall tale produced an awareness of outsider status and perhaps a 
chance to reassert self-determination through the distancing function of laughter.  
A hoax, on the other hand, could create something more.  While the victim of a 
tall tale could learn little other than that s/he did not fit in on the frontier, the 
victim of a hoax could learn a lot more because his/her assumptions about science 
and the real world were the real target.  This was Twain’s design when he set out 
to “kill the petrifaction mania with a delicate, a very delicate satire” in the 
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“Petrified Man,” and when he set out to expose the dividend-cooking mining 
companies in the “Empire City Massacre.”  The hoax offers an opportunity to 
open readers’ eyes to potentially dangerous assumptions they make about a 
particular social institution. 
The hoax accomplishes this in the moment the reader perceives the gap, 
the lack, between what s/he has assumed and what the state of the art really is.  It 
is a moment of embarrassment, in the “pregnant” root sense of the word—the 
moment when everyone else can see publicly what you know privately about 
yourself.  If this moment of embarrassment is produced by an awareness of 
ignorance about a subject—science or economics, for instance, an educative 
potential to the hoax experience emerges.  The distancing effect of laughter, in 
addition to reasserting self-control, can also express a desire for self-education as 
insulation against further attempts by others to control you through illusions.  This 
instructive moment of embarrassment is very similar to the moment that 
Socrates’s dialectic partners came to realize the gap of inconsistency between 
beliefs they entertained simultaneously—the elenchus. 
What is particularly interesting is that there is some evidence that Twain 
was familiar with the elenchus as a dialectic method.  While there is no direct 
evidence that he read Plato, he avidly enjoyed Voltaire, who channeled a great 
deal of Platonic dialectic into French common-sense criticism.  Voltaire and 
Twain, in fact, are considered together as founders of the Freethinkers movement, 
an atheist movement beginning in the 18th century that now is usually labeled 
secular humanism.  Voltaire’s works contain dialectic passages similar to Socratic 
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dialogues, where a naïve questioner is made by a master dialectician to admit the 
inconsistency of his/her assumptions.  One of these passages can be found in 
Candide where Martin and Candide debate the jaded critical attitude of 
Pococurante, and Martin brings Candide to elenchus by pointing out an 
inconsistent belief he entertains—that Pococurante experiences pleasure by never 
having pleasure (Voltaire 139).  In 3,000 Years Among the Microbes, Twain 
constructs a very similar dialectic between Huck and a clergyman over the issue 
of animals having souls.  The clergyman begins: 
“What is a creature?” 
“That which has been created.” 
“That is broad; has it a restricted sense?” 
“Yes.  The dictionary adds, ‘especially a living being.’” 
“Is that what we commonly mean when we use the word?” 
“Yes.” 
“Is it also what we always mean when we use it without a qualifying 
adjective?” 
“Yes.”  ( 496) 
And the dialectic continues until the clergyman forces Huck to see that he 
already believes all living beings, germs included, have souls because Huck does 
not distinguish “life” from “animation,” or soul-possession. 
The question arises, then, if Twain was bringing his readers’ 
understanding of the world to an elenchus, a null state of internal contradiction, 
why was he doing it?  What did he hope to accomplish with his readers by 
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entering into this dialectic with them in “The Petrified Man”?  Joan Belcourt Ross 
argues that Twain wanted his readers to “see themselves true,” to realize they 
were all the victims of hoaxes perpetrated not only by scientists, but by the 
church, by politicians, by Twain’s favorite flogging-horse, Christian Science, etc. 
(Ross 189).  Pascal Covici makes the same point slightly differently:  "The hoax-
as-satire becomes especially important in Twain's works when it serves to reveal 
the hidden truth about the reader himself.  Ourselves in particular, not people in 
general, are stripped of pretensions and made to stand self-revealed by Twain's 
most effective hoaxes" (159).   
This goal as expressed by Ross and Covici is essentially a negative one.  It 
argues for a deconstructive laughter that tears down the “wonder-business” of 
popular science but builds no belief structure in its place.  This is the sort of 
laughter that follows a Poe hoax, as Poe had no vested interest in improving the 
lives of the people he fooled with his hoaxes (Rourke 6:3). 
But Twain’s hoaxes are not like Poe’s.  Twain states a social goal from the 
beginning of “The Petrified Man,” and that is to snap his readers’ out of their 
googly-eyed fascination with paleontology while “touching up” the local coroner, 
to boot.  If Twain was shaking up his readers’ perceptions of reality, what did he 
want to put in place of their illusions, if anything? 
Constance Rourke in her study of Twain’s humor writes, “It is a mistake 
to look for the social critic—even manqué—in Mark Twain. In a sense the whole 
American comic tradition had been that of social criticism: but this had been 
instinctive and incomplete, and so it proved to be in Mark Twain” (7:2).  Rourke, 
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like Ross, sees Twain deconstructing the edifices in which his readers put their 
trust but refusing to inculcate them with his own values, tell them what to believe 
now.  In fact, however, Twain was very vocal about what he thought Americans 
should believe.  We have already seen his praise of working men over college 
boys in An American Claimant.  He dedicated a book to exposing what he felt to 
be the fraudulent claims of Mary Baker Eddy in Christian Science.  And, he 
championed democracy against hereditary systems of power in Huckleberry Finn, 
An American Claimant, and Connecticut Yankee.  In Following the Equator, he 
decried both missionaries and American Imperialism, arguing for the fundamental 
right to self-determination of all nations on earth.   
This last was the social arena in which Twain was most active.  He was 
Vice President of the Anti-Imperialist league from 1901 until his death in 1910 
and a vocal opponent of both the Spanish-American and the Philippine-American 
wars, especially the brutal use to which technology was put in them.  His essay 
for the North American Review in 1901, “To the Person Sitting in Darkness,” was 
a scathing review of “the missionary question” in the wake of the Boxer Rebellion 
in China.  In it Twain denounces the use of American technology to extend 
American dominance over less industrialized nations under the guise of 
missionary activity: 
Shall we? That is, shall we go on conferring our Civilization upon 
the peoples that sit in darkness, or shall we give those poor things a rest? 
Shall we bang right ahead in our old-time, loud, pious way, and commit 
the new century to the game; or shall we sober up and sit down and think 
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it over first? Would it not be prudent to get our Civilization-tools together, 
and see how much stock is left on hand in the way of Glass Beads and 
Theology, and Maxim Guns and Hymn Books, and Trade-Gin and 
Torches of Progress and Enlightenment (patent adjustable ones, good to 
fire villages with, upon occasion), and balance the books, and arrive at the 
profit and loss, so that we may intelligently decide whether to continue the 
business or sell out the property and start a new Civilization Scheme on 
the proceeds? (2)  
The essay created such a media firestorm, according to Jim Zwick, that 
one prominent Massachusetts editor claimed, "Mark Twain has suddenly become 
the most influential anti-imperialist and the most dreaded critic of the sacrosanct 
person in the White House that the country contains.”  The backlash affected 
Twain significantly.  What is today considered Twain’s most powerful piece of 
anti-war literature, the “War Prayer,” a black satire of the glories of war 
reminiscent of Stephen Crane’s “War is Kind,” was considered so incendiary by 
Twain’s biographer, Albert Bigelow Paine, that he urged Twain to suppress it; it 
was only published posthumously, during World War I. 
Certainly, this late-life political cause against the connection between 
American technology and American imperialism cannot be read back onto 
Twain’s early hoaxing, like “The Petrified Man,” but it reflects the reaching of a 
state of critical mass of a concern that is present in that seminal hoax, present 
throughout all of Twain’s writings—self-determination.  If Twain had one 
absolute belief, consistently evident in his thinking, it was in the right of a human 
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being to decide his/her own destiny.  Twain’s hoaxes gave readers a chance, 
through the social mechanics of laughter, to stand apart from their old 
preconceptions and choose a new path. 
Lest we think of Twain as the champion of free-thinking, however, it is 
important to point out that Twain also recognized the powerful mechanics of 
control inherent in the hoax.  If the reader wished to be an “insider” like the 
author, then the hoax could instigate the kind of laughter that desired 
identification, an education in insider-hood, a distancing of the self from the old 
self-image, and a realignment with the values of the author and his insider group.  
Warwick Wadlington finds exactly this dynamic active in Twain’s satiric travel 
narrative Innocents Abroad.  In The Confidence Game in American Literature, 
Wadlington takes issue with James Cox, who says that Twain hoped to use his 
readers’ laughter to  “set the reader free” from her misconceptions.  Wadlington 
finds instead that Twain wished to shatter his readers’ habitual epistemologies and 
then reshape their worlds as Twain saw them.  “The really pertinent test of 
sincerity in the book’s rhetorical system is whether or not a given Twain 
performance accomplishes the twofold end of relieving excitable feelings and 
achieving authority over the reader" (195).   Twain’s hoaxes can be viewed as 
another rhetorical means to this end. 
Twain in his last years had a clear view of the social mechanics of 
laughter.  In “The Mysterious Stranger,” he has Little Satan describe laughter as a 
technology—a powerful social weapon: 
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…for your race in its poverty, has unquestionably one really effective 
weapon—laughter.  Power, money, persuasion, supplication, 
persecution—these can lift at a colossal humbug—push it a little—weaken 
it a little, century by century; but only laughter can blow it to rags and 
atoms at a blast.  Against the assault of laughter nothing can stand.  You 
are always fussing and fighting with your other weapons.  Do you ever use 
that one?  No; you leave it lying rusting.  As a race, do you ever use it at 
all?  No, you lack sense and the courage (88). 
Twain may truly have wished for his readers to use this weapon to blast 
away the hoaxes being foisted on them by the American technological and 
imperial industries and “see themselves true,” reassert control over their own 
lives.  Or, he may have wished to use this laughter to break down his readers’ 
value systems and replace them with his own—with the value of self-
determination paramount over all.  By times, maybe he used laughter toward both 
of those ends.  But what is clear is that the social mechanics of the rhetoric he 
chose when he faced his readers in “The Petrified Man” were more than powerful 













Chapter Four:  The Hoaxes of Dan De Quille—Building and 
Defending the West 
Dan De Quille’s scientific media hoaxing was deeply conditioned by both 
Poe’s and Twain’s hoaxes but was ultimately a different project from theirs.   Poe 
did not have Western pioneer readers—fiercely independent men and women who 
prided themselves on making up their own minds (sometimes independently of 
the facts), who were suspicious of outsider commercial interests, and who were in 
general ignorant of science but intimately familiar with mining technologies.  And 
even though Twain and De Quille shared these readers, Twain could not relate to 
them at the level that De Quille did.  De Quille admired his “stubborn old 
comstockers” (“Quille Drops”).  After all, he had been a miner himself for several 
years before turning to journalism, and he stayed in Nevada for almost 30 years 
after Twain went back East.  His empathy with his readers permitted De Quille to 
simultaneously gull them and immortalize them as America’s new folk heroes 
through his hoaxes.   His pride in the character of the American prospector 
coupled with his love of science and technology made De Quille’s hoaxing 
historically unique.  Enamored by the tremendous potential of the hoax to 
construct realities, Dan De Quille used the four major and several minor scientific 
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media hoaxes he wrote from 1865 to 1880 to create and defend his ideal West and 
Westerners from Eastern commercial appropriation. 
1.  RHETORICAL EDUCATION 
Dan De Quille is somewhat of a mysterious character, only a fraction 
having been written about his life compared with the volumes penned on his 
famous colleague on the Territorial Enterprise, Mark Twain.  Richard Dwyer and 
Richard Lingenfelter have produced the most recent and extensive biography of 
De Quille (1990), amplifying Lawrence Berkove’s excellent biography in his 
1988 edition of De Quille’s novella Dives and Lazarus.  In both of these portraits, 
De Quille appears as a cluster of contradictions:  a devoted and supportive father 
and husband, who nonetheless left his family for nearly forty years to prospect 
and write in the West; a reputedly genial and non-confrontational friend, who was 
also known to pick fights in bars for practically no reason; a dedicated journalist, 
by all contemporary reports the workhorse of the Territorial Enterprise, who was 
fired at least twice from that paper for being too drunk to work for weeks at a 
stretch; and, a tolerant and well-read socio-political theorist, who turned out 
shockingly virile anti-Semitic and anti-Chinese statements in his later life. 
Dan De Quille was born William Wright on May 19, 1829, to a farming 
family in Knox County, Ohio.  When he was 18, the family relocated to West 
Liberty, Iowa, and shortly thereafter, William’s father died and left him largely 
responsible for his mother and eight younger siblings.  At the age of 24, he 
married Carolyn Coleman and had five children with her in four years, two of 
whom did not make it past infancy. 
 280 
Little is known about Wright’s early education other than evidence from 
his early letters that he was well-lettered.  He supposedly submitted stories to 
Eastern magazines, though there is no evidence that these were published  
(Wright The Big Bonanza  viii).  From his letters we know that he read widely in 
world literature; some of his favorites included Don Quixote, many of Dickens’s 
novels, the Arabian Nights, Ben Jonson, Jonathan Swift, James Fenimore Cooper, 
and Thomas Carlyle.  He quoted frequently from Shakespeare and the Bible 
(Wright Dives and Lazarus  30). 
In 1857 Wright left his family for the California/Nevada territories and 
gradually migrated to Virginia City in 1860, following rumors of new gold and 
silver claims.  He would not return to Iowa, except for a few brief visits, for 36 
years.  He wrote his sister Lou religiously; if he wrote his wife and young 
children, those letters are no longer extant.  Finally, his health broken, he returned 
to Iowa to live with his daughter in West Liberty for the last few years of his life.   
De Quille never managed to strike it rich as a placer miner and 
supplemented his income writing for several territorial newspapers of the 
“Sagebrush School,” including the Golden Era in San Francisco, the Engineering 
and Mining Journal, and, starting full-time in 1861, the Territorial Enterprise.  It 
was about this time that he began to sign his articles “Dan De Quille.”  Unlike 
Twain he used his nom de plume (pun intended by De Quille) exclusively until his 
death; most of his friends in the West knew him only by this name.  His colleague 
C. C. Goodwin punned on De Quille’s pseudonym in a sketch called “Dan and 
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His Quills” that also provides us with a sampling of De Quille’s journalistic 
repertoire: 
Across the table from us Dan De Quille is writing some of his 
abominable locals, and we have been studying his face.  Of late he has 
thrown away his pencils and procured old-fashioned quill pens….He 
writes ordinary locals with a turkey quill; for important affairs, like 
runaways and dog fights, he takes a goose quill; for obituary notices he 
keeps the plume of a raven; for mining reviews nothing will do but a 
swan’s quill; his scientific articles are fashioned by the quill of an owl; 
while for the dreadful legends which he strings together for Sunday’s 
Enterprise nothing will answer but a feather from the pinion of an eagle or 
an albatross (2). 
The Comstock, the region around Virginia City comprising the Comstock 
Lode and the towns that sprang up on it, provided a wealth of rhetorical 
opportunities for Dan De Quille.  Contrary to many assumptions, Virginia City 
was not just a shantytown.  Thanks to the largesse of citizens who had “struck it 
rich,” the boomtown of nearly 30,000 citizens possessed a full-fledged theater that 
put on Shakespeare plays, several musical venues, a newspaper vaunted as the 
best in the territory, a hotel that boasted the first elevator in the West, and social 
societies who put on lectures and balls.  Culturally and religiously, the Comstock 
was extremely diverse with Mormon, Catholic, and protestant Christian practices 
mixing and matching with the traditions of Jews, the Washoe and Piute Indians, 
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and the large Chinese population who immigrated to the area to work on the 
railroads and in the mines (Wright Dives and Lazarus  31).   
Newspaper clippings preserved in the Dan De Quille Papers at the 
Bancroft Library [BANC P-G 246], reveal that De Quille was curious about all of 
these different rhetorics and histories.21  He clipped extensively on Asian culture, 
tucking into his scrapbooks a few postcards with pictures from Indonesia; he also 
collected articles on mythologies of several cultures, especially Native American 
cultures, and various religious and supernatural items.  He also saved clippings on 
famous American authors, their personality traits, handwriting, and personal 
histories.  A particularly telling clipping for our purposes is a memoir of Poe 
clipped from the New York Times with mention of both “Hans Phaal” and the 
“Balloon-Hoax” (fldr. 42).   
These influences show up in both the topic and style of pieces De Quille 
wrote for the Enterprise and the Golden Era.  In his regular “Quille Drops” 
column he offered snapshots of the lifestyles of the many cultures living on the 
Comstock; occasionally, he even attempted to portray the dialects of the local 
prospectors, both White and Black, and those of the Washoe Indians and Chinese 
immigrants.  Since these dialect experiments were conducted both before and 
after his working acquaintance with Twain, it is hard to argue a cause-and-effect 
relationship between his dialect practices and Twain’s in Huckleberry Finn, etc.  
                                                 
21 All references to the De Quille papers in the body of the text are given 
parenthetically with the appropriate container numbers.  The full citation of the 
papers is found in the Bibliography. 
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Certainly, Twain’s transcriptions are more regular and phonetically realistic.  
Working with Twain, however, affected De Quille’s rhetoric in other ways.   
Twain and De Quille shared a room and a desk while working on the 
Enterprise, and they often helped each other out with stories—not just with topics, 
but also with argument structure and language.  In general the object was humor 
and sensation, as the local columns were either filled with gunfights or the 
detailed history of a passing haywagon, and either extreme of interest had to be 
accommodated by an attention-arresting style in order to keep the subscription of 
the paper up.  De Quille reminisced about trying to get Twain to multiply his 
textual hints for readers that the “Empire City Massacre” was a sham, and Twain 
waving him off with an, “It is all plain enough” (Wright Reporting 171).  It seems 
significant that De Quille, while he wrote many humorous articles, did not attempt 
a hoax until after Twain wrote the “Petrified Man” in 1862.  And when he did, 
with the “Silver Man” for the Golden Era in 1865, it was on a very similar topic—
a man found turned entirely to silver instead of stone.  But where Twain left off 
scientific hoaxing after his one experiment, De Quille went on to produce four 
major hoaxes and at least 12 other short, humorous squibs, all concerned 
completely with science and technology.  This predilection was in part due to De 
Quille’s well-deserved reputation as a serious, self-educated mining writer. 
2.  SCIENTIFIC EDUCATION 
De Quille claimed that Twain would have nothing to do with reporting 
science or geology at the Enterprise because he "hated to have to do with figures, 
measurements, and solid facts, such as were called for in matters pertaining to 
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mines and machinery" (Wright Reporting 171).  De Quille, on the other hand, 
could not get enough of them.  His papers are interspersed with back-of-the-
envelope calculations of shaft depths and mine production rates, and with 
sketched maps of the shafts of the Savage Mine and other big mines in the area.   
Twain and De Quille did about equal time as placer miners.  De Quille had 
no further formal scientific or technical education than did Twain.  However, the 
difference between the writers that Judith Yaross Lee notes in her article 
“(Pseudo-) Scientific Humor”—namely that Twain makes fun of science like an 
amateur and De Quille, like an expert—may have come down simply to a matter 
of interest.   
De Quille was fascinated by all things scientific, and especially by mining.  
Most of his clippings are on geologic, metallurgic, and mining matters.  He also 
kept up with news about climate and weather, chemistry, physics, astronomy, and 
“pseudoscientific” news about ESP and other psychic phenomena.  His papers 
contain a bulletin from the Society for Psychical Research calling for news about 
hallucinations, thought-transference, crystal vision, and automatic writing (ctn. 2).   
In addition to keeping up with general scientific news, De Quille also 
wrote extensively and seriously on mining.  Lawrence Berkove assesses De 
Quille’s career as a technical writer as follows:  "His reputation undoubtedly 
played an important part in establishing and maintaining the Enterprise as the 
dominant newspaper in mining circles.  Even much later in his life, his articles on 
mining were solicited and published by a variety of periodicals, including 
specialized mining journals" (16).  These journals included the Mining Industry 
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and Tradesman and the Engineering and Mining Journal, for whom De Quille 
wrote not only histories and reports of the mines in the Comstock Lode, but also 
mining culture articles about “dowsing,” or mineral-divining, and the “Tricks of 
Miners” ("Divining" 171; "Tricks" 618).  He was taken seriously by mining 
engineers at all levels.  His clippings contain several favorable reviews of a 
proposal he apparently drafted for an improved method of constructing canals.  
His magnum opus, The Big Bonanza:  An Authentic Account of the Discovery, 
History, and Working of the World-Renowned Comstock Lode of Nevada, was 
published in 1876 to universal accolades not only in the territories but also on the 
East Coast, and it is still considered the “bible” of Comstock mining history.  De 
Quille’s friend and colleague, editor Wells Drury, attested to De Quille’s 
preoccupation with mining journalism:   
…his conscience never swerved from the firm conviction that the true 
calling of a first-class newspaper is to publish items concerning prospects, 
locations, mines and mills, shafts, tunnels, drifts, ore developments, 
stopes, assays and bullion outputs.  All other matters to him appeared 
inconsequential and of no material interest.  If there was a murder, a 
sensational society episode or a political contest, any of them were 
welcome to space after his mining notes were provided for.  (211) 
Aside from his technical mining reports, De Quille also wrote popular 
science news in at least three distinct registers:  a “high style” formal technical 
manner, a “wonders of the world” style, and a humorous style.  His high register 
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can be typified by the following excerpt on assaying procedures from The Big 
Bonanza: 
In testing ores for silver, the miners in the early days used 
acids….The heavy residuum was then washed from the horn into a 
matrass (a flask of annealed glass, with a narrow neck and a broad 
bottom).  Nitric acid was then poured into the matrass until the matter to 
be tested was covered, when the flask was suspended over the flame of the 
candle or lamp and boiled until the fumes escaping (which are for a time 
red) came off white. (71) 
While the language is as simple as possible aside from the mining jargon, 
and the argumentation is linear and logical, the lack of clever commentary or 
word play is notable.  It is this authoritative style that cemented De Quille’s 
reputation as a trustworthy science writer, a reputation that became crucial to the 
reception of his hoaxes.  De Quille’s middle register adopts a bit of “mystery” or 
“wonders of the world” rhetoric, as in this clipping from an article written for the 
San Francisco Chronicle on animal magnetism:   
Some remarkable discoveries have been recently made by French 
physicians in regard to what they call the action of medicines at a 
distance…. 
How were all these mysterious effects produced, often without 
even external contact?  How could mercury blister the flesh through its 
tubes of glass and cloth envelopes?  How could a medicine, placed 
unknown under a person's pillow, cause salivation, with the accompany 
 287 
symptoms?  The substances were usually inclosed in paper, or in bottles, 
and many of them are odorless and cold send forth no effluvium to affect 
the patient's nerves.  The whole matter is profoundly mysterious. (ctn. 1, 
fldr. 50) 
De Quille’s humorous register was easily identifiable, as in this job 
description for the state mineralogist of Nevada, published in the Enterprise:  “He 
is to discover earthquakes and provide suitable means for the extermination of the 
same; also, for book agents, erysipelas, corn doctors, cerebro-spinal meningitis, 
and the Grecian bend” (ctn. 1, fldr. 8). 
The impact of De Quille’s many-layered scientific writing on his hoaxing 
is complex.  Clearly, if he often wrote humorous pieces, his readers knew him to 
be just as capable of spinning a yarn as giving them a “true” report of what was 
going on in the mines or what new natural marvel had been discovered in the 
Nevada territory.  To make matters worse, it appears De Quille regularly mixed 
modes in the same article.  C. Grant Loomis writes in his extensive survey of De 
Quille’s modes of journalism, “With no distinction between a true story or a 
fanciful one, he inserted the real and the false item into his daily public offering" 
(30).  Twain and De Quille both practiced this “padding” in their frantic attempts 
to fill their local columns by press time.  However, according to contemporary 
reports, this intermittent reinforcement only served to cement De Quille’s 
reputation as a scientific “savant” with his readership.  Attested De Quille’s friend 
C.C.  Goodwin, “…what he wrote, everybody believed implicitly.  This or that 
expert might make a report, and men would say, ‘He may have been mistaken.’  
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This or that owner of heavy shares might express his opinion, and men would say:  
‘Maybe his interests prejudice him.’  But everyone believed Dan" (214). 
In addition to his technical reputation, of course, De Quille’s extensive 
experience reading and writing technical rhetoric stood him in good stead when 
he began his hoaxing with “The Silver Man” in 1865.  Judith Yaross Lee 
summarizes the effect of his rhetorical knowledge:  "Dan De Quille knew enough 
science to fill his tales with incredible facts as well as convincing fantasies.  In 
consequence, the stories conveyed an authentic respect for scientific knowledge in 
general and a persuasive pride in his own explanation of the 'truth'" (144).  As we 
will see, De Quille’s hoaxes deliver a level of scientific “verisimilitude” both in 
terms of language and knowledge that rivals or perhaps even surpasses Poe’s.  De 
Quille stuck to what he knew from experience with his hoaxes—mines, 
chemicals, and minerals.  The prevalence of these topics in the everyday lives of 
his readers, coupled with his stand-up reputation as a science writer, made De 
Quille a formidable hoaxer. 
3.  DE QUILLE’S HOAXES 
“A Silver Man” was De Quille’s first "deliberate tall-tale creation" 
(Loomis 29).  G. Grant Loomis refers to these creations as “scientific tall tales” 
rather than hoaxes, an important difference in terminology that we will return to 
in the Discussion section of this chapter.  However, Loomis has made a careful 
assay of De Quille’s scientific “sells” or “quaints,” as the author referred to them.  
He found, in addition to the four major hoaxes considered in this chapter, 12 other 
minor squibs having to do with fantastic discoveries in geology, biology, or 
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paleontology, all completely made up, most appearing in the Territorial Enterprise 
between 1867 and 1878.  A complete list of these can be found in Loomis’s article 
“The Tall Tales of Dan De Quille.”  In addition to Loomis’s 12, I have found a 
copy of one other hoax and mention of three more—the “Mountain” or “Highland 
Alligator” hoax, which drew a letter from the famous fossil collector Edward 
Drinker Cope; a hoax remembered by C.C. Goodwin having to do with the 
“excessive” water in the Comstock mines being an offshoot aquifer of Lake 
Tahoe; a hoax Wells Drury reported about a perpetual-motion windmill; and, a 
hoax about a scientist hatching a live bird from a genetically engineered egg.  In 
this chapter we will focus on De Quille’s four most notorious hoaxes, along with 
Cope’s letter about the “Mountain Alligator.” 
3.1  "A Silver Man" (1865) 
As I have done in past chapters, I will use De Quille’s first hoax to set up 
the major topics and issues concerned with his reading of reader expectations 
about science news.  Then, we will consider his other major hoaxes and reader 
reactions to them before adjusting the filter of science reading expectations to 
reflect the milieu of De Quille’s hoaxing.  In some ways “Silver Man” is not the 
ideal hoax to begin with because, as C. Grant Loomis attests in his search for 
reprints in other papers after the publication date, “the story seems to have passed 
without any particular notice” (37), which is not the case with De Quille’s later 
hoaxes.  However, in this first hoax De Quille introduces all the rhetorical 
strategies he will continue to develop in his later hoaxes:  an “Emperor’s New 
Clothes” style of presuppository argument; emphasis on witness; argument for 
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plausibility via analogy; and, skillful exploitation of the codependence of doubt 
and belief.  He also uses a unique form of refutatio in which he monitors his 
readers’ interpretive process on-line, so to speak, and adjusts his arguments to 
cater to what he believes to be their highest-ranked expectations. 
“The Wonder of the Age:  A Silver Man” appeared in two long columns 
on pages three and four of the 5 February 1865 edition of the Golden Era, the San 
Francisco paper that first employed De Quille after his arrival in the territories.  
Two advertisements for the piece appeared on page one:  “The Marvelous ‘Silver 
Man’ is described by Dan De Quille in another column”; and, “Dan De Quille, the 
Sage Brush Humorist of Silver Land, discourses on a scientific subject with the 
spirit of a true savan.”  While these announcements have a coy tone, they may, 
first of all, have gone unnoticed by readers, sandwiched as they were down in the 
lowest columns of the first page; secondly, they may not have prejudiced readers 
against the truth of De Quille’s argument, since as argued earlier, he had been a 
contributor of mining news to the Golden Era for five years at this point, and his 
readers knew that he wrote both serious and humorous scientific news.  Therefore, 
readers were likely committed to judge for themselves at this stage, as De Quille 
himself expected them to (Lee 142). 
The entire story is too long to quote here, but it concerns a man found 
turned entirely to silver—all the way down to silver pyrite crystals encrusting the 
cavities in his bones and between his garments—down in the “Hot Springs Lead” 
deposit in a local mine.  De Quille begins with an argument for the credibility of 
the finding in spite of its incredible appearance.  He goes on to cite the individuals 
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involved in the discovery, to give the history of the lead deposit and the mine in 
which it was found, and to relate the details of the discovery itself.  The article 
finishes first with a statement that many witnesses have seen the “Silver Man” 
(which, unfortunately, was deteriorating so rapidly from oxidation that it would 
not be viewable much longer), and with a lengthy analogy to two similar findings, 
one in a Swedish mine, and one by a French chemist. 
Immediately, we recognize many familiar features of the hoax:  the “hot 
topic” of a mineralized human being in the midst of daily finds of fossils and 
petrifactions; the plausibility of the well-known location and the “Hot Springs 
Lead” deposit; the ethos leant by the witnesses and the foreign scientists; and, the 
minute details of the mineralization process.   However, De Quille uses some 
rhetorical strategies we have not analyzed in previous hoaxes.  We will consider 
each in roughly the order they are employed in the hoax.  For each, we will 
answer the question of how the choice of this strategy reflects De Quille’s mental 
model of his readers’ expectations. 
3.11 The “Emperor’s New Clothes” ploy 
De Quille opens the hoax with a presupposition that the silver man exists 
and his readers are already familiar with it:  “"Dear Era:--Everybody, no doubt, 
has heard of the discovery of the wonderful "Silver Man," found in a mine 
between Esmeralda and Owen's River” (3).  The use of the definite article to 
introduce “the discovery” and “the silver man” here, in contrast to the indefinite 
“A Silver Man” of the title, adds linguistic force to a presupposition of existence 
and publicity for the discovery.  Later in the story, De Quille employs a similar 
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strategy of presupposition.  "All who have the least knowledge of palaeontology 
know that all those wonderful remains of fishes, animals, etc., found in limestone 
and other rocks, and about which so much is said and written, are not the 
creatures themselves, but merely their shapes replaced by mineral substances"(4).  
De Quille, here, is constructing an audience of savants by using a “anyone who 
disagrees with these facts is necessarily ignorant” line of argument.   
The pressure on De Quille’s readers of this strategy is not immediately 
apparent unless we return to the self-sufficient Jacksonian pioneer that played the 
foil to the dupe of many a tall tale in Twain’s and De Quille’s era.  Just as the tall 
tale depended for its success on hapless outsiders trying to make a show of 
familiarity with their bizarre new environment in the West, De Quille is trying to 
force his pioneer readers to acquiesce to his argument by making the alternative to 
belief unpleasant—looking to everyone else like an un-savvy outsider.  It is the 
“Emperor’s New Clothes” strategy, where even though the emperor’s senses tell 
him he is naked, he would rather risk nakedness then a public show of his 
stupidity.  Similarly, De Quille’s pioneers would rather risk jumping to the wrong 
conclusion than being labeled an outsider.   
Support for De Quille’s attraction to this strategy comes from Neil 
Harris’s analysis of contemporary responses to P.T. Barnum’s hoaxes.  Harris 
explains, “Men priding themselves on their rationalist, scientific bent, familiar 
with the operation of novel machines, aware of the variety of nature, tended to 
accept as true anything which seemed to work--or seemed likely to work" (72).  
De Quille’s pioneers grew up in the same exciting era of industrial genesis and 
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possibility as Barnum’s viewers; most of them had lived in that technologically-
charged Eastern environment just a few years prior to reading De Quille’s articles.  
Accordingly, they may have felt the enormous social pressure that came with the 
Jacksonian territory, the pressure to appear self-sufficient or risk seeming un-
American.  Therefore, in situations where they knew themselves to be under-
educated, De Quille’s readers may have thought it best to make a show of 
competency.  De Quille seemed to be counting on his readers’ need to appear 
knowledgeable when he employed the “Emperor’s New Clothes” rhetoric to 
coerce belief in his hoax. 
3.12 Refutatio  
With the presuppository strategy, De Quille shows himself sensitive to 
what he believes is his readers’ desire to appear on top of the latest developments 
in science (related to their Novelty expectations).  With his unique refutatio 
strategy, he makes an argument that Plausibility is even more important to his 
readers.  Almost immediately in “Silver Man” he injects a rebuttal argument:    
Everybody, however, has not heard the full particulars of the 
discovery, and many will hoot the idea of any such discovery ever having 
been made. 
They will at once say that it is impossible for a human body to be 
changed to silver ore--Let them have their say! 
Although the story is almost too much for belief, yet I hope to be 
able to show, before finishing this account, that, startling as the assertion 
may appear, such a change in the substance of the human body is not only 
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possible, but that there is on record one well authenticated instance of a 
similar changing of a human body into a mass of ore. (3) 
Here, De Quille constructs readers who are not impressed by the sensation 
and novelty of the silver man but instead “hoot” at its “impossibility.”  He models 
for himself a “false” interpretive judgment they might have made in the face of 
the conflicting expectations of Novelty/Sensation and Plausibility.  To try to 
correct this “false” impression, De Quille reassures his readers he will indeed 
offer arguments through logic and real-world analogy that will satisfy their high-
ranked expectation of Plausibility.  Thus, his refutatio is a meta-rhetorical 
strategy, an attempt to persuade by intervening in the interpretive process—just as 
his hoax is an attempt to persuade through intervention in the process of science 
popularziation.  De Quille immediately proceeds to make an interesting variation 
of the “mystery” move from our antebellum hoaxes:   
We have had all kinds of astonishing discoveries.  Many things 
formerly classed among the impossibilities are now familiar, every-day 
possibilities.  We are now to acknowledge that it is not impossible for a 
human body to be changed—through contact in a mineral vein with 
solutions of certain salts, carbonic and hydrosulphuric gases, and the 
electrical currents induced by the reaction of said solutions upon each 
other—into a mass of sulphuret of silver. (3) 
Instead of the traditional “mystery” opening, this is an “anti-mystery” 
argument about the power of science to demystify what has previously seemed 
awesome and supernatural.  This rhetorical strategy is a marked change from the 
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rhetoric of the 1830s where science and mystery cooperated.  De Quille’s appeal 
to scientific fact and jargon (Plausibility, Popsci., and Detail) are time-honored 
strategies.  However, this time they are meant to reassure, not to overwhelm, his 
readers as miners were familiar with these compounds from the reactivity tests 
they routinely performed on ore to determine if it contained silver. 
It appears from this refutatio strategy that De Quille believed himself to be 
dealing with a readership that was less swayed by Novelty than by Plausibility.  
This conclusion is borne out by his next strategy, which is the establishment of 
multiple witnesses to the discovery. 
3.13 Witness 
De Quille provides copious witnesses to the silver man, but these do not 
provide the same sort of ethos provided by De Quille’s attention to his readers’ 
Foreign expectations in the article, i.e., the name-dropping of the foreign Swedish 
mine where a man was found turned to copper and the French geochemist de 
Senarmont.  Instead, Kuhlman and the miners who discover the silver man in De 
Quille’s story, along with the “scientific friend” of Kuhlman’s in Aurora, the 
viewers of the silver man, and De Quille himself, who saw a button of silver 
produced from the silver man—these locals provide a vicarious experience of 
witness for the hoax’s readers. 
Newsreaders counted on journalists to bear witness to things the readers 
themselves did not have access to, and thus to construct for them much of the 
world that spread beyond the realm of their senses.  This was doubly true in De 
Quille’s milieu, where pioneers did not have readily available to them 
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independent sources for confirming or denying the truth of what was printed in 
the newspapers.  This coerced trust between reader and journalist helps explain 
some of the personal animosity that is still directed toward hoaxers today when 
their hoaxes are exposed.  What is at stake is not just the journalist lying; the 
world the reader has been living in suddenly does not hold true. 
De Quille seemed to sense the importance of vicarious witness because he 
anchored the truth of the “silver man” to the experiences of character types his 
readers would trust—local miners, journalists, and scientists.  As in birdwatching, 
De Quille knew it took more that just his witness of the silver man to make it exist 
for his readers. 
3.14 Analogy 
Throughout the “Silver Man,” but especially in the later sections, De 
Quille makes arguments for the plausibility of the silver man by analogy.  He 
harps at some length upon the analogy of several Swedish miners found turned to 
copper.  (Odds are good he fabricated this analog, making the “Silver Man” in 
actuality a sort of Russian nesting-doll of hoaxes.)  He also mentions, as quoted 
above, the fossilization of fishes and other animals, a process similar to the 
mineralization of the silver man which De Quille knew his readers would find 
familiar.  He finishes with an analogy to crystallization processes studied by M. 
de Senarmont, an actual French chemist. 
Argument by analogy was one of the original components of Popsci.  
However, Analogy takes on additional significance given a new reading context:  
the conditions of life on the frontier.  Anyone who has spent any time in the West 
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knows (!) that the majority of place names are analogies to forms or places in the 
homelands of the pioneers; thus, you have New England, and Glasgow, Montana, 
and Paris, Texas.  Geologic forms are also usually named for what they 
resemble—camels or wagons or breasts.22  Naming by analogy is a way to reduce 
the complexity and threat of a foreign environment.  By relying on analogs as a 
central proof in the “Silver Man,” De Quille counted on his readers to use the 
same epistemological strategy when considering his hoax as they did in their 
everyday lives on the frontier—and to use it to his advantage. 
3.15 Codependence of Belief and Doubt 
De Quille makes a move in “Silver Man” that seems odd at first if we 
assume that his first priority is to present a seamless hoax.  He acknowledges his 
readers’ doubt by admitting his own, albeit on minor points of the narrative.  In 
describing the silver man, De Quille writes, "The body is supposed to be, and 
doubtless is, that of an Indian; but in its present changed state it is impossible to 
be certain on that point” (3).  He reintroduces the impossibility of proving the 
“Silver Man” a bonafide artifact at the end of the story: 
I might say much more in proof not only of the fact of a human 
body so changed having been found, but of the simple and natural causes 
which have operated to produce a change which at the first glance appears 
so wonderful; however, as many would not believe, even though I should 
                                                 
22 The obvious shortage of landforms named for male sex organs, in spite 
of the abundance of glaringly suggestive opportunities in the West, raises a naïve 
but still interesting connection between strange landscapes and gendered Others 
who must be feared and dominated. 
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produce the body and melt it up into buttons before their very eyes, I 
refrain. (4) 
De Quille’s rhetoric of doubt and belief here conflates the two at every 
turn.  First, he uses the word  “doubtless,” which introduces his readers’ “doubt” 
even as it implies they should be sure of what De Quille reports.  He argues twice 
for the impossibility of proving the silver man genuine, but the somewhat 
sarcastic reason he provides is that some of his readers would doubt no matter 
what ironclad proof he offered them.  In this way, De Quille cleverly constructs a 
believing readership on the “Emperor’s New Clothes” paradigm again, this time 
by providing a negative model for their interpretive behavior:  in paraphrase, 
“Only ignorant readers masquerading as skeptics could still doubt this story.”  
And no one wants to be in that crowd.  Because there is no extant reader reaction 
to the “Silver Man” hoax, we cannot gauge the extent to which readers responded 
to De Quille’s manipulations of belief and doubt in this hoax, but De Quille’s 
focus on these techniques testifies to his belief, as a member of his own 
readership, in their effectiveness. 
In addition to the “Emperor’s New Clothes” game with belief and doubt, 
De Quille is making an argument about the fundamental codependence of these 
interpretive modes, one which finds resonance across mid-nineteenth-century 
American culture, according to Neil Harris.  Harris argues that P.T. Barnum’s 
hoaxes succeeded because Americans knew just enough science to make them 
insecure about how much they really knew:   
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American experience with science and technology was crucial to 
the hoaxing attempts, but this experience led not to less credulity but to 
more.  A vital factor in the success of the hoaxes was national skepticism 
itself.  Men accustomed to examining the truth or validity of every person, 
idea, object or act presented to them—as Americans proverbially were—
became easy targets for pseudoscientific explanations, for detailed 
descriptions of fictional machinery, for any fantasy that was couched in 
the bland neutrality of a technological vocabulary. (72) 
In other words, doubt actually fostered belief in the presence of sufficient social 
pressure to appear a man or woman of independent judgment.  Harris argues this 
constant tension between doubt and belief, i.e. skepticism, provided an almost 
erotic thrill to the viewers of Barnum’s hoaxes—an illicit determination of one’s 
own reality without the sanction of authorities or institutions. 
Harris points out, as we discussed in Chapter Two with respect to Poe’s 
and Locke’s hoaxing, that “the exposure of sham was the negative image of the 
practical joke, and both appealed to the same sensibility.  Many deceivers were 
also exposers, since the two processes fed public fascination for information and 
detail” (82).  Edgar Allan Poe revealed Maelzel’s Chess Automaton to be a fake 
but went on to write his own hoax (“Von Kempelen and His Discovery”) about 
the family who had built the automaton in Europe.  Richard Adams Locke 
publicly exposed one of Barnum’s hoaxes in the Sun not long after concocting his 
own “Moon Hoax.”   
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The motions of concealment and exposure, and the motions of belief and 
doubt, share the same epistemological arc between the unknown and the judging 
mind, between the data of the senses and the evaluation of that data.  On the 
receiving end, that arc could be described just as De Quille defined the 
responsibility of his readers, “deciding for themselves.”  On the authorial end, that 
arc is the sheer pleasure of using words to construct realities for a public kept 
constantly at a distance by those words from firsthand experience of those 
realities.  This was De Quille’s game, and he refined it over the next 35 years 
through the publication of three more major hoaxes. 
3.2  “Solar Armor” (1874) 
 On 2 July 1874 a story appeared in the Enterprise about the 
untimely death of a Nevada inventor.  Entitled “Sad Fate of An Inventor,” it 
described an invention gone horribly awry: 
A gentleman who has just arrived from the borax fields of the 
desert regions surrounding the town of Columbus, in the eastern part of 
this State, gives us the following account of the sad fate of Mr. Jonathan 
Newhouse, a man of considerable inventive genius.  Mr. Newhouse had 
constructed what he called a “solar armor,” an apparatus intended to 
protect the wearer from the fierce heat of the sun in crossing deserts and 
burning alkali plains.  The armor consisted of a long, close-fitting jacket 
made of common sponge and a cap or hood of the same material; both 
jacket and hood being about an inch in thickness.  Before starting across a 
desert this armor was to be saturated with water.  Under the right arm was 
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suspended an India rubber sack filled with water and having a small gutta 
percha tube leading to the top of the hood.  In order to keep the armor 
moist, all that was necessary to be done by the traveler, as he progressed 
over the burning sands, was to press the sack occasionally, when a small 
quantity of water would be forced up and thoroughly saturate the hood and 
the jacket below it.  Thus, by the evaporation of the moisture in the armor, 
it was calculated might be produced almost any degree of cold.  Mr. 
Newhouse went down to Death Valley, determined to try the experiment 
of crossing that terrible place in his armor.  He started out in to the valley 
one morning from the camp nearest its borders, telling the men at the 
camp, as they laced his armor on his back, that he would return in two 
days.  The next day an Indian who could speak but a few words of English 
came to the camp in a great state of excitement.  He made the men 
understand that he warned them to follow him.  At the distance of about 
twenty miles out into the desert the Indian pointed to a human figure 
seated against a rock.  Approaching they found it to be Newhouse still in 
his armor.  He was dead and frozen stiff.  His beard was covered with frost 
and—though the noonday sun poured down its fiercest rays—in icicle 
over a foot in length hung from his nose. There he had perished miserably, 
because his armor had worked but too well, and because it was laced up 
behind where he could not reach the fastenings. (ctn. 1, fldr. 120) 
This hoax has the full-fledged form of a news article.  It starts with a 
summary of the “sad fate” of the inventor and then moves to the details of the 
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story—the who, what, when, where, why and how.  It finishes with an analysis of 
how the death must have transpired.  Terse and to the point, it avoids a great deal 
of the rhetorical flights of the “mystery” openings and “benefits to mankind” 
conclusions that the 1835 hoaxes and science articles exhibited.  As evidenced by 
De Quille’s science writings about dowsing and other “mysterious” phenomena, 
science now provided natural explanations for many things that had theretofore 
seemed supernatural or mysterious.  This may account for the stripping of the 
grandiose language from hoaxes written after 1865.  However, science and nature 
also presented pioneers with many experiences and objects that were beyond the 
pale of their experiences back East.  De Quille definitely exploited this 
“supernatural” aspect of scientific inquiry when presenting a man freezing to 
death in a roasting desert. 
De Quille includes many scientific details about the solar armor that 
would satisfy readers Detail expectations as well as their Plausibility expectations, 
like the careful description of the pump apparatus.  As Poe did with his balloon, 
De Quille walks readers through the workings of the pump rhetorically to actually 
create a working pump in their imagination.  He adds to these appeals the appeal 
of local eyewitnesses in the forms of prospectors, again, and an Indian.  Readers’ 
Novelty and Sensation requirements are certainly satisfied in the irony of death by 
freezing in Death Valley. 
The most interesting aspect of this hoax, however, is its reprinting history.  
The story was copied widely, and we have many of these reprints thanks to De 
Quille scrapbooking them and mentioning specific reprinting papers and dates.  
 303 
He wrote to his sister Lou Wright on 23 August 1874, “My story of the man who 
was frozen to death by a solar armor of his own invention was illustrated in one of 
the Eastern pictorials.  It was not well done, however.  The artist made a horrible 
looking beast of poor Woodhouse.  The Scientific American thought enough of 
that sell to copy it, it being somewhat in their line” (3).  The Scientific American 
reprint De Quille refers to here was on 25 July 1874.  The editors’ introduction to 
the story, titled “Sad Fate of a Nevada Inventor” was rather coy:  “The coolest and 
most refreshing item we have read since the commencement of the heated term 
lately appeared in the Virginia City (Nevada) Enterprise” (51).  However, the 
editors went on to reprint the story almost verbatim, and it appeared not on the 
first page, where jokes and anecdotes usually appeared, but on page 51 alongside 
engravings of a new “Apparatus for Transplanting Trees” as well as a description 
of “A New Alkaloid from Morphine” and an innovative air-conditioning system 
used in the House of Commons in London.   
We know the story was also reprinted in several New York papers, 
including the Sun, for which De Quille was a regular Western correspondent.  De 
Quille’s colleague at the Enterprise, C.C. Goodwin, reported that De Quille 
received a copy of the London Times in the mail with a copy of the “Solar 
Armor” story in it, including recommendations by the editor that the British Army 
consider the armor for equipping its soldiers in India and other hot climates 
(Goodwin  216).  Goodwin claimed that De Quille bracketed the story with an 
elaborate picture of a man thumbing his nose (reminiscent of the posture of 
Twain’s “Petrified Man” !) and mailed the paper back to the English science 
 304 
writer.  Delancey Ferguson discredits Goodwin’s report because, according to his 
research, the hoax never made it to the Times (193).  However, Ferguson checked 
the Times for 1862, the year of Twain’s hoax, and not 1874, the year of the “Solar 
Armor” hoax.  The story does indeed appear in the London Times on 27 July 
1874 under the title “Too Successful” with no editorial criticism.  However, this 
article makes no mention of using the solar armor for British troops. 
The London Daily Telegraph for 3 August 1874 reprinted the story, and it 
is worthwhile considering their editor’s comments because they become the 
catalyst for De Quille’s next installment of the hoax.  The Daily Telegraph editor 
prefaces the story with a brief description of Virginia City and the scalding desert 
to the east of it, which makes “men—and even wagons, with their teams of from 
eight to sixteen mules or oxen—to sink overwhelmed with heat and thirst when an 
effort is made to cross this desert in summer.”  This description seems to validate 
Newhouse’s ultimately tragic quest for a “solar armor” to combat the heat.  
However, the Daily Telegraph finishes with this evaluation:   
The marvelous stories which come from ‘the plains’ are apt to be 
received with incredulity by our transatlantic kinsmen who dwell upon the 
Eastern seaboard of the United States.  We confess that, although the fate 
of Mr. Newhouse is related by the Western journal au grand serieux, we 
should require some additional confirmation before we unhesitatingly 
accept it.  But every one who has iced a bottle of wine by wrapping a wet 
cloth round it and putting it in a draught, must have noticed how great is 
the cold that evaporation of moisture produces.  For these reasons we are 
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disposed to accept the tale from Virginia City in the same frame of mind 
which Herodotus, the Father of History, usually assumed when he 
repeated some marvel that had reached him—that is to say, we are neither 
prepared to disbelieve it wholly nor to credit it without question. (ctn. 1, 
fldr. 120) 
The editor for the Daily Telegraph lets us glimpse the competition 
between his expectations that leads to a suspension of judgment.  First, he cites 
the “marvelous” quality of the story in a negative light.  His comments may 
reference a shift in attitude about the Sensation expectation since 1835:  namely, 
as the English have gained far more control over their environment through 
science and technology than have American pioneers, Sensation might actually 
acquire a negative valence for the English popular scientific press, since 
sensational events resist the control and logical consistency of a scientific 
epistemology.  It is of course impossible to know the connotations of the editor’s 
use of “marvelous,” but the latter suggestion deserves further inquiry. 
In addition to the negative light of “marvelous,” the editor cites the 
dubious authority of newspapers from ‘the plains’ as a weak point of the story 
(Medium).  However, he goes on to counterbalance these negative points with the 
conformity of the story to Popsci. expectations, “au grand serieux.”  He adds to 
the positive column a supporting analogy of cooling by evaporation (Plausibility).  
“For these reasons,” the writer concludes, the Daily Telegraph suspends its 
judgment.  The editor’s interpretive activity can be represented graphically as in 
Table 20: 
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Table 20:  Editor’s suspended judgment about “Solar Armor” hoax 
 Sensation (-) Medium (-) Popsci. Plausibility 
True * *   
False   * * 
If the editor had made a judgment, we would have an indication of which 
expectations mattered more to him; a check mark would appear by “True” or 
“False” to indicate his decision.  As it is, the suspension of judgment tells us that 
sensationalism, the reputation of the medium, the conformation of the article to 
Popsci. conventions, and the plausibility of the topic are all equally ranked in his 
view; this lack of ranking is indicated by dotted lines.  Accordingly, the violations 
add up to a tie, at two for each candidate interpretation (“true” or “false”).  If the 
editor committed to believing the story, he would have to violate his usual 
assumption that sensationalism is untrustworthy (here, I am testing out the 
negative-valence Sensation, or Sensation [-]); he would also have to violate his 
usual assumption that the Enterprise lied.  On the other hand, if he committed to 
believing the story false, he would have to violate the demonstrated scientific 
plausibility of cooling by evaporation, and he would have to violate his usual 
assumption that if an article sounded like a genuine science article, “au grand 
serieux,” that it indeed was.  Faced with this stalemate, the writer indicates that he 
is waiting for more information, which might add the crucial violation or two that 
would shift the balance in favor of either a true or false interpretation.   
He might have had stronger feelings that would have swayed the ranking 
of expectations if the decision mattered more to him, if he had been a miner or 
inventor in Nevada rather than an editor in England.  As David Kaufer and 
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Kathleen Carley point out in their study of the social dynamics of print, major 
factors in the acceptance of printed claims include a desire to engage with the 
author through the text, and a sense of cognitive similarity with the text and 
author (300).  The editor lacked both of these dynamics, and so his interpretation 
of the story would have been very different than if he lived in Nevada, felt 
similarity with the characters in the “Solar Armor” story and with Dan De Quille, 
and felt he owed it to himself or someone else to make a decision about the truth 
value of the story. 
De Quille used this editor’s doubts as a springboard to launch the second 
installment of his hoax, “A Mystery Explained.—The Sequel to the Strange Death 
of Jonathan Newhouse, the Inventor of the Solar Armor.”  The sequel, a strategy 
perhaps suggested by Mark Twain’s sequel to “Petrified Man,” appeared in the 
Enterprise on 30 August 1874.  In it De Quille presents the Daily Telegraph editor 
as a doubter: 
…as the truth of our narration appears to be called in question, if not 
directly at least impliedly, by a paper which enjoys the largest circulation 
of any daily newspaper in the world, we feel that it is but right that we 
should make public some further particulars in regard to the strange 
affair—particulars which throw a flood of light upon what, we must admit, 
did appear almost incredible in our account of the sad occurrence as 
published.  It seemed strange that so great a degree of cold could be 
produced simply by the evaporation of water, but it now appears that it 
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was not water—at least not water alone—that was used by the unfortunate 
gentleman. (ctn. 1, fldr. 120) 
De Quille continues to focus his appeal on scientific plausibility and 
internal consistency here (Plausibility and Internal Coherence).  Sensation and 
Novelty wear off quickly; a month after the first installment of “Solar Armor,” 
their effects must have been greatly diminished if not vanished altogether.  
(Eye)Witness and Plausibility are what count now, and De Quille provides these 
in spades.  He claims that David Baxter, the Coroner at Salt Wells, performed an 
inquest on the body of Jonathan Newhouse and goes on to list all of Newhouse’s 
statistics, including place of birth.  The text of the inquest, inferred rather than 
quoted, is a metonym De Quille uses to argue for the reality of the “Solar Armor”; 
i.e., the coroner’s report exists and is true, so by extension the “Solar Armor” 
must exist.  De Quille would develop this strategy of textual witness even further 
in his last two hoaxes.   
Next in the sequel, De Quille produces more witnesses—prospectors at the 
camp from which Newhouse began his fateful walk.  These men apparently found 
a satchel of Newhouse’s that contained chemicals that intensified the evaporation 
within his solar armor, thus freezing him to death.  Several of the witnesses 
reported frostbite on their hands from handling the body.  The Coroner 
supposedly tells De Quille that he is sending the chemicals on to the Academy of 
Sciences at San Francisco (a genuine organization) for analysis.  De Quille wraps 
up, however, with his signature performance of doubt.  “Whether or not he has 
done so we cannot say.  For several weeks we have closely watched the reports of 
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the proceedings of the learned body named, but as yet have seen no mention made 
of either the chemicals or the armor.” 
This article spawned a new flurry of reprinting on the East Coast as papers 
responded both to the Daily Telegraph criticism and to De Quille’s new 
installment.  The New York Sun defended itself for having publishing the first 
installment in good faith by now reprinting the “additional proof” of the coroner’s 
report on 17 September 1874 (ctn. 1, fldr. 120).  The New York World took a 
slightly cagier approach.  It started off, “About two months ago the Virginia City 
Enterprise, of Nevada, a journal that so ingeniously mingles fact with fiction that 
its readers are never weary of exclaiming, ‘Well, I wonder!’ related the incidents 
connected with the demise of Mr. Jonathan Newhouse….”  The World next 
juxtaposed the Telegraph’s complaints with De Quille’s rebuttals, ending with an 
tongue-twisting list of the chemicals from the “inquest”:  “’Ammonic nitrate,’ 
‘Sodic nitrate,’ ‘Ammonic chloride,’ ‘Sodic sulphate,’ and ‘Sodic phosphate.’”  
The article at last concluded, “Let the Telegraph now fold it hands, murmur ‘Si 
non e vero,’ &c., and be satisfied’” (ctn. 1, fldr. 120).  Si non e vero, e ben trovato 
translates roughly, “If it’s not true, it’s well done/worked” and is reminiscent of 
Poe’s claims that if his inventions did not actually exist and work, it was not 
because they could not.  The World thus seems to take De Quille’s sequel as 
demonstrating a level of authority beyond which it is fruitless to argue, whether or 
not you believed the story. 
Overall, the second wave of debate about the “Solar Armor” hoax focused 
positively on the testimony of the coroner and the further scientific justification 
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De Quille provided.  This reaction confirmed the efficacy of the strategies of 
local/textual witness and scientific plausibility that De Quille was refining 
through this hoax.  Also, the editors of the reprinting papers focused on the fact of 
De Quille’s sequel itself as authoritative proof of the verity of the  “Solar Armor,” 
providing powerful reinforcement for De Quille to produce sequels to his other 
hoaxes, most notably the “Traveling Stones” hoax, which boasted a public half-
life of 25 years. 
3.3  “Traveling Stones” (1867, 1876, 1879, 1892) 
The “Traveling Stones” hoax was De Quille’s most famous and the 
longest-running, its installments spanning 25 years.  The story was about 
magnetic stones that would move from wherever they were placed and cluster 
together.  It first appeared in the Enterprise on 26 October 1867 and was reprinted 
in his history of Nevada mining, the Big Bonanza, in 1876.  Here is the version 
that originally appeared in the Enterprise:   
A gentleman from the southern part of Pahranagat, who passed 
through this city a day or two since on his way to Sacramento, Cal., 
showed us a half a dozen or so of very curious pebbles—not curious in 
appearance, but rather curious in action. They were almost perfectly 
round, the majority of them nearly as large as a black walnut, and 
appeared to be of an irony nature. About the only remarkable thing about 
these pebbles—and it struck us as rather remarkable—was that when 
distributed about upon a floor, table or other level surface, within two or 
three feet of each other, they immediately began traveling toward a 
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common centre and there huddled up in a bunch like a lot of eggs in a 
nest. A single stone, removed to the distance of three and a half feet, upon 
being released at once started off with wonderful and somewhat comical 
celerity to rejoin its fellows; taken away four or five feet it remained 
motionless. Mr. Hart, the gentleman in whose possession we saw these 
rolling stones, says they are found in a region of country that, although 
comparatively level, is nothing but bare rock. Scattered over this barren 
region are little basins, from a few feet to a rod or two in diameter, and it 
is in the bottom of these that the rolling stones are found. They are from 
the size of a pea to five and six inches in diameter. The cause of these 
stones rolling together is doubtless to be found in the material of which 
they are composed, which appears to be loadstone or magnetic iron ore 
(3). 
In spite of the wink-and-nudge use of the word “irony” in the second 
sentence, De Quille expends some effort in making the stones sound genuine.  
The best lie, as they say, is one that has a lot of the truth mixed in, and De Quille 
got his inspiration for this hoax from actual geologic discoveries.  Among the 
newspaper clippings in his papers at the Bancroft are an article on the “seven 
wonders of Corea including a floating stone…” and a “hot stone glowing on top 
of a high hill” (ctn. 2, fldr. 98).  He also clipped an article entitled “Are Stones 
Alive?” (ctn. 2, fldr. 3).  The hoax also contains many familiar features including 
a trustworthy local “gentleman,” the mystery language of “very curious” 
(although the opening of the piece is still straightforward “who, what, when, 
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where, why” rhetoric), and a scientific explanation of the stones’ behavior due to 
their composition of “loadstone or magnetic iron ore.” 
This hoax apparently worked spectacularly well.  Contemporary Wells 
Drury describes De Quille getting an offer of $10,000 for a “few bushels” of the 
stones from P.T. Barnum, on the condition that they could be made to perform 
under the big top.  De Quille also supposedly received a request from a German 
physics society to examine the stones (Drury 212-213).  These requests are not 
extant in De Quille’s papers, but neither allegation is unlikely, as we know that 
De Quille’s previous stories were reprinted in European papers, and that Barnum 
was always on the hunt for new attractions to add to his shows. 
The rhetoric of this initial phase of the hoax is relatively pedestrian, but its 
rhetorical history is fascinating, for De Quille, encouraged by the success of his 
sequel to the “Solar Armor” hoax, added two more installments to the “Traveling 
Stones” hoax over the next 25 years.  The next installment appeared in the 
Enterprise on 11 November 1879 (quoted from Dwyer and Lingenfelter): 
 …the story of the little traveling stones seemed to supply a want that had 
long been felt—to fit exactly and fill a certain vacant nook in the minds of 
men—and they traveled through all the newspapers of the world. This we 
did not so much mind, nor were we much worried by letters of inquiry at 
first, but it has now been some years since we ceased to enjoy them. First 
and last, we must have had bushels of letters asking about these stones. 
Letter after letter have we opened from foreign parts in the expectation of 
hearing something to our advantage—that half a million had been left us 
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somewhere or that somebody was anxious to pay us four bits a column for 
sketches about the mountains and the mines—and have only found some 
other man wanting to know all about those traveling stones.   
  So it has gone on all these fifteen years. Our last is from Tiffin, 
Ohio, dated Nov. 3, and received yesterday.  His name is Haines, and he 
wants to know all about those stones, could he obtain several and how? 
Not long since we had a letter from a man in one of the New England 
States who informed us that there was big money in the traveling stones. 
We were to send him a carload, when he would exhibit and sell them, 
dividing the spoils with us. We have stood this thing about fifteen years, 
and it is becoming a little monotonous. We are now growing old, and we 
want peace. We desire to throw up the sponge and acknowledge the corn; 
therefore we solemnly affirm that we never saw or heard of any such 
diabolical cobbles as the traveling stones of Pahranagat— though we still 
think there ought to be something of the kind somewhere in the world. If 
this candid confession shall carry a pang to the heart of any true believer 
we shall be glad of it, as the true believers have panged it to us, right and 
left, quite long enough.  (22) 
De Quille seems to derive no little pleasure from the “pang” his revelation 
is causing the Eastern businessmen and other believers in his hoax, although no 
evidence of these letters exists other than Drury’s testimony to Barnum, the “man 
in one of the New England states,” offering to pay $10,000 for the stones.  
Interestingly, however, De Quille backs away from disavowing the stones’ 
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existence altogether, hinting that he might have been prescient rather than a flat-
out liar.  This hint will turn into a strategy of hoax perpetuation in the final 
installment of the “Traveling Stones” hoax.  Notice also another innovation De 
Quille is making with the Witness expectation.  Instead of merely mentioning 
eyewitnesses, as he did in the “Silver Man,” hoax, De Quille is now citing textual 
evidence, “letters” from other believers.  The mere mention of these texts serves 
to reify the existence of the traveling stones in readers’ imaginations. 
On 6 March 1892, a story called “The Traveling Stones of Pahranagat” 
appeared in the Salt Lake Daily Tribune as part of an article entitled “Undesirable 
Thriftiness.”  In it the story, De Quille explained that he had written his original 
“Traveling Stones” hoax with another object, in addition to teasing his readers, in 
mind; he had put it out as a “feeler.”  He claimed, “My object was to set the many 
prospectors then ranging the country to looking for such things.”  He went on to 
state he had confessed the hoax only out of exasperation with all the requests he 
received for the stones.  From there, the article took an interesting turn: 
Shortly after I denied the existence of the traveling stones, I began 
to receive assurances that such stones had really been found in central 
Nevada.  Among others who had found and owned such stones was Joseph 
E. Eckley, present State Printer of Nevada.  Mr. Eckley has several times 
told me of his having owned a lot of such stones which he was a citizen of 
Austin, Lander county.  He obtained them in Nye county on a hill that was 
filled and covered with geodes.  Most of these geodes contain crystals of 
various colors.  These are not the traveling kind.  Those that appear to be 
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endued with life are little nodules of iron.  They are found on the hill 
among the geodes, and it was only by accident that Mr. Eckley discovered 
their traveling propensities.  He had the stones he found for some months, 
and frequently exhibited them.  This finally led to their being stolen, some 
one breaking open his cabinet and carrying them off.  Mr. Eckley is a 
truthful man.  He now resides in Carson City, and doubtless would be able 
to give further particulars in regard to the stones he discovered. 
Not satisfied with this single appeal to eyewitness, De Quille went on to 
reprint a “letter” from another prospector in Idaho who claimed to have found 
traveling stones in Humboldt County and offered to go get them so Nevada could 
present them at the next World’s Fair.  His citation of textual authorities to satisfy 
readers’ desires for vicarious witness has at this stage turned into full-blown 
forgery of these supporting texts.  He is expanding on the “Russian nesting doll” 
strategy of embedding hoaxes within hoaxes that he began by inserting the fake 
analogy of the Swedish “copper man” in the “Silver Man” hoax. 
A more pressing question about this last installment of the “Traveling 
Stones” hoax is the following:  why would De Quille revive this hoax after having 
exposed it thirteen years before?  His motivation is impossible to reconstruct, but 
his arguments in the last installment of the hoax lead to some suggestive 
conclusions that show him developing other strategies nascent in the “Silver 
Man” hoax.  In addition to the striking development of textual Witness, this last 
installment of the “Traveling Stones” contains a greater weight of scientific detail 
about geodes and iron nodules in order to lend plausibility to the tale (Detail, 
 316 
Popsci., Plausibility).  De Quille is also developing the codependence between 
belief and doubt in his hoaxing.  By exposing his hoax in 1879, he simultaneously 
corroborated the convictions of those who had originally disbelieved the story and 
undermined the convictions of the original believers.  His tactics of reviving the 
hoax in 1892 complicate his relationship to these readers enormously.  This time 
he claims that he himself, once a doubter, has been made a believer by the 
appearance of “testimonials” to the stones’ existence.  His stated plan to “flush 
out” the real stones by publicizing fake ones has worked; he has literally made the 
stones materialize with his rhetoric.  Now, De Quille’s original believing readers 
are vindicated, and it is the doubters’ turn to be ashamed of their lack of faith in 
De Quille. 
In “The Force of Falsity,” the first essay in Umberto Eco’s 1998 collection 
Serendipities:  Language and Lunacy, Eco discusses historical situations very 
close to the one De Quille constructed with his “feeler” story about the traveling 
stones.  Eco examines important forgeries and shows how they sometimes led, 
outside the intention and control of their creators, to serendipitous discoveries.  
For example, a wishful underestimation of the earth’s circumference based on 
Ancient Egyptian geometry by a 15th-century geographer motivated Columbus to 
attempt a Westward route to the East Indies, thus leading to the discovery of the 
East Indies.  Eco’s argument extends beyond the merely historical, however; in 
addition to showing how documents could change the course of history, he 
suggests that intuition and desire, in the absence of empirical fact, are powerful 
heuristics of discovery.  Eco’s examples tend to conflate deliberate forgeries with 
 317 
self-delusional theories because his focus is really on how these documents were 
read and acted upon by others.  De Quille’s “Traveling Stones” hoax was a 
deliberate hoax, not a self-delusion, and his argument that his hoax turned up the 
“real deal” is equally a fabrication as far as we know.  Primarily the hoax served a 
function outside Eco’s field of view—the embarrassment of “outsider” Eastern 
businessmen and scientific entrepreneurs.  But De Quille’s “feeler” strategy, when 
viewed from the angle of Eco’s analysis of historical forgeries, forges hard-cast 
historical authority for De Quille as a literal creator of the West and its scientific 
phenomena. 
So, the 25-year attenuation of the rhetorical game De Quille played with 
his readers through his “Traveling Stones” hoax makes two important 
epistemological arguments:  first, that truth is often judged simply as a function of 
persistence, and that readers’ ongoing debate over the verity of a story merely 
serves to cement the authority of its writer as an oracle of natural reality.  With 
the “Traveling Stones” saga, De Quille developed strategies of testimony that kept 
his readers ever on the edge of their judgment, all the while cleverly increasing 
their reliance on him for “information and detail,” as Neil Harris put the case for 
Barnum’s authority over his audience (82).  As De Quille’s readers constructed 
their realities, however they chose to do so, they had to go through him and his 
words.  He was a rhetorical magician who made stones literally appear and 
disappear at whim.  It is perhaps telling that eight years after his last installment, 
 318 
stones that appeared to move on their own were reported at the Racetrack Playa in 
Death Valley, and they are called “traveling stones” by many to this day.23 
3.4  “Eyeless Fish” (1876) 
The “Eyeless Fish” story was De Quille’s final major hoax, not counting 
the sequels to the “Traveling Stones.”  It appeared as “Mystery of the Savage 
Sump” on 19 February 1876: 
 A most singular discovery was yesterday made in the Savage mine.  
This is the finding of living fish in the water now flooding both the Savage 
and Hale and Norcross mines.  The fish found were five in number, and 
were yesterday afternoon hoisted up the incline in the large iron hoisting 
tank and dumped into the pump tank at the bottom of the vertical shaft.  
The fishes are eyeless, and are only about three or four inches in length.  
They are blood red in color.   
 The temperature of the water in which they are found is 128 
degrees Fahrenheit—almost scalding hot.  When the fish were taken out of 
the hot water in which they were found, and placed in a bucket of cold 
water, for the purpose of being brought to the surface, they died almost 
instantly.  The cold water at once chilled their life blood. 
 In appearance these subterranean members of the finny tribe 
somewhat resemble gold fish.  They seem lively and sportive enough 
while in their native hot water, notwithstanding the fact that they have no 
                                                 
23 See www.desertusa.com/who/mar_ebag.html for one account and 
www.geosci.unc.edu/faculty/ glazner/dvflight/dv.html for some pictures of the 
stones. 
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eyes nor even the rudiments of eyes.  The water by which the mines are 
flooded broke in at a depth of 2,200 feet in a drift that was getting pushed 
to the northward in the Savage.  It rose in the mine—also in the Hale and 
Norcross, the two mines being connected—to the height of 400 feet; that I, 
up to the 1,800 foot level. This would seem to prove that a great 
subterranean reservoir or lake has been tapped, and from this lake 
doubtless came the fish hoisted from the mine last evening.   
 Eyeless fishes are frequently found in the lakes of large caves, but 
we have never before heard of their existence in either surface or 
subterranean water the temperature of which was so high as is the water in 
those mines.  The lower workings of the Savage mine are far below the 
bed of the Carson river, below the bottom of the Washoe lake—below any 
water running or standing anywhere within a distance of ten mils of the 
mine. (ctn. 1, fldr. 120) 
The fantasy of this hoax ties in with one of De Quille’s “quaints,” cited by 
C.C. Goodwin, about a subterranean lake connecting all the Washoe from Lake 
Tahoe (“Dan De Quille” 215).  De Quille consistently worked and reworked ideas 
that attracted him over time, as evidenced with the “Traveling Stones.”  He had 
clearly been intrigued by reports of unusual fish for quite some time, because his 
clippings include an article about ten-headed fish supposedly found in China (ctn. 
1). 
De Quille’s own “fish story” ended up being reprinted extensively and 
attracting high-level scientific attention.  De Quille pumped the public enthusiasm 
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for the fish with three and possibly four follow-ups.  A New York paper, probably 
the Sun, reprinted the story verbatim (ctn. 1, fldr. 120).  Reactions to the story by 
local papers, on the other hand, were split, and the argument quickly derailed into 
the issue of water in the mines signaling the running-out of the Comstock lode.  
The Grass Valley Union reprinted the story and reflected, “We regard those fish 
as evil omen, so to speak.  A big cavern full of water will not probably contain 
much silver ore.”  The paper went on to carp that the San Francisco merchants 
were already refusing to take silver “trade dollars” had better mend their ways 
before silver production fell off dramatically and silver became more dear than 
gold (ctn. 2, scrapbk. 2).24 
The San Francisco Stock Report did not like the conclusions the Grass 
Valley Union drew from the fish story.  Its writer grumbled that the Union was 
not alone in its naïve assumption-making about the “canard” printed by the 
Enterprise: 
That the story was a palpable “yarn” on its very face to all who understand 
the conditions of the great mines on their lower levels does not in the least 
                                                 
24 “Trade dollars” were a controversial minting of heavy silver dollars by 
the U.S. Mint in 1873 in order to shoulder the standard Mexican peso out of 
currency in the Far East.  According to numismatic historian Anthony Vigliotta, 
some of the “trade dollars” trickled back to the States, which they were never 
meant to and, coupled with a drop in silver stock prices in 1876, created an 
unfortunate surplus of silver currency, especially on the West Coast.  This led to 
employers abusing their employees by paying them the undervalued trade dollars, 
which were refused by many merchants as indicated in the Union’s response to 
the “Eyeless Fish” hoax.  Overall, silver and “free silver” issues in the West are 
complicated economic and political problems that cannot be done justice in a 
short space.  A more detailed treatment will follow below in a discussion of De 
Quille’s role in the free silver movement.   
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prevent its gaining credit among people who do not understand those 
conditions, and as the obvious inference is that where there are fish, 
eyeless or otherwise, there must be water, the story was calculated to 
injure the mine.  A joke is a joke, but such a joke as this becomes serious 
in its consequences in proportion as it is successful. (ctn. 2, scrapbk. 2) 
De Quille followed up with at least three installments, all of which appear 
to be from the Enterprise.  The first appeared the next day and showcased De 
Quille’s famous performance of doubt:   
The local department of the Enterprise of yesterday contained a 
very nice yarn about fish being found swimming in the water which is 
now flooding the lower levels of the Savage and Hale & Norcross mines.  
It is a very Dandequillish story, which, being told on the authority of Col. 
F.F. Osbiston, Superintendent of the Savage mine, makes us believe it is 
perfectly true….In fact, the water tastes and smells a little fishy, like the 
story, and if the fish were a little thicker, it would be merely one extensive 
chowder.  
However, De Quille went on to offer proofs aimed at his readers’ expectations of 
plausibility, through analogy once more (Plausibility, Analogy):   
Strange as this story may appear to the unscientific, yet it is by no 
means so unnatural as it seems for even the extreme of cold does not 
always destroy piscatorial life.  We have seen small fish frozen solid in 
cakes of ice for weeks and when thawed out gradually they all came to life 
and swam about as lively as ever….An uncle of ours was mate of a New 
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Bedford whaler in the Summer of 1848, on the coast of Greenland.  One 
day they found a small whale frozen into the side of a huge iceberg.  They 
cut him out, got a clove hitch about his tail, and left him in the water over 
night to thaw the frost out of him.  In the morning they found him alive 
and towing the ship to windward at the rate of five knots an hour.  
In spite of the connotations of the “whale” with respect to his story, De Quille 
finishes off his proof with an appeal to eyewitness—his: 
Since writing the above, Mr. James Orndorff, of the Delta Saloon, 
Virginia City, as shown us some of those fish from the flooded Savage 
mine, their red color is evidently produced by the oxide of iron, found so 
plentiful in some portions of the west wall of the Comstock.  The flesh is 
very firm, fins and tail short and compact, and the skin rough and 
corrugated.  They have no scales, and look like a cross between a lobster 
and a sardine.  They can be seen at the Delta saloon. (ctn. 2, scrapbk. 2) 
This item was coupled by an announcement of the exhibition of the fish, “of a 
variety well enough known to naturalists” at the Delta saloon attended by 
“hundreds of prominent citizens” (ctn. 2, scrapbk. 5).  De Quille is working all his 
tricks in these two sequels:  refutatio, “Emperor’s New Clothes” appeal, analogy, 
witness, and the use of the sequel to perpetuate the illusion of reality for the hoax, 
intensify the belief/doubt codependence, and thus cement his authority. 
Not content with his success to that point, De Quille provided one and 
possibly two more sequels to the “Eyeless Fish” business.  One included the 
textual authority of a forged “letter” from Maurice May of Franktown, Nevada, 
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claiming that at Washoe lake lived a little gray version of the red eyeless fish; Mr. 
May surmised that in the journey through the subterranean water tunnels, the fish 
must have become blind.  He also stated his intentions to sue the Comstock for 
stealing Washoe Lake’s water and fish (ctn. 2, scrapbk. 2).  The last installment, 
continuing in this tongue-in-cheek vein, may not be De Quille’s but certainly 
sounds like it.  It takes issue with the Grass Valley Union’s alarmist rhetoric and 
reassures reader that the only subterranean sea-life they need fear is the “mining 
shark.”  “This is a terrible creature, with a stomach and throat extended enough to 
swallow a city at a gulp.  This fish has grown very fat since the Comstock was 
discovered, and the only redeeming thing in his character is the fact that he 
prefers his own species for food” (ctn. 1, scrapbk. 120).  The article turns into a 
comic allegory of the San Francisco and Eastern mining interests scamming 
Nevadans. 
De Quille’s mature hoaxing tactics in the “Eyeless Fish” earned not only a 
wide readership for the hoax but, more importantly, a request from Spencer Baird, 
curator of the Smithsonian Institution, for a specimen of the fish preserved in 
alcohol.  Thomas Donaldson, Baird’s secretary, wrote to De Quille, “If the 
statement in the slip enclosed be true, a very important discovery has been made.”  
De Quille’s satisfaction with his skillful hoaxing is apparent in the comment he 
scribbled on the back of the envelope of Donaldson’s letter:  “A Sold Professor—
The ‘Eyeless Fish’ biz.” 
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3.5 Minor hoaxes and scientific reaction 
De Quille wrote many other humorous scientific pieces.  Loomis counts 
twelve other “tall tales” of scientific wonders, including another fish story, an 
article entitled “Ringing Rocks and Singing Stones,” and “The Eucalyptus,” 
reporting a new animal of that name found in the Washoe region.  Many of these 
are brief and fall short of the level of scientific plausibility and tone “au grand 
serieux” that characterized his four major hoaxes.  De Quille was full of ideas for 
more of these stories.  His notebooks sketch out ideas for “A Natural Incubator--
At Steamboat Springs, hatches all kinds of fowls from a humming bird to an 
Ostrich--I interview the man who has burn marks and [illegible]….”  De Quille 
attaches a news clipping to his notebook about an "ossified man" who slowly 
turned to bone.  He notes, "I find similar man hidden in a hut awaiting death.  He 
expects soon his heart will turn to bone—kidneys, liver, one lung gone.  He is 
trying vegetable diet (or some diet containing no lime).  Lime in everything.  He 
tries to precipitate it, etc" (box 3).  We will never know if De Quille was going to 
develop these stories along a humorous line or a more straight-faced line that 
would have made them good candidates for hoaxes. 
Naturally, it is possible that the reason his four most famous hoaxes 
succeeded where the minor ones failed is due as much or more to reader interests 
and agendas.  The “Eyeless Fish” certainly hit a sore spot with readers fearful of a 
future linked to the fate of silver in the West.  The “Solar Armor” hoax arrested 
reader attention with the conundrum of freezing to death in a desert.  The “Silver 
Man,” however, attracted almost no attention.  I treated it here simply because it 
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was the site where De Quille developed the strategies he would perfect in the 
successful hoaxes, and it is also the longest and most elaborate of his hoaxes.   
I have found evidence of at least four more “serious” hoaxes De Quille 
wrote, and one of them succeeded in attracting national scientific attention.  The 
underground lake hoax mentioned by Goodwin appears to have been locally 
successful, but it is hard to track down without further identification.  Wells Drury 
claimed success for De Quille’s “quaint” about a windmill that stayed in perpetual 
motion by using loose sand it hauled up in windy periods as ballast to drive the 
mill in windless periods (213); the quaint was supposed endorsed by “an 
engineering journal,” in which a Boston engineer figured out “the exact 
horsepower” the windmill would generate, but no corroborating evidence for this 
anecdote is extant.  “An Astounding Discovery.—Extraordinary Advance in 
Science—A Savant Makes an Egg and Hatches Therefrom a Live Bird” appeared 
in the 19 February 1876 Enterprise and claimed to be a reprint from the Church 
Union.  This “hoax,” however, may have been read as humor rather than as 
science news due to its outlandish subject (thus violating readers’ Plausibility 
expectations) and a few off-key phrasings in the piece like “his darling scheme” 
and “The Professor was almost wild with delight” (violations of Popsci. 
expectations). 
De Quille’s “Mountain Alligator” or “Highland Alligator” hoax, however, 
prompted a letter from no less a personage than famed evolutionary paleontologist 




I see a notice of your “Mountain Alligator” in the Virginia City Enterprise.  
I do not know how true the statements are, & I write to inquire about the 
matter.  Can you tell me if the length is 7 feet long as stated?  Also will 
you describe the color of the beast? 
As a naturalist who has devoted more attention to the reptiles than any 
other man in this country, I am very curious to give a scientific account of 
your beast in the Magazine above named [The American Naturalist].  Can 
you find the skeleton & the skull & feet you took from the skin?  I can 
determine exactly what it is if you will send them to me.  You may have 
thrown them away, but I will value them—even if dirty and broken, as I 
can clean & study them.  Of course the skull is most important.  Can you 
send it?  I would much like also to see the skin.   
Will you give me an account of the locality from whence the specimen 
was obtained?  I will be in Arizona in October…. 
Yours very truly,  
E.D. Cope 
De Quille annotated the envelope, beneath the address, “A Professor who 
was sold on the ‘Highland Alligator.’”  The letter is dated 18 September, either 
1880 or 1888.  A search of the Territorial Enterprise for both of those years up to 
that date revealed no story about a “Mountain Alligator” or “Highland Alligator,” 
but it could very well be that Cope was looking at a paper a year or two older. 
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Cope may have shared many of the values of Twain’s miner readers 
discussed in Chapter Three.  Like the local miner population, Cope could not be 
too picky about which stories he believed if he wanted to beat Othniel Marsh out 
as the premier naturalist of the late nineteenth century.  Cope does mitigate his 
request with “I do not know if the statements are true,” but his eagerness to get his 
hands on the fossil in the second paragraph is almost cloying.  An additional 
dynamic indexed by this letter and the letter from Spencer Baird’s secretary bears 
importantly on our analysis of De Quille’s hoaxing.  De Quille inscribes on both 
of these letters the mark of his triumph over the East Coast “professors.”  He has 
“sold” the university men on eyeless fish and mountain alligators simply because 
the professors are outsiders and are therefore not privy to the local, contextual 
information that would expose the hoaxes.   
The use of the word “sold” is not accidental.  Nevada’s silver resources 
were being bought by the government, first to finance the Civil War, and then to 
finance America’s burgeoning foreign trade.  This business was being transacted 
increasingly to the detriment of the local miners and prospectors.  De Quille 
seems to have had a strong sense that his doughty local prospectors were 
constantly in danger of having their hard work bought out from under them 
cheaply by Eastern commercial interests.  This national “yard sale” included the 
begging, buying, or stealing of Western natural wonders like fossils and geodes 
by university collectors.  Jealous and proud of the progress Nevada had made as a 
State and as a monument to the pioneering spirit, De Quille got a great deal of 
satisfaction out of Baird and Cope “buying” a Nevada hoax.  That “sale” leveled 
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the playing field a little for the pioneers against Eastern money and political 
power.  De Quille once wrote to his sister that he believed Easterners were afraid 
of the Westerner’s “off hand and irreverent way of mentioning men of note and 
standing” (Wright Dives 22).  De Quille believed he and other Nevadans 
possessed, by constructing their destinies on the say-so of no one but themselves, 
a weapon that was capable of neutralizing the old social institutions and 
hierarchies that they had moved West to escape but which had followed them 
anyway.  These conclusions based on Cope’s and Baird’s letters will be addressed 
more fully in the final section of this chapter. 
4.  SUMMARY OF READING EXPECTATIONS BASED ON DE QUILLE’S HOAXES 
Dan De Quille utilized at least four new strategies in his hoaxes:  the 
“Emperor’s New Clothes” appeal, refutatio, witness, and exploiting the 
codependence of belief/doubt through sequels.  Each of these strategies is 
fundamentally linked to reader expectations.  The “Emperor’s New Clothes” 
strategy can be connected with Novelty, as it induces a strong desire to “keep up 
with the Joneses” and appear on top of new developments in science and 
technology.  But it more properly belongs to a level of reader desires that is 
beyond expectations about ethnoscience and science news, the expectations to 
which we have restricted this study.  “Emperor’s New Clothes” appeals tap into a 
type of social competition fostered by Jacksonian rhetoric about the self-made 
common American—the struggle to appear independently knowledgeable in all 
circumstances and thus self-sufficient. 
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Refutatio is De Quille’s strategy for increasing the effectiveness of his 
argument by constructing a model of his readers’ interpretations on-line and 
adjusting his arguments to play to their highest-ranked expectations.  His shifting 
of his arguments toward Plausibility show us that he believed his readers to rank 
Plausibility very highly.  The skeptical demands by New York and English editors 
for further proof of De Quille’s claims, along with the requests by the 
Smithsonian and Cope for verification, support this plausibility-focused model of 
science reading as more general than just De Quille’s personal conception.  
Perhaps many science newsreaders, especially Eastern and European readers, 
were entering a phase where Novelty and Sensation were being either valued 
negatively or simply devalued because of bad experiences with trusting medicine-
show and Barnumesque scientific claims.  On the other hand, in the case of the 
“Eyeless Fish” causing near-panic among the Nevada and California papers over 
the prospect of the mines running out, we see the residue of the reading filters of 
Western miners who still rank Novelty higher than Plausibility because their 
unstable futures depend on reacting quickly to new information. 
De Quille’s appeal to local and textual witness necessitates a new 
expectation, Witness.  We saw the seeds of this practice in Twain’s hoaxes, where 
he followed up the “Petrified Man” hoax with a notice that hundreds of people 
had been to see it and ended his “Empire City Massacre” with the murderer 
dropping dead in front of a saloon full of locals.  Over and above the ethos of 
foreign experts (Foreign) that we saw as a regular feature of the New York hoaxes 
of the 1830s and 1840s, Witness requires local testimony, which was the surest 
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way to verify truth in 1865 Nevada where there were very few papers, courts, 
law-enforcers, and other official social arbiters of truth.  This new expectation can 
be stated thusly: 
Witness:  If trustworthy locals reportedly witnessed a phenomenon, it is probably real. 
De Quille’s performance of the codependence of belief and doubt through 
his sequels is the area in which we have the most evidence for development and 
evolution in his hoaxing.  Its basic rhetorical success seems to hinge on De 
Quille’s ability to project himself over time as a skeptical authority weighing his 
options just like the reader.  This performance increased the appearance of 
cognitive similarity between the reader and writer, in Kaufer and Carley’s 
terminology, and thus increased the chances that the reader would be sympathetic 
to the hoaxer’s claims.  However, it also made a fundamental, indirect argument 
for De Quille’s authority, namely, “Whichever way you make up your mind, 
you’re still counting on me for your information.” 
 After a consideration of Twain’s hoaxing, we determined the 
following filter of expectations for a Western readership predominantly composed 
of miners and prospectors: 
Authority >> {Novelty, Sensation} >> {(Medium), Plausibility, Popsci., Internal Con.} 
{Sensation, News, Progression} >> Comprehension 
The top tier, with Authority first, reflected the trumping power of the dual 
journalistic reputations of “Sam Clemens” and “Mark Twain.”  For unsigned 
articles, however, the urgent need to exploit new information (as well as a thirst 
for sensation on the sparsely-populated frontier) tended to win the day over the 
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more quotidian evidence provided by the text in the form of plausibility, 
conformity to generic conventions, and internal logical consistency.  Medium was 
left in parenthesis because for many readers, it may have been deactivated by the 
ambiguous reputation of the Territorial Enterprise.  The bottom tier reflected both 
Twain’s and the contemporary editors’ observations that people tended to skim 
science news, using the familiar structure of the news article as a hypertextual 
guide for skipping around; this skimming was performed to the detriment of 
comprehension of details, especially at the end of articles. 
After considering De Quille’s hoaxing, I have made the following 
adjustments to the filter: 
1. Authority>>{(Medium), Plausibility, Popsci., Internal Con., Witness}>> 
{Novelty,Sensation} 
2. {Sensation, News, Progression} >> Comprehension 
Authority is left in highest position due to evidence from contemporary readers 
that De Quille had a stand-up reputation as a journalist.  De Quille himself 
seemed to depend on this reputation as evidenced by his practice of interleaving 
fact and fiction in his articles with no overt distinction between the two.  The 
switching of the text-internal expectations with Novelty and Sensation indicates 
De Quille’s belief that his readers actually read and paid attention to the facts and 
the language of his articles.  This observation is corroborated by De Quille’s 
remonstrating with Twain to provide clearer evidence of the “joke” in “Empire 
City Massacre,” by De Quille’s practice of monitoring his readers’ potential 
interpretations online and adjusting his evidence to satisfy their demands for 
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plausibility, and by the requests for further evidence by Eastern and English 
reporters and scientists.  Witness reflects the eventual displacement of Foreign 
experts in De Quille’s hoaxing by “trustworthy” local characters who vicariously 
perform the functions of witness and validation for the readers; it also indicates 
the strategy De Quille developed in his later hoaxing of forging testimonies and 
embedding them as support in his hoaxes.  Overall, the changes to the filter reflect 
De Quille’s projection of his self-made, independent pioneer readers and his 
personal experience as one of them. 
5.  DISCUSSION:  DE QUILLE’S HOAXES BUILD AND DEFEND HIS IDEAL WEST 
The questions remaining about De Quille’s hoaxing now are the same that 
we have answered for each hoaxer:  Why did De Quille choose hoaxes to address 
his readers about science and technology?  What message was he trying to get 
across about those topics?  What relationship was he attempting to construct with 
his readers through the hoaxes?  The short answer is that De Quille’s hoaxing was 
overall a constructive activity.  Instead of having a particular axe to grind with the 
way science or technology were being implemented in the West (after all, he was 
a miner and loved science), he instead concentrated on using scientific rhetoric to 
build the West that he wanted to live in and that he wanted to project to the East.  
He playfully exploited the authority he had earned with his readers through 
legitimate mining reporting to construct for them and for outsiders a West full of 
wonders.  If, in the process, he caught some important Eastern scientists and 
businessmen in his net, all the better for his project of championing the pioneer as 
a scrappy folk hero triumphing over the silk-vested Eastern fat cat. 
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This portrait of De Quille’s hoaxing revises two previous conceptions of 
it.  C. Grant Loomis’s study of De Quille’s hoaxes, the most extensive, classifies 
them as “scientific tall tales” since they are all on topics of science and 
technology.  However, this purely topical approach unfortunately lumps together 
two different registers of De Quille’s scientific journalism as discussed at the 
opening of this chapter:  his humorous “tall tales,” and his “quaints” or “sells” 
(his hoaxes).  A tall tale like “The Boss Rain-Maker” (ctn. 1, fldr. 8), about a 
miner who makes rain by shooting the clouds with buck-shot, is written in dialect 
and makes no pretense to be anything other than a humorous story on a quasi-
scientific topic.  The “Silver Man,” hoax, on the other hand, is written as a high-
register science news article.  De Quille was clearly engaging his readers in two 
different games with these two different rhetorics.  Lawrence Berkove recognizes 
this rhetorical difference when he separates out from De Quille’s humorous 
fiction the special category of his “quaints,” in which his purpose was “always the 
same:  to gull unwary readers by his matter-of-fact style and copious use of 
speciously corroborative detail into believing them true” (Dives 21). 
The distinction is a crucial one to make, for if we obscure it we rob 
ourselves of an explanation for the resilience of De Quille’s reputation as a 
trustworthy scientific writer in spite of his copious hoaxing.  Hoaxing, as 
discussed with respect to the Authority expectations in Chapter Two, creates a 
condition of expert notoriety for the hoaxer; in many instances, this effect 
provides powerful motivation to hoaxers like Poe and Twain who wish to create 
an ethos of counter-cultural authority.  But Poe and Twain’s journalism was more 
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amenable to contamination by the waggish reputations they developed through 
hoaxing.  Poe wrote fiction and poetry and essays on those same topics.  Mark 
Twain, too, apart from a short stint as a congressional reporter at the start of his 
career (which he carefully marked with his given name in order to quarantine it 
from his developing reputation as a wag) wrote fiction and satire.  They were 
yarn-spinners.  It was easier for their readers to reconcile their hoaxing with their 
overall literary endeavors.  De Quille, on the other hand, evinced a rather sharp 
divide in his journalism between his technical writing on the one hand and his tall 
tales and hoaxes on the other.  The contemporary commentary shows De Quille’s 
readers cognizant of this Great Divide.  Wells Drury, for example, writes the 
following about the relation of De Quille’s hoaxing to his technical writing: 
 When the newspapers of the coast took Dan to task for his trifling, 
Dan only laughed and resolved never to do it again, but the next time that 
items were scarce he was tempted and fell from grace….These diversions, 
of course, were only occasional and desultory.  In his regular work Dan 
was a model of method and accuracy. This made his hoaxes all the more 
dangerous. (213-214) 
Because De Quille had two distinct journalistic modes, his readers were 
able to bracket off his technical writing and reputation from infection by the 
notoriety that hoaxing usually brings.  Interestingly, however, that interpretive 
barrier was permeable from the technical side, as Drury notes above:  De Quille’s 
reputation as a scientific expert continued to lend at least initial credibility to his 
hoaxes, written as they were to sound like serious science articles.  Local readers 
 335 
had access to enough ancillary evidence to eventually sort out De Quille’s 
“quaints” from his technical pieces.  East Coast readers likely did not.  With both 
readerships, however, De Quille’s formidable technical expertise appears to have 
insulated his journalistic ethos from notoriety. 
De Quille scholars have made another, more serious, error in apprasing his 
hoaxing.  Much like the critics who claimed Twain had no social project, 
Lawrence Berkove argues that De Quille’s hoaxes had “no ulterior purpose 
beyond entertainment" (20).  As we have seen throughout this study, hoaxing is 
serious business, altering the very fabric of what readers consider real.  The 
editors of the San Francisco Stock Report cut to the core of the issue when they 
criticized the “Eyeless Fish” for starting a dangerous rumor about the future of 
silver in the West: “A joke is a joke, but such a joke as this becomes serious in its 
consequences in proportion as it is successful.”  A hoax becomes 
epistemologically and politically serious when many people start believing it.  
That De Quille was serious about people believing his hoaxes is evident in the 
copious sequels he wrote to the “Traveling Stones” and “Solar Armor” hoaxes in 
particular.  He persisted in defending his hoaxes for as long as thirty years. 
Why would De Quille work so tirelessly to secure belief in his hoaxes?  
Most of the locals that read his paper could verify within hours or days that De 
Quille’s “quaints” were nonsense, just by asking the people referenced in them.  
Some answers to this conundrum become clearer when we consider De Quille’s 
second readership, his East Coast readers, along with his central social and 
political passions:  state-building and the free silver movement. 
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5.1 State-building and the prospector as folk hero 
 Lawrence Berkove justly describes De Quille as a major Western 
writer who “was shaped by the West even as he helped create it” (39).  De Quille 
was invested in Nevada.  After all, he chose to spend nearly 40 years of his life in 
the territory/state when he had a wife and three children back East in Iowa.  His 
papers contain envelopes in which he collected clippings pertaining to “Nevada 
matters” (ctn. 1, fldr. 39), and he followed and wrote on the politics of statehood.  
He owned a complete copy of the laws passed by the Nevada legislature during 
the 1863-1864 session, right before Nevada achieved statehood (ctn. 2).   
De Quille’s hoaxes are not about events in Europe or on the moon, as 
Poe’s were.  They are all about Nevada locations, phenomena, and people.  De 
Quille was a correspondent for Eastern papers and knew they clipped his stories.  
He knew that hoaxes created new realities for readers, both Western and Eastern.  
The hoaxes, along with De Quille’s other stories, served to create a larger-than-
life legend of Nevada as a scientific wonderland and Nevadans as stout-hearted 
individualists who did not shy away from the most bizarre of discoveries.  As De 
Quille wrote of the men who supposedly discovered the “Silver Man,” “Had the 
finders been any other than California or Washoe miners, there would have been a 
jolly stampede and some frantic climbing” to retreat from the terrifying sight (3).  
De Quille did not insert people in his hoaxes, as Twain did, to mock them.  The 
prospectors, miners, inventors, and doctors who staff De Quille’s hoaxes are 
America’s new folk heroes—ingenious, fearless, and occasionally tragic, as in the 
case of Jonathan Newhouse and his solar armor. 
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One might justly argue that the self-revealing character of De Quille’s 
hoaxes would damage the grand reputation he was trying to construct for the West 
and Westerners with an Eastern readerhip.  In fact, the track record of revelation 
for De Quille’s hoaxes is extremely interesting, as he only revealed one in print, 
the “Traveling Stones” hoax.  His other hoaxes, much like Poe’s and Twain’s, 
contained clues and witnesses that locals could use to debunk the stories.  The 
explicit revelation of the “Traveling Stones,” as we saw in the analysis of that 
hoax, was not so much a revelation as a dramatic prelude to De Quille’s final 
installment in the hoax, his own conversion as a believer in the existence of the 
stones.  Cleverly, he claims to have believed from the beginning that they were 
always out there and that his story merely goaded his readers on to find them.  
Revelation, therefore, was actually a constructive strategy for De Quille, allowing 
him to capitalize on the codependence of belief/doubt to assert his authority over 
the reader who could not independently test his “quaints.”  This reader was the 
Eastern reader, the main target of De Quille’s hoaxes.   
5.2 Free silver and the defense of the West   
Nevada became a state in 1864, and De Quille lived there for nearly thirty 
years after that.  Lawrence Berkove writes of his later years, “He had outlived the 
bonanza times but was not content to silently carry to the grave his love of the 
pioneer and prospector ethic" (35).  For this reason, Berkove claims, De Quille 
wrote Dives and Lazarus, his longest fiction work, which remained unpublished 
until nearly a hundred years after his death.   Through the allegory of a poor 
prospector who goes to heaven and a rich gold-trader who goes to hell, the book 
 338 
contains some heavy propaganda on an issue that engaged De Quille’s passions—
the free silver movement.  When viewed through the lens of this political issue, 
De Quille’s hoaxes appear as a means to symbolically redress the debts that he 
felt Eastern governmental and commercial interests owed the Nevada prospector. 
The free silver movement was a reaction to Eastern commercial 
appropriations of Western resources.  Nevada was made a territory in 1861 by 
Lincoln so that its burgeoning silver yields would serve the Union and not the 
Confederacy during the Civil War.  The silver financed a great deal of the rest of 
that war as well as foreign trade afterword, as footnoted above with respect to the 
“trade dollar” debate in the “Eyeless Fish” hoax.  However, in spite of the boon 
the vast silver resources of Nevada had provided the nation, the U.S. stuck to the 
gold standard after the Civil War, a policy that increasingly hurt Nevada during 
the series of depressions that wracked the country from the 1870s until World 
War I.  Silver languished at various unpredictable fractions of the price of gold, 
making paying for debts and basic necessities with silver dollars nearly 
impossible.  Proponents of “free silver” wanted the U.S. mint to allow the 
stamping of as many silver dollars as there was free silver in Nevada, at a constant 
rate of 16 silver dollars to one gold dollar.  This would have helped miners and 
small businessmen in the West recover somewhat from the depression.  But the 
U.S. government refused, and miners believed it was because big businessmen 
and bankers, who would suffer if the debts they held were easier to pay back, had 
undue influence with the government (Wright Dives 32-33). 
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In addition to the allegory of Dives and Lazarus, De Quille wrote 
vehemently in favor of free silver.  In his articles he polarized everyone into “the 
millionaires versus the masses, plutocracy versus democracy, remorseless 
Shylocks versus the 'race of hardy frontiersmen,' evil versus good’” (Wright 
Dives 33).  It was in this phase of his life that De Quille, who had been multi-
culturally educated and tolerant in his fiction and non-fiction to this point, 
suddenly wrote bitterly against Jews and the Chinese, whom he believed were 
conspiring with the gold-standard supporters against the miners. 
This passionate defense of the miner against the East Coast political and 
business interests dovetails with De Quille’s hoaxing practices.  As mentioned 
with respect to the “Eyeless Fish” and “Mountain Alligator” hoaxes above, De 
Quille enjoyed “selling” big East Coast professors on stories that his uneducated 
miner friends at the saloon would never take seriously for more than a day or two.  
The professors were outsiders, Nevadans were insiders, and the hoaxes 
dramatized that divide.  The same dynamic held in the “Traveling Stones” 
revelation of 1879.  De Quille claimed he only revealed the hoax because he was 
tired of being pestered by requests for the stones from P.T. Barnum, German 
scientists, and Eastern businessmen.  Perhaps his motivation was rather a 
symbolic victory over these prestigious figures via public humiliation.  He rounds 
out his revelation by relating the annoyance of being hustled by an Eastern 
businessman to produce a “carload” of the stones, after which he snipes, “If this 
candid confession shall carry a pang to the heart of any true believer we shall be 
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glad of it, as the true believers have panged it to us, right and left, quite long 
enough” (Dwyer 22).   
5.3 Conclusion 
De Quille’s hoaxing is not an indirect criticism of the role of science in 
American life, as were Twain’s and Poe’s.  De Quille was a lay scientist and 
wrote as enthusiastically about the progress of science and technology in the West 
as anyone.  The target of his hoaxes was the East Coast commercial appropriation 
of what Western miners and pioneers broke their backs for—a problem that he 
also worked out in detail in his free silver journalism and in Dives and Lazarus.  
The hoaxes were De Quille’s private, and public, vendetta against the powerful 
Eastern interests victimizing De Quille’s friends and neighbors. 
In the end the legacy of De Quille’s hoaxing moves beyond the valiant but 
losing fight he waged against the East and the gold standard.  His hoaxing 
practices utilize the foundational strategies developed by Poe and adapt them to a 
popular science rhetoric that demonstrated through its matter-of-fact language the 
control that American science had extended over nature in the intervening thirty 
years.  In addition, De Quille’s hoaxes clearly demonstrate their inheritance of 
Twain’s conception of the hoax as local political activism.  But De Quille is also 
an innovator.  He develops rhetorical strategies of hoaxing—like “Emperor’s New 
Clothes” appeals, forged testimonies, and sequels—that specifically exploit the 
power of print to build reality over time.  His legacy is the idea of the West as a 
perpetual frontier where the possible and impossible regularly change places 
through the translation of scientific rhetoric, as a liminal realm that divulges its 
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mysteries only to those who go there and write about it.  With his hoaxes De 
Quille—just as significantly as other, more canonical Western writers like Twain 
and Bret Harte—conditioned his readers to believe that the West was a region of 







Chapter Five:  The Mechanics of Hoaxing 
In this project I have treated scientific media hoaxes as historical 
rhetorical events—exchanges on issues of science and/or technology between 
writers and their audience(s) that play out over time through news media.  This 
definition was developed as a reaction to certain problems with traditional generic 
definitions of hoaxes, namely their inability to account for hoaxes’ stubborn 
tendency to expand the boundaries of their textuality.  Functions like revelation, 
author intentionality, reader reception, and medium-dependence must be 
considered when analyzing the success of a well-crafted scientific media hoax.  
When we view the hoax as not a text but an event, a public exchange during 
which Americans decide what they believe to hold true in their world, the hoax’s 
expansive textuality is transformed from a definitional obstacle into a key 
instrument for shaping a portrait of science newsreading. 
This redefinition of a hoax has required a methodology of rhetorical 
analysis that can cope with the entire communicative loop of the hoax—author, 
medium, audience message—or the “symbolic action” the hoax enacts in its 
community, in the alternate terminology of Karlyn Kohrs Campbell (49).  The 
expectation-based method chosen for this analysis meets these criteria because not 
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only does it model the interaction/competition of readers’ expectations during 
their decisions about the truth of a hoax, but it also models the guesses of the hoax 
writer as he strove to camouflage his project under the features readers would 
expect of a “real” science news item.25   
1.  CONSEQUENCES OF A RHETORICAL REDEFINITION OF HOAXING 
Before I move on to my conclusions about hoaxing in nineteenth-century 
America, we should examine two key consequences of approaching hoaxing with 
a method that combines rhetorical hermeneutics and pragmatic linguistics:  first, 
authorial intention cannot be ignored, as it is crucial feature of the hoax as a social 
project; and, second, the reception of hoaxes at different times and places (kairoi) 
in nineteenth-century America is reconstructed as evolving filters of common 
reader expectations. 
                                                 
25 Why didn’t women write hoaxes?  A purely statistical answer is that 
there were simply not many women reporters for popular media in the mid-1800s 
(if any) and no women popular science writers (to my knowledge), so women 
simply lacked the opportunity for large-scale scientific media hoaxing.  However, 
this is not a satisfactory explanation.  A naïve hypothesis might hold that hoaxing, 
with its agonistic emphases on criticism and dominance, was gendered male 
rather than female at this time, though this generalization begs for close scrutiny 
and corroborating research.  As a potential counterpoint to this argument, women 
did read and publicly respond to hoaxes (cf. Elizabeth B. Browning’s letter to Poe 
about “M. Valdemar” and Harriet Martineau’s commentary on Locke’s “Moon 
Hoax”).  A more suggestive reading of the gendering of hoaxes keys off Blair and 
Hill’s classification of hoaxing as “subversive.”  In Sensational Designs:  The 
Cultural Work of American Fiction, Jane Tompkins has made an excellent 
argument that women writers pioneered their own highly effective “subversive” 
mode of social criticism and subversive cultural work that fell within the bounds 
of respectable femininity in antebellum America—the sentimental novel.  Chapter 
Five of Sensational Designs frames the issues of gender and power associated 
with this literature through the lens of Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s 
Cabin. 
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1.1 The social projects and intentions of the hoaxers 
In spite of choosing a common rhetorical mode through which to criticize 
the role of science in America, each author had a slightly different social project 
in mind with his hoaxing.  Poe’s hoaxing was groundbreaking.  He and Richard 
Adams Locke innovated the genre just as Poe innovated the American genres of 
the short story, detective fiction, and science fiction.  Poe’s hoaxes took 
advantage of current “fads” in popular technology and science, especially those of 
European provenance.  He used these sexy topics as vehicles to launch an indirect 
assault on a reading culture that rewarded Baconian scientists for their 
technological productions but refused to support artists in their endeavors.  He 
considered the revelation of his hoaxes as a social triumph for artists, reasserting 
their authority not only over the language of science but also over the construction 
of public truth.  Simultaneously, Poe exploited the double audience that hoaxes 
construct to materialize for himself a community of like-minded readers who 
shared his preference for imaginative scientific epistemologies like the one 
outlined in Eureka. 
Twain’s hoaxing inherited many characteristics of Poe’s practices, 
especially the sensational topic (petrifaction) and the undercutting of the authority 
of paleontologists.  While Poe’s hoaxes played on the exotic marginality of 
Europe or pseudoscientific phenomena, Twain’s hoaxes were rooted in the West 
and dealt with local Western issues.  Both hoaxers thus exploited frontiers, lines 
where readers’ knowledge became fuzzy or unstable, but they did so for different 
purposes.  Poe had a personal scientific agenda to push.  Twain was disturbed first 
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by scientists’ cooption of the right to write the West for Americans and later by 
the bending of technological progress in America toward imperialistic ends.  His 
hoaxes produced laughter that was an affirmation of self-determination in the face 
of many American institutions—science, organized religion, Victorian morality, 
the military—that were vying for authority over the individual.  However, 
Twain’s hoaxes also served to re-establish his authority over his readers as the 
only trustworthy author who was willing to unmask others’ social hoaxes and 
reveal the real West, the real America. 
De Quille’s hoaxing was a celebration of the ability of the scientific 
imagination to create American reality.  He continued Twain’s local practices, but 
his personal rhetoric of hoaxing was more complex than either Twain’s or Poe’s.  
Manifesting a finely-tuned awareness of the needs and expectations of his readers, 
De Quille actually adjusted his argumentation within his hoax to anticipate his 
readers’ interpretations using a strategy of refutatio, and he employed 
sophisticated rhetorical manipulations of his readers’ psychological needs for 
witness and for insider status in order to secure belief in his hoaxes.  His target 
was also slightly more focused than Twain’s or Poe’s.  Instead of railing against 
science or industry, De Quille’s hoaxes targeted Eastern commercial interests, 
including the government and universities, which were seeking to profit from the 
risk and labor of Western pioneers.  De Quille exploited the insider/outsider 
dynamic of hoaxing inherited from the tall tale in order to defend his ideal West 
from Eastern appropriation. 
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In addition to these social projects, two of our authors had personal axes to 
grind with their hoaxes.  Poe used “Von Kempelen” to mock George Eveleth, an 
irritating groupie; Twain famously aimed “Petrified Man” at Judge Sewall.26  
Since the hoaxes make public these very personal goals, it is impossible to avoid 
the issue of author intentionality in hoaxing, no matter how vexed a question it 
may be. 
The easiest formulation of the problem is this:  If an author intends a hoax, 
but no one believes it, is it a hoax?  The answer is almost certainly no, and the 
term “failed hoax” is probably the most felicitous for this situation.  The more 
troubling formulation of the author-intentionality problem in hoaxing remains as 
follows:  If an author did not intend his/her story to be taken for a serious witness 
of a real scientific event, but it was received as such by a readership (not just one 
or two people), was it a hoax?  My gut reaction, which I suspect is shared by 
many, is “no.”  The folk use of “hoax” bears negative connotations that felicitate 
its pairing with verbs like “perpetrate” and “foist,” which require a villain as an 
agent.  However, at least two complications to this claim have emerged in the 
course of this study.   
One of these complications was the reception of Poe’s “M. Valdemar.”  
There is no extant evidence that Poe intended the story to be taken literally; 
however, once it became clear to him that he had secured the belief of readers 
from Europe and America, he began referring to the story as a “hoax” to pump up 
                                                 
26 De Quille obviously derived satisfaction from fooling scientists Baird 
and Cope, but his personal papers leave us no evidence of his use of the hoax to 
satisfy a personal vendetta 
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its celebrity.  This seems to indicate that author intentionality is not simply a 
problem for the framing of the hoax but also gets interleaved with reader 
responses.  Thus, “M. Valdemar” is a hoax because Poe chose to own it as such 
once readers started believing it.   
A second author intention problem arose with Twain’s hoaxing, where he 
claimed that “Petrified Man” and “Empire City Massacre” were not hoaxes but 
satires, and he spent a great deal of time justifying this claim by pointing to clues 
he had planted in the stories, which his readers had missed.  While Twain’s claims 
are not consonant with his actions, which were calculated to perpetuate and repeat 
these “misunderstandings,” this scenario raises the crucial role of reader reception 
in the hoaxing event.  If many readers believe something to be true that is later 
revealed to be false, irrespective of author intentions, the word “hoax” can still be 
applied.  For example, “War of the Worlds” is almost always referred to as a hoax 
in spite of the fact that the original broadcast contained announcements that it was 
fiction; the massive public panic that ensued has ensured its historical status as a 
hoax.   
What seems crucial is that in a hoaxing event, the fooled readers or 
listeners hold someone perceived as the author accountable for their 
embarrassment or discomfort.  In the case of “War of the Worlds,” angry 
responses from listeners forced Orson Welles to issue a public apology for the 
“misunderstanding,” even though his broadcast had included disclaimers.  
Therefore, this is the answer to the intentionality problem that I offer for now:  If 
an audience publicly constructs itself as deliberately deceived by an author or 
 348 
agency through a news medium, the event counts for historical purposes as a 
hoax, irrespective of the stated intentions of the author.  This definition rules out a 
case where one or two readers with active imaginations or serious psychoses 
believe a piece of science fiction is a news report.  This definition also correctly 
assigns cases like John Symmes’s “Symzonia,” in which the author genuinely 
believed in and lobbied for the report he issued of subterranean passages leading 
to the earth’s core (Collins 63).  This was not a hoax because even if a readership 
believed the story, so did its author.  There was no “malice and aforethought,” no 
discrepancy between the knowledge states of the author and readership that could 
be publicly demonstrated and decried. 
This definition of author intentionality in hoaxing actually makes a 
striking argument for the function of reader response in constituting authorial 
agency—and in levying the historical judgment of “hoax” itself against these 
rhetorical exchanges.  Reader judgments formed the core of this project.  From 
readers’ reactions to the hoaxes, I reconstructed expectations associated with 
science and science news that repeatedly served as “sticking points” in the debates 
over the truth of the hoaxes.  These expectations were organized according to 
their relative power in the interpretive process into sets or “filters” of expectations 
that readerships held in common.  By comparing these filters across time and 
between readerships, we can get some perspective on how the reading of science 
news changed in America from 1835 to 1880. 
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1.2 Reception figured as filters of reading expectations 
The method of this project introduces a cognitively-based formalism into 
the study of historical American literature.  To justify the imposition of the OT 
model on the hoaxes and their reception, two key questions must be answered:  
first, is the model necessary?  Second, are there precedents demonstrating the 
utility of decision-making models for describing rhetorical and literary 
discourses? 
Chapter One included an extensive justification of the necessity of a 
constraint-satisfaction model like Optimality Theory for describing readers’ 
decisions about the truth-value of the hoaxes.  To briefly recap that argument, 
contemporary commentary on the “Moon Hoax” by Edgar Allan Poe singled out 
readers’ pre-existing expectations about science and science news as the driving 
force behind the hoax’s general acceptability among New Yorkers.  In addition to 
this evidence, other contemporary commentators reiterated Poe’s attribution of the 
effect of the hoax to reader assumptions about authority, plausibility, novelty, 
“verisimilitude,” etc.  Accordingly, I needed to find a way to talk about these 
reader expectations and to explain the competitions between them that frequently 
surfaced as readers debated the truth of Locke’s hoax and the other hoaxes in my 
project.  The most germane models were Ellen Schauber and Ellen Spolsky’s 
preference rules for reading genres, and Optimality Theory, a framework for 
modeling decisions made in the face of competing values or constraints.  The two 
models are by no means mutually exclusive, but I chose OT because of its greater 
precision in modeling multiple levels of different constraints and because of its 
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visual inspectability.  The data in my project drove my choice of method, not the 
other way around. 
Beyond its necessity in this particular instance, is a cognitive model like 
OT useful for examining other rhetorical and literary problems?  Have similar 
models been applied successfully in these arenas?  The final section of this 
chapter will list some suggestions for productive applications of an OT-type 
model to other literary questions.  But there are already good historical precedents 
for the application of cognitive models to problems of reading and composing, 
and my methodology proves to be a natural extension of these successful 
approaches. 
Reading or writing a hoax involves processing information from varied 
sources—including the cultural environment, personal goals, and reader 
feedback—and making judgments and decisions based on that information.  I 
have more than once compared hoaxing to a game, calling it an “interpretive 
game,” describing “winning” and “losing” interpretations, and attributing various 
rhetorical “moves” and “strategies” to the hoaxes’ designers.  Cognitive models 
focusing on human adaptation to the environment, like Vera and Simon’s Situated 
Action (SA) and J.R. Anderson’s Adaptive Character of Thought (ACT-R) 
theory, excel in modeling game-playing.  These theories have successfully taught 
computers how to solve puzzles like the Tower of Hanoi and Building Sticks.  
They demonstrate how human psychology might have used complex information 
from the environment along with feedback from competitors to develop strategic 
faculties.  Optimality Theory is closely related to these types of cognitive models 
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and to Game Theory.  Because it can handle complex information input, OT can 
model how hoax readers make judgments about the world when what they read 
competes with what they know.  It also explains how hoax writers make strategic 
decisions based on their mental models of what their readers expect. 
OT is also similar to cognitive models that have yielded valuable insights 
into rhetorical processes.  Among composition theorists, Flower and Hayes (1981) 
were the first to propose a cognitive model of writing.  They recorded writers 
talking to themselves while they composed and found that the writers oscillated 
between planning what they were going to write, jotting it down, revising, and 
comparing the revisions to original plans.  Their behavior did not match the 
traditional stage model of composition that claimed that writers first planned, then 
wrote, then evaluated in a linear fashion without recursion to earlier stages.  So, 
Flower and Hayes developed a model of writing with three modules—
environment, memory, and process—that could be hierarchically and recursively 
embedded within each other, thus mirroring more accurately writers’ observable 
behavior. 
David Kaufer and Brian Butler developed a very similar model to help 
explain the Lincoln-Douglas debates.  Since transcripts of the debates remain, 
Kaufer and Butler were able to track strategic changes in both candidates’ 
speeches as they adapted to each other’s arguments and to the responses of 
audiences.  Kaufer and Butler’s model is also modular, including Plans, Tactics, 
Events, Presentation, and Strategy.  Each of the modules is responsible for a 
different information source, and the modules monitor each other for changes that 
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can be incorporated in future discourses to better fit them to the kairos at hand—
in this particular case, the campaign trail of 1858.  From this analysis, Kaufer and 
Butler were able to demonstrate Lincoln’s superiority in the debates as a function 
of his superior ability to neutralize Douglas’s attacks and to adapt his platform to 
audience values. 
Optimality Theory extends these analyses in a very specific way by 
structuring the means by which writers represent to themselves their audiences’ 
values.  If these models were to be applied to the problem of how the hoaxers 
composed the hoaxes, audience expectations about science news and ethnoscience 
would form the engine of Flower and Hayes’s Memory module and of Kaufer and 
Butler’s Tactics and Strategy modules—the parts of the writing process 
responsible for monitoring audience feedback. 
My use of OT does not equate to an argument that reading hoaxes is 
biologically-determined behavior or that all readers make the same types of 
choices about hoaxes.  The model is descriptive, not prescriptive.  It is flexible 
enough, as I have demonstrated, to account for many different individual 
approaches to the same hoaxes, and for readings of different hoaxes over time.  
OT simply enables thick description of the interpretive process, allowing for the 
impact of readers’ socio-economic and ethnoscientific acculturation, and provides 
as an output an argument about common reading priorities that can then be 
compared against the rhetorical aims of the hoaxers. 
The result of the application of this method is an evolving portrait of 
reader priorities spanning the careers of these three authors.  Overall, four general 
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trends are visible upon inspection of Table 21, which compares the filters of 
expectations gleaned from the contemporary reactions to each of the three 
author’s hoaxes: 
Table 21:  Comparison of filters of reading expectations from the project 
Expectations of Poe’s New York newsreaders from 1835-1849 
 
{Medium, Authority}>>{Novelty, Sensation, Plausibility}>> 
{Popsci., Foreign, Internal Coh.} 
 
Expectations of Twain’s Western newsreaders in 1862 
 
1. Authority >>{Novelty, Sensation}>>{(Medium), Plausibility, Popsci., Int. Coh.} 
2. {Sensation, News, Progression}>> Comprehension 
Expectations of De Quille’s Westerns newsreaders from 1865-1880 
 
1.  Authority >>{(Medium), Plausibility, Popsci., Internal Coh., Witness}>> 
{Novelty, Sensation} 
2. {Sensation, News, Progression}>> Comprehension 
 
A few reminders about the structure of the filters are in order.  The filters 
are linear lists of reader expectations in order, right to left, of increasing strength 
in determining decisions about the truth of the hoaxes.  No single reader’s 
interpretation of a hoax is likely to use all of the expectations in the filter, as 
readers tend to focus on two or three competing expectations, at the most.  The 
filter is an abstraction incorporating the ranking information from many different 
readers’ decisions.  The crucial levels of rank in the filter are indicated by “>>”; if 
there is more than one expectation in a level, they are bracketed together in order 
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to indicate their equality of strength and lack of competition with each other in the 
interpretive process. 
A few general trends are visible from comparing the filters.  The 
reputation of the author (Authority), whether positive or negative, remained a 
powerful determiner of reliability.  The reputation of the medium (Medium) 
became a weaker constraint in decisions about truth in Western journalism, which 
was very new and still involved with folk practices of tall-tale telling and practical 
joking.  The placing of Medium in parenthesis indicates its optionality.  Some 
readers, like rival editors, used the negative reputation of the Enterprise as an 
important factor in their decisions about potential hoax stories.  Other readers, 
accustomed to the unreliability of the Enterprise, did not use Medium in their 
decisions at all; they just used their own “common sense” and the textual, factual 
expectations like Plausibility, Popsci., and Internal Coherence.  Finally, 
information junkies like miners and collectors like Cope and Baird had to weigh 
their desire for a scoop against the fishy reputation of the paper, so Medium 
would still be active for them at a mid-strength level. 
The reactions to De Quille’s hoaxes in the 1870s, particularly those from 
the reprinting papers, revealed that novelty and sensation (Novelty and Sensation) 
were not considered as reliable indicators of scientific truth as they were a few 
decades earlier. Eastern readers, especially, tended to evince suspicion without 
further proofs of plausibility.  The history of Plausibility and other expectations 
concerned with factuality is particularly interesting.  Poe’s readers, especially in 
the case of “Von Kempelen” seemed to use plausibility as a benchmark that Poe’s 
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hoax on alchemy failed to meet.  Twain and his rival editors, however, seemed to 
feel that their miner readers’ hunger for new information caused them to 
downgrade Plausibility and other expectations of factuality.  Dan De Quille, 
perhaps as a side-effect of his readers’ devaluation of Novelty and Sensation, 
restored the higher ranking of factuality and plausibility in his hoaxes.  Their 
successful reprinting history seems to corroborate this judgment he made about 
his readers’ expectations.  A final observation is that for the Western hoaxes, the 
presence of eyewitnesses (Witness) in the sparsely-populated territories was 
important for readers to feel they had been provided with a vicarious experience 
of a real scientific phenomenon. 
A few other trends are not immediately apparent but still important.  The 
popular science article (Popsci.) changed over time to conform more to the format 
of a regular news article, front-loading the “who, what, when, where, why” and 
foregoing the “mystery” opening.  This development goes hand-in-hand with the 
suspicion of sensation appearing in the reader reactions to the postbellum hoaxes.  
The popular science article also began to place background information at the end 
of the story instead of at the beginning, thus favoring a journalistic rather than a 
strictly narrative structure.  The disappearance of Foreign from the expectations of 
the later Western newsreaders reflects Twain’s and De Quille’s adjustment in 
their hoaxing to a local epistemology based on lay eyewitness. 
I introduced a second tier of expectations, reflecting newsreading 
psychology, beginning with Twain’s hoaxing because his commentary and the 
editorial reactions to his hoaxes reference it as affecting the interpretive process of 
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hoax readers.  This delayed introduction does not imply that Poe’s readers never 
skimmed to get to the good parts.  However, the 1860s was the era in which the 
news article was settling into a more standardized format, enabling readers to 
make use of skimming heuristics.  Finally, the Medium is in parenthesis in both 
Twain’s and De Quille’s contexts of reading, reflecting evidence from the 
contemporary commentary that different readerships with different agendas 
treated the reputation of the Enterprise differently.  Locals tended to deactivate it 
because they knew the paper was unreliable; rival editors tended to give it a 
strong negative valence; Eastern editors tended to give it a weakly negative 
valence, as they were suspicious of “Sagebrush” journalism but responded to the 
compelling scientific topics of the hoaxes.  Not visible in this table is the 
expectation Entertainment, which deactivates all decisions about truth and leads 
to reading with suspended belief, similar to fiction reading.  This of course was 
the stance of some readers who enjoyed the play of the hoaxes.  Many readers, 
however, judging from their strong reactions, took the hoaxes as quite serious 
games with their realities, games with consequences.   
The final and major consequence of a rhetorical redefinition of hoaxing 
must now be addressed.  If a hoax is not a certain kind of text, what is it?  Exactly 
what kind of “rhetorical exchange” is a hoax, and what “symbolic action” did it 
accomplish in its reading community?  Though these questions have been 
answered on a very local scale for each author, this project—definitional as it is—
begs for at least a limited historical generalization.  A forty-five year span of 
reading and cultural development in American (1835 to 1880) initially seems too 
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much to comprehend with any one coherent, helpful statement.  However, if we 
consider some similarities in the hoaxers’ practices over this time, a few 
productive patterns emerge. 
2.  SIMILARITIES AMONG POE’S, TWAIN’S, AND DE QUILLE’S HOAXING 
PRACTICES 
An obvious common denominator in the scientific media hoaxing of Poe, 
Twain, and De Quille is that they all seemed to derive an almost gleeful 
enjoyment from the hoax’s capacity to create scientific realities for readers and 
thus to demonstrate creative authority over those readers.  Poe’s letter to Evert 
Duykinck about “Von Kempelen” eagerly trumpets the “quiz” as the “first 
deliberate literary attempt of the kind on record” and states that “nine persons out 
of ten” will have their perception of the Gold Rush altered by the hoax (Poe 319).  
His eagerness for his readers to recognize the genius behind the “Balloon-Hoax” 
reportedly led to a theatrical and public exposure of the hoax on the steps of the 
New York Sun’s publishing house (Falk 48).  Twain seemed no less pleased that 
his enemy Sewall, the coroner whom he razzed with “Petrified Man,” was being 
plagued with requests for verification by readers:  “I could not have gotten more 
real enjoyment out of him without killing him,” Twain wrote (Clemens 860).  
And De Quille’s comments on the backs of the letters sent him by professors 
inquiring after his zoological “discoveries”— “A Sold Professor—The ‘Eyeless 
Fish’ biz,” “A Professor who was sold on the ‘Highland Alligator.’”—are 
triumphant brags like notches on a rifle barrel. 
In addition to the sheer pleasure of creation and establishing creative 
authority over readers, all three writers seemed to value the hoax’s ability to 
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indirectly implement programs of social control—not just the demonstration of 
authority over readers, but an actual attempt to change readers’ social behavior.  
Poe clearly had a social agenda with his hoaxes—chastising readers for promoting 
scientists over artists and substituting his own imaginative science for 
professionalized Baconian science.  Twain wished to “educate” his readers to 
reject scientific and political illusion for a kind of self-determination that refused 
to extend itself imperialistically over other peoples.  De Quille wished to maintain 
his considerable control over the construction of the idea of the West and to 
defend that idea from Eastern commercial appropriation. 
A final and very telling similarity in the hoaxers’ practices is their 
absorption with mechanics.  Two of Poe’s four hoaxes construct machines.  Many 
of his other writings, especially “Maelzel’s Chess-Player” and “The Gold-Bug,” 
perform a strong correspondence between the construction of discourse and the 
engineering of machinery.  Twain’s hoaxes are not about machines, but much of 
his other “scientific” fiction—particularly A Connecticut Yankee in King 
Arthur’s Court, An American Claimant, and 3,000 Years Among the Microbes—
are actually about technology and mechanics.  In addition, his partnership in the 
Paige typesetter, his inventions, and his installation of telephones and other 
gadgets in his own home are just a few instances of a well-documented lifelong 
fascination with machines.   
These preoccupations with creation, authority, social control, and 
mechanics suggest that the rhetoric of the nineteenth century scientific media 
hoax may have operated by analogy to the machines that surrounded and 
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fascinated Americans during this time.  This conclusion receives corroboration 
from the hoax’s conditions of production, from contemporary commentary 
connecting textuality and mechanism, and from current historical analyses of 
machines and culture in nineteenth-century America. 
3.  THE HOAX AS A MACHINE 
As we have already seen in comparing the hoax to the tall tale, the hoax 
contains elements that are strikingly industrial when compared to its oral 
predecessors.  The hoax relied on the following machine-age institutions:  the 
communicative distance of print technologies, a mass distribution network, and an 
industrial mode of authorship that encouraged anonymity as a means of effacing 
the individual and strengthening the perception of the institutional.  Examining 
the conditions of production of the first media hoaxes reveal that the hoax is 
indeed a machine-age genre.  Most early hoaxes or media satires in Britain, like 
Gulliver’s Travels, Robinson Crusoe, or “A Modest Proposal,” all date from a 
time after the Industrial Revolution.  In fact, the Oxford English Dictionary, 
second edition, claims the earliest the word “hoax” appears as either a noun or a 
verb in print is in 1796 in Grose’s Dictionary; most other usages are mid-
nineteenth century.   
Miles Orvell argues in The Real Thing that two primary conditions of the 
Industrial Revolution made fakery possible if not inevitable:  first, machines 
cheaply produced thousands of near-perfect copies of goods, riveting the value of 
mechanism and fascimile deeply in the public consciousness; secondly, a 
booming industrial economy replaced transactions with trusted individuals with 
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repeated transactions with strangers, thus shifting public trust from personal ethos 
to general templates or schemata for transactions, a focus on form rather than 
content (Orvell xvii).  Hoaxes were a special rhetorical mechanism for exploiting 
public trust in form and facsimile in order to display its instability.  As such, they 
were attractive to any writer who wished to draw the critical public eye to key 
“cogs” in the industrial workings of America like businesses, the government, and 
professionalized science. 
Comparing discourses to machines became a reflex in the thought of some 
of America’s most prominent philosophers and writers.  One of the most famous 
instances of this connection is discussed by Leo Marx in The Machine in the 
Garden.  Ralph Waldo Emerson said by just looking at the workings of a steam-
engine, he could read as though from a text the industrial progress the machine 
was engaged to produce; through its gears and pistons, it both announced and 
interpreted itself as a messenger of progress for the viewer (Marx 236).  Henry 
Adams in the “Dynamo and the Virgin” chapter of The Education of Henry 
Adams figures the social discourses of his era as an enormous, sublime engine 
spinning almost out of control.  And Mark Twain treats his composing abilities as 
mechanical potential when he writes his brother Orion, ”…for the talent is a 
mighty engine when supplied with the steam of education—which I have not got, 
& so its pistons & cylinders & shafts move feebly & for a holiday show are 
useless for any good purpose” (Clemens 323).  It is clear that mechanism, 
especially the mechanics of the steam presses that produced texts, became 
obvious metonyms for the production of discourse.   
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This mechanical metonymy brought with it a fear of runaway effects that 
could outpace the intentions of the creator of the discourse or machine.  Emerson 
recorded these fears applied to technology and imperialism in his “Ode, Inscribed 
to William H. Channing” when he wrote, “Things are in the saddle and ride 
mankind.”  Henry Adams expressed very similar fears in a letter in 1862:  “Man 
has mounted science, and is now run away with.  I firmly believe that before 
many centuries more, science will be the master of man” (Adams Letters 290).  
These fears of snowballing effects, transferred to rhetoric, become worries about 
mass production and the decline of quality in literature.  Poe himself, in his 
“broad-axe” criticism, repeatedly condemned the American publishing industry 
for literally manufacturing “a pseudo-public-opinion by wholesale,” aimed at 
puffing American literature for strictly commercial purposes (Thomas and 
Jackson 305).  He argued this “puffery” was destroying the very literature it 
sought to “elevate” (Thomas and Jackson 514). 
These connections between texts and machines were more than just 
abstractions.  They became ingrained at a very basic level of ontology, as readers 
came increasingly to associate reading and writing with printing, and literature 
with printed texts.  Recently, scholars have discovered even deeper influences 
between the rhetoric of science texts and the technologies that both produced and 
justified them.  Elizabeth Tebeaux, in her study of Renaissance technical manuals, 
found that authors often established the utility of these manuals by titling them 
with the names of contemporary technologies that readers knew and trusted on a 
daily basis.  So, a treatise on military maneuvers was called The Military Garden, 
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and two healing manuals were titled The Castle of Helth and The Myrour or 
Glasse of helth (Tebeaux 84).  These metaphors argued that the text was not just a 
text, but actually a technology or mechanism for improving the quality of life.   
Likewise, the nineteenth-century writers who compared discourses to 
machines were not invoking an abstraction but were constructing a concrete 
metonymy to a very particular sort of machinery familiar to their readers:  “gears-
and-girders” technology, in Cecilia Tichi’s terminology.  In Shifting Gears Tichi 
defines gears-and-girders technology as machines that visibly transform energy, 
e.g. coal to steam, and that encourage their viewers to imagine themselves as co-
engineers by laying the structure and workings of the mechanism bare to the 
novice eye, fostering a sort of “Oh, so that’s how it works,” gestalt experience 
(Tichi xii).  A nineteenth-century scientific media hoax operated in a similar 
fashion:  it transformed readers’ assumptions about science into an embarrassed 
awareness of the instability of those assumptions, and it did this precisely by 
revealing the structure of those assumptions to the reader.  Through this process, 
the hoax made its readers co-engineers; it implicated them in constructing the 
problem (professionalized science taking over American society) that drove the 
hoax in the first place. 
The ability of the hoax to stand in for a social problem and transfer agency 
for that problem to its reader/viewer makes it a “hybrid” in Bruno Latour’s theory 
of the relation of science to society as outlined in We Have Never Been Modern.  
According to Latour, all technologies, including popular science articles, 
instantiate the connectivity between Nature and Society, a dichotomy that the 
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project of modernity has futilely tried to create and maintain through analytical 
criticism.  Latour argues that hybrids are the central irony of a modern world 
view, because the harder we try to segregate the human and non-human elements 
of our world, the more connectivity we create between the two in the form of 
technologies to do our science, economic and political alliances to regulate our 
societies, and texts to clarify our epistemological positions (12).  Technologies, 
economies, polities, and texts are all hybrids.  The popular science article is an 
archetypal hybrid, as it is a text written by humans that nevertheless conveys, 
supposedly transparently, a non-human or transcendent truth about the world.  A 
scientific hoax, then, can be viewed as a sort of meta-hybrid.  It is a technology 
whose function is to call attention to the hybridity of the scientific article; it 
accomplishes this function by forcing readers to confront their dependence on 
science news, to acknowledge the ways in which hybrids (science news articles) 
are substituting themselves for social understanding of and judgment about the 
natural world. 
A mechanical model of hoaxing is therefore both immanent from the 
contemporary culture of Poe, Twain, and De Quille and corroborated by recent 
analyses of the relationships between machines and people in the modern era.  As 
with any other model, it carries consequences for the hoaxes studied in this 
project.  First, the idea of the hoax as a machine implies that the hoaxes we have 
examined were engineered with specific input and functions in mind.  Indeed, this 
is the case, as the hoaxers gauged their readers’ expectations and then 
constructed—via word choice, format, and argumentation—a mechanism that 
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satisfied these expectations and produced belief as an outcome.  By planting clues 
or by exposing their machinations extratextually, the authors were able to use the 
machine of the hoax itself as a lesson.  Readers were able to look back at the 
text/machine and see exactly the processes by which their assumptions were 
exploited to secure their belief.  Expectations were both the motivating principle 
for the construction of the hoax and its fuel.   
The notion of “fuel” surfaces another point of fit between the rhetorical 
approach taken toward hoaxing in this project and mechanics: both have to be in 
motion to work.  Considered alone and inoperative, machines and hoaxes are 
mere artifacts of axles, cogs, or words.  They have to be in action to be 
themselves, since both machines and hoaxes are the sum of their functions.  This 
fact helps illustrate again why a hoax is no longer a hoax once it is removed by 
time or space from its original publication context.  Both a machine like an old 
combine and a hoax like “M. Valdemar” lose their significance when viewed in a 
state of inactivity and removed from the contexts of their original operation—say 
in a junkyard, or in a science fiction anthology.   
Finally, the notion of a hoax as a machine helps illuminate the 
experimental “tinkering” that all three authors appeared to do with their hoaxing 
over time.  Each writer learned from a certain hoaxing experience what had 
worked, and what did not, and after this analysis adjusted his rhetoric to produce a 
more successful result the next time.  Poe recorded a great deal of this process for 
us in his writings about Locke’s “Moon Hoax” and “Hans Phaall”; certainly he 
produced a much more successful hoax the next time around with the “Balloon-
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Hoax.”  Twain provided us with a negative portrait of this tinkering process, as he 
dramatized all of the reasons his “satires” failed and yet continued to persist in 
those rhetorical practices that coerced belief from readers.  De Quille did not 
leave overt commentary on his revising of his hoaxing practices, but as we have 
seen, he responded to the success of the “Solar Armor” sequel by constructing 
numerous sequels for his remaining hoaxes, thus solidifying his authority as an 
expert witness to the West while making an implicit argument for the truth of his 
hoaxes via their persistence through time. 
Viewing the scientific media hoax as a rhetorical and psychological 
machine fits well with the evidence from this study and argues for a feedback 
loop of influence between salient technologies in a reading culture and the 
structuring of rhetorical exchanges within that culture.  If as Elizabeth Eisenstein 
and Walter Ong argue, print technology has affected (but not determined) readers’ 
cognitive organization and function over the last four hundred years, and if as 
Kathleen Welch argues, the internet has affected the design of books, documents, 
and arguments in the classroom, it seems reasonable to suggest that a salient 
technology like the gears-and-girders-type machine could catalyze the 
development of a new rhetorical genre.  Being tied to a particular type of 
technology keeps the hoax/machine correspondence limited locally and 
temporally, so these claims cannot be generalized to all times and places where 
hoaxing occurs.  I will argue shortly, however, with respect to the recent Sokal 
hoax, that the mechanics of the scientific media hoax have evolved over the last 
century to mimic information technology instead of gears-and-girders technology. 
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4.  EXTENSIONS OF PROJECT METHODOLOGY TO OTHER DISCIPLINARY 
PROBLEMS 
I developed a new methodology for recuperating reader expectations 
during this project in order to account for the many extratextual dimensions of the 
historical reading of hoaxes.  New Historicist and Rhetorical-Hermeneutical 
methods helped reconstruct the reader expectations from archival sources, and 
then Optimality Theory provided a basis for modeling their interaction and 
competition in the interpretive process.  Because of the potential infinitude of 
expectations that readers can bring to bear on the reading process, I restricted the 
field of inquiry to consider only genre expectations and ethnoscientific 
expectations that contributed to decisions about the truth-value of the hoaxes.   
Required and validated by the very nature of the hoax—which, as a 
parasitic genre, operates on reader assumptions about other genres—this new 
method “bought” us a way of analyzing the hoaxes that moved beyond the 
habitual confusion of generic terminology in hoax criticism 
(hoax/parody/satire/burlesque/science fiction) and the tendency to use hoaxes to 
psychoanalyze their authors.  The expectation-based method allowed us to bring 
readers’ daily experience with science in nineteenth-century America into contact 
with the interpretive process as a source of newsreading expectations.  In addition, 
it helped us identify key cultural and generic expectations that encouraged readers 
to believe in scientific media hoaxes, and it provided us with a language to talk 
about why some of these hoaxes accomplished their purpose better than others.  
Because reader expectations about science and science news were also the target 
of these hoaxes’ attacks, we were also prepared to discuss particular reader 
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expectations that authors identified through their hoaxing projects as dangerous or 
in need of revision, and this helped enrich our understanding of these authors’ 
social projects. 
Does this methodology, designed specifically for dealing with the rhetoric 
of hoaxing, have extensions outside of this project?  An expectation-based 
methodology is useful in any interpretive context where readers and writers must 
coordinate their activity based on guesses about each other’s world-views, needs, 
and desires.  In this section I will make three specific applications of the project 
method to problems in genre studies, historical rhetorical analysis, and rhetoric of 
science. 
4.1 Genre studies 
Aside from an obvious extension to the analysis of other parasitic genres, 
like parody and satire, there is a less obvious but still pressing problem in genre 
studies that my method can help address.  In the text-linguistic end of genre 
studies, there is currently an active debate about textual organization above the 
sentential level.  Since the “paragraph” often co-occurs with but does not 
necessarily predict larger units of thought, researchers have become interested 
instead in the organizing notions of “discourse mode” and “genre.”  Carlota S. 
Smith’s new book, forthcoming from Oxford, argues for the mode as the next 
important unit of organization in texts, and she provides evidence from 
grammatical functions like aspect and topicalization that help distinguish between 
different modes of discourse like narration and description.  Genre, according to 
this school of thought, is a global organizing feature of discourse that reflects 
 368 
readers’ and writers’ purposes in creating a coordinated discourse activity rather 
than strictly pragmatic-linguistics choices in constructing a discourse (Clark 62); a 
single genre can combine any number of discourse modes to achieve its author’s 
purposes. 
Monika Fludernik in her recent article for Style sums up just how 
complicated the problem of text typology has become over the last twenty years.  
Researchers have used parts of theories presented by Seymour Chatman, Robert 
Longacre, and James Kinneavy, among others, to posit many different levels of 
textual organization, some cognitively motivated, some psychologically 
motivated, some textually motivated.  Fludernik’s own typology recognizes a 
generic level she calls genres/text types and a lower tier she calls discourse 
modes; these terms correspond roughly to the ones employed by Carlota Smith. 
However, a major difficulty with all of these schemata is that, while they 
make use of rhetorical research, like Longacre’s and Kinneavy’s, they tend to 
strip it of its rhetorical context.  Judgments about levels of text organization 
become reflections of researchers’ own academic readings of the texts as trained 
experts.  Input from real readers/listeners would greatly enrich this project and 
potentially clear up the confusing taxonomies to some degree.  Just as Rolf Zwaan 
observed the differences in two groups of readers reading the same text under 
differing generic labels (news vs. fiction), reader responses to certain discourse 
modes under different generic labels could help clarify the process by which 
readers recognize textual organization.   
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From studying Twain’s hoaxing, we recognized that reader expectations 
occur at many levels, some of which interact, and some of which operate 
independently.  Progression and comprehension, for example, are constraints on 
reading at a stage before interpretive or evaluative processes even begin; they 
decide what information gets admitted to the interpretive process.  There are 
many other levels of expectations, too.  In “Optimality Theory and Re-Reading 
‘The Garden of the Forking Paths,’” I argue for at least five levels of reading 
expectations or constraints: 
1. Basic pragmatic expectations like anaphora resolution, parallelism, and 
topic chains. 
2. Speech-act expectations:  Grice’s maxims operate here, as does J.L. 
Austin’s theory of speech act recognition and coordination. 
3. Generic expectations like the Popsci. criteria developed in this project. 
4. Psychological meta-constraints on the reading activity like progression vs. 
comprehension.   
5. Sociolinguistic constraints like the effect of the gendering of the reader on 
his/her interpretive process. 
Reader expectations stratify into these different levels or arenas of play 
according to persistent patterns of interaction and competition: some expectations 
are constantly in contest with each other in certain interpretive decisions while 
others are irrelevant to those decisions.  Even when all levels are operative during 
reading, their stratification could provide helpful clues to levels of textual 
organization.  Reader-response or read-aloud protocol methods focused on 
 370 
eliciting expectations could provide an independent means of distinguishing 
discourse mode from genre according to which expectations are interacting when 
readers are reading a descriptive paragraph, for example, as opposed to when they 
are trying to reconcile what they have read with the generic purposes of the text as 
a whole.  Since genre is constituted by expectations and conventions, the method 
developed in this project promises a new level of insight into generic 
classification. 
4.2 Historical rhetorical analysis 
The most immediately obvious application of the project methodology to 
historical rhetorical analysis is to an area skirted by this analysis—the relationship 
of gender to reading expectations.  Since Janice Radway’s ground-breaking 
ethnography of women reading romance in 1987, critics of historical women’s 
fiction in American have begun to focus on records of women reading and 
responding to fiction as a way of accounting for the influence of gender on 
reading in America.  Barbara Sicherman’s case study of the women of the 
Hamilton family in the late 1800s found evidence in reading journals that the 
Hamilton daughters developed a powerful ideal of female heroism from reading 
Victorian novels and histories.  Sicherman focused on reading “codes” or 
practices developed in the “interpretive community” of the family unit, although 
she does not elaborate on what these “codes” were or how they were inculcated.  
A productive extension of Sicherman’s case study would apply an expectation-
based methodology to a wider community of readers—say newsreaders in New 
York, or a reading group responding to a certain text by a female author.  There 
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are two angles that could be feasibly pursued with this method.  First, 
contemporary reader responses to a popular novel by a woman, like Hope Leslie 
by Catharine Maria Sedgwick, could be compared to a contemporary male-
authored novel on a similar subject, like James Fenimore Cooper’s The 
Deerslayer.  Differing reactions to similar elements within the two stories 
(violence, portrayal of Native Americans, portrayal of women, etc.) could index 
differing filters of expectations that were applied to women’s writing and men’s 
writing; these differing filters would suggest differing cultural standards for 
women’s and men’s literary behavior.  On the other hand, similar reactions to 
these elements might suggest that generic conventions or shared experiences of 
the Revolutionary milieu operated more powerfully than gender in determining 
reading expectations.  A second approach to the problem of historical reading and 
gender would be to compare contemporary reactions to the same text by both men 
and women to see if differing filters could be constructed according to gender of 
the reader—or, on the other hand, if reading expectations were acquired in 
common, contrary to the opinions of many current feminist scholars who believe 
that interpretation always varies as a function of reader gender.  Combining both 
angles of expectation-based inquiry would provide a portrait of gendered reading 
in America that relied on the words of the readers themselves rather than on 
anachronistic judgments by literary critics long removed from the kairos of the 
original reading events.  This method does not construct an objective portrait of 
gender and reading but rather writes a situated local history of it. 
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4.3 Rhetoric of science 
Social historians of science who treat experimental procedures as political 
textual constructions have lately come under legitimate fire from scientists in the 
wake of the Sokal affair.  The level of expert scientific knowledge required to 
analyze laboratory procedures prevents all but a few scientifically trained 
rhetoricians and historians from producing responsible histories of them.  
However, the texts that scientists themselves produce to explain their motivations 
and findings to the public are another matter.  Not merely reports of objective 
natural facts, these texts are also political documents whose warrants require 
exposure and analysis by social historians and rhetoricians of science.  This 
project is all the more urgent in the face of a crisis in the public funding of both 
the arts and sciences that has both groups scrambling for alternative means of 
support—particularly private, corporate support.   
Scientific grant writing, aimed at both public and private granting 
institutions, is the primary way in which the sciences support themselves.  Writing 
grants successfully requires not only experience with the generic conventions of 
the practice but also a political awareness of the values and desires of the granting 
institutions.  Studies of grant-writing via analysis of successive drafts for changes 
in self-presentation and other rhetorical functions have already been conducted by 
researchers like Greg Myers.  Since grant writers must project for themselves the 
reading expectations of their adjudicators, the methodology of this project can add 
a new dimension to work on grant proposals by providing ways to measure the 
achievement of expertise in terms of acquiring a filter of grant-writing 
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expectations that more and more closely matches the filter of reading expectations 
used by adjudicators.  Two studies are feasible.  The first, a comparative 
synchronic study, would compare the grant-writing processes of novice and 
expert grant writers.  By conducting think-aloud protocols with each writer as s/he 
plans and writes the grant proposal, a filter of expectations operative in the 
composing process could be constructed.  These expectations could then be 
compared to see if there were substantive differences between the novices’ and 
the experts’ projected model of their reviewers’ expectations.  A second 
diachronic study could be conducted with a few novice grant writers who, over a 
period of ten to fifteen years, become experts in writing grants.  The changes in 
their projections of their readers’ expectations over time could be compared with 
the results of the synchronic study to provide a key not only to the cognitive and 
rhetorical processes of acculturation in the genre of grant writing but also to the 
political acculturation of the scientists as they seek support for their endeavors 
among public and private readerships. 
The groundwork for studies of reader expectations in scientific rhetoric 
has already been laid.  In “A Study in Rhetorical Reading,” Davida Charney 
compared the reading behavior of novice and expert biologists.  Although her 
project was not framed in terms of reading expectations, per se, she found a 
significant difference in the reading behavior of the two groups, particularly in 
terms of genre/text structure and global meta-commentary:  the expert scientists 
made between two and four times as many of these types of comments as novices.  
This outcome seems to indicate experts’ heightened ability to think about and 
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verbalize communal expectations of genre.  Lester Faigley’s study of expert and 
novice revisers also indicated a greater sensitivity to macrostructural elements and 
genre-related goals by the experts.  My proposed studies would help illuminate 
the process by which expert writers—grant-proposal-writing experts, in this 
case—acquire their rhetorical expertise. 
Composition researchers recognize that greater awareness of both expert 
strategies and reader expectations produces more successful writing.  Lorraine 
Higgins found that exposing novices to expert research strategies improved the 
quality of the novice writing.  Karen Schriver found that teaching novices 
awareness of reader goals and desires improved their writing as well.  These 
studies suggest a possible application of my proposed studies in technical writing 
classrooms.  Expert knowledge may be transferable to novices to some degree via 
explicit statements of reader expectations; the results of my studies might then be 
used to accelerate the acculturation of novice scientist writers to the grant-writing 
process. 
5.  CONCLUSION 
The project method has promising applications beyond its immediate 
context of development.  Reader expectations represent cognitive, psychological, 
and cultural factors influencing the reading experience; thus, the method 
continues to explode inherited Romantic conceptions of reading as a solitary and 
individual act between a mind and a text.  In this study of hoaxing we have seen 
that a hoax is not a person being tricked by a text but instead a complex and 
coordinated social project in which current events, culturally-inherited ideas, 
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celebrities, learned conventions of reading, personal agendas, media, and the 
projected assumptions of other readers all shape public decisions about what 
counts as the truth.   
Hoaxing both reifies and responds to lack—gaps and inequities in status, 
education, and group membership.  These gaps did not vanish with Victorian 
science; they have merely shifted in size and orientation as the arts and sciences 
have endured two World Wars, a Cold War, and most recently, the Science Wars.  
In many ways, Poe and Twain lost the fight to keep professional scientists from 
becoming America’s new oracles.  Barry Barnes claims that science is our new 
metaphor for comprehending both our physical and social realities.  “For us,” he 
writes in his study Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory, “natural order 
is a model for understanding social order” (2).   
Yet even within this new order, hoaxing remains a first-rate strategy of 
comeuppance, a means of redressing power imbalances between the public 
images of the arts and science through the mass media.  Since the social stakes 
have changed since the nineteenth-century hoaxes, the mechanics of the hoax 
have morphed to reflect current technologies and address current power struggles.  
The recent Sokal hoax is the perfect site to examine the evolution of scientific 
media hoaxing, since it is in many cases the inverse of the hoaxes we have 
studied—a scientist hoaxing literary critics on the grounds that they are trying to 
recapture the right to determine what counts as truth (or the very status of truth 








Epilogue:  The Sokal Hoax 
In 1996 Alan Sokal, a particle physicist at NYU, submitted an article to 
the prestigious cultural studies journal Social Text entitled “Transgressing the 
Boundaries:  Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity.”  
Although the editors requested that Sokal cut parts of the article, including 19 
pages of citations, in the end they accepted it unchanged for inclusion in their 
“Science Wars” issue, which purposed to examine the resistance of scientists to 
social constructivism.  Strong social constructivism holds, after Michel Foucault, 
that “nature” itself is a social construction fraught with politics.  The “Science 
Wars” issue framed itself as social constructivists’ response to Paul Gross and 
Norman Levitt’s 1994 book Higher Superstition, which criticized the sloppy 
appropriation of scientific concepts and terminology by cultural studies scholars. 
On the same day that the “Science Wars” issue of Social Text came out, 
Alan Sokal published a companion article in Lingua Franca explaining that his 
Social Text article was a hoax.  Sokal described it as an experiment:  “Would a 
leading North American journal of cultural studies—whose editorial collective 
includes such luminaries as Fredric Jameson and Andrew Ross—publish an 
article liberally salted with nonsense if (a) it sounded good and (b) it flattered the 
editors’ ideological preconceptions?” (Sokal "Revelation" 49). 
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The hoax became an industry overnight.  The editors of Social Text 
retorted that they had not really been fooled after all, that they had read Sokal’s 
article as an interesting “document” of resistance by scientists to cultural studies.  
That statement prompted a barrage of criticism.  Scholars and lay people wrote 
into news media and academic journals alike voicing both support and disdain of 
Sokal’s project, both criticism and support for cultural studies.  The argument 
quickly exploded to the internet and the mass media and became the topic of 
university forums and journal issues; similarly, the issues raised by Sokal’s 
original hoax were lost in a free-for-all about the postmodern Left, the quality of 
college education, the role of women and non-Western Others in the “Science 
Wars,” and the very issue of truth—if there were any such thing in the first place, 
and if there were, was science its only trustworthy oracle? 
Reaction to the hoax has received more scholarly scrutiny than the hoax 
itself.  Jeanne Fahnestock and Marie Secor cogently dissected the warrants of 
Stanley Fish’s condescending dressing-down of Sokal in the New York Times.  
The editors of Lingua Franca have published an entire volume of reactions to the 
Sokal hoax, and the reactions to those reactions, both in the domestic and foreign 
media.  The issues of the “Science Wars” in America, the “two cultures” 
controversy, and the social constructivist approach to science studies have all 
been commented upon by eminently qualified scholars in both the sciences and 
arts.  What this project can contribute to the Sokal affair is an description of how 
the hoax functioned in its original context and why it functioned differently than, 
say, a critical article on the same topic or an exposé-style book like Gross and 
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Levitt’s.  An analysis of the language used to describe the hoax in the reactions to 
it can also illuminate how scientific media hoaxing has changed since the 
nineteenth century (and how it has remained the same). 
Sokal’s hoax observed many of the principles of hoaxing left over from 
the nineteenth-century scientific media hoaxes.  It conformed to the format of the 
academic cultural studies article by employing heavy citing.  It appealed to expert 
authority in those citations by quoting founding scholars in the cultural studies 
movement, like Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, and Stanley Aronowitz.  It 
employed jargon from the field, as in the following example:  “Natural 
scientists…cling to the dogma imposed by the long post-Enlightenment 
hegemony over the Western intellectual outlook” (217).  Significantly, it also 
included scientific jargon like “Planck-scale” and “open strings” that was 
unfamiliar to cultural studies scholars, just as Poe and Locke laid an impenetrable 
veneer of astronomical jargon over their hoaxes in order to give them an air of 
scientific authority. 
The scientific jargon constituted Sokal’s most interesting trick and a key 
point for our discussion of the effects of his hoax: this trick was a version of De 
Quille’s “Emperor’s New Clothes” appeal.  Fascinatingly, many of the media 
reactions to the hoax (and Sokal’s own revelation of it) referenced exactly this 
folk tale—but from the perspective of the bystanders who watch the emperor 
parade by them in his birthday suit.  Many critics felt cultural studies had finally 
been “exposed” by Sokal’s hoax for the intellectual charade and waste of taxpayer 
money that it really was.  However, there is another angle to the “Emperor’s New 
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Clothes” story, the angle De Quille also exploited in his hoaxing, and that is the 
tailors’ point of view.  Sokal, as the canny tailor, casts the editors of Social Text 
in the emperor’s role.  Unwilling to admit to anyone that they really did not know 
enough about science to judge the merits of Sokal’s quantum mechanical 
argument, they published his article anyway because it was better to risk fall-out 
than to lose the chance to have a “real” scientist supporting cultural studies (Sokal 
144).  The editors’ own statements corroborate this reading to some extent.  In 
their defense of their acceptance of Sokal’s article, then claimed that because they 
“try to keep abreast of cultural studies,” they viewed Sokal’s contribution as 
“unusual,” coming from a natural scientist, and therefore “worth encouraging” 
(Robbins 55).  This focus on maintaining face within a particular community 
sometimes distracts attention from facts and details, and that is exactly the same 
psychological response De Quille counted on in his readers when he employed his 
“anyone who knows anything knows X” strategy for securing belief in his hoaxes. 
Another familiar feature of Sokal’s hoax is the public notoriety it created 
for him as a counter-cultural Leftist fighting, in the view of some, the excesses of 
the culture-studies Left and, in the view of others, the entire bloated edifice of the 
academic humanities.  There is at least some evidence that this notoriety was 
Sokal’s central goal in constructing his hoax.  First, there is the evidence of the 
hoax itself.  In the Lingua Franca piece Sokal defended attacks on his ethics by 
saying he chose “satire” as a weapon because it was “an attack that could not be 
brushed off.”  The very reason it cannot be brushed off is because a hoax 
constructs a Barnumesque public spectacle beyond the control of its victims:  the 
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spectacle of a victorious, notorious expert versus losing dupes.  If Sokal had not 
intended to construct this ethos for himself, he would have worked through 
conventional channels to voice his criticisms of the Social Text crowd directly in 
an academic essay.  Further evidence of Sokal’s desire for notoriety comes from 
Sokal’s active role in perpetuating the public life of the hoax.  He wrote hundreds 
of emails in its wake, attended public forums on it, wrote response pieces for 
national and international journals.  All in all this campaign cost him a three-year 
black hole in the “Publications” section of his physics CV.  In 1998 when it 
appeared the hubbub was going to die down, he published a book with European 
physicist Jean Bricmont called Les Impostures Intellectuelles, in which he 
extended arguments about the inadequacy of French postmodernist critiques of 
science that he had begun making during the reaction to his hoax.  Finally, there is 
the evidence of the evolving scope of Sokal’s arguments over time.  He began, as 
in Lingua Franca, insisting he only had a small “target” in mind with the hoax, the 
editors of Social Text.  But as reader reaction expanded his role and his position, 
crediting him with nothing short of an attack on culture studies as a whole for its 
role in diminishing the public reputation of American science, Sokal stepped into 
these larger and larger shoes with such alacrity that it seemed clear that this is 
where he intended to go with his hoax in the first place.  In a public lecture given 
at a New York University forum just a few months after the hoax was published, 
Sokal unveiled this expanded vision: 
Social Text is not my enemy, nor is it my main intellectual 
target….  Rather, my goal is to defend what one might call a scientific 
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worldview -- defined broadly as a respect for evidence and logic, and for 
the incessant confrontation of theories with the real world; in short, for 
reasoned argument over wishful thinking, superstition and demagoguery. 
And my motives for trying to defend these old-fashioned ideas are 
basically political. I'm worried about trends in the American Left -- 
particularly here in academia -- that at a minimum divert us from the task 
of formulating a progressive social critique, by leading smart and 
committed people into trendy but ultimately empty intellectual fashions, 
and that can in fact undermine the prospects for such a critique, by 
promoting subjectivist and relativist philosophies that in my view are 
inconsistent with producing a realistic analysis of society that we and our 
fellow citizens will find compelling. (“Plea”)  
It seems clear from these comments that Sokal’s ultimate goal was a broad 
intellectual stance, and the hoax genre afforded him the ideal public stage on 
which to take it. 
As counter-evidence for these claims about Sokal’s intentionality with 
respect to the construction of his public ethos, one might observe that Sokal 
initially tried to distance himself from the notoriety the hoax constructed for him 
and the aspersions it cast on him ethically.  As mentioned above, his Lingua 
Franca revelation eschews the term “hoax” altogether.  In later commentary, 
however, including the New York University forum speech excerpted above, he 
began owning his original article as a hoax, and this shift in terminology 
coincided with his acceptance of a larger public role as a spokesperson for the 
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natural sciences against the incursion of cultural studies.  It remains to be seen if 
the ethics of the hoax will infect Sokal’s reputation as an academic, as in the case 
of Poe and Twain, or if, as in De Quille’s case, Sokal’s physics is a separate 
enough endeavor from his social commentary that his scientific reputation will 
remain unsullied among his peers.  Certainly, humanists like Stanley Fish have 
argued that Sokal’s scientific ethics are suspect because of his media ethics.  But 
Fahnestock and Secor countered Fish by arguing that Sokal’s projects are 
ethically as well as topically separate.  Further, since Sokal attacked members of a 
rival field, his reputation among particle physicists and other scientists may 
remain unsullied or may perhaps be strengthened because these colleagues are 
“on his side.”27   The test of time, as always, will determine Sokal’s historical 
reputation as a scientist. 
Setting these familiar features of Sokal’s hoax aside—its construction of 
notoriety, its dependence on jargon and citation to create verisimilitude—crucial 
rhetorical innovations distinguish it from the nineteenth-century hoaxes.  First, 
Sokal is a scientist creating a literary hoax for cultural studies scholars, which is 
an inversion of the nineteenth-century scientific media hoax dynamic.  Now, it is 
our scientists, not our artists, who feel their social prestige is at stake.  Hoaxes 
remain a subversive strategy for taking the stuffing out of newly prominent people 
or institutions.  The commentary in the Sokal affair figures literary scholars as the 
pretenders to the throne whom scientists are desperately trying to disinherit.  This 
                                                 
27 I am indebted to Davida Charney for this insight.  For a contrasting case 
of peer reaction to scientists creating controversy in their own field, see Charney’s 
“A Study in Rhetorical Reading:  How Evolutionists Read 'The Spandrels of San 
Marco.'” 
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reactionary rhetoric is backed up by economic metaphors in the reactions to the 
hoax.  The issue of the public funding of science keeps coming up: some critics 
suggest Sokal and his fellow physicists are sniffing around for a new enemy after 
the Cold War and the collapse of the defense industry (Latour 124); others 
suggest that Sokal is bitter because cultural studies and science studies are starting 
to dampen the American enthusiasm for science—an enthusiasm based on 
science’s spectacular performances for America in the World Wars and the Cold 
War (Robbins 58 ).  Both of these views paint Sokal and his colleagues as 
threatened by the incursion of culture studies—the exact inverse of the picture 
that Poe’s and Twain’s hoaxes painted of artists being threatened by scientists. 
Another significant difference in Sokal’s hoax is in the nature of the hoax 
itself.  It is not immediately comparable to our nineteenth-century scientific media 
hoaxes, as it was not a story in a newspaper about cultural studies scholars finding 
evidence that things disappeared when they stopped thinking about them or 
proving that gravity was propaganda.  The hoax targeted a small professional 
group—the editors of Social Text.  They were the audience who had to make the 
crucial decision about the truth or falsehood of the text in front of them.  
However, because it is the job of those editors to make widely public the results 
of those value judgments, the hoax had a second life, so to speak, in which both it 
and Sokal’s revelation of it appeared simultaneously to a different and much 
wider readership.  For this second readership, Sokal’s article actually read as a 
parody since the readers were in on the joke rather than on the business end of it; 
they are the emperor’s subjects watching him parade by naked.  This crucial 
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distinction helps explain why there is so much terminological confusion in the 
reaction to Sokal’s hoax.  The editors of Lingua Franca sum up the mayhem 
cleverly:   
In the headlines alone, Sokal's article has been called a hoax, a 
joke, a sting, and affair, a paródia, a prank, uno sfregio, a spoof, a con, un 
canular, a fraud (delicious and malicious) a ruckus, la farce parfaite, a 
Pomolotov Cocktail, a brincadeira, a mystification pédagogique, double-
speak, un'atroce beffa, nonsense, gibberish, rubbish, and hokum. (6) 
Many of these variants, of course, refer to differing aspects of the Sokal 
affair and amount to scholarly word play.  However, there is one rhetorically-
significant confusion of terminology, even in Sokal’s own discussion of his 
hoax—the confusion between hoax and parody.  The article’s bi-level audience 
(the “hoaxed” editors and the general public enjoying the “parody”) legitimates 
both terms, even though no one involved in the controversy clarified this point.  
Many commentators do demonstrate an unconscious awareness of the difference: 
criticisms of Sokal’s agency in the matter tend to favor the word hoax, especially 
as a verb; those commentators who discuss the article’s literary aspects or who 
efface Sokal’s agency tend to prefer the term parody.  Sokal himself uses both 
terms eventually (the debate drags on for at least two years, and Sokal and Jean 
Bricmont publish a follow-up argument in 1997), but in the initial revelation of 
the hoax in Lingua Franca in 1996, Sokal carefully avoids using the word hoax.  
He uses “parody,” “satire,” “spoof,” and “experiment,” and he accompanies these 
words with corroborating words like “silliness” and “nonsense.”  As we discussed 
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with respect to author intentionality, the word hoax carries with it a connotation of 
villainous agency.  In his revelatory article, Sokal is clearly trying to impose a 
level of artistic and aesthetic distance between himself and his deliberate attack on 
the reputation of the editors of Social Text. 
A final difference between the Sokal hoax and the nineteenth-century 
hoaxes is both a difference and a similarity.  The Sokal hoax is still patterned after 
a salient technology in its reading culture—but that is now the computer virus, 
rather than the gears-and-girders-type machine.  Kaufer and Carley argue that the 
virus is now the major metaphor for communication among researchers in the 
field (Communication 2).  The computer virus, a hybrid of mechanical and 
organic villainy, is therefore the perfect double for the rhetorical mechanics of the 
twenty-first century hoax.  Far from being a clever argumentative convenience, 
this metaphor actually helps explain key aspects of Sokal’s hoax:  his choice of 
the hoax as a mode of attack, his hoax’s dependence on the internet, and his 
choice of Social Text as his target. 
The connection between the computer virus and the Sokal hoax is 
apparent if we consider the language of reaction to the hoax, the media of 
transmission and reaction, and the dominant mode for hoaxing in the 1990s.  
Sokal himself uses the words “deception,” “weapon,” and “attack” in his Lingua 
Franca piece to describe his project.  The reactions to the hoax give it all sorts of 
labels, but two pervasive metaphors (aside from the emperor’s new clothes) pick 
up on Sokal’s own assessment:  terrorism and mechanics/technology.  The hoax is 
referred to as “intellectual terrorism” and Sokal is compared to Ted Kaczynski; 
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these references are accompanied by references to bombs and explosions, 
including words like “defuse,” “detect,” “breach,” “attack,” “burn,” and 
“fireworks.”  The other persistent analogy is to mechanism, particularly to a trap.  
The mechanical language includes words like “picks up steam,” “contrived,” and 
“fabricated.”  The hoax is elsewhere figured as a “trap” that was “camouflaged” 
for “prey” that “took the bait” or “lure.” 
The common denominator between terrorisms, traps, and technology is 
not immediately apparent unless we consider a major player in the Sokal affair 
that has been almost entirely overlooked in the voluminous commentary—the 
internet.  Peter Osborne was the only major commentator who even mentioned 
that the internet “played a significant role in framing and sustaining the affair” 
(196), although he did not go into much detail about this role.  He noted that much 
of the discussion after the hoax’s publication took place in emails and internet 
forums between the principals and observing critics, which is significant.  
However, he did not mention that the crucial negotiation of the placement of 
Sokal’s hoax in Social Text took place between the editors and Sokal via the 
internet.  Nor did he mention that to this day the hoax is sustained by a virtual 
reconstruction of all of the original texts and texts of reaction on Sokal’s personal 
webpage, where it shares space with propaganda about Impostures Intellectuelles 
and commentary of other natural scientists criticizing cultural studies. 
I argue that the strong internet presence constructed by Sokal for his hoax 
is not coincidental.  Sokal is exploiting the primary medium of twenty-first-
century hoaxing.  From “how to make your own atomic bomb” websites to fake 
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web diaries of teenagers with STDs to “urban legend” and scam emails, the 
internet has picked up where nineteenth-century print media.  Objectivity 
standards in print and television media have made them inhospitable (while not 
impervious28) to hoaxing; meanwhile, the development of the internet offers an 
attractive alternative medium for hoaxers.  First, its distributed network resists 
monitoring by any central authority and therefore frustrates would-be censors and 
referees.  Print publishing houses, doing business in the physical rather than the 
virtual marketplace, are subjected via their physicality to a higher degree of 
centralized control; there is somewhere you can “go” to stop a story or interrogate 
a writer.  On the internet anyone with access to a server can publish and 
disseminate any message they wish.  Further, this lack of centralized authority 
makes the construction of internet ethos difficult and interesting.  How does an 
anonyomous email or webpage accrue authority?  In the absence of personal 
information or references, resources like graphic presentation, timeliness of topic, 
celebrity, language, and ubiquity play a powerful role in establishing the 
credibility of information received via the internet.  Interestingly, if we look at our 
filters from the nineteenth century, a similar result can be obtained by stripping 
off the top tier of expectations—those associated with the reputation of the author 
and the medium.  In the absence of those powerful deciding factors, expectations 
concerning plausibility and novelty, visual impact, format, and language 
                                                 
28 An interesting example is hoaxer Joey Skaggs, who through clever 
press-releases has gotten TV and print media to broadcast several of his hoaxes 
over the last 30 years, including a “Fat Squad” that bullies its clients into thinness, 
and “Solomon” an artificial-intelligence jury that Skaggs “announced” in the 
wake of the O.J. Simpson trial; it was reported by CNN and CBS radio news, 
among other media. 
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determined interpretation for Poe’s, Twains, and De Quille’s readers.  In this way 
the media revolution represented by the internet can be characterized as a 
diminishment of the resources readers have at their disposal to guide judgments 
about truth and falsity. 
In spite of this anarchic picture, the internet is hardly a den of thieves.  
Trustworthy institutions and foundations also make use of the internet to stay in 
convenient contact with their clients.  Therefore, enough useful and credible 
information comes via the internet that it presents a very similar environment to 
the penny daily of the 1830s.  A carrier of both fact and fiction, it is the perfect 
milieu for hoaxes.   
The most common type of internet hoax is the email hoax.  It is very 
quick, anonymous (with the use of fake names and email accounts), and has the 
added bonus of accumulating ethos for the hoax through the headers of concerned 
friends who forward the warnings about gang initiations, fast food 
contaminations, and computer viruses.  The computer virus scam email is the 
most interesting of these internet hoaxes for our purposes because it actually 
performs the fear of contracting the virus, i.e., “I got this email, so I could get the 
virus just as simply.”  Real computer viruses, of course, are easy to contract via 
the Internet; the Klezworm virus is one of the most recent examples.  It sends 
itself as a message with a vague lure of a subject header, like “per your request,” 
and when it is opened, it finds every confidential file in your computer and 
attaches it to emails that go out to everyone on your email list. 
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Sokal, likely unconsciously, adopted the signature of this salient 
technology to pattern his hoax after.  Like a computer virus, his hoax contained 
“lures” that tempted the editors of Social Text (called appropriately in some 
commentary the “host” journal of the hoax) to include it in the “Science Wars” 
issue.  However, Sokal’s simultaneous revelation in Lingua Franca made Social 
Text disseminate a far different message from the one they intended to 
communicate with that issue.  The other articles in the issue were practically 
forgotten, and instead the attention of Social Text’s readers was focused on the 
gullibility of the editors and on Sokal’s indictment of cultural scholars for their 
sloppy handling of scientific concepts.  The sensation caused the “Science Wars” 
issue to sell out.  In addition, the hoax disseminated over the internet to reach 
universities and popular media, who then reprinted Sokal’s basic message 
(“Cultural studies are ignorant and politically dangerous; science is still the only 
objective channel to truth and reality”) to a wide lay audience.29  The essential 
functions of the computer virus—luring a host machine into reproducing and 
disseminating the virus to other machines—are all performed in Sokal’s hoax. 
A computer virus damages the host and uses the host to spread its code, its 
message, across the internet, and both this damage and this dissemination were 
clearly Sokal’s intention.  Osborne comments, “Sokal has used the media 
                                                 
29 Kaufer and Carley find, against Walter Ong’s hypothesis that new 
media gradually kill old media, that in fact combining multiple media—like print 
and the internet—augments the speed and range of communications 
(Communication 6).  This finding may explain why Sokal quickly shifted the 
central action of his hoax to the internet:  he was both responding to its 
proliferation to electronic media and facilitating it in order to reach as wide an 
audience with his hoax as possible. 
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skillfully, both to register his hoax and to generalize its point into a full-scale 
attack on 'cultural studies of science' and 'postmodern cultural studies' (which he 
tends to treat as equivalents)” (197).  Just as computer virus hoax emails perform 
the danger of the “viruses” they warn users about, Sokal’s virus-hoax performed 
the vulnerability of cultural studies to attack by any discipline whose discourse 
they used without true understanding.  Sokal’s specific goals dictated his choice 
of the hoax over other methods of public criticism.  He explained his motivations 
in his revelation: 
In the end, I resorted to parody for a simple pragmatic reason.  The 
targets of my critique have by now become a self-perpetuating academic 
subculture that typically ignores (or disdains) reasoned criticism from the 
outside.  In such a situation, a more direct demonstration of the 
subculture’s intellectual standards was required.  But how can one show 
that the emperor has no clothes?  Satire is by far the best weapon; and the 
blow that can’t be brushed off is the one that’s self-inflicted (53).  
Sokal’s “Emperor’s New Clothes” reference is doubly significant.  First, it 
implies that print media, when compared to the internet that sustained much of 
“l’affaire Sokal,” is the “emperor” of media.  The academic journal is the prestige 
form against which the cyber-manifestations of Sokal’s hoax—including his 
email negotiations with the editors, his online debates, and his personal webpage 
that documents and reifies the hoax—constitute a guerilla-style assault.  A second 
but equal significance of Sokal’s “Emperor’s New Clothes” allusion is that it 
references the primary social function of hoaxing, which Sokal exploited even if 
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unconsciously:  the hoax’s ability to call into question the construction of reality.  
The hoax, as we have discussed, operates at the stasis of existence; it play with 
what holds true in the world-views of its readers.  An evaluation can be drawn 
from it, and most of the discussion of the hoax has been absorbed in evaluation, as 
Sokal intended.  But the basic function of the hoax is to call into question 
assumptions about the real world.  This is what made it the ideal mode of attack 
for his purposes.  Sokal positioned himself as defending objective scientific 
reality from the attacks of the “emperors” who claimed there was no objective 
reality.30  What better way to make his point, then, than to use a hoax to show that 
the worldview that the emperors cloaked themselves in amounted to a lot of thin 
air and that scientists, in the final accounting, were the tailors with their eyes wide 
open and their purses full of the emperors’ money. 
                                                 
30 Andrew Ross, Stanley Aronowitz, and Bruno Latour, among others, 
strenuously objected to this claim, arguing that no sane cultural critic thinks there 
is no such thing as reality.  They corrected Sokal’s misapprehension by saying 
that what is at issue in cultural studies of science is our inability to separate fact 
from value when claims about reality become public and therefore inescapably 
rhetorical. 
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Appendix: How to read tables in Optimality Theory (OT) 
Table A1 is a representation in OT of how English speakers unconsciously 
select the optimal syllabification of the word “onset” ( /ansεt/ in International 
Phonetic Alphabet notation): 
Table A1:  Syllabification of  /ansεt/ in OT 
 FAITH ONS NOCODA 
 an-sεt  * ** 
   Ans-εt  * *!** 
   <a>nsεt *!  * 
 
What the parts of the table mean: 
• The leftmost column lists the most probable syllabifications of the English 
word “onset.”  A hyphen indicates the syllable break in the word.   The 
bracketed <a> in the third candidate represents a deleted vowel (which is 
actually a fairly common phonological feature in colloquial English:  think 
of the nasal “N-n” with a head shake in place of “no, no”). 
• The top row lists all phonological constraints that apply to syllabification 
left-to-right from strongest (inviolable) to weakest (often violated in 
practice).  The ranking was predetermined from analyzing many 
phonological data sets in English.  The constraint FAITH requires that all 
parts of a word should be pronounced; ONS says syllables should start 
with consonants; and NOCODA says syllables should not end in 
consonants.  The solid vertical line between FAITH and ONS divides the 
levels of ranking and tells us that FAITH crucially dominates both ONS 
and NOCODA.  ONS and NOCODA are unranked with respect to each 
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other because they never operate on the same part of the syllable and 
therefore never compete with each other; the vertical dotted line signifies 
this lack of competition.  The ranking of the constraints in this tableau 
could also be notated in a linear form as FAITH >> {ONS, NOCODA}, 
where “>>” signifies domination and bracketing with commas signifies 
equality of rank and therefore lack of competition.   
• The asterisks in the matrix of the table represent violations of particular 
constraints.  The violations add up like penalty points against a candidate, 
with a violation of a stronger (leftward) constraint counting more than a 
violation of a weaker one.  An “!” follows and indicates the fatal 
violation, the one that knocks the candidate out of the running for optimal 
form (violations are usually counted up from right to left, weakest to 
strongest).  A candidate can earn a fatal violation either by violating a 
higher-ranked constraint than the other candidates do, or by accumulating 
more total violations than other candidates at the same level of ranking. 
• The check mark in the candidate column indicates the optimal candidate 
phonological form, the one that “wins” by accumulating the fewest 
violations of higher-ranked constraints.  This is the form speakers actually 
use when they pronounce the word “onset.” 
The results of the syllabification of /ansεt/: 
In the example in Table 1, “an-sεt” is the optimal form.  While it has more 
total violations than “<a>nsεt,” it satisfies FAITH, the highest ranked constraint.  
The runner-up, “<a>nsεt”, does not.  The third form, “ans-εt”, gets knocked out of 
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the running even earlier because it accrues more NOCODA violations than either 
of the other two forms due to a consonant cluster “ns” at the end of the first 
syllable. 
Optimality Theory applied to a decision about a hoax’s truth-value 
Table A2 represents a decision about the truth-value of Richard Adams 
Locke’s “Moon Hoax” by a reader who values spectacle over strict technical 
consistency and accuracy (see Chapter Two, section two, for a history of this 
hoax): 
Table A2:  A reader’s decision to believe the “Moon Hoax” based on spectacle, 
not science 
 Novelty Sensation Popsci. Plausibility Internal 
Coh. 
TRUE    ******** * 
FALSE * * *!   
The solid vertical line locates the crucial competition—between first 
impressions and factuality, essentially.  The dotted lines denote a lack of evidence 
for competition in this particular decision about the truth of the hoaxes:  i.e., 
Novelty, Sensation and Popsci. (verisimilitude) are equally and highly ranked in 
this reader’s estimation; thus, these expectations “work together” rather than 
compete with each other as the reader reads.   
In the graph the nine factual errors in Locke’s story are counted with nine 
asterisks (representing eight violations of Plausibility and one of Internal 
Coherence.  In spite of all of this faulty evidence, this reader still believes Locke’s 
story to be “true” because to consider it “false” would force the admission that 
something novel, sensational, and “verisimilar” is not true.  In this reader’s world-
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view, the correlation between spectacular first impressions and truth cannot bear 
violation, and so the “false” interpretation loses.  The exclamation point on the 
chart indicates that all violations at this highest level of expectation are 
unacceptable (the convention is to mark unacceptability on the very first violation 
that renders the candidate interpretation unacceptable, and this is usually the 
weakest or right-most violation on a given level, as expectation strength increases 
from right to left).  Thus, the candidate with more total violations actually wins in 
this case because of the very low value assigned to scientific accuracy by the 
reader.  This graph accurately represents Poe’s complaints about the values of 
popular science newsreaders.  Now, a table of Poe’s personal reading of the hoax 
would look almost exactly the reverse of the one above, with a judgment of 
“false” for the hoax and with plausibility and consistency ranked very firmly over 
novelty, sensation, and “verisimilitude.” 
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Glossary 
The following terms and symbols are essential for understanding 
Optimality Theory as it is adapted in this project: 
*:  indicates one violation of a particular reading expectation 
!:  an exclamation mark placed after a violation “*” indicates that that violation is 
fatal, i.e. that candidate interpretation is now disqualified from the 
competition to be the optimal interpretation. 
candidate:  a possible interpretation of a text, i.e. “true” or “false” in the case of 
the simple truth-value decisions about the hoaxes considered in this 
project.  The interpretation that best survives the “filter” of the reader’s 
preconceptions about science and science news is identified as the optimal 
candidate or interpretation.  Occasionally the reader will have insufficient 
information to select an optimal candidate or will value two conflicting 
preconceptions equally.  In these cases, two or more interpretations will be 
equally entertained until further information is gathered or a value 
judgment is made. 
constraint:  The term in Optimality Theory for a rule that governs a particular 
decision matrix.  Constraints are stated in prepositional form.  For reading 
constraints, see the definition of “expectation.” 
dominate:  to be ranked higher than in importance or value.  Domination is 
determined on the basis of readers’ decisions in the face of competing 
expectations.  For example, if a reader chooses to believe a sensational 
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news item regardless of the fact that it is riddled with scientific errors, 
Sensation crucially dominates Internal Coherence for that reader. 
expectation:  a preconception that influences interpretation while reading.  
Expectations are stated as propositions that are either met or violated 
during a particular reading experience of a particular text.  The 
expectations used in this project are expectations of genre (science news) 
and ethnoscience (popular cultural knowledge about science): 
Authority:  The author or authority figure’s previous reputation holds. 
Comprehension:  It is optimal to comprehend everything written in a 
story.  (This is not a conscious expectation; it is more properly a 
constraint on the reading activity that determines what information 
gets admitted to the interpretive process) 
Foreign:  Anything foreign is good and probably true. 
Internal Coherence:  If the claims made by a story are logically 
consistent, it is probably true. 
Medium:  The previous reputation of the medium holds. 
News:  It is optimal to read news non-linearly, skipping to the Main 
Events and Details of Main Events sections first and only reading 
background and supporting material as time and interest allow. 
Novelty:  New discoveries are highly valued and probably true. 
Plausibility:  If it seems like it could happen, it probably did. 
Popsci:  Stories that sound like true science reports probably are.  Sub-
expectations within this category are as follows: 
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Long:  Longer popular science articles are often given in 
installments. 
Decoration:  Popular science reports will often be decorated with 
bold headlines and woodcuts. 
Mystery:  Popular science reports often have a “mystery” opening 
signaled by words like “wonders” 
Ignorance:  After the opening, popular science reports generally 
indicate that the public is ignorant of a particular 
principle/phenomenon. 
Wisdom:  After the lament for ignorance, pop sci reports generally 
point out a wise person who knows better. 
Detail:  Pop sci articles will often have a lot of technical detail, 
which is a good indicator of truth. 
Analogy:  The details in a pop sci article will often be explained 
with analogy to well-known phenomena. 
Use:  Pop sci articles often finish with an evaluation of the benefit, 
physical or metaphysical, of the scientific 
principle/phenomenon. 
Entertainment:  Reading of pop sci articles is for entertainment, 
not truth, value. 
Progression:  It is optimal to read a story as fast as possible.  Competes 
with Comprehension (see note to Comprehension). 
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Sensation:  Sensational elements in a story have a high literary and truth-
value. 
Witness:  If trustworthy locals reportedly witnessed a phenomenon, it is 
probably real. 
ranking:  a crucial ordering of expectations based on importance to the reader.  
See “dominate.”  Ranking is indicated graphically by solid vertical lines 
separating levels of rank; everything to the left of a solid line dominates 
everything to the right of it.  Equality of rank is indicated by dotted 
vertical lines between expectations that do not compete with each other 
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